Putin, Erdogan and the expansion of NATO

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 28 June 2022:      

            Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, no less than fourteen of its one-time satellite states in eastern Europe have joined NATO. Russia’s president Vladimir Putin has watched the NATO boundary advance inexorably toward his western border with increasing concern. In particular Latvia and Estonia now stand nose-to-nose with Russia, since each shares a land border with it. As for Belarus and Ukraine, Putin has been determined that neither would ever enter the NATO camp, since that would bring NATO right into the heart of Mother Russia. At least, Putin has consoled himself, up in the far north Finland, with its long land border with Russia (1,340 kilometers or 830 miles) is neutral and has always steered clear of NATO membership.

         The failure of the West in general, and NATO in particular, to react decisively to Putin’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014 must have led him to regard the West as disunited and ineffective. He had done his best, moreover, to ensure that Western Europe had grown very largely dependent on Russia for its energy needs, putting Putin in a dominant negotiating position. A swift land grab of Ukraine, he must have calculated, would not only halt NATO’s advance in its tracks, but probably evoke as little adverse reaction as his Crimea adventure had done.

          Putin has been proved wrong on each of these assumptions. His invasion of Ukraine brought about an instant and universal adverse reaction. The valiant fight-back led by its President Zelensky evoked admiration in the West, and a determination to support him. Support may have been hesitant at first, but unlike in 2014 the West has finally demonstrated determination of purpose. As for Europe’s overwhelming dependence on Russian energy, that had been real enough, and it has taken time and political will for the EU to change direction and find alternative sources, but the process is under way.

          However much Russian spokespeople may dissemble and word play, it is patently obvious that Putin’s plans have gone disastrously awry. When on February 24, 2022 he sent in the troops he had been amassing for nearly a year on the Ukrainian border, he anticipated a 3-week campaign at the most, and a swift and decisive victory. He most certainly did not expect to find himself in June bogged down in the middle of a still-independent Ukraine, licking his wounds.

          The most surprising of all Putin’s miscalculations, perhaps, concerns Finland and Sweden. Long unwilling to ally themselves to NATO, the raw aggression displayed by Putin in invading Ukraine proved a catalyst, leading them to agree jointly on May 15, 2022 to apply for membership. The time had come to confront the ruthless and power-hungry dictator on their doorstep before it was too late.

          This potential expansion of the NATO alliance is far from a foregone conclusion. NATO rules state that any extension of its membership must have the unanimous approval of all existing members. From out of the shadows stepped President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, a long-time NATO member, announcing that he did not favor accepting the Swedish and Finnish applications. They are both, he asserted, “guesthouses for terrorist organizations”.

          Turkey has repeatedly criticized western European countries, including Sweden and Finland, for tolerating organizations it deems “terrorists”, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), as well as the followers of the US-based Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen. Erdogan accuses followers of Gulen of mounting a coup attempt against the Turkish government in 2016.

          At a press conference on May 16 Erdogan made two demands: that Finland and Sweden end their support for the PKK, and that their ban on arms exports, imposed in October 2019 after the Turkish incursion into northern Syria, be lifted. Two days later he extended his wish list, including extraditing alleged Kurdish terrorists and ending support for Kurdish fighters in Syria.

          His accusations are not a new device, dreamed up for the occasion. Lists of alleged PKK members and Gulen supporters were presented to Sweden and Finland as far back as 2017, with a demand for their extradition. Turkey wants 12 people returned from Finland and 21 from Sweden. Moreover Turkish media has revealed that the Syrian branch of the PKK held meetings in Stockholm, part-hosted by the Swedish foreign office. Turkey also says that Swedish security forces did nothing to prevent a PKK protest held in 2019 in support of the jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan.

          On June 9 Erdogan said: “Sweden at the moment is a country that terror organizations like the PKK, PYD and YPG use as a playground. In fact, there are terrorists even in this country’s parliament.”

          He was referring to the leading Swedish politician Amineh Kakabaveh, who grew up in a poor Kurdish home in western Iran. She says she was just 13 in the late 1980s when she joined Peshmerga fighters rebelling against the Islamic regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

          A strong advocate for Kurdish self-determination in the Middle East and a fierce critic of Erdogan, she is in an extraordinarily powerful position because the Swedish government depends on her vote for its one-seat majority in Parliament. Kakabaveh’s backing allowed Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson to become Sweden’s first female prime minister last year. In return, the center-left Social Democrats agreed to deepen cooperation with Kurdish authorities in northern Syria. Erdogan makes no distinction between the Kurdish groups in Syria and the PKK.

As for Finland, its foreign minister Pekka Haavisto has assured Turkey that the PKK connections in the country will be monitored more closely.  "We can certainly give such guarantees to Turkey, since the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization in Europe."

He believes it would take no more than a few weeks for Finland and Turkey to resolve issues related to Finland's NATO application.

Inevitably, there has been speculation that Finland might disengage from its joint application with Sweden to join NATO.  Finland’s president, Sauli Niinisto, and its prime minister, Sanna Marin, hastened to quash it.  Both have said that Finland would continue its application in lockstep with Sweden.

As long as Erdogan remains adamant in his demands, Putin ‘s worst fears regarding NATO’s expansion to his very doorstep will remain unrealized. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 June 2022, and in the Jerusalem Post on-line under the title: "Erdogan will ensure Putin's fears of NATO expansion are unrealized":

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-710550

Published in Eurasia Review, 8 July 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/08072022-putin-erdogan-and-the-expansion-of-nato-oped/

Published in MPC Journal, 12 July 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/putin-erdogan-and-the-expansion-of-nato/

Published in Jewish Business News, 8 July 2022

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/07/08/putin-erdogan-and-the-expansion-of-nato/

Normalization splits the Arab world

    

         On March 28, 2022, the town of Sde Boker in Israel’s Negev region hosted an historic event – a meeting of the top diplomats of four Arab nations with those of the US and Israel. In a joint declaration all six endorsed the objectives of the Abraham Accords, reaffirmed the importance of fostering ties between Israel and the broader Middle East, and declared that the conference represented the launch of what would become a permanent regional forum.

          On May 26 Iraq's parliament approved legislation that criminalizes any form of normalization with Israel. All Iraqis, whether inside or outside the country, are banned from establishing relations with Israel, visiting the country, or promoting normalization. The legislation applies to all state officials, including those in the semi-autonomous northern Kurdistan region, as well as government institutions, private sector companies, the media, foreign companies and their employees.

          The law stipulates that any Iraqi who visits Israel will be sentenced to life imprisonment, and those who establish any political, economic, or cultural relations with Israeli institutions, even through social media networks, will be sentenced to death.

          At the joint press conference in Sde Boker, Israel’s foreign minister, Yair Lapid, said the forum was building “a new regional architecture based on progress, technology, religious tolerance, security and intelligence cooperation” intended, he emphasized, to intimidate and deter “our common enemies – first and foremost Iran and its proxies. They certainly have something to fear.”

          Some commentators identify two distinct blocs in the Arab world – a so-called “axis of normalization” consisting of moderate Sunni-Arab states that endorse formal or informal relations with Israel, and an “axis of resistance” comprising Iran and Iranian-supported bodies comprised of Shia-led governments such as Syria, quasi-states such as the Houthis in Yemen, and non-state groups like Hezbollah. It is possible the boundary between these blocs will widen, as remaining Arab states determine whether or not to normalize relations with Israel.

          A few states, such as Kuwait and Qatar remain uncommitted on the issue, maintaining ties with both the US and Iran. Saudi Arabia, which is also currently on the fence, is being wooed by its Gulf neighbors and Israel to join the Abraham Accords, and may be on the point of succumbing since it recently invested $2 billion by way of its sovereign-wealth fund into two Israeli tech start-ups. Turkey’s roller-coaster relationship with Iran has not prevented it from recently rebooting its relations with Israel.

          Within the rejectionist axis Tunisia and Algeria have cordial ties with Iran. Tunisia has on several occasions considered criminalizing normalization with Israel – the last in June 2021. As for Algeria, the Moroccan-Israeli accord has turned it into a hostile state. Algeria has consistently opposed Morocco’s claims on Western Sahara, which were recognized by the US and Israel as a quid pro quo for Morocco joining the Abraham Accords. In any case, relations between Algeria and Iran have been improving fast in recent years, and Algeria now stands virtually aligned with Iran and China against the West.

          Getting the anti-normalization law through the Iraqi parliament was a political coup by Muqtada al-Sadr, a leading Iran-supporting Iraqi politician and Shia cleric.

He heads the Sairoon Alliance, the largest bloc in Iraq’s parliament. Sairoon, which won 74 seats out of a possible 329 in the parliamentary elections held in October 2021, out-maneuvered the not inconsiderable opposition emanating from Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Many Kurdish political leaders have close and long-lasting links with Israel.

          On September 24, 2021, a conference in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, hosted more than 300 delegates from across Iraq including tribal and religious leaders, and actually called for the normalization of ties between Iraq and Israel, along the lines of the Abraham Accords: "We call for Iraq to enter into relations with Israel and its people through agreements similar to the Arab countries that have normalized." The motion was swiftly condemned by the Iraqi government, which dubbed the event a “illegal meeting”, and the judiciary issued arrest warrants for leading participants.

          Iran controls, either directly or by way of proxies, many of the state and military instruments within Iraq, and it has been pressuring the country to clamp down on the growing Israeli influence in the Kurdish region. In March Iran's IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) claimed to have carried out a ballistic missile attack against alleged Mossad targets in Erbil, possibly over plans to export Kurdistan's gas to Turkey via a new pipeline involving Israel. The Kurdish Regional Government estimates potential gas reserves in the Kurdistan Region at 200 trillion cubic feet.

          But all is not well within the Kurdish body politic. It is split into two camps: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the leaders are trying to overcome the discord between them.

A visit to the KDP by Kurdistan Region president, Nechirvan Barzani, of the PUK on May 21 was aimed at starting the process, but also with addressing the vexed question of forming a national government. Ever since the parliamentary elections of October 2021, Iraq has been without a government. Kurdish involvement is crucial, since under Iraq’s new constitution the presidency is reserved for a Kurd.

          The KDP and the PUK have allied themselves with opposing sides in the political bartering. The PUK opted to join a pro-Iran Shiite Arab alliance despite its differences with them over links with Israel, while the KDP has become part of a tripartite alliance with the Sadrist bloc and a Sunni Arab grouping that is equally anti-Israel.

          In short, both Israel-supporting Kurdish parties are prepared to collaborate with the political groupings that passed Iraq’s anti-normalization law. What is more, the next president of Iraq, whenever he is elected, has to be a Kurd. This must indicate that al-Sadr’s successful maneuver on May 26 in Iraq’s hamstrung parliament may not be the last word on the subject.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 21 June 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-709927

Published in Eurasia Review, 2 July 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/02072022-normalization-splits-the-arab-world-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 2 July 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/normalization-splits-the-arab-world/

Published in Jewish Business News, 1 July 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/07/01/normalization-splits-the-arab-world/

How Iran stands to gain from the war in Ukraine

 

          On June 2 the Dubai-based media outlet, Al-Arabiya News, highlighted the irony of how Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has impacted on the Middle East. Citing reports that Russian troops were being withdrawn from Syria to augment the forces in Ukraine, the article maintained that further Russian retreats will likely follow, “paving the way for Iran to wield complete influence over Syria.” “No one,” it writes, “could have guessed that Iran would gain the most from the Ukraine crisis.”

          Al-Arabiya News favours Russia’s presence in Syria, not so much for sustaining in power Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, as for restricting Iran’s military expansion. Russia’s ambitions in the region, it maintains, were not too grand — to improve its trade and investment balance, use the port of Tartus, and play a significant role in the Middle East.

          “Today, this theoretical foreign balance in Syria is about to be tipped in favour of Tehran… The withdrawal of Russia coupled with the continued military presence of Iran could rekindle the flames of conflict inside and around Syria, as the objectives of Iran’s presence in Damascus go far beyond protecting the Syrian regime.”

          The Moscow Times is Russia’s leading independent media outlet. In March 2022, following a new law in Russia restricting media coverage of the invasion of Ukraine, it moved its main editors to Amsterdam. A few weeks later the authorities blocked access within Russia to its Russian-language website. Nevertheless it continues to publish.

          On May 6 the Moscow Times reported that, in order to strengthen his Ukrainian operations, Russian President Vladimir Putin was downsizing Russian military involvement in Syria. The news outlet maintained that Russia had already begun the process of withdrawing a proportion of its 63,000 troops stationed in Syria, and was concentrating them at three airports before transferring them to the Ukrainian front. The troops being redeployed included the notorious mercenary Wagner Group. Abandoned Russian air bases were being handed over to Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Lebanon’s terrorist Hezbollah.

          Two days later Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, was in Iran. Some commentators believe Assad went specifically to ask for increased Iranian support to make good any Russian scale-back in Syria. Assad is well aware that it was only Putin’s intervention in the Syrian conflict in September 2015 that enabled him to defeat his opponents and retain power.

          Yet Assad is in something of a dilemma. If Russia’s support weakens, he cannot cozy up too closely to Iran even though, as an adherent to the Shi’ite tradition of Islam, he has long been its client. Assad wants to be readmitted to the Arab League, and to succeed he needs Arab support. Any substantial strengthening of Iran’s position in Syria would undoubtedly affect Syria’s relations with other Arab countries, most of whom regard Iran and its regional ambitions with suspicion.

          This political reality was made crystal clear by Jordan’s King Abdullah on May 18.

Visiting Stanford University in the US, Abdullah maintained that the Russian presence in southern Syria was a “stabilizing factor”, and that if it withdrew the void would be filled by Iran and its proxies posing a real threat to Jordan’s stability. He added that ever since Moscow had been distracted by the Ukraine war, his country had been facing the possibility of conflict on its border with Syria

          Abdullah was referring to reports that Iran was already taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine to expand into south and central Syria. Iran’s presence in southern Syria represents a real threat to Jordan. Abdullah has long warned about Iran’s ultimate ambitions in the Middle East. The Jordanian army is currently mobilizing along the border with Syria to combat drug and arms smuggling. In January Jordan announced that in future it will, if necessary, pursue smugglers across the border and apprehend them inside Syria.

          Russia has invested heavily in Syria, partly to ensure its continued access to the Mediterranean by way of the port of Tartus, and Putin would not withdraw fully except under extreme pressure. The extent of his continued presence in Syria depends on how successful his military operation is in Ukraine. If he needs to augment his fighting force there, then he will draw even more heavily on his troops currently stationed in Syria, and the shift in the balance of power would soon become evident. The Assad regime would undoubtedly turn to Iran and its IRGC to maintain control and to continue fighting the opposition and extremist Sunni groups.

          Russia and Iran, although nominally in alliance in Syria, were far from agreeing on such issues as Syria’s political future, its postwar reconstruction, and future economic, political and military policies. Iran could find itself with considerably increased powers in Syria, both military and political. Any significant increase in Iranian troop levels or military activity in Syria would probably attract further Israeli strikes.

          So the political equation turns out to be: Russian failure in Ukraine equals a strengthened Iran in Syria, and a more powerful Iran probably equals increased anti-Iran military activity by Israel. Democratic interests in the Middle East find themselves condemning Putin’s Ukrainian adventure, but fearing lack of success in the operation would boost the Iranian regime’s power base in the Middle East. This is the unexpected and uncomfortable by-product of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 13 June 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/international/article-709243

Published in Eurasia Review, 26 June 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/25062022-how-iran-stands-to-gain-from-war-in-ukraine-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 26 June 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/how-iran-stands-to-gain-from-the-war-in-ukraine/

Published in Jewish Business News, 24 June 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/06/24/how-iran-stands-to-gain-from-the-war-in-ukraine/

The precarious Yemen truce

 

              The two-month truce between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, brokered by the UN, ended on June 2 but has been extended for a further two months. The two sides are still far apart, but the truce period certainly witnessed a marked reduction in civilian deaths and casualties – down by more than 50 per cent according to published data.  It has also seen a degree of tentative co-operation between the two sides.  But the situation remains shaky, and the two sides continually trade accusations about breaches committed by one side or the other.

   The truce deal included a halt to offensive military operations, permitting fuel imports into Houthi-controlled ports and some flights from Sanaa airport which has been closed to commercial flights since 2015. The Yemeni government controls Yemen's airspace and seas.

Misunderstandings mark the relationship between the two sides. On May 6 the Saudi-led alliance announced a humanitarian gesture in support of the truce.  In coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross, it said it was in the process of freeing more than 100 Houthi prisoners and transporting them back to Yemen.  In the event 126 prisoners were repatriated, of which 108 were flown from Saudi Arabia to the southern city of Aden, where Yemen’s Saudi-backed government is based.  The Houthis refused to accept them.  The head of the Houthis’ prisoner affairs committee said the list of detainees included people “unknown to us and who are not among our prisoners”.

They said that only five of the detainees were “prisoners of war”, four were fishermen “who had been kidnapped in the Red Sea” and nine of the detainees were foreigners from Africa.  The Houthi movement said it welcomed the freeing of any Yemenis, but called for coordination with its authorities – adding that, for its part, the group had freed 400 prisoners of war so far in 2022.

On May 10 Hans Grundberg, UN special envoy for Yemen, hastened to the country intent on shoring up the truce.  He had issues to resolve with both sides. He needed to persuade the Houthis to resume flights from Sanaa airport and to lift their siege of Taiz in south-western Yemen. He had also to take into account the Houthis’ accusation that the government had been impeding fuel shipments to the port of Hodeidah. 

Grundberg made progress.  The government had been insisting that all passengers on flights from Sanaa carry government-issued passports.  By May 12 Grundberg had persuaded the Saudi coalition to allow Houthi-issued passport holders to travel outside Yemen, removing the major obstacle to the resumption of commercial flights from Sanaa under the truce deal. 

Meanwhile, in the face of a potential environmental disaster, the two sides in Yemen’s civil conflict did at least agree on one issue.

The FSO (floating, storage and offloading vessel) Safer was constructed in 1976 as an oil tanker and converted to an FSO facility a decade later. It is among the largest oil tankers in the world and is currently holding more than a million barrels of oil.   Anchored off Yemen’s Red Sea coast for more than 30 years, it has been out of use since 2015 and is now beyond repair and at imminent risk of spilling its contents into the Red Sea.  The consequences would be disastrous. Fishing communities on the Red Sea coast would be devasted, and the nearby ports of Hodeidah and Saleef, the lifelines allowing food, fuel and humanitarian supplies to enter Yemen, would close.

On May 11 the UN and the Netherlands co-sponsored a pledging conference in the Hague, in an effort to raise the $144 million required to prevent the Safer from splitting, breaking apart or exploding.  The plan is to install a replacement vessel within 18 months, and meanwhile to transfer the oil from the decaying tanker to a safe temporary vessel in a four-month emergency operation. 

In a video message to the conference, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stressed the need for urgent action. “Today’s event is a critical step towards preventing a catastrophe that would affect Yemen, the region and the world,” he said. “There isn’t a moment to lose.” 

Some $40 million was immediately pledged by 10 donor countries plus the EU, and is now available to allow a start to be made. The UN-coordinated plan is supported by both the Yemeni government coalition and the Houthis. 

The official coordinating the UN Development Program in Yemen, Auke Lootsma, emphasized the urgent need for the rest of the funding: “If we do not receive sufficient funding urgently, the weather window to transfer the oil will close.  By October, high winds and volatile currents make the operation more dangerous and increase the risk of the ship breaking up.” 

This common danger has already generated a degree of agreement between the disputing sides in Yemen, and might well induce more. So the UN is trying to arrange for the truce to be extended beyond June 2, to allow for negotiations aimed at ending the seven-year war.

          The war can be brought to a close only through an understanding between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, but all parties will need to be realistic about the limits of the Houthis’ capacity for compromise, particularly when it comes to their relationship with Iran.  What Yemen really needs are elections, an inclusive government, and a new structure for the state. UN Resolution 2216 aims to establish democracy in a federally united Yemen. The Houthis must be given the opportunity to choose. Do they wish to remain an outlawed militia permanently, or would they prefer to become a legitimate political party, able to contest parliamentary and presidential elections and participate in government? The price would be serious engagement in negotiations aimed at a peaceful transition to a political solution for a united Yemen.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 29 May 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-707919

Published in Eurasia Review, 11 June 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/11062022-the-precarious-yemen-truce-oped/

Published in MPC Journal, 12 June 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-precarious-yemen-truce/

Published in Jewish Business News, 10 June 2022;
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/06/10/the-precarious-yemen-truce/

Erdogan’s charm offensive: a limited success

On June 1 Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, broke off the talks he had initiated with Greece back in January 2021, and canceled the High-Level Strategic Council that they had set up as a forum in which to discuss their differences.

Erdogan’s approach to Greece had been part of the policy turn-around that so puzzled political observers in December 2020.  Out of the blue Turkey embarked on a charm offensive that had politicians and commentators scratching their heads. Was Erdogan playing a new devious game, or was he genuinely trying to turn over a new leaf?

There was certainly reason enough for Turkey to mend fences.  In 2020 its international standing, on a steady downward trajectory for some eight years, was truly in the doldrums.

The US presidential election was in full swing.  President Donald Trump, who had turned a blind eye to Erdogan’s anti-Kurd land grab in northern Syria, had drawn the line at Turkey, a member of NATO, acquiring the US’s state-of-the-art F-35 fighter aircraft while already purchasing the Russian S-400 – an anti-aircraft system designed specifically to destroy aircraft like the F-35. So Trump ejected him from the F-35 program and imposed sanctions on Turkey. Presidential hopeful Joe Biden, long opposed to Erdogan’s power-grabbing activities in Syria, would certainly not reverse that.

Erdogan had also attracted the displeasure of the EU by continuing to explore for gas in what is internationally recognized as Cypriot waters.  After months of acrimonious exchanges, in December 2020 the EU actually imposed targeted sanctions on Turkey. The UK, now no longer in the EU, sanctioned Turkey on the same grounds.

Turkey’s relations with Egypt had been frozen since 2013, when Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi was ousted by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.  Erdogan, a life-long adherent of the Brotherhood, expelled Egypt’s ambassador, and Sisi reciprocated.  Egypt and Turkey backed opposite sides in the war in Libya, while Turkey did its best to subvert Egypt’s developing commercial and maritime partnership with Greece.  Relations with Saudi Arabia had been overshadowed for years by the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi’s consulate in Istanbul.

As for Israel, it had long been obvious that Erdogan seized every opportunity to denounce Israel in the most extravagant terms, and to act against it whenever he could.  Not the least of his hostile moves was to support Hamas and to provide a base in Istanbul for senior Hamas officials, granting at least twelve of them Turkish citizenship.

In short, Turkey urgently needed to improve its relations with, inter alia, the US, the EU, the UK, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Greece and Israel.

This was the background to Erdogan’s change of tone on the international scene.  To achieve his strategic objective of extending and stabilizing Turkey’s power base across the Middle East, he or his advisers must have realized that a reassessment of tactics was called for.  Out of what must have been a root and branch analysis, came a plan to address the problem – Turkey would embark on a program of “rebooting” relationships with unfriendly states, opponents or enemies. 

A change of tone, leading to conciliatory moves, proved remarkably successful in a number of instances– not least with Israel, whose president, Isaac Herzog, visited Turkey in March 2022.

    This was followed by a visit to Israel by Turkey’s foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, and the opening of renewed cooperation between the two countries.

Turkey’s relations with the EU in general, and Germany in particular, were put on a new footing. Repaired relations with Egypt, too, seem on track – Egyptian and Turkish diplomats are about to hold a third round of negotiations, while Turkey has decided to appoint a new ambassador to Cairo after a gap of nearly nine years.

Elsewhere the story is less encouraging.  Turkey began wooing Iran in November 2021, when Turkey’s Cavusoglu met the newly-elected Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi. Two weeks later the two presidents met for the first time and signed up to a comprehensive improvement of bilateral relations. That arrangement has come unstuck.  Already at odds over Iraq and control of the Iraqi region of Sinjar, in May a major row erupted between Turkey and Iran over transboundary waters. Turkey has started to construct dams on the Aras and Tigris rivers, and is ignoring Iran’s objections.

As for Greece, reconciliation has apparently proved too hard a nut for Turkey to crack.  A breakdown in the détente turned on the status of certain islands in the Aegean.  On May 31 Turkey’s Cavusoglu accused Greece of violating international agreements that guarantee the islands remain demilitarized. He claimed that Greece was violating the agreement by flying aircraft over them.  He threatened action if the violations did not stop.

More than once during the Syrian civil conflict Erdogan’s obsession with the threat he perceives from the Kurdish independence PKK party has led him to actions at odds with NATO policy.  For example the defeat of Islamic State in Syria was due in large part to the heroism of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces fighting on behalf of the Western coalition, but Erdogan regarded them as potential enemies and grabbed swathes of Kurdish occupied territory south of the Turkish border.

Now Turkey is pitted against a NATO consensus over the wish of Sweden and Finland to join the organization to strengthen the West against the imperial ambitions of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin.  Erdogan has used the veto available to every NATO member to oppose their membership.  Once again the perceived PKK threat to Turkey’s integrity lies at the root of the issue. Turkey accuses Sweden and Finland of harboring people linked to the PKK and others it deems terrorists.

“As long as Tayyip Erdogan is at the head of the Republic of Turkey,” Erdogan told journalists on May 28, “we cannot say ‘yes’ to countries that support terror joining NATO.”

          Sweden and Finland have said they condemn terrorism and would welcome the possibility of liaising with Turkey.  Erdogan remains adamant.  Charm – at least as far as Greece and NATO are concerned – seems to have dissipated.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 7 June 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-708706

Published in Eurasia Review, 18 June 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/18062022-erdogans-charm-offensive-a-limited-success-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 17 June 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/erdogans-charm-offensive-a-limited-success/

Published in Jewish Business News, 11 June, 2022:https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/06/17/erdogans-charm-offensive-a-limited-success/