Why did Syrian president Bashar
al-Assad meet with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on May 17, 2018? "Quite comprehensive negotiations took place,“
was the explanation offered by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.
With his tongue in his cheek, no
doubt, and perfectly aware of where the credit really lay, Putin congratulated
Assad on the success of the Syrian government forces in the
fight against terrorist groups. He
then moved on to the consequences of that success. Putin has said more than
once that as the military phase of the Syrian civil war reached its end, the
time for constitutional reform and the resumption of a fully-fledged political
process would follow .This, moreover, would allow him to withdraw the bulk of
Russian armed support, another objective he has stated on more than one
occasion.
Whether or not any pressure was
applied to Assad, he enthusiastically endorsed Putin’s position. In a statement following the talks, he said: "Today
I confirmed to President Putin that Syria will send a list of its
delegates to the UN constitutional committee to discuss amendments
to the current constitution. This will be done as soon
as possible."
Putin riposted: "Russia
welcomes this decision by the Syrian president, and will support it
in every possible way."
But there was something odd about
the whole proceeding, because everything agreed between Putin and Assad on May
17 had already been signed and sealed back in January, at the Congress held in
Sochi to which the UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, had been
invited.
(Credit: YouTube)
De Mistura had appreciated the
significance of his invitation. In a message to media representatives, he noted that in its Final Declaration,
the Congress had agreed that a constitutional committee should to be formed
tasked to draft a constitutional reform, and that it should include the Syrian
government delegation, Syrian experts, independents, tribal leaders, women and representatives
of Syria’s ethnical and religious leaders, Also to be included was a widely-representative
opposition grouping. Syrian government representatives had so far consistently
refused to sit down with the main opposition group, which wants Assad to have
no part in Syria’s future.
De Mistura was pleased that the
task of establishing the constitutional committee had been remitted to him as
the UN’s special envoy. and that final agreement was to be reached within the
UN-led Geneva process. He would decide the criteria for committee members and
select about 50 people.
Since agreement had already been
reached, why did Putin summon Assad back to Sochi for a further
head-to-head? Perhaps to emphasize that this
time the Syrian government delegation simply must sit at the table and
negotiate; perhaps to guarantee that
whatever the outcome of the constitutional process, Assad would not be
unceremoniously booted from office; perhaps to make a generous offer, if such an
eventuality becomes necessary, of a dignified retirement and a luxurious haven
in Russia for Assad and his family.
Whatever else Putin’s purposes may
have been, there was certainly a need to stiffen Assad’s resolve to proceed
with the constitutional committee, because two weeks after the Sochi Congress,
at which unanimity seemed to have been reached, the Syrian government
delegation reneged on the agreement.
“As a state,” declared Ayman Soussan, an assistant to the Syrian Foreign Minister, at a press
conference in Damascus, ”we are not bound by, nor have any relation with, any
committee that is not Syrian formed, led and constituted. We are not bound by
anything that is formed by foreign sides, whatever their name or state, we are
not bound by it and it is of no concern to us.”
Nine rounds of UN-sponsored peace
talks, most of them in Geneva, had failed to bring Syria’s warring sides
together. Finally the powers that had
emerged as the principals in the Syrian situation − Russia, Iran and Turkey − had
banded together in an effort to move beyond the 7-year war into the political
reconstitution of Syria, and had sponsored the Sochi Congress. Success had been virtually in their grasp,
when the cup was snatched from them. The same could not be allowed to happen
again.
Yet the path was far from smooth,
despite Assad’s apparent compliance with the agreed way forward. On the face of it, Assad’s team seemed more
obstructive than he was himself. Ahmad
Al-Kuzbari, a Syrian parliamentarian and a participant in the Sochi conference, had pronounced that any
constitutional amendments or additions proposed by the new UN constitutional
committee would have to be subject to a referendum in Syria. "Nothing will happen,” said Al-Kuzbari,
“except under the provisions of the current constitution, which the people
voted on in 2012."
He seemed to envisage the UN
Constitutional Committee validating the Syrian constitution hastily introduced
by Assad back in 2012, in an attempt to stave off the rapidly growing civil rebellion. The new constitution, which abolished the
one-party state, and instituted a form of democracy and presidential elections,
limiting the term of office for the president to seven years with a maximum of
one re-election, was adopted on 27 February 2012, following a referendum. With what authority did Al-Kuzbari speak?
A careful comparison of Assad’s
compliant words to Putin with what de Mistura has said reveals the basis of
Al-Kuzbari’s assertion.
Assad: "Today I confirmed
to President Putin that Syria will send a list of its delegates
to the UN constitutional committee to discuss amendments to the
current constitution.”
De Mistura: “a constitutional committee is to be formed
comprising the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic government, along with a
widely-represented opposition delegation, for drafting a constitutional reform.”
In short, Assad envisages discussing
amendments to the current constitution; de Mistura believes his committee will
be drafting constitutional reform.
If hard-liners believe they can
stave off the introduction of a newly conceived constitution by insisting that
the 2012 one remains valid and could be used to veto it, they may be greatly
mistaken. It is more than likely that
the committee will recommend starting with a completely clean slate.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 6 June 2018:
https://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Syria-the-next-steps-559291
Published in the Eurasia Review, 4 June 2018:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/04062018-syria-the-next-steps-oped/
Published in the MPC Journal, 4 June 2018:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2018/06/04/syria-the-next-steps/
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 6 June 2018:
https://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Syria-the-next-steps-559291
Published in the Eurasia Review, 4 June 2018:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/04062018-syria-the-next-steps-oped/
Published in the MPC Journal, 4 June 2018:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2018/06/04/syria-the-next-steps/