Can Israel stomach a rehabilitated Assad?

This article appears in Eurasia Review of 29 October as "Assad at the Crossroads". 

When Israel’s prime minister, Naftali Bennett, met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on October 22, Syria and its future featured high on the agenda.  Putin said that Russia had been “making efforts” to restore the country’s statehood and strengthen it.  It is not clear if that was a form of shorthand for consolidating Bashar al-Assad in power as Syria’s president for the next seven years, in line with the dubious election in which Assad recently won a fourth term with 95.1% of the votes.

If Putin is thinking along those lines, his policy would accord with that of some Arab states which are seeking ways to bring Syria back into the so-called ‘Arab fold’.  Despite the West’s abhorrence of the crimes against his own people attributed to Assad, now presiding over 70 percent of what was once sovereign Syria, the realpolitik of the Middle East may yet see him rehabilitated. 

Can Israel sit back and permit this to come about without intervening?  Syria controlled by an Assad reconfirmed in office and readmitted to the Arab league, would represent an enhanced danger to Israel.  The reality would be a strengthened “Shia Crescent” – the Iranian empire sweeping round from Yemen to Bahrain, then to Iran itself, then Iraq, Syria and Lebanon where it holds sway by way of its Hezbollah proxy.  Israel’s efforts to deter the transfer of armaments, and perhaps eventually nuclear weapons, from Iran to Hezbollah by way of Syria, would need to be redoubled.

This Arab policy shift seems to be led by Jordan and it requires a focused diplomatic counter-offensive by Israel.

In September Jordan fully reopened its trade border with Syria, while in the last few weeks Jordan has been the driving force behind a deal to use Syrian facilities to pipe Egyptian natural gas into Lebanon, which is facing an energy crisis. Syria’s defense minister, Ali Abdullah Ayyoub, visited Jordan in September and met with Jordanian military officials.  Shortly afterwards Jordan’s King Abdullah spoke to Assad by phone for the first time since 2011.  

          Syria was suspended from the Arab League back in 2011 because of its failure to end its violent crackdown on protesters demanding Assad’s resignation. In 2018 the United Arab Emirates reopened its embassy in Damascus, closed since 2011, and recently the idea of reinstating Syria to the League has been mooted.  Perhaps as a step in that direction, the UAE economy minister, Abdulla bin Touq Al Marri, recently announced that the Gulf state and Syria had agreed on plans to enhance economic cooperation.  The value of non-oil trade between the two countries in the first half of 2021 was some $272m.

A few weeks ago the UAE invited Syria to participate in Dubai’s Expo 2020, the first world’s fair to be held in the Middle East. So named because it was originally planned for last year, Expo 2020 was postponed because of the COVID pandemic.  It runs from October 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022.  Al-Marri met his Syrian counterpart on the sidelines where, it is reported, they looked at ways to expand the UAE-Syrian relationship.

          Political as well as economic considerations loom large in current Arab thinking. The loss of US prestige following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well as its moves to reactivate the Iran nuclear talks, has prompted a reassessment of policy priorities.  The ties that Arab states enjoy with Russia, Assad's most powerful backer, become a consideration. If Russia, which has been pressing for Syria’s return to the League, moves towards consolidating Assad in power, some Arab states will go along. 

Unlike the pragmatic Arab world, western opinion remains opposed to Assad, widely regarded as a tyrant whose hands are covered with the blood of his own people.  There is something of a consensus that he must be removed from power before Syria can be brought back into a normal relationship with the rest of the world.  Bennett may have taken this line in Sochi.

In 2011 with the Arab Spring at its height, Syria, like a handful of other regional dictatorships, was plunged into civil conflict.  Popular dissent soon developed into an armed revolt, which finally sought to overthrow the despotic Assad régime and substitute a democratic form of government.  In August 2013 it became clear that Assad had used chemical weapons against his opponents without regard to the horrific civilian casualties that resulted. 

US President Barack Obama – although he had sworn to punish Assad if he deployed chemical weapons – failed to act.  Putin seized the political initiative.  He quickly extracted an undertaking from Assad to surrender the chemical arsenal that he had originally denied possessing.  Obama embraced the pledge, but it was a total sham.  In June 2021 Fernando Arias, the head of the international chemical weapons watchdog, told the UN Security Council that chemical weapons had so far been used in Syria a probable 17 times.

On October 13 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated US opposition to any normalization of relations with Assad.  A US law, known as the Caesar Act, that came into force last year punishes any companies that work with Assad. 

"What we have not done, and what we do not intend to do, is to express any support for efforts to normalize relations or rehabilitate Mr Assad," Blinken told a joint news conference, pointedly refraining from according the Syrian leader the title “President”.  Blinken set out the US requirement with regard to Syria as “irreversible progress toward a political solution”.  This can possibly be interpreted as free and fair elections in which Assad will be debarred from standing, leading to a new constitution for the country.

Whether this will become anything more than a US aspiration, though, is doubtful. The words are strong; the commitment less so.  Syria is scarcely seen in Washington as a vital US interest.  Indeed the Middle East as a whole is not among Biden’s top priorities.  Given the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and shortly from Iraq, the Arab world would not be too surprised if the administration announced it was leaving Syria. 

A decisive lead from the US can prevent Assad’s rehabilitation.  But is Biden, like Obama before him, too concerned with the nuclear deal and Iranian sensitivities?


Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 October 2021:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/can-israel-stomach-a-rehabilitated-assad-opinion-682982

Published in Eurasia Review as "Assad at the Crossroads", 29 October 2021:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29102021-assad-at-the-crossroads-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal as "Assad at the Crossroads", 28 October 2021:
https://mpc-journal.org/assad-at-the-crossroads/

Published in Jewish Business News, 29 October 2021:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/10/29/can-israel-stomach-a-rehabilitated-assad/

Iraq’s elections: has Iran lost enough ground to make a difference?

 

            Iraq’s election on October 10 saw the lowest voter turnout of any of its six polls since the 2003 US-led invasion of the country.  

All the same the results met one of the major demands of the young activists who had pressed for early elections, and then urged a voter boycott – a loosening of Iran’s stranglehold on the nation.  The Iran-supported parliamentary bloc emerged surprisingly and significantly weaker.

Iraq’s Al-Fatah Alliance is the political umbrella for a collection of Shia militias loyal to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.  Led by paramilitary leader Hadi al-Ameri, Fatah had held 48 seats in the Iraqi parliament.  They emerged from the latest poll with only 17.

            The dominance of Iran-supported elements within Iraqi society had long aroused public resentment.  Iraq is dependent on its powerful neighbor Iran for gas and electricity, and for a vast range of goods and materials that support Iraqi industries.  The value of bilateral trade is estimated at $1 billion per month. Yet many Iraqis resented the nation being converted into an Iranian satellite, and Iran-supporting politicians and organization were perceived as regressive, diehard and opposed to change. 

Late 2019 and early 2020 witnessed huge public protests across Iraq in support of sweeping political and economic reforms and new elections.  The demonstrations were suppressed by the security forces, dominated as they are by Iran-supported militias, and fired live ammunition and tear gas into the crowds. More than 600 people were killed and thousands injured while the protests persisted. 

This heavy-handed reaction shocked the nation.  It was no coincidence that initial outrage at the assassination in Baghdad on January 3, 2020 of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani – the man responsible for Iraq’s Iran-supported security forces – quickly faded, to be replaced by condemnation of Iran’s excessive influence in the governance of the country.

Leading up to the elections, a series of kidnappings and targeted assassinations by pro-Iranian militias killed more than 35 people and further soured the public mood.  Responding to popular sentiment, the firebrand politician Muqtada al-Sadr began vigorously criticizing corrupt politicians, inept public authorities and Iranian influence, even though he is a Shia Muslim with links to Iran, and his supporters were active at all levels of state governance.  The maneuver paid off.  His 54-seat Saeroun movement, the largest bloc in the last parliament, was boosted to 73 seats

Consequently Sadr, who wants to end both US and Iranian influence over Iraq's internal affairs, has claimed victory and promises to help form a government free from foreign interference – a government he will not be able to lead, since he himself did not stand as a candidate.  His strengthened political position, though, will ensure that he has a leading role in the lengthy backroom negotiations to select a consensus prime minister and to agree on a new coalition.  The big question is whether the approved candidate will be the current prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi.

Kadhimi, aligned to no political party, was chosen back in May 2020 as someone more or less acceptable to all interested players. In office he spent most of his time trying to hold the balance between competing interests within Iraq’s body politic.  One of them was the US garrison attempting with varying success to maintain a degree of law and order.  Kadhimi was recently informed by US President Joe Biden that all US troops will be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2021. 

Anticipating that Iraq might become vulnerable to some sort of takeover by Iran-supported militias Kadhimi, in search of support, began hosting delegations from a range of countries.  He also started talks on a new tripartite economic and political partnership with Egypt and Jordan.  Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Baghdad in June, the first visit by an Egyptian leader in more than 30 years. Kadhimi’s efforts impact on Israel’s security, for if he does manage to shackle the militias, he can curb Iran’s practice of using them to transfer weapons to Hezbollah across the Syrian border. In addition Kadhimi has recently hosted negotiations between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran.

He does not appear to have been adversely affected by these activities.  He is still perceived as seeking to reduce Iranian influence within the organs of the Iraqi state. The election result, which points in that direction, might well result in his reappointment as prime minister.

Despite using the right language on reform, Kadhimi would still face an uphill battle to enact change.  The old political interests are well entrenched, and will not yield their privileged positions easily. Kadhimi would need outside assistance, just as he did to guarantee a free and fair election. No less than twelve democratic nations issued a statement on October 6 praising him for his efforts in that direction.  The UN and the EU sent teams to oversee the poll. More than 600 international observers were in place across the country, and new biometric fingerprint scanning voting cards were used for the first time.

If Kadhimi does take up the reins again, he would be strengthened if Western states increased their support for Iraqi civil society and exerted pressure on Iraq’s establishment to bring about political change. In a second term Kadhimi might find the strength to empower advocates of change and tackle structural reform. These are immense challenges in the context of the Iraqi situation. Yet they are necessary and the most effective way to forestall further instability in that insecure and unhappy country, for whose troubles the western world bears no little responsibility.

Published in Eurasia Review, 22 October 2021:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/22102021-iraqs-elections-has-iran-lost-enough-ground-to-make-a-difference-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 22 October 2021:

https://mpc-journal.org/iraq-elections-has-iran-lost-enough-ground-to-make-a-difference/

Published in the Jewish Business News, 22 October 2021

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/10/22/iraqs-elections-has-iran-lost-enough-ground-to-make-a-difference/

Reactivating the Iran nuclear deal – who has the whip hand?

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post of 17 October 2021

          The two main protagonists in the Iran nuclear deal issue – the US administration and the Iranian regime – are locked in a battle of wills. The US refuses to ease the sanctions it has imposed on Iran or re-enter the deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – unless Iran first undertakes to comply with its terms, agreed to in 2015 but since violated. The Iranian regime has refused to put the brakes on its renewed nuclear activity and comply with the JCPOA unless US economic sanctions are first lifted. Deadlock. Which of the two is in the stronger position?

          Throughout his presidential election campaign, Joe Biden made it clear that he opposed then-President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement in 2018.  He is as adamant as Trump in his opposition to Iran ever gaining a nuclear arsenal, but he – along with the EU and many Western leaders – believe that the best way of achieving that is by way of the deal, flawed though it is. He did not believe that Trump’s policy of economic coercion, known as “maximum pressure”, would deliver an improved agreement. 

Accordingly, shortly after he assumed the presidency, Biden initiated talks with Iran aimed at reviving the JCPOA.  After six rounds of discussions, contact was suspended in June, two days after hardliner Ebrahim Raisi was elected Iran’s president.  Raisi is under personal US sanctions over allegations of human rights abuses in his past as a judge.

On October 2 Iran’s new foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, told a TV interviewer that the US government had “tried to contact me through various channels, and I emphatically told the intermediaries that if the Americans are serious in their intentions, then they must release 10 billion dollars of our frozen assets as a prerequisite."  That is the regime’s current price for returning to the talks.  Its leaders have calculated that Biden has pledged his word to reactivate the JCPOA, that he is politically committed, and that $10 billion is a price he is prepared to pay.  Has Iran got the measure of the situation, and will it be able to stick to its demand?

Raisi gained the presidency of a nation heavily crippled by wide-ranging US sanctions – in both 2018 and 2019 its economy contracted by more than six percent.  The result was widespread public unrest.  From the winter of 2017 onward the deteriorating economic situation and its effect on people’s standard of living led to a succession of nationwide public protests. The already dire situation was exacerbated in the summer of 2021 by a long-lasting drought, and led to serious riots shortly after Raisi’s election. 

          Raisi’s prime concern must be restore a degree of economic and social stability to the country.  To achieve this, the sanctions imposed on Iran by the US – and, indeed, those imposed by the UN and the EU – have to be lifted, or at least substantially reduced.  The only practical way of achieving this would be for Iran to return to the nuclear deal talks and reach agreement on a revised JCPOA, with a lifting of sanctions and a large cash sweetener as part of the deal, in line with the terms of the original agreement in 2015.    

Yet Raisi must believe he still has room for maneuver.  For example US and UN sanctions on the sale of Iranian oil have been consistently ignored by China. Purchases of Iranian oil by Chinese companies are believed to have helped keep Iran's economy afloat.  And China is one of the signatories of the JCPOA, so may be relied on to support Iran when negotiations about reactivating it get tough.

He may also choose to discount a Reuters report on September 28.  "We are aware of the purchases that Chinese companies are making of Iranian oil," a senior US official told Reuters.  "We have used our sanctions authorities to respond to Iranian sanctions evasion, including those doing business with China, and will continue to do so if necessary.”

            This may not concern Raisi overmuch because he will be aware that battle-lines are being drawn for a power struggle between the US and China across a variety of areas, both geopolitical and economic.  Positioned firmly as a China ally, Iran – despite its economic and social difficulties – is well-placed to stand firm and insist on its demands being met before agreeing to re-enter the JCPOA.  It’s a win-win situation for Iran because, if by chance a renewed deal fails to gell, the hardline element within the Iranian regime will rejoice in the fact that their aim of acquiring a nuclear weapon capability is substantially advanced.

            In brief, the Biden administration has the short end of the stick.  It has rejected Trump’s policy, which considered the 2015 deal to be a free pass to an eventual nuclear Iran, and regarded the regime as hell-bent on realizing its objective of political and religious hegemony in the Middle East.  From this standpoint there was logic in the US using sanctions to force the leadership back to the table with the aim of securing a more watertight arrangement which would preclude Iran from ever obtaining nuclear weapons.

            Biden, on the other hand, is attempting to cajole the Iranian regime back to the table with the carrot of financial inducements, an eventual lifting of sanctions, and the prospect of re-admitting it into the so-called “comity of nations”.  This approach – basically conciliation and appeasement, even if backed by strong words – takes no account of the Iranian regime’s own long-term jihadist and political priorities.  Nor does it factor in the reaction of the more moderate Arab states, which regard with alarm Iranian ambitions, and the regime’s efforts to undermine and subvert their own administrations.  Biden’s approach jeopardizes America’s standing in the Arab world.

            Weighed in the balance, the advantage in this particular game of diplomatic chess lies with the Iranian regime. Perhaps the US Democratic administration needs to reconsider its conviction that everything Trump did was automatically misconceived.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 October 2021

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/who-has-the-power-to-set-iran-deal-back-in-motion-opinion-682185

Published in Eurasia Review:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/15102021-reactivating-the-iran-nuclear-deal-who-has-the-whip-hand-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal:

https://mpc-journal.org/reactivating-the-iran-nuclear-deal-who-has-the-whip-hand/

Published in Jewish Business News:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/10/15/reactivating-the-iran-nuclear-deal-who-has-the-whip-hand/

 

Labour pains: Britain’s opposition party wrestles with its identity

This article appears in the Jerusalem Report dated 25 October 2021

            Annual party conferences are the lifeblood of British politics.  So basic are they, that each September the UK Parliament goes into recess simply to allow what is known as the conference season to take place. Every year each of the main political parties organizes an event lasting several days at which politicians, party members, lobbyists and affiliated groups gather together with the aim of re-energizing their membership, rallying support and attracting media attention.

            Being British, the whole affair is arranged in a very gentlemanly fashion.  The main political parties have long agreed on two vital matters – the conferences are staggered so that each party can have its time in the sun; and the sequence is invariably Liberal Democrats, followed by Labour and finally the Conservatives. 

            This year the Labour conference, running for four days from September 25, was especially significant.  COVID restrictions had led to the cancellation of the event in 2020, so Sir Keir Starmer, Labour’s new leader, would be addressing conference for the first time in his new role.

            Following Labour’s disastrous showing in the general election of December 2019, its worst for eighty years, leader Jeremy Corbyn resigned.  A complex and extended leadership election procedure followed, finally won by Keir Starmer in April 2020.  He came to the post declaring his utter determination to address the issues which, by general consent, had led to his party’s rejection by the British electorate.  High among them was the failure of the leadership under Jeremy Corbyn to deal effectively with persistent and increasing instances of antisemitism within the party.

Dissatisfaction with the failure of Corbyn and his officials to address the issue grew among Labour Members of Parliament (MPs).  Finally in February 2019 nine of them, some Jewish some not, resigned en bloc. 

Perhaps the most distinguished Jewish Labour MP at the time, Dame Louise Ellman, did not join them. She had represented her Liverpool constituency since 1997, and was awarded her damehood in 2018.  She was the Honorary President of the Jewish Labour Movement, and Chair of both the Labour Friends of Israel and the All-Party Britain-Israel Parliamentary Group.  Her long-standing loyalty to the Labour party inhibited her from acting at the time.

But the continued lack of effective action by the Labour Party led her, in September, to say she "shared the fears" of other Jews living in the UK about the prospect of a Labour government led by Jeremy Corbyn.

Clearly perceived by grass-roots activists as a powerful threat, in early October 2019 a motion of no confidence in Ellman was submitted for discussion at a branch of her constituency Labour Party – a first step towards deselecting her as their MP.  They scheduled it to take place on the evening of Tuesday, October 8 – Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.  Ellman called the move "particularly insidious"; and Marie van der Zyl, President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, said it should be “a source of deep shame.” 

So on October 16, 2019, Ellman resigned from the Labour Party.  She wrote that "under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership, antisemitism has become mainstream in the Labour Party. Jewish members have been bullied, abused and driven out. Antisemites have felt comfortable, and vile conspiracy theories have been propagated.”

Starmer came into office reiterating his utter determination to stamp out the scourge of antisemitism from the party. 

“Antisemitism has been a stain on our party,” he said. “I have seen the grief that it's brought to so many Jewish communities.  On behalf of the Labour Party, I am sorry. And I will tear out this poison by its roots, and judge success by the return of Jewish members and those who felt that they could no longer support us.”

From very early in his leadership Starmer demonstrated his resolve.  Two months after coming into office, he summarily dismissed his shadow education secretary, Rebecca Long-Bailey, for approving an interview about the death of George Floyd in which actor Maxine Peake said the US police tactic of kneeling on someone’s neck was taught by the Israeli secret service – an assertion emphatically denied by Israel, and later retracted by Peake.

Following Long-Bailey’s dismissal, Labour MP Margaret Hodge, one of Corbyn’s fiercest critics on the antisemitism issue, tweeted: “This is what a change in culture looks like. This is what zero tolerance looks like. This is what rebuilding trust with the Jewish community looks like.”

            Over the following months Starmer proved his good faith on the antisemitism issue time and again.  As a result, when addressing his party conference for this first time as its leader, Starmer was able to announce within the first two minutes: “Louise Ellman, welcome home,” and to relish the prolonged applause that followed.

            The antisemitism issue that had dogged the Labour party since Corbyn’s election as leader in September 2015 was in fact only one manifestation of the deep chasm within the party – the divide between the moderate social democratic mainstream and the hard-left “pure Socialist” wing, whose activists subscribe to every aspect of left-wing dogma.  One fundamental belief is “intersectionality” – all oppression is related, and those perceived to be oppressed must be supported.  The Palestinians are deemed to be oppressed, and Israel is considered their oppressor.  With no regard for the complexities of a decades-long political problem, nor of the many efforts to resolve it, unequivocal support for the Palestinian cause and denigration and delegitimization of Israel is the approved line.  Anti-Zionism morphs easily enough into antisemitism.

Historically Britain’s Labour party, while always containing a wide spectrum of left-wing opinion, has generally pursued moderate left-of-centre policies when in government.   The record shows that whenever the hard left gained sufficient clout to influence policy, the result was electoral defeat.  Starmer clearly has little time for left-wing extremism, and that wing of the party has come increasingly to realize that he intends to devise a strategy aimed at winning back the voters that deserted Labour in droves in the December 2019 election.  As a result their opposition to him has become ever more overt.

            His speech to conference – heckled throughout by Corbyn supporters determined to rain on his parade – had been preceded by the opportunely timed resignation of a member of his shadow Cabinet, and an equally opportunistic debate sponsored by Jawad Khan, of Young Labour, condemning “illegal actions” by Israel’s government against Palestinians.

Said Khan: “The motion before you today will… send our uncompromising solidarity with the Palestinian people by calling for sanctions against the state that is practising war crimes.”  The motion condemned the “ongoing Nakba in Palestine,” labelled Israel an apartheid state, resolved to support “effective measures” including sanctions, and included the right to return for Palestinian refugees.  It did not need a card vote.  It gained a clear majority on a show of hands.

   The motion was immediately condemned by shadow foreign secretary Lisa Nandy: “We cannot support this motion”.  In a later statement she wrote:  “We owe it to the people of Palestine and Israel to take a fair and balanced approach that recognizes there can only be peace through a safe and secure Israel existing alongside a sovereign and viable Palestinian state.”

The two-state solution is Labour’s firm and settled policy on the Israel-Palestine issue.  “There must be a negotiated, diplomatic settlement,” said Nandy in a statement to the media supported by Starmer “...a safe and secure Israel, alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state. We will continue to be strong and consistent advocates for justice, human rights and international law in this conflict, and to condemn the unacceptable use of violence against civilians on all sides.”

The anti-Israel activists within the party can generally be identified with those on the hard left dubbed “Corbynistas”.  They represent a sizeable minority, and Starmer’s task between now and the next general election, scheduled for no later than May 2024, will be to weaken, undermine or circumvent their influence.  Only then can he present himself to the electorate as the leader of a party united behind his policies for government.  And only if he succeeds in this can he hope to win the election and emerge as Britain’s next prime minister.

The Middle East is no longer a top US priority

 Where the US goes, much of the Western world follows – willingly or reluctantly, depending on circumstances. 

From the first days of his presidency Joe Biden started implying that the Middle East did not feature among his top concerns.  As a consequence the region has been sinking down the policy agenda of major players like the EU and its member nations.  To other interested parties, however, this shift in Western priorities must seem like an opportunity too good to miss – parties like Russia, Turkey, Iran, even China.  With the US no longer fully engaged, all are feeling less constrained in pursuing their particular interests in the region – a recipe for intensifying the current chaos. 

A close Biden adviser told the on-line journal Politico recently: “If you are going to list the regions Biden sees as a priority, the Middle East is not in the top three…That reflects a bipartisan consensus that the issues demanding our attention have changed as great power competition is resurgent.”  He meant an upcoming struggle for power between the US and China, and also possibly Russia.

Biden’s chaotic withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, regardless of consequences, is taken by friend and foe alike as evidence of his comparative lack of interest in the future of the region.  This perception was reinforced when Biden recently informed Iraq’s prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, that he intended to end the US’s combat mission in that country too, and withdraw all American forces by December 31.

The Cato Institute, a leading global think tank, recently produced what it called a blueprint for the US disengaging altogether from the Middle East. “If Biden can end America’s 20‐​year‐​participation in an unnecessary war,” it posited, “why not also end America’s 40‐​year occupation of a region of ever decreasing importance?” 

The author could find no reason in terms of America’s self interest for it to engage with the Middle East by any but diplomatic means.  And indeed there would seem few political advantages to be gained from direct involvement in the conflicts and economic disasters rocking the region.  The only benefits might lie in the moral field.

The situation in Yemen has been described as a humanitarian crisis for at least two years, with the nation on the brink of famine. Widespread poverty and internal economic turmoil have brought Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Libya to within a hand’s-breadth of catastrophe. The future of each rests in the balance.

Lebanon, with the highest per capita proportion of refugees in the world, has been in freefall since a financial crisis began in late 2019.  About three quarters of the population now struggle to feed themselves, while electricity, fuel and medicines are in short supply.

Libya has been torn apart by a hodge-podge of rival militias ever since 2015, and the country remains a battlefield.  Iraq, gripped by poverty, has fallen prey to a determined effort by the Iranian regime to establish an unshakable grip on the nation’s institutions.  Prime Minister Kadhimi struggles to hold a balance between competing interests within the body politic.  And however smoothly Biden manages the exit of US forces on this occasion, the fact is that he will leave Iran as the dominant external power in the country.

In his first address to the UN General Assembly on September 21, Biden entirely ignored the chaos gripping so much of the Middle East.  He devoted his address to matters that loom much larger in his mind.  They could be dubbed “the three Cs” – coronavirus, climate change, and China.  He did refer to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, perhaps to indicate his intention of abandoning the sort of direct involvement in the Middle East that has marked US foreign policy for decades. 

The change in US policy priorities is reflected down the administrative line. National security adviser Jake Sullivan has downsized his team devoted to the Middle East and expanded the unit that coordinates US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. Biden’s new defense secretary, Lloyd Austin, has appointed three special advisers on the new key issues: Covid, climate change and China.  

Whether Biden will be able to stick to his intention of downgrading America’s involvement in the Middle East depends crucially on how he handles his standoff with Iran.  It does not seem to be his intention to stick with former President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal.  Re-entry into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its official title, has been described by Sullivan as a “critical early priority”.

Following a long period of posturing by both Iran and the US, Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian told reporters on September 24 that Iran will return to talks on resuming compliance with the 2015 Iran nuclear deal "very soon."  

There was nothing conciliatory about his message, which he presented in a belligerent wrapping. He accused the Biden administration of sending contradictory messages — saying it wants to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal while imposing new sanctions on Tehran.  He said his government believed that Bidem “keeps carrying close to his heart the thick file of the Trump sanctions against Iran, even while seemingly pursuing negotiations.”

Biden’s reassessment of US strategic priorities has not gone unnoticed by Arab states.  None are enamored with the prospect of a newly empowered Iran moving ever closer to a nuclear arsenal.  One result of a perceived reduction in the US’s commitment to the region may well be an increase in Israel’s stature as a leading regional power – a stalwart ally against Iran’s ambitions to dominate the region.  Israel would also become a useful portal to Washington.  This readjustment in the power balance in favour of Israel could well be the factor that pushes Saudi Arabia – and with it perhaps other Arab states – into joining the Abraham Accords.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 October 2021:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/the-mideast-is-no-longer-a-top-us-priority-681233

Published in the Eurasia Review, 9 October 2021:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/09102021-the-middle-east-is-no-longer-a-top-us-priority-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 7 October 2021:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-middle-east-is-no-longer-a-top-us-priority/

Published in Jewish Business News, 8 October 2021:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/10/08/the-middle-east-is-no-longer-a-top-us-priority/

  

Egypt-Israel relations – on the right road, but a distance to travel

             Given the flurry of optimistic stories about future Egypt-Israel relations following the meeting on September 13 between Israel’s prime minister and Egypt’s president, a stark statement on September 19 in the on-line magazine IsraelDefense came as something of a shock: “Egypt is preparing its armed forces for the possibility of a war with Israel”.

   The well-respected journal justified its statement by referring to the contract signed by Egypt in May this year to buy 30 advanced Dassault Rafale fighter jets from France. The deal, states the magazine, was intended “to improve Egypt’s chances if it has to fight the powerful Israeli Air Force.”

Its assessment of Egypt’s motives at the time may well be correct, but a lot of water has flowed under the political bridge since May, and the undisputed warming of relations between Egypt and Israel may be causing some apprehension among France’s defense experts.  Given the blow the French defense industry has just suffered from the cancellation of Australia’s $68 billion submarine contract, could this $4.5 billion Egyptian deal go the same way?

Israel’s Prime Minister Naftali Bennett met Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh, the resort town on the south-eastern edge of the Sinai peninsula. Occupied by Israel during the Six-Day war, that eastern strip of territory was handed back to Egypt, luxury hotel and all, in 1982 in the third phase of Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai.

The meeting between the two leaders went so well that, on the Israeli side at least, officials were full of optimistic predictions about an imminent warming of relations between the two countries and a consequent strengthening of cooperation and mutual support across a range of fields. 

Bennett himself said the two leaders had “laid the foundation for deep ties moving forward.” He told reporters that the talks covered diplomacy, security and the economy, including aspirations to expand trade and tourism.  Other sources disclosed that the talks had also addressed regional issues, including Iran's nuclear program and Sisi’s aspirations for a resumption of the Israel-Palestinian peace process, based on the presumption of a two-state solution. One observer claimed that the discussion ranged even wider, and included natural gas, Gaza, increasing the Egyptian army’s presence in Sinai, the GERD (Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) dispute between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other, and more.

It is not unlikely that Sisi arranged this open show of friendship toward Israel’s new prime minister with one eye on Washington.  Egypt receives more foreign aid from Washington than any country except Israel, and the bilateral military ties are deep and varied. But Barack Obama as US president, together with his vice-President Joe Biden, did not approve of the military coup that brought Sisi to power in Egypt, and condemned his crackdown on opponents of the new regime.  Biden made it clear from the start of his presidency that he was going to hassle Sisi on his human rights record.

“We will bring our values with us into every relationship that we have across the globe,” said State Department spokesman Ned Price in March 2021. “That includes with Egypt.”

On the very day that Bennett and Sisi met, it was reported that the US would withhold $130 million in aid unless Egypt improved its human rights.  On September 14 the State Department notified Congress that it intended to do so until Egypt meets specific standards. 

The measure is not the expression of moral outrage that it appears.  $130 million is a drop in the ocean of the $1.3 billion in security aid the US annually provides to Egypt.  It is, moreover, less than half the $300 million on which Congress annually places human rights restrictions (usually rescinded at the request of the State Department).  The step, it turns out, is nothing more than a gesture by the Biden administration to placate those voices on the left of the Democratic party demanding tough action on Sisi’s human rights record. They were unplacated.

The warm meeting with Israel’s prime minister was a way of Sisi reminding the US that Egypt is an irreplaceable player in maintaining stability in the region.  Sisi has proved his value to US interests in a number of ways.  The 11-day conflict between Hamas and Israel in May was resolved as a result of Egypt acting as honest broker – an outcome not originally foreseen by Washington.  Subsequently Sisi has placed himself in a key role in the Gaza situation by facilitating discussion between the main players – Hamas, Israel and Qatar. Following the meeting with Sisi Bennett’s office mentioned Egypt’s role in maintaining stability and calm in Gaza.

Egypt hopes for Israel’s good offices in supporting the continuation of US military aid, and also in the fraught situation regarding GERD.  A dispute between Ethiopia, source of the head waters of the Blue Nile, and Sudan and Egypt, whose economic and social existence depend on its waters, remains to be resolved.  The operation of the giant dam has the potential to disrupt and reduce the normal flow of the Nile through those countries, and an agreement needs to be hammered out. Egypt believes that Israel has sway in both Washington and Addis Ababa, and could be the key to bringing Ethiopia to the negotiating table.

Some immediate results followed the cordial Bennett-Sisi encounter.  Travel and transport links between Egypt and Israel received an immediate boost.  The Taba crossing at Eilat, an entry point for car-bound Israeli tourists into Egypt, became fully operational with extended opening hours and no limit on the number of entry permits. In addition it was announced that from October Egyptair would begin operating several flights a week between Cairo and Tel Aviv.

All of which indicates that the direction of travel towards closer cooperation and mutual support between Egypt and Israel has been set, and the first steps taken.  But to convert the cold peace of the past 42 years into a genuinely friendly relationship between the two nations involves a long and difficult journey.  Let us hope we are on our way.

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 October 2021:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/01102021-egypt-israel-relations-on-the-right-road-but-a-distance-to-travel-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 September 2021
https://mpc-journal.org/egypt-israel-relations-on-the-right-road-but-a-distance-to-travel/

Published in Jewish Business News, 1 October 2021:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/10/01/egypt-israel-relations-on-the-right-road-but-a-distance-to-travel/