Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 December 2024
Abu Mohammed al-Julani surely never envisaged the rapidity with which the Assad regime would crumble under the assault he master-minded on November 27.
It must, however, have
been clear to him that if he was ever to make a bid to overthrow Bashar al-Assad,
this was the moment. It was a golden
opportunity. The two powers that had
come to his aid time and again in the past were both preoccupied with their own
problems. Russia was bogged down in the
quagmire of the Ukrainian war; Iran was
shaken to the core by Israel’s success in neutering Hezbollah. Assad could expect little comfort from
either. Moreover his own armed forces
were weakened by years of war, and the regime’s economy was struggling under
the burden of international sanctions.
So, seizing the moment,
Julani ordered his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia to break out of its
stronghold in the Idlib area and storm Syria's second-largest city, Aleppo. The
assault was unexpected, and government troops and security forces put up little
resistance.
The next city south on
the way to Damascus was Hama. Here,
alerted to what was clearly a determined offensive operation, the government
managed to muster some token support from Russian planes and Iranian troops,
but they were no match for the resolute HTS attack. Hama fell to the rebels on December 5. The regime was visibly disintegrating under
the HTS assault.
Two days later they captured the city of Homs after only a day of fighting, and early on Sunday, December 8, HTS-led rebels entered Damascus and began releasing detainees at the country’s most notorious military prison, Sednaya.
At the end of the week
Julani declared that he was intent on restoring some form of stable governance
in Syria, and that he was communicating with Western embassies for assistance..
On December 14 he issued
a statement claiming that his plans for the reconstruction and development of
Syria were ready. In preparing them up
he had drawn on his seven years’ experience of administering Idlib province. Since
2017 HTS had been operating what it called the Salvation Government, a civilian
administrative body which, on the lines of ISIS in its heyday, set up and ran education,
healthcare, and public services, funded by taxes, tolls, and fees. “Based on our administrative experience in
Idlib,” said Julani, “we will advance in the rest of the country’s
governorates.”
He used the same
statement to assure world opinion that he was not to be thought of as
extremist. On the contrary he was moderate, peace-loving and even-handed. “We
are not going to get into a conflict with Israel,” he announced, adding –
choosing his words with the utmost care – that he and his organization had “no
hostility toward Iranian society.”
He is at one with Israel
on that. It is the Iranian regime that
is the rogue presence in the Middle East, dedicated to its declared objective
of converting the whole world to Shia Islam, and of destroying both the US and
Israel, to say nothing of Sunni Islamic states, in the process. Now the ayatollahs are writing off the
billions of dollars they have wasted in supporting Assad. Moreover Syria’s ever-open door has been
slammed shut, and a major conduit for supplying arms to their main proxy –
Hezbollah in Lebanon – has been removed.
One of the pillars of their foreign policy has been kicked from beneath
them. The Iranian regime has been
severely, if not fatally, weakened.
Meanwhile
Julani is turning into something of an enigma.
As part of an attempt to show that he has moved from heading a militant
organization to a possible future as a political leader, he has quietly dropped
his nom-de-guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, and has asked to be referred to by
his real name, Ahmed al-Shara. Some
media outlets. including the BBC, are complying.
In a radio interview
with the BBC on December 18, he was the epitome of quietly spoken moderation,
discussing his plans to involve the whole of Syrian society in establishing its
future governance. He had earlier reassured
the minorities and non-Muslim sects in Syria that they would live in peace and
security under his rule: “No one has the right to erase another sect or
religion,” he said. “[They] have
coexisted in the region for hundreds of years.”
He has also positively
rejected the idea of autocratic rule, stressing that Syria deserves a system of
government based on institutions.
How much of this
represents his true intentions is hard to assess, given that he and his HTS are
rooted in a jihadist past. Moreover the extremist groups allied to his organization
have little sympathy with the softly-softly methods he is adopting to
consolidate his position.
Julani’s honeyed words
seem to have given new motivation to the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.
Formed in 2012, at the very start of Syria’s civil war, the body
represented all the political opposition factions that came together with the
goal of overthrowing the Assad regime and establishing a free and democratic
country.
As HTS forces proclaimed the capture of Damascus, the Coalition, although more or less moribund for years and much fractured, announced that it was committed to "completing the transfer of power to a transitional governing body with full executive powers, paving the way for a free, democratic and pluralistic Syria." Its statement made no mention of Julani or the HTS, but its vice-president, Dima Moussa, told the BBC that the "transition requires coming together of all Syrian people, including those who are carrying arms."
The Coalition then
proceeded to draw up and issue its own proposals for Syria’s future. On December 12 Anas Abdah, a member of the Coalition’s
political committee, unveiled a comprehensive plan for managing the
transitional phase in Syria.
Abdah explained that Julani’s
government “is a caretaker administration until early March. During this
period, preparations will be made to establish an inclusive transitional
government to manage the transitional phase.”
Abdah stressed that maintaining the continuity of institutions is a key guarantee of stability and preventing the collapse of the state. He suggested that the post-March 2025 transitional governing body should prepare for a national, inclusive conference aimed at building a national consensus. This conference, he proposed, would pave the way for a constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution that reflects the aspirations of the Syrian people. Based on the principle of equal citizenship without discrimination, this draft constitution would be the subject of a nationwide referendum.
Nothing of these
ambitious, possibly illusory, proposals has so far been referred to by Julani.
Whether they ever see the light of day depends on whether he sees himself as a
more moderate version of Assad, or as the political head of a democratically
elected, representative government. His
real intentions, for now, are shrouded in mystery.