What chance for regime change in Iran?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2025

In any consideration of a possible regime change in Iran, one potential leader stands symbolically head and shoulders above anyone else – the man born to be Shah of Iran and who, for the first nineteen years of his life, was its Crown Prince, namely Reza Pahlavi, now 65 years old.

When his father, faced by an army mutiny and violent public demonstrations, went into voluntary exile on January 17, 1979 young Pahlavi was a trainee fighter pilot at a US air base in Texas.  Two weeks later Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Islamic revolution, took control of the country.  Neither Pahlavi nor his father ever set foot in Iran again. 

To end his own exile has been Pahlavi’s main purpose in life for the past 46 years. Though living in the West under the constant threat of assassination, he has campaigned constantly for the overthrow of the rule of the ayatollahs and to return home to help create a new modern, liberal democracy that respects human rights, freedom and equality. 

In pursuit of his aim he leads a body called the National Council of Iran for Free Elections (NCI).  The Council, an umbrella group of exiled opposition figures, seeks to restore Pahlavi to the leadership of Iran, either as Shah or as president.  Meanwhile it acts as a government-in-exile, and claims to have gathered "tens of thousands of pro-democracy proponents from both inside and outside Iran."  

On June 23, in a press conference held in Paris, Pahlavi called for an end of Iran’s theocratic government.  In its place he proposed establishing a constitution based on the separation of religion and state, with liberty and equality for all citizens. 

“I am stepping forward to lead this national transition,” he said, “not out of personal interests, but as a servant of the Iranian people.”  Promising a national referendum on the nature of a future democratic Iran, he called on the “patriotic members of our armed forces” to “join the people”.  

 Pahlavi is not intent on masterminding either a military or a popular coup.  He appears to believe that a spontaneous popular uprising will topple the regime. His starting point is the burgeoning disillusion with the regime among the Iranian people.

When Iran’s then-incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was declared the winner of the presidential election in 2009 with 63% of the vote, the Iranian public was outraged.  The whole tenor of the campaign had suggested he was about to be ousted by a large majority.  Two of the other candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, alleged widespread electoral fraud and vote rigging, and called on the Iranian people to protest.

The mass demonstrations that broke out across the country gave rise to what became known as the Green Movement, a symbol of unity and hope for those demanding political reform.

The crackdown by the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps),was brutal.  Thousands were detained, while reports emerged of severe abuse, torture, and even deaths in detention.  Some protesters were killed in the streets. Dozens of detained protesters and reformists were paraded in televised trials to intimidate dissenters.

That is what might be expected following any attempt at regime change in Iran that was less than meticulously planned, fully prepared, and executed with complete professionalism. 

It took eight years before economic hardship, government corruption, and anger at the nation’s costly support of foreign proxies of the regime led to another outburst of public anger and resentment.  One notable development marked this episode.  Among the slogans chanted by protesters across the country and reported in the media were, for the first time: “Bring back the Shah”.

Then on September 13, 2022 Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, was arrested by Iran’s infamous morality police.  Her nominal offense was that she was wearing her hijab “improperly”.  Mahsa was taken to the Vozara Detention Centre.  Three days later she died.

The Iranian nation erupted in protest.

Thousands took to the streets in cities across the country.  Very soon dissent expanded beyond the severe dress code imposed on women and enforced by the morality police.  Soon the protesters began targeting the regime itself and the Supreme Leader.  Posters with the slogan “Death to the Dictator” began appearing, and videos posted online showed demonstrators burning images of Khamenei and calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty.

Last month, on May 19, a new wave of protests erupted triggered by widespread anger over poverty, corruption, and economic mismanagement by the regime.  They were marked by coordinated actions directly challenging the government’s handling of the economy and social welfare, and demonstrators chanting slogans such as “Death to Khamenei” and “Death to the dictator” were recorded.

The regime’s suppression of these mass demonstrations was brutal.  Security forces confronted protesters with tear gas and batons.  Police, backed by IRGC personnel, used force to disperse crowds, and in some cases bulldozed protest sites.  There were widespread arrests and a dramatic increase in state executions – at least 175 people were executed during May.

What forces does Pahlavi have at his beck and call to counter such ruthless suppression? The regular army remains nationalist and traditionally non-political.  He may enjoy quiet sympathy within it, but there is no visible sign of pro-Pahlavi coordination, and he seems to have nothing like the infrastructure needed to lead or support a coup.

The regular police (FARAJA) is poorly paid and sometimes shows sympathy with protesters, especially in urban centers, but there is no indication of coordination with external figures like Pahlavi.

Reformists and pragmatists inside the Islamic Republic have been marginalized since 2020, but even they do not associate publicly with Pahlavi. Many fear that aligning with an exiled figure would mean accusations of treason and possible imprisonment.  As far as the business sector is concerned, those tied to the regime (via IRGC contracts, bonyads, or patronage) will not defect unless the system is collapsing.

Finally, and perhaps crucially, Pahlavi’s team has no direct media infrastructure inside the country.  Internet censorship, intimidation, and disinformation severely limit his ability to organize or communicate with supporters on the ground.  His most effective channels are diaspora satellite stations and social media, which are limited in reach due to filtering and surveillance.

In short, there is no confirmed underground or internal network working directly for, with, or under Pahlavi. There are grassroots networks inside Iran: feminist, student, labor, and ethnic groups.  These movements are fragmented and internally suspicious of external figures, even when monarchism isn’t the issue.  

The available evidence seems to indicate that Reza Pahlavi lacks the internal support structure and organizational mechanisms required to coordinate a successful uprising from within.  He seems to hope that one will occur, and that he will be called upon to help develop a democratic government afterwards.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Is there a chance for regime change in Iran?", 30 June 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-859384

Iran’s countdown to fantasy

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 June 2025   

            

  The digital clock on display in Palestine Square, Tehran, counting down the days till Israel's destruction in 2040, as predicted by the Supreme Leader

          It was almost exactly eight years ago, on June 26, 2017, that a huge digital clock was placed prominently in Tehran’s central Palestine Square.  Beneath digital numerals​, shown consecutively ​in Farsi, Arabic and English, it began the countdown, day by day, to Israel’s extinction according to Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  In a speech in Tehran on September 9, 2015, he had predicted that Israel would cease to exist within the next quarter century. 

“God willing, there will be no such thing as a Zionist regime in 25 years,” he ​said. 

In finalizing the original nuclear deal with Iran, known as the JCPOA  (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), the permanent members of the UN Security Council, joined by Germany, allowed hope to outweigh commonsense.  Signing it on July 14, 2015, they removed a tranche of sanctions laid on the Iranian regime and handed it a huge cash bonus.  Meanwhile Iran, hand on heart, undertook to limit its nuclear program in the future to exclusively peaceful purposes.

            Of course the Iranian regime had no intention of curtailing its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, an essential step towards achieving its fundamental purpose – to destroy Western democracy, starting with Israel, and to substitute a Shi’ite theocracy across the whole world. The founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and those who followed him into positions of power in Iran, never made any secret of this ultimate objective.  Khomeini identified Israel and the United States as his prime targets, but included what was then the USSR.

“We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, Capitalism and Communism to wither throughout the world,” said Khomeini on February 1, 1979.  “We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the Islamic order of the Prophet.”  By this he meant his strict Shia interpretation of Islam, for elsewhere he had declared that the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, situated in the heart of Sunni Saudi Arabia, were in the hands of “a band of heretics”.

It is no surprise, therefore, to learn that even before the JCPOA came into effect, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was prophesying the elimination of Israel. But since Israel was widely assumed to have its own nuclear capability, a nuclear arsenal was clearly a prerequisite​.  Khamenei obviously reckoned that Iran would have acquired its nuclear stockpile well before 2040, by which time Iran would have achieved its objective.

            The Iranian leadership decided to hallow his prediction by thrusting it into the forefront of the public’s consciousness.  Plans were made to construct a digital clock, to be placed prominently in central Tehran, counting down the days until the date in 2040 when the Supreme Leader would be shown to have been touched with the divine gift of prophe​cy.  Its unveiling was the highlight of the annual Quds (Jerusalem) rally in 2017.​

Beneath the digital numerals​ appear Khamenei’s words in Farsi, Arabic and English: “The Zionist regime will not survive the next 25 years."  The day may arrive – perhaps it already has – when leadership figures, including the Supreme Leader himself, may regret the hubris that induced them to erect the clock in the first place.  It is doubtful if either of Iran’s Supreme Leaders envisaged fighting both the Little and the Great Satan, as they dubbed Israel and the US, at the same time.  Yet on the night of Saturday, 21 June, US President Donald Trump sent B-2 stealth bombers with their 30,000-pound bunker buster bombs to obliterate what was left of Iran’s nuclear program, using the deep-penetrating weapon that Israel lacks.

Insiders said this military action was not a departure from his campaign pledge to steer clear of foreign entanglements, but a reminder that American power is based on the idea of “peace through strength”.  He still puts deals ahead of military action, one former official is quoted as saying, but he recognizes that the best deals come when adversaries are negotiating from a weakened position.

“We have completed our very successful attack on the three nuclear sites in Iran, including Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan,” the president posted on social media. “All planes are now outside of Iran air space.”

          Nearly ten years have passed since Khamen​ei, then riding high in the geopolitics of the Middle East, uttered his prediction about the limited time left for Israel as an independent sovereign state. At the time Iran exerted control or influence over a "Shia crescent" – or “Ring of Fire” as Iran began calling it – stretching from Lebanon to Yemen. Hamas, Hezbollah, militias in Iraq, Assad in Syria, the Houthis – all created a noose round Israel’s neck that could be tightened at a given moment. The Iranian leadership must have persuaded themselves that it would not be long before a joint onslaught against Israel would sweep it from the map of the Middle East.

           Today Iran itself is close to collapse​.  Its proxies have been largely degraded and their leaders killed.  In Syria, Iran’s puppet Assad has been swept from power and the country can no longer be used as a overland transit route to Lebanon.  Only the Houthis in Yemen continue to follow Iran’s agenda by disrupting shipping in the Red Sea, but they have their own priorities – gaining power across Yemen – and may soon begin to put self-interest first.

Trump still envisages a negotiated end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. If the Iranian leadership believe they cannot prevail against Israel and the US combined, they will probably decide to sit down at the negotiating table. They will do so knowing that the terms demanded of them will be so stringent, and the subsequent inspection regime so intrusive, that they will be admitting they have lost their current bid to acquire a nuclear arsenal.  But the regime will still be in power, and perhaps that consideration will outweigh all others.

Weakened across the board, and with their nuclear facilities under constant attack, Iran’s Supreme Leader and his acolytes may be viewing the huge countdown clock in the center of Tehran as an embarrassment of the first order.  The longer it continues to mark down the days until Israel’s putative disappearance, the more of a humiliation it becomes.  Yet to remove it would be mortifying, an acknowledgment that far from Israel disappearing from the scene by 2040, the more likely candidate for oblivion is the Iranian revolutionary regime itself.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iran's countdown to erase Israel backfires", 23 June 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-858544 

Published in Eurasia Review, 28 June 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/28062025-irans-countdown-to-fantasy-oped/

Sanctions on speech - it could work both ways

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 June 2025

CANZUK (an acronym formed from the initial letters of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK), is an advocacy body promoting the idea of close formal cooperation between those founder members of the defunct British empire.  The organization must be rubbing its hands in satisfaction, metaphorically speaking, at their first truly joint initiative.  For on June 10 the CANZUK group of nations, joined by Norway, collectively imposed sanctions on two Israeli cabinet ministers, Itamar Ben-Gvir (Security Minister) and Bezalel Smotrich (Finance Minister). 

 To be quite clear, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are not charged with any criminal or illegal activity.  According to the document signed by the parties involved, their offense was “inciting violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.”  In other words, it was not for anything they did, but for what they said, that sanctions were imposed.

 The document proceeds to provide the signatories’ opinion about the behavior that merited the punishment:  “Settler violence is incited by extremist rhetoric which calls for Palestinians to be driven from their homes, encourages violence and human rights abuses and fundamentally rejects the two-state solution.”

The CANZUK nations and Norway apparently believe that right-wing rhetoric not only incites settler violence but, sin of sins, induces people to reject that article of faith of the western world – the two-state solution. Discounted, or ignored, is the fact that for nearly a century Arab leadership has rejected umpteen opportunities to embrace a two-state solution, starting in 1937 with the Peel Commission, but including the UN’s proposal in 1947.

Most Palestinians still do not want a two-state solution. The most recent poll of Palestinian opinion, conducted in the first few days of May 2025, reveals that some 60% of respondents reject the idea. What the majority want was revealed in a poll conducted by Birzeit University in November 2023.  It found that 74.7% of Palestinians supported “a Palestinian state from the river to the sea,” that is, across the entire land including today’s Israel, essentially eliminating Israel’s sovereign status. 

Nevertheless the West is intent on forcing a two-state solution on them.  That would involve creating a Palestinian state sited within easy striking distance of Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion airport, and certain to act as a launch pad for jihadists seeking Israel’s destruction and the slaughter of as many Jews as possible.​  Such considerations are ignored or discounted.

There ​seems to be a consensus that settler violence against Palestinians has been on the increase, while government action against the perpetrators has been inadequate.  ​Reports in the media suggest that, since October 7​, ​there are on average about four incidents of settler violence each day across the West Bank. ​  

 President Isaac Herzog has explicitly condemned the rise in extremist settler actions.
He has described settler attacks on Palestinians as “illegal and immoral” and condemned violent, cruel, and unrestrained riots by settlers against innocent Palestinian residents as a sort of revenge for terrorist attacks. Herzog emphasized that such acts contradict moral and Jewish values.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also publicly condemned settler violence – directed at times against the IDF in its attempts to restore calm – but the political imperative of maintaining the integrity of his coalition is widely believed to have held him back from taking  effective action against it.  A few violent settlers have faced legal restrictions or arrests, but the vast majority of complaints of settler violence have not resulted in convictions. 

So the issue is real, and more needs to be done to bring it under control.  ​But in what sense is it the business of foreign governments?  As each of the sanctioning governments are aware, outspoken extremists from both left and right emerge occasionally in democracies.  Western governments may have no sympathy at all with the views held passionately by right-wing Israelis, but sanctioning two democratically elected members of the Israeli government for giving voice to their opinions is unprecedented.  ​The main effect of targeting Israeli ministers will be to embolden Hamas and its fellow jihadists. 

“We remind our partners​," said US Secretary of State​ Marco Rubio,​ "not to forget who the real enemy is.”  

​ There are at least seven members of the UK parliament who have consistently promulgated unsubstantiated charges against Israel, advocated action aimed at boycotting the state, and given comfort to those intent on eliminating Israel altogether.  ​What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.​  The most appropriate action the Israeli government could take in response to Britain’s sanctions is to impose sanctions on those whose statements stir up antisemitic violence on the streets of Europe’s major cities.

When two ​on-the-record anti-Israel Labour MPs – Yuan Yang and Abtisam Mohamed – were turned back at Israel’s borders on April 5 because they had “supported campaigns aimed at boycotting the State of Israel”, what a furor there was in the UK parliament.

Britain’s Middle East minister, Hamish Falconer, opened an 80-minute debate on the matter by telling the Commons that this was “no way to treat democratically elected representatives”. 

        There is also a ​distinct group ​of MPs in the UK parliament dedicated to an anti-Israel agenda. In the general election of July 2024, a ​number of Muslims decided to​ ​contest Labour​-held constituencies with significant Muslim populations. ​In four of them they managed to unseat the sitting Labour MP. A fifth winning contestant was Jeremy Corbyn, the left-wing former leader of the Labour party who once described Hamas and Hezbollah as his friends.

        The five, calling themselves the Independent Alliance, have became a sort of anti-Israel lobby in parliament. In addition to Corbyn, the members are:

        Shockat Adam: “Israel has done everything in its capacity to try and destroy any chance of Palestinian statehood — through settlement, land theft and now the wholesale decimation of Gaza.”

        Adnan Hussein: “They let Gaza burn… Now let’s make Israel burn, let’s make Israel burn. We will stop their funding…”

        Ayoub Khan: “The Government have done little to change the course of Israeli aggression.”

        Iqbal Mohamed: “Find every brand…that has been supporting Israel and Zionism … Put the list on your fridge.”

        So there are at least seven members of Britain’s parliament spreading hatred of Israel and encouraging its boycott. If sanctions on rhetoric are now the order of the day, why should Israel not declare to the world that it will no longer tolerate active advocacy of anti-Israel action? These seven, at least, might each have the sanction of persona non grata slapped on them, and be told that their presence in Israel would be unacceptable in any circumstances.

Published in the Jerusalem Post 16 June 2025, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Israel can sanction UK lawmakers just as they sanctioned Israeli ministers":

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-857762

Iraq in the changing Middle East

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 10 June 2025

          The US invaded Iraq in 2003 to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein.  When the fighting was over, the UN established UNAMI (the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq).  It was created at the request of Iraq’s interim governing council to support the country’s reconstruction and political development.  Later UNAMI’s role was expanded to embrace a constitutional review, regional dialogue, and human rights.   

 At the end of this year UNAMI will be wound up.  In May 2024 the Iraqi government petitioned the Security Council to terminate its operations, citing the significant progress Iraq had ​made in political stability and governance.  Iraq​, said prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani​, had advanced beyond the need for continuous outside support​.  As a result the Security Council unanimously agreed t​hat the mission​ would ​end on December 31, 2025.

Today, both politically and economically, Iraq is relatively stable.  The government has been in office since October 2022, and the large-scale anti-government protests that rocked Iraq in 2019–2021 have died down.  All the same an under-current of public discontent rumbles on, based on poor services, youth unemployment and corruption in high places.

A  glance at the map reveals that Iraq lies cheek-by-jowl with its much larger neighbor to the east, Iran, along a border some 1600 kilometers long.  Ever since 2003 Iran has exerted substantial influence across many aspects of Iraq’s economic, political, and social life.  Recently this influence has been meeting increasing resistance.

Iraq imports a significant portion of its electricity and gas from Iran, ​and Iranian-backed businesses and financial institutions have a strong presence​ in the country.  Iran supports various Shia political factions and paramilitary groups​ and through them has, in the past, exercised considerable influence ​on Iraq​i politic​s, including appointments, security policies, and parliamentary votes.

However, Iran’s grip on the nation is weakening.  Many Iraqis, including nationalists and youth movements, resent Iranian interference, particularly its role in violent crackdowns on protests and perceived infringement on Iraqi sovereignty.

A major cause of tension within Iraq’s body politic are disagreements between the state and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 

Iraq’s 2005 constitution recognizes the Kurdistan Region as a federal, semi-autonomous entity with its own parliament, president, and security forces. The region has the right to manage its natural resources, but disputes over sharing its oil revenues have persisted. 

On June 5 Reuters reported that Iraq's oil ministry had declared it was holding the KRG legally responsible for the continued smuggling of oil from the Kurdish region.  The dispute centers on a 2022 ruling by Iraq's federal court that Kurdish authorities should hand over their crude oil supplies to the central government. The oil ministry is saying that the KRG’s failure to comply with the law has hurt the public revenue​s, and has forced the government to cut output from other fields to meet OPEC quotas.

  With that internal issue still to be resolved, Iraq is increasingly confident in its international persona.  It hosted the Arab Summit on May 17, held in Baghdad, which considered among other issues Egypt’s plan for the reconstruction of Gaza once the fighting is over.  Significantly, that conference was attended by the interim president of Iraq’s “new” neighbor to the north-west – post-Assad regime Syria.  The invitation was extended to Ahmed al-Sharaa by Iraq’s prime minister, al-Sudani, when they met in Doha in April.

   The Iraqi government’s initial response to the overthrow of the Assad regime was cautious.  It closed border crossings and deployed troops to the 630-kilometer border with Syria. There has been a slow shift towards a more pragmatic approach.  Iraq has been sending officials on formal visits to Syria, virtually acknowledging the legitimacy of the new regime.

Iran-affiliates in Iraq, all of them Shi'ite, have opposed this, or indeed any normalization with post-Assad Syria or its Sunni interim president.  Over fifty members of the Iraqi parliament signed a petition to reject al-Sharaa’s attendance at the Baghdad summit, while the leaders of militia groups active in Syria until recently, posted direct threats to Sharaa on their social media.

Writing on the Atlantic Council’s website on June 4, Iraqi international relations analyst Shermine Serbest said: “At this turning point in the region’s history, Iraq has a rare opportunity to start a new chapter with Syria….Opening effective channels of communication between the Iraqi and Syrian governments will be critical in efforts to stabilize and normalize…Iraq should also work closely with the new Syrian regime to establish a high-level security cooperation, including immediate investments in border crossings and towns, to prevent the resurgence of extremist groups and smuggling activities across the joint border…Baghdad should continue to identify economic opportunities and solidify them with memoranda of understanding, trade agreements, and investment deals…Over the past thirteen years, Iraq’s role in Syria has been marked by hardship and complexity. Now, the current Iraqi administration holds the opportunity to turn a new page and help shape a future defined by peace and regional cooperation.”

 The remaining strength of pro-Iran interests in Iraq will be tested in the next parliamentary elections, slated for November 11, 2025.  Under Iraq’s constitution these elections will determine the composition of the 329-seat Council of Representatives of Iraq. The elections are expected to be a significant indicator of Iraq's political direction, especially concerning the balance between nationalist movements and Iran-aligned parties.

Under Iraq’s constitution the country’s president is not elected by popular mandate but by a vote in the parliament.  The most recent presidential poll occurred on 13 October 2022, resulting in the election of Abdul Latif Rashid for a four-year term. Consequently, the next presidential election is expected to take place in 2026, following the formation of a new parliament.

The wild card in Iraq’s electoral process is the enormously influential figure of Muqtada al-Sadr, paradoxically both a Shi'ite cleric and a strong anti-Iran nationalist. 

His Sadrist movement won 73 seats in the 2021 elections – far more than any other party – but in June 2022 he ordered all 73 members of his bloc to resign amid a political impasse over government formation. This effectively removed his movement from the legislative arena, and they have not returned since.

As a result a three-party Iran-aligned coalition, the Coordination Framework, has exercised most political influence in the parliament.  In what appears a somewhat perverse decision al-Sadr has announced that his movement will boycott the upcoming November elections, citing concerns over corruption and foreign influence.  He may yet change his mind.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iraq's new chapter: UNAMI's exit and the battle for sovereignty," 10 June 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-856937

Published in Eurasia Review, 16 June 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/13062025-iraq-in-the-changing-middle-east-oped/

Peace in Gaza

This letter was published in the Daily Telegraph, 5 June 2025: 

SIR - Philip Crowe writes that “the suffering inflicted upon the innocent is unacceptable.” War is unacceptable, but it is sometimes forced on a nation, as it was forced on Israel on October 7, 2023. Hamas, backed by Iran, is openly engaged in an attempt to eliminate Israel as a sovereign nation, killing as many Jews in the process as possible. Its spokesmen have threatened to repeat the massacre of 7 October “again and again.” That is why Israel is seeking total victory over Hamas, and its disempowerment. It also explains why calls for a ceasefire that allows Hamas to remain in control in Gaza is unacceptable to those responsible for the protection of Israel and its citizens.

Neville Teller



This is the letter as submitted:

SIR - I suspect that many like me who lived through the Second World War would find Philip Crowe’s position on the Gaza war (Letters, June 4) inadequate. He writes, putting all other considerations aside, “the suffering inflicted upon the innocent is unacceptable.” Equally unacceptable, from a humanitarian point of view, was the flattening of Berlin and other German cities with their vast civilian death toll and suffering, to say nothing of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. War itself is unacceptable, but it is sometimes forced on a nation. It was forced on Israel on 7 October 2023. When it was forced on Britain, Churchill gave voice to the nation’s aim: “Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival."

The Nazis were not threatening Great Britain with annihilation but with subjugation. Hamas, backed by Iran, is openly engaged in an attempt to eliminate Israel as a sovereign nation, killing as many Jews in the process as possible. Its spokesmen have threatened to repeat the massacre of 7 October “again and again.” That is why Israel is now seeking total victory over Hamas, and its disempowerment. It also explains why calls for a ceasefire that allows Hamas to remain in control in Gaza is unacceptable to those responsible for the protection of Israel and its citizens.

There is ample evidence that the Israel Defense Forces expend very considerable efforts to minimise civilian suffering, while Hamas – holding on to its illegally snatched hostages – uses for propaganda purposes the inevitable casualties of the war they initiated.

Neville Teller

After the war is over

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 June 2025

            One day the fighting in Gaza will end – how or when remains a matter of speculation, hope or despair.  ​With the latest Witkoff ceasefire formula in the balance and Israel's “Operation Gideon’s Chariots” ​in full swing, a final end to the conflict could be months or even years away.​

Nevertheless Gaza cannot remain a devastated battleground forever, even if – as prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced to the media on May 5 – the IDF holds on to conquered areas of the Strip until Hamas is well and truly cleared from them;  or - a possibility reported in the media three days later – the US leads a temporary post-war administration for a while.  A “day after” will undoubtedly arrive, and on that day a fully-prepared plan for reconstruction will be needed, primed and ready to be put into effect.

            An early vision of a possible future for Gaza was announced to an astonished world by Trump on February 4, 2025.  He declared that he intended the US to take over ownership of the Gaza Strip and convert it into the “Riviera of the Middle East”.

            His proposal sent shock waves through the region, but when he then suggested that the entire Gazan civilian population should be resettled in neighboring countries during the development process, he faced a torrent of dissent from the world at large, and the Arab world in particular. 

To counter Trump’s proposals, Egypt took the lead in formalizing ideas already in circulation for reconstructing, developing and administering post-war Gaza.  An Arab summit was hastily convened, and on March 4 the Egypt-led post-Gaza-war plan was officially unveiled.  The comprehensive reconstruction plan was approved and adopted unanimously. 

Since then it has gained significant traction among international stakeholders including the UN, the EU, and the African Union.  UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres "strongly endorsed" the Egyptian plan, saying the UN stood ready to cooperate fully in implementing it. 

The Egyptian initiative addresses both immediate humanitarian needs and the long-term governance and reconstruction of Gaza.  It envisages a three-phase process: first, immediate humanitarian action;  then a multi-year reconstruction effort; and finally establishing a new governance structure for Gaza.

The first phase is planned to be completed in about six months; the rebuilding and governance reforms are estimated to last about a further four to five years.

The plan explicitly excludes Hamas from any involvement in the future governance of Gaza.  It also bars the Palestinian Authority (PA) from direct administrative control, but it does envisage an umbrella-type council composed of Palestinian technocrats, operating under the auspices of the PA but supported by an international Governance Assistance Mission.  In addition, to maintain security during the transition, it proposes the establishment of an International Stabilization Force to be led by Arab states.

            It is obvious that the cost of rebuilding Gaza’s towns and cities and their infrastructure will be astronomic.  Egypt’s three-phase plan puts it at $53 billion, to be expended over 5 years.  For the first six months of humanitarian relief, the reconstruction program is costed at $3 billion.  Phase two, which would involve rebuilding infrastructure such as roads and utilities, and constructing 200,000 permanent housing units, would cost some £20 billion.  The final phase, lasting two-and-a-half years and costing $30 billion, aims to complete infrastructure, build another 200,000 housing units, and develop industrial zones, ports, and an airport.

To finance this $53 billion plan, Egypt proposes establishing an internationally supervised trust fund to receive, channel and manage financial support from a wide range of international donors.  The initiative envisages a broad coalition of donors including the UN, global financial institutions, the wealthier Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the European Union, and other international bodies.

Although it is widely supported, the US and Israel have reservations, such as the lack of explicit measures for the disarmament of Hamas, the involvement of the PA, and the potential engagement of UNRWA.

Hopes of the reconstruction plan being ready for action as soon as the fighting ends were dashed at the Arab summit held in Baghdad on May 17.  In his speech Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said that Egypt plans to host an international conference for the reconstruction of Gaza, “once the aggression stops”.

 ​He seems to need the expressions of approval for his plan to be backed by commitment.  Nevertheless Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, said that Iraq will work on setting up an Arab fund for the reconstruction of the region in which Baghdad will pay $20 million for Gaza and a similar amount for Lebanon.​  

In their closing media release, the Arab leaders reiterated their opposition to Trump’ s idea of displacing Gazan civilians.  Any such move, they said, would be “a crime against humanity.”

In line with the Egyptian plan, Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, called on Hamas to abandon power in Gaza and, along with other militant groups, hand over its weapons to the PA.

In fact a large question mark looms over Hamas’s true attitude toward the Egyptian proposals.

On March 5, the day after the Arab League had unanimously endorsed the plan, Hamas issued a statement praising Egypt’s role in devising it, and urging "all necessary steps to guarantee its success".  It framed this statement as support for Palestinian-led reconstruction, and made no mention of its own exclusion from the future governance of Gaza. 

The truth is that Hamas probably aims to retain a controlling presence through local networks, civil servants, and security forces. Moreover the plan’s lack of explicit disarmament clauses could allow it to retain some form of military capability.  This issue will need to be resolved if Saudi Arabia and UAE funding is to be secured to implement the plan.  Both states demand not only Hamas’s exclusion from any part of the governance of post-war Gaza, but also its total disarmament.

In essence, Hamas’s acceptance of the Egyptian plan is a survival tactic aimed at securing a foothold in post-war Gaza, while retaining as its long-term strategy the total elimination of Israel through armed conflict. 

Whether Egypt’s plan, or any modification of it, ever sees the light of day depends on a range of unforeseeable and imponderable factors.  Nevertheless, instead of hanging fire and waiting for the fighting to end before holding a conference to finalize the details, as Egypt seems to be suggesting, the plan’s supporters should expend every effort to ensure that any problems have been ironed out, and that it is ready to swing into action the moment the conflict has formally ended.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Arab nations' post-war Gaza plans are not ready for the 'day after'."

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-856404

UK-Israel Free Trade deal on hold

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 26 May 2025

In the afternoon of Monday, May 19, David Lammy, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, rose to his feet in the House of Commons and read out a statement condemning how the war in Gaza was being conducted by the Israeli government.

“Netanyahu’s government is planning to drive Gazans from their homes into a corner of the Strip to the south,” he said, “and permit them a fraction of the aid that they need…The planned displacement of so many Gazans is morally unjustifiable, wholly disproportionate and utterly counter-productive.”

“We cannot stand by in the face of this new deterioration,” said Lammy. “Therefore today, I am announcing that we have suspended negotiations with this Israeli government on a new free trade agreement…The Netanyahu government’s actions have made this necessary.”

 ​Clearly Britain’s Labour government has little sympathy with Israel’s Likud-led coalition​. Nevertheless it condemns Hamas’s bloodthirsty incursion into Israel on October 7, 2023.  UK ministers, from the prime minister down, reiterate time and again their support for Israel’s right to defend itself, and continue to demand that Hamas release all the hostages it snatched during its pogrom. Beyond this, however, there seems little, if any, empathy with the formidable problems that Israel faces, or with its efforts to deal with them.

The left wing of Britain’s Labour party is notoriously anti-Israel – a euphemism, many believe, for frank antisemitism.  This was demonstrated beyond any doubt during the five years the party was led by the radical Jeremy Corbyn (2015-2020). 

In May 2019 the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a body legally charged with promoting and enforcing the UK’s equality and non-discrimination laws, launched a formal investigation into whether Labour had "unlawfully discriminated against, harassed or victimized people because they are Jewish."

The legacy Corbyn bequeathed to Sir Keir Starmer, who succeeded him as Labour leader and is now Britain’s prime minister, was the EHRC report, published in October 2020.  In it the EHRC determined that the Labour party had indeed been "responsible for unlawful acts of harassment and discrimination" against Jewish people.  As a result, the party was legally obliged to draft an action plan to remedy the unlawful aspects of its governance. 

But pro-Palestinian sentiment was too deeply embedded in the Labour party for ​the leadership to ignore​ it.  The manifesto on which Starmer’s Labour party fought the July 2024 general election declared:  "Palestinian statehood is the inalienable right of the Palestinian people.”  It went on to commit a future Labour government to recognize a Palestinian state “as a contribution to a renewed peace process which results in a two-state solution, with a safe and secure Israel alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state.”

 Following the Hamas attack of October 7, Starmer stood shoulder-to-shoulder with then-UK prime minister Rishi Sunak, then-US president Joe Biden, and most Western political leaders, in proclaiming Israel’s right to defend itself.  His stance was not acceptable to two entities he faces on his own political terrain, and this remains his problem​ today.  One is the powerful hard-left element within his party; the other is the strong Muslim presence in some traditionally Labour constituencies.

Four years ago there were some 4 million Muslims in the UK, representing about 6% of the population.  The figures are almost certainly higher than that today, and in certain areas represent a significant proportion of the voting electorate.

Labour’s pro-Palestine component began to assert itself on October 7 itself, with scattered voices approving the Hamas attack.  The collateral civilian deaths and casualties arising from the IDF campaign were enough for the party’s support for Israel to begin to slide. Then came the first test of electoral opinion in the UK since October 7.  On May 2, 2024 local elections took place across the country.  The results, no doubt to Starmer’s dismay, indicated that Labour’s position on the Israel-Hamas war had dented its support in Muslim areas.  A BBC analysis found that in areas with a substantial Muslim presence Labour's share of the vote had slipped by 21% compared with the last time the seats were contested.

Ali Milani, chair of Labour Muslim Network, said Labour's positioning on Gaza "is going to have a serious electoral consequence.” 

He was not wrong.  In the general election in July 2024, which Labour won with a landslide, five independent pro-Palestine candidates unseated Labour incumbents in key constituencies. Four were Muslim; one was Jeremy Corbyn.

In the aftermath, Corbyn announced plans to form a parliamentary alliance with the four independent Muslim MPs. Th​is permanent anti-Israel bloc in the House of Commons, supported by many radical Labour MPs, has ​resulted in increased advocacy for Palestinian rights, and increased pressure on the UK's foreign policy decisions related to the Middle East.  It has contributed to the decision announced by Lammy to suspend the negotiations aimed at securing a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) between the UK and Israel.

A​s the UK left the EU, it signed a continuity agreement with Israel​ to ensure uninterrupted trade between the two countries.  Coming into effect on 1 January 2021, ​it coincided with the end of the Brexit transition period​ and maintain​ed the terms of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. ​ ​On July 20, 2022 ​ the UK and Israel embarked on the negotiations for a FTA ​. ​With both parties ​world leaders in hi-tech, the negotiators aimed​ ​particularly to enhance collaboration in technology, innovation, and digital services.

The talks were conducted against the backdrop of flourishing ​UK-Israel bilateral trade.  There had been year-on-year growth from 2014 to 2018, when the figure reached $10.5 billion​. Subsequently both Brexit and Covid caused the figure to fluctuate​. The best estimate of UK-Israel bilateral trade in 2024 is $7.2 billion.

The suspension of negotiations for a UK-Israel FTA will not necessarily have a major impact in the short term. Trade between the UK and Israel will continue under the UK-Israel Trade and Partnership Agreement, concluded at the time of Brexit.  Businesses will still be able to trade with relative certainty, and supply chains will remain intact. What might be affected is investor confidence.

If the suspension is maintained, however, the consequences for both parties could be significant.  The half-formalized FTA aimed to modernize and expand the​ bilateral  trade framework to cover areas such as digital trade, cybersecurity, med-tech, green energy, AI, intellectual property rights, fintech, optics and lasers, aerospace and defense, sustainability and government procurement.  Without the developmental boost that the FTA was calculated to provide, growth in these hi-tech areas, in which Israel is a world leader, will certainly slow down.  The UK, no less than Israel,​ will lose out.​  And so ​will the world at large​. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "UK freezes trade with Israel - and integrity with it", 26 May 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-855313

Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 May 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052025-uk-israel-free-trade-deal-on-hold-oped/

Israel's choices in Gaza

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 19 May 2025

          It boils down to two stark alternatives.  Negotiate a full hostage release, end the war and leave Hamas still functioning; or defeat Hamas, ensure the return of all the hostages, and help build a Hamas-free future for Gaza. 

The former course is currently being offered by Hamas at the negotiations in Doha; it means the terror organization would remain in being, free to continue its existential vendetta against Israel.

The latter course is being pursued now by the Israeli government and, if successful, removes the constant threat by rocket and missile attack that has endangered Israeli lives and property for nearly twenty years.  It removes a neighboring entity dedicated to Israel's destruction and the slaughter of its people.  

If it does succeed, it will not be without cost.  There will inevitably be much collateral death and injury, and Israel’s international reputation will be further damaged.  In pursuing this strategy Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is clearly modelling himself on Winston Churchill in the Second World War when he declared: “Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival."

The release by Hamas on May 12 of Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander after 584 days in captivity significantly energized and advanced ceasefire-hostage release negotiations between Israel and Hamas. 

Brokered by the US, Egypt and Qatar, they had just resumed in Doha on May 7 after a period of deadlock, but Alexander’s release acted as a catalyst in re-energizing the discussions.  Qatari spokesperson, Majed Al-Ansari, said Alexander's release "gave a push to Gaza ceasefire negotiations," adding that Qatar was working with mediators Egypt and the US to bridge the gap between the two sides.

That gap, however, remains dangerously wide.       

The latest US-backed proposal under discussion is the so-called Witkoff framework,  named for Steve Witkoff, President Donald Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East. It would see the release of as many as half of the remaining living hostages in exchange for a ceasefire lasting several weeks. During this period, Israel would engage in talks about ending the war, but without agreeing in advance to a permanent cessation of hostilities.

In fact Netanyahu refuses to commit to ending the war or withdrawing from Gaza as a precondition for further hostage releases.  In the days leading up to Trump’s tour of the Middle East, he delivered a clear ultimatum to Hamas.  They had until the end of Trump’s four-day visit to the region to accept the terms of the Witkoff plan, or Israel would unleash the full force of its Operation Gideon’s Chariots into Gaza. This military operation has as its objective to crush Hamas militarily and politically, secure the release of all hostages, and establish permanent Israeli control over recaptured areas in Gaza.

Netanyahu emphasized that if Hamas did not comply Israel would launch its major ground operation; in the meanwhile any ceasefire-hostage release negotiations would be conducted "under fire," meaning that there would be no pause in military activities except for brief periods to facilitate hostage releases.  That is what is now taking place.

It was on May 15, perhaps to mark what Palestinians term “Nakba Day” – their commemoration of the mass displacement that accompanied the birth of the State of Israel – that Israeli military operations in Gaza intensified. Widespread airstrikes targeted more than 130 militant sites, including rocket launchers and command centers. Ground operations were also conducted in areas like Rafah and Gaza City.

  As for Netanyahu’s ultimatum to Hamas, President Trump’s visit to the region has ended and, despite ongoing negotiations and US pressure, Hamas has still not agreed to implement the Witkoff framework.  

Hamas’s terms for releasing the remaining hostages are a guaranteed permanent ceasefire and full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.  So far, this has been its red line.  While the group has indicated that it is willing to discuss disarmament and the transfer of governing power to an independent Palestinian technocratic committee, it has consistently maintained that, for a comprehensive deal, ending the war and an Israeli withdrawal is non-negotiable.   Its reasons are not hard to discern.  Even though it has gone along with the demands, including from the Arab world, that it disarms, it cherishes the hope that it might somehow retain influence and a presence in a postwar Gaza.  This would only be possible if Israel had no presence there.

Egyptian and Qatari mediators, with US support, are attempting to bridge the divide by proposing an initial ceasefire longer than previous ones (potentially several months), during which substantive negotiations on a permanent end to the conflict would occur.  Mediators hope the extended truce will create space for further agreements.

On May 13, as part of Israel’s broader strategy to degrade Hamas’s command-and-control infrastructure and prepare for intensified military operations if peace talks fail, the IDF targeted Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Mohammed Sinwar.  The airstrike hit the Gaza European Hospital in Khan Yunis, where Sinwar was reportedly present in an underground command-and-control center located beneath the hospital.  His death awaits official Israeli confirmation, although Arab media have been reporting that he died in the air strike.

Israeli defense sources believe that two other leading Hamas figures were with Sinwar in the tunnels beneath the hospital during the strike, namely Muhammad Shabana, head of Hamas's Rafah Brigade; and Abu Obaida, Hamas's military spokesman. Both may have been killed with him.

Mohammed Sinwar’s elimination could possibly lead to greater negotiating flexibility from Hamas.  Media reports suggest that Sinwar has been one of the hardest-line figures in the Hamas leadership – arguably even more extreme than his brother Yahya, killed in October 2024. He was among the top operatives behind the onslaught on Israel on October 7, 2023, and has since shown no signs of moderation or willingness to compromise. On the contrary, he has demonstrated that to maintain Hamas’s grip on Gaza he is ready, indeed willing, to sacrifice tens of thousands of lives. He has repeatedly blocked a ceasefire, or any deal with Israel.

If he is indeed out of the picture, more pragmatic voices within the leadership might be heard.  Muhammad Ismail Darwish, Khalil al-Hayya and Nizar Awadallah - all of whom are in the Hamas talks team - have recently demonstrated some inclination to compromise and focus on negotiation over continued conflict.

In short the Israel-Gaza ceasefire and hostage release talks are active but stalled, with both sides holding firm on core demands.  For the moment Israel seeks a temporary truce tied to limited hostage releases;  Hamas insists on a permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal as conditions for release of all hostages.  Meanwhile international mediators continue efforts to find common ground, and Israel seeks final victory over Hamas.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Israel must make its next choices regarding Gaza very carefully", 19 May 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-854486

Normalization between Syria and Israel – it is possible

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 12 May 2025

         When President Donald Trump visits the Middle East in May 2025, he will find it much changed from the last time he was there in May 2017.  To take only one example, the long half-century of autocratic Assad family rule in Syria is over.  Today the nation is living with a new reality, and the rest of the world is trying to come to terms with it.  First among the confusing issues are the true intentions of the man who swept down from the north, leading his highly trained militia, and overthrew the regime of Bashir al-Assad in a matter of days.

Known then as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and invariably pictured in uniform, he has since cast aside both his military persona and his name. He now dresses in statesmanlike suits, and answers to the name Ahmed al-Sharaa.  Appointed Syria’s interim president in January 2025, he formed a transitional government in March, suspended the Assad-era constitution, produced an interim one, and pledged to draft a new constitution within a few years.

The interim constitution commits the nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, explicitly pledges to maintain freedom of opinion and expression, and establishes a People’s Committee to function as an interim parliament.   

On March 10, three days before al-Sharaa signed it, he signed a landmark agreement with the leader of the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF), Gen. Mazloum Abdi.  The SDF was in effective control of the Kurdish-occupied area in northern Syria known as Rojava. 

Basically the agreement recognizes the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian nation.  It stipulates that the Kurdish-led SDF is to be integrated into the nation’s military forces, and that all Rojavan civil and military institutions will merge with new state institutions. 

This joint decision has potentially vast implications. Syria’s new constitution, when it eventually appears, could propose a situation akin to that in Iraq, where a Kurdish-majority area has been recognized as a federal entity and accorded autonomy within the constitution. 

Al-Sharaa’s agreement with the SDF seems to substantiate his declared intention to rule over a pluralistic society.  He has promised amnesty for most former regime loyalists, and assured religious minorities that he will safeguard their rights. He has also stated that the new Syria would not be used as a launchpad for attacks on neighboring countries, including Israel.

It is inevitable that many in government and the media remain highly skeptical about al-Sharaa’s intentions, believing that the leopard cannot change its spots.  They look back to his history and see only a dyed-in-the-wool jihadist.

Born in Riyadh in 1982 to a Syrian family from the Golan Heights, al-Sharaa grew up in Damascus.  He went to Iraq when the US invaded in 2003, subsequently joined the jihadist group, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and was imprisoned by American forces from 2006 to 2011.  When released he returned to Syria and in 2012 founded the al-Nusra Front.  In 2016, he severed ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded his militia as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). ​ It was as the leader of HTS that he toppled the Assad regime.

His subsequent words and actions send a largely positive, but still mixed message. Major media outlets highlight his democratic pledges, yet question whether the moderate persona he is now projecting is a pragmatic facade. 

Confidence was badly shaken on March 6, when Alawite civilians in Syria’s coastal and central provinces were attacked and slaughtered by government forces.  This was followed by violent encounters with Druze rebels in Damascus on May 1. Two days followed of deadly sectarian violence involving the Druze minority and pro-government forces, and on May 3 Israel carried out an intense wave of airstrikes in Syria, claiming it was protecting the Druze minority. 

Those still mistrustful of al-Sharaa’s true intentions also point to the retention of Islamist clauses in the provisional constitution he has established.  Yet even the most cynical would find it difficult to deny that a new spirit is abroad in Syria.

A demonstration of Syria’s changed future occurred outside the UN building in New York on April 25.  Syria’s foreign minister, Asaad al-Shibani, watched as the two-starred red, white and black flag of Assad’s Syria was lowered, to be replaced by the three-starred green, white and black flag previously used by HTS.  This is now Syria’s official emblem.

“This flag is not a mere symbol,” said al-Shibani, “but rather a proclamation of a new existence ... embodying a future that emerges from resilience and a promise of change after years of pain.”

On April 25, the New Arab bore the headline: “US Congressmen claim Syria's Ahmed al-Sharaa open to Israel normalization”.  The story beneath reported that Congressman Cory Mills had held a 90-minute meeting with Sharaa, who had indicated that he was willing to normalize relations with Israel.  Mills was accompanied by fellow Congressman Marlin Stutzman who separately told The Jerusalem Post that Sharaa was interested in joining the Abraham Accords. 

"Sharaa said that he was open to the Abraham Accords,” said Stutzman, “which would put them in good standing with Israel, other Middle Eastern countries, and, of course, the United States."   

Both Congressmen are Republicans, and have Trump’s ear.  It is not impossible that he will take the opportunity of his visit to advance the idea of Syria-Israeli normalization with his hosts – Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

          There seems to be a solid base to work on. During al-Sharaa’s visit to French President Emmanuel Macron on May 7 both leaders confirmed that Syria has held indirect talks with Israel through mediators, aiming to reduce tensions, particularly after recent Israeli strikes near Damascus. Macron condemned these strikes, and Sharaa expressed openness to "technical discussions" with Israel.

No doubt the Golan would be included. Israel views the Golan as vital to its security, and annexed it in 1981.  During Trump’s first administration the US recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, a move that Biden’s administration did not overturn.  Any demand to reverse the situation would certainly scupper normalization discussions.  To achieve the benefits that would flow from normalizing relations with Israel, al-Sharaa would probably adopt the pragmatic approach favored by other Abraham Accord states, and put the issue on the side burner. 

There is no doubt that the tenor of remarks by al-Sharaa from the start of his governance seem to favor conciliation toward Israel and suggest a potential openness to the principles of regional normalization and cooperation embodied in the Abraham Accords.  If Syria’s interim president eventually delivers the inclusive, unified, well-governed state that he promises he will have proved himself the most remarkable leader to have emerged in the Arab world for generations.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Normalization between al-Sharaa's Syria, Israel possible after decades of hostilities", 12 May 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-853558

Published in Eurasia Review, 16 May 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/16052025-syria-israel-normalization-its-possible-oped/