The Egyptian Army’s Department of Morale Affairs (morale, please note, not
moral, which it probably isn’t), has been doing a great job since the overthrow
of the last administration.
The Department is responsible for managing the public image of the Army.
Ever since the coup, led by then-General Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi, it has been
assiduously encouraging a cult of personality around him.
His recent promotion to Field Marshal provided it with a field day. Its media campaigns have resulted in his face
appearing frequently on Egyptian state television and in state-run newspapers,
on posters and billboards, and even on memorabilia ranging from chocolates to
underpants.
The skilful
propaganda projection of him as an upbeat officer who is at the same time a
devout Muslim, harbouring traditional respect for women and Christians, goes
some way to explaining the high regard in which he is held. His popularity rating is also due, in no
small measure, to the popularity of the military, which continues to be the
most trusted institution in the country. Around 90 per cent of Egyptians
support it.
Until Wednesday, March 26, 2014 al-Sisi was Egypt ’s
deputy prime minister, the minister of defense and the commander-in-chief of Egypt Egypt Egypt
What sort of president will he make?
He often appears alongside images of the late presidents Gamal Abdel
Nasser and Anwar Sadat. Some commentators suggest
that he will take one or other of these predecessors as his model. He certainly
followed both by pursuing the “political track” within the Egyptian military,
and in particular the infantry – the corps which produced both Nasser and Sadat.
Although very different in temperament and outlook, the two late presidents
had one thing at least in common – both took Egypt
into direct combat with Israel Jerusalem to address Israel Israel in combating the jihadist terrorism current
rampant in Sinai, fostered by the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and threatening
both Egypt ’s nascent régime
and Israel
And it is on
counter-terrorism, according to Professor Robert Springborg, an expert on the Egyptian political
scene, that al-Sisi’s pre-presidential campaign has concentrated so far – both
in Sinai, and much closer to home. In
pursuit of this policy, he has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood within Egypt
As for al-Sisi’s
economic policy, it is shrouded in ambiguity. Negotiations with the IMF have
been suspended, since the conditions they would impose for a loan would be
political suicide. He continues to rely
on huge subsidies from Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf states , while he attempts to
persuade capitalists in exile to return to Egypt
Meanwhile the
economic crisis intensifies, reflected in government debt, rising unemployment,
poverty, inflation, power outages, and an absence of tourists. “For all of this,”
writes Professor Springborg, “Field Marshal Sisi has avoided any direct blame,
skilfully shuffling that off onto Prime Minister Hazem Beblawi and his hapless
cabinet, which resigned on 24 February.”
Springborg believes
al-Sisi wants to project a presidential image of a new, “believing" Nasser
(Nasser was somewhat of a secularist), although the profound changes since the
1950s within and beyond Egypt Russia
Al-Sisi would seem
to be emulating Nasser in one further respect.
He is already identifying his forthcoming presidential era as one of grand
projects, just as Nasser had done with the
Aswan Dam. Al-Sisi’s project is the proposed development of the Suez Canal
area, being heavily promoted as the key to Egypt
Anwar Sadat followed
Nasser into power, shoehorned into the presidency by Nasser 's supporters, who regarded Sadat
as a transitional figure that they believed could be manipulated easily. He was
to prove them wrong. Sadat did not agree with Nasser ’s distrust of
Islamic influence on government and opposed his socialist inclinations. He succeeded in instituting a "corrective revolution" which purged the government, political and security
establishments of the most ardent Nasserists.
In addition Sadat actually encouraged the emergence of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which had been suppressed by Nasser .
He gave them "considerable cultural and ideological autonomy" (as author Gilles Keppel has
it) in exchange for political support, little realizing the viper he was
clutching to his bosom. In this, at least, al-Sisi utterly rejects the Sadat
approach.
In 2006, al-Sisi was sent to the US Army War College to study for a master's
degree. In a research paper he warned that democracy in the Middle
East was "not necessarily going to evolve upon a Western
template". He argued that
"democracy, as a secular entity, is unlikely to be favourably received by
the vast majority of Middle Easterners, who are devout followers of the Islamic
faith". However, he did not talk about implementing Islamic law.
So President
al-Sisi is likely to rule Egypt Egypt ’s national
interests in mind, he is likely to adopt a pragmatic approach to cooperation
with Russia –
President Putin is anxious to counter US
influence in the Middle East – and with Israel , where collaboration in overcoming
extremist terrorism in Gaza
And the 1979 peace
treaty with Israel , brokered
by Egypt ’s President Sadat
and Israel
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 2 April 2014:
Published in the Eurasia Review, 1 April 2014:
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