Why do the Palestinians say no?

          Why did the Palestinian Authority (PA) instantly and vehemently reject the Trump Vision for Peace as it was announced on January 28, 2020? Why indeed had PA President Mahmoud Abbas already rejected it, sight unseen?  Why had he and the Palestinian leadership refused even to contemplate the economic leg of its Middle East peace plan: Peace to Prosperity ?  Subtitled A New Vision for the Palestinian People, the 40-page document set out in considerable detail a scenario under which, with a huge input of funding and economic aid, prospects for the Palestinian people would be immeasurably transformed for the better. 

          In the document’s own words: “with the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over 10 years, Peace to Prosperity represents the most ambitious and comprehensive effort for the Palestinian people to date. It has the ability to fundamentally transform the West Bank and Gaza, and to open a new chapter in Palestinian history – one defined not by adversity and loss, but by freedom and dignity.”

          The economic plan, covering all aspects of Palestinian life from education and health care to taxes, roads and railways, was based on three pillars – the economy, the people and the government.

         A main goal of the economy pillar – to connect Palestinian-occupied areas to regional and global markets – included integrating Gaza and the West Bank “through an efficient, modern transportation network, including a transportation corridor directly connecting” the two areas. “Billions of dollars of new investment will flow into various sectors of the Palestinian economy,” said the document, which also detailed how “hospitals, schools, homes and businesses will secure access to affordable electricity, clean water and digital services.”

          The second pillar aimed to “improve the well-being of the Palestinian people” through educational programs, vocational and technical training, expanding the female labour force, reducing Infant mortality and increasing average life expectancy.

          The third pillar proposed a range of reforms in the Palestinian government including reforming the tax structure and increasing exports and direct foreign investment.

          Root and branch rejection from Palestinian leaders and spokesmen was immediate. Abbas said “there can be no economic solution before there’s a political solution.”

          There are several causes for this downright refusal to engage.

          One is how deep “anti-normalization” has penetrated the Palestinian psyche. For hard-line supporters of the Palestinian cause, “normalization” (or tatbia in Arabic) is the worst political sin. It has been adopted as a term of abuse by the Palestinian leadership and by organizations which support them, including the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement. In the view of the anti-normalizers, no form of joint activity, cooperation or dialogue with Israelis is acceptable - even engaging with Israeli peace activists who have the best of intentions towards them. All such must be viewed as collaboration with the enemy, the “colonial oppressors” of the Palestinian people.

          The elephant in this room is the fact that every day some 130,000 Palestinians cross into Israel from the West Bank to work for some 8,100 employers. They bring home about 5 billion shekels ($1.4 billion) each year. Their average salary is two-and-a-half times the average salary in the Palestinian autonomous areas.

          In addition to the Palestinians who work in Israel, around 36,000 are employed in Israeli firms in the West Bank, many earning up to three times the average Palestinian wage. Israel has established several industrial zones there, comprising around 1,000 businesses in all.

          This on-going demonstration of Palestinian-Israeli joint activity on a massive scale is rarely referred to by the anti-normalization activists, perhaps because of the sheer number of Palestinians, multiplied by their families, involved.

          So turning a blind eye to this inconvenient aspect of the issue, the anti-normalization campaign has devised a long and detailed rationale for its programme. One of the document’s core assumptions is that Israel is a “colonial oppressor”, a charge made repeatedly in the paper. It is shorthand for the argument that Israel was created as the result of invasion and occupation of the Holy Land by Western colonialists, and that the Jewish people have no historic connection to it. As a logical consequence, the anti-normalization document calls for resistance to Israel’s existence.

          The paper asserts that joint cooperative initiatives aimed at fostering peace “serve to normalize oppression and injustice.” The two-state solution is rejected out of hand. In its view acknowledging Israel’s right to exist at all “advocates an apartheid state in Israel that disenfranchises the indigenous Palestinian citizens”.

          It seems clear from what BDS and its supporters write and say that, in their minds, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not over and Israel is a temporary phenomenon that, given sufficient time and effort, will be eliminated,. Any attempt at reconciliation, at normalization, undermines this objective. It is a sad fact that by refusing to accept that Israel is a permanent presence in the Middle East, by advocating continuing resistance and turning their backs on any attempt at reconciliation, they are essentially condemning generations of Palestinians, as well as Israelis, to a perpetual state of conflict. The PA leadership seems to view this prospect with equanimity.

          Then, of course, there is the undoubted fact that the PA leadership has painted itself into a corner. Vying with Hamas on the one hand, and extremists within its own Fatah party on the other, it has glorified the so-called “armed struggle”, making heroes of those who undertake terrorist attacks inside Israel, and reiterating the message in the media and the schools that all of Mandate Palestine is Palestinian and the creation of Israel was a national disaster.

          The end-result of its own narrative is that no Palestinian leader dare sign a peace agreement unilaterally with Israel based on a two-state solution. They dare not even give a tacit nod towards peace negotiations. The consequent backlash from within the Palestinian world, to say nothing of the personal fear of assassination, have made it impossible. The only hope of progress towards an eventual accord lies in the creation of some sort of Arab umbrella – a group of Arab states prepared to back a return to the negotiating table. 

          The PA position seems to be that Trump’s “Deal of the Century” is carved in stone and is non-negotiable, that it is a case of take it or leave it. That is not the situation.  In the words of the document itself:   "We hope that the parties will seize the opportunity, embrace this vision, and begin negotiations."  A Palestinian leadership genuinely committed to reaching an accommodation with Israel could take the proposals in Vision for Peace as a starting point for negotiations, especially as there is so much on offer to the benefit of the Palestinian people.

          The plan proposes four years in which to come to an accord. It is time that should not be wasted in unproductive rejection for rejection’s sake.

Published in the Eurasia Review, 27 June 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/27062020-why-the-palestinians-say-no-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 27 June 2020:
https://mpc-journal.org/blog/why-the-palestinians-say-no/

Published in The Times of Israel, 30 June 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/why-do-the-palestinians-say-no/

The West Bank – some clear thinking required

          Storm clouds have gathered on the political horizon. They are already moving swiftly toward Israel. If the new government does not soon take a firm grip, it will be overwhelmed by a veritable hurricane of universal condemnation. Israel’s enemies, like the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, will have achieved their aim. Israel will be delegitimised in the eyes of the world.

          Perhaps because the new government was so long in the making, Israel’s publicity and media relations machine has still not swung into action. As a result there is confusion in Israel and abroad about what action the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is actually proposing in the West Bank. Action of some sort he certainly indicated during his election campaign. Because there has been no subsequent clarification, global opinion has decided that he intends unilaterally to annex Israeli-occupied areas within Area C. That perception has given rise to pre-emptive condemnation from around the world, not least from much Jewish opinion in the diaspora. 

          There are at least three ways to view the issue. 

          First, the matter of land-swaps is central to the Trump peace plan – rejected totally by the Palestinian Authority, but given a cautious welcome by a clutch of Arab states including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. 

          In essence the plan breaks through the argument over the status of the “occupied territories” – namely the areas conquered from the Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian armies in the Six-Day War in 1967. In line with previous US determinations, the plan does not recognize the West Bank as Palestinian land since it belonged to no sovereign state when it was fought over and won by Israel. Accordingly, the plan allows Israel to incorporate the settlements in that area – historically known as Judea and Samaria – into Israel proper. 

          Nevertheless the plan envisages the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the areas outside the settlements, plus a Gaza greatly expanded by the yielding of Israeli territory south of the Strip. All Palestinian occupied territories would be made contiguous by way of a network of highways and a road tunnel linking the West Bank to Gaza. That prospect is dependent on the Palestinian leadership fulfilling certain preconditions – such as renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel as the Jewish state. The plan allows four years for these conditions to be met. 

          At the White House on January 28 both Netanyahu and Benny Gantz accepted the plan, and undertook to abide by it. If the government were to indicate that any change in status of the West Bank was part of a firm intention to facilitate a sovereign Palestinian state, the anti-Israel situation could be largely de-toxified. The onus would then be on the Palestinian leadership to justify their objection to talking peace. 

          A second cause of confusion is to equate extending Israeli law and sovereignty to West Bank Jewish communities with “annexation”. They are not the same, but the government has so far issued no indication as to which path it is taking. Taking Israeli communities under normal Israeli jurisdiction rather than leaving them under military occupation could seem a reasonable step to much unprejudiced opinion. 

          Thirdly, as two experts in international security from the University of South Wales pointed out in the Jerusalem Post on June 7, Israeli action in the West Bank can be viewed from either end of the telescope. Extending Israeli jurisdiction to Jews living in the West Bank could indeed be seen as extending the scope of Israeli sovereignty. Alternatively, it could be viewed as Israel disengaging from its military occupation of Palestinians and taking its own citizens under its wing. 

          The current problem is that there is no firm hand at the tiller of Israeli public and media relations. A clear decision needs to be taken at top leadership levels as to what exactly is proposed in regard to the West Bank, and then the government publicity machine must carve out a firm line to disseminate to the world’s media, and get on and disseminate it.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 24 June 2020 as: "The many viewpoints on West Bank annexation"

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/the-many-viewpoints-on-west-bank-annexation-opinion-632685

Is there any justification for “annexation” in the West Bank?

There is very nearly universal agreement that it would be not only illegal under international law, but disastrous for both Israel and the Palestinians if Israel were to go ahead with extending its sovereignty to encompass Israelis living in the West Bank.  In the interests of balance and a fuller understanding of the issue, this is an attempt to set out the opposite case.

          “Peace to Prosperity” is the plan devised by the Trump administration as the basis for a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinian leadership. One of its aims is to achieve a contiguous, viable sovereign Palestine comprising 70 per cent of the West Bank together with a Gaza expanded by three substantial land swaps – in other words, a two-state solution. With the deal comes a huge financial boost to the Palestinian Authority, and an economic aid package akin to the Marshall Plan. Both Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Benny Gantz, Israel’s alternate prime minister, have accepted it. It is only within the terms of this plan that any extension of Israel’s sovereignty is being contemplated.

          The essence of the legal case for Israel extending its sovereignty to Israeli citizens living in Area C of the West Bank is that under international law, by way of an international legal instrument unanimously approved by the 51 members of the League of Nations in 1922, Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem are within the territory designated as the “national homeland of the Jewish people”. The treaties in question, which have never been abrogated, amended or rescinded, are the San Remo Resolution of 1920, and the League of Nations’ Mandate for Palestine of 1922, preserved by Article 80 of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, which grant Jews the irrevocable right to settle anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

          Turning to “annexation”, the term is universally agreed to be “the incorporation of newly acquired territory into the national domain”. Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, the argument runs, cannot be construed as “newly acquired territory”, since under international law they have always been part of Israel proper. “Annexation” as legally defined does not apply where the country considered to be doing the “annexing” already possesses sovereignty.

          As for the term “occupied territory”, the classic and received definition of “occupied territory” in international law is laid out in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations: “Territory is considered occupied when … a belligerent state invades the territory of another state with the intention of holding the territory...” However, Israel did not invade Judea and Samaria in 1948. The invading “belligerent state” was Jordan, and the territory invaded belonged to the nascent State of Israel. So the territory that Israel reclaimed in 1967 had never been “the territory of another state,” nor did Israel obtain it by a war of aggression but rather by undisputed self-defense.

          In short, the conclusion of this legal opinion is that what is being proposed by Israel is not “annexation” but rather the lawful exercise of full sovereignty over the State of Israel’s own legitimate territory.

         It need hardly be said that this interpretation of international law is strongly, and almost universally, disputed. Unfortunately there appears to be no wholly independent international judicial forum in which it could be tested.

Lord Jonathan Sacks: Why "We" is more important than "I"

My review of  "Morality:  Restoring the Common Good in Divided Times”  by Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks appears in the edition of the Jerusalem Report, dated July 6, 2020.

          Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks’s new book, Morality: Restoring the Common Good in Divided Times is an impressive tour d’horizon of the state of the western world – the US and the UK in particular – at the end of the second decade of the 21st century. Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, the UK’s Chief Rabbi for 22 years, subjects western civilization to a detailed and acute analysis, and concludes that in the course of their evolution, modern societies have veered far from the principles that for millennia bound nations together.

          In particular he finds that whereas historically a nation’s moral sense was lodged in its individuals and communities, successive generations have progressively handed it over to the state and the market-place. While both have achieved some positive benefits for their societies, neither can provide the moral compass that helps individuals and communities to live meaningful lives.

          Sacks brings this thought down to the simple disparity between “We” and “I”. He sees an inexorable rise of the “I” concept over the past 40 or 50 years, highlighting so-called “identity politics” as one obvious manifestation. Increasingly political campaigning has degenerated from considering the needs of the nation as a whole, to concentrating on the interests of a series of self-identifying minorities. This phenomenon has resulted in what Sacks calls an "assault on free speech” in the social media and even in universities, originally conceived as bastions of freedom of expression and the pursuit of truth. Opinions at variance with what minorities hold to be inviolable are being silenced. Increasingly only those parroting “acceptable” opinions are being allowed a voice.

          In attempting to define what he means by “morality”, Sacks concentrates on his “We-I” contrasting views of how to live the good life. “The “We” basis has fallen into decline,” he maintains, with many an example to prove his point, and the “I” is at the heart of the new morality. “Our children and grandchildren are paying the price of abandoning a shared moral code”.

          In a recent interview, he explained that what made him put pen to paper was his sense that the West is in dark times, and that we have lost sight of the common good and been seduced by individualism.

          The loss of a sense of “we” – what Sacks calls cultural climate change – was caused, he says, by the social revolution of the 1960s, the economic upheaval of the 1980s, and the recent social media revolution with its focus on the presentation of self.

          But Sacks was writing in what might be designated the “BC” era – Before Coronavirus. Many of the deficiencies that he correctly identified as dominating our world up to January 1, 2020 were swept away in the unprecedented pandemic era. The media of the time is filled to overflowing with examples of the “We” approach sweeping all before it. Selfless devotion to community interests manifested itself wherever the coronavirus gained hold and multiplied. In the UK the bitter divisions that had dominated the Brexit debate only a few short weeks before simply faded away.

          Many people believe that once the pandemic has retreated the world will never be the same again. If this proves to be the case, Sacks will surely rejoice that out of evil, the good that he is advocating emerged – that it was lying dormant, only awaiting an opportunity to manifest itself. He says: “We need to recover the sense of ‘all-of-us-together’”. That much-to-be-wished consummation was surely achieved in the periods of lockdown, self-isolation, and soaring hospital admissions, when literally thousands of people, both professionals and next-door neighbours, came forward to bring relief and comfort to people in difficult circumstances. As Sacks says: “Morality is the capacity to care for others. It is a journey beyond the self.” If he saw this quality diminishing in the BC world he was describing, he would surely recognize that it was in full evidence during the pandemic.

          How much of this traditional morality – previously atrophied – will survive is a matter for speculation. Perhaps history will record that it blossomed but briefly, and western society returned unchanged to the BC world that Sacks describes. But perhaps the changes were too profound to be kicked into the side grass, for they were previously unimaginable.

          One area Sacks singles out for scrutiny is economics. He insists that a nation’s economics needs an ethical dimension, that markets were made to serve people, not the other way around. Could anyone have envisaged governments borrowing billions in order to pay wages for workers who were unable to earn a living, and loans and mortgages for companies forced out of business by the virus?

          It is not impossible that the old BC concept of what is owed by government to its citizens has undergone a sea-change, and can never return to what it was.

          Sacks maintains that the future of western civilization depends on the whole population becoming involved in rebuilding our common moral foundation. That, he asserts, is how the general public will come to understand that a nation is strong when it cares for the weak, and rich when it cares for the poor. It could be that the coronavirus pandemic that has shaken us to the core has also set us on the path towards achieving Jonathan Sacks’s worthy objective.

Erdogan’s dangerous game

        Russia’s foreign and defense ministers were due to visit Turkey on June 14. At the last minute the visit was called off. No reason was given.

        Relationships between states are notoriously unstable. Old enmities dissolve into new alliances and back again with cynical speed, depending on perceived self-interest. The process is rendered relatively easy when the states in question are ruled by autocratic near-dictators.

        Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is one such. Erdogan is a volatile and unstable element in the Middle East. What Erdogan has sought in his political career first and foremost, is absolute power. He has managed to win something very close to it by outwitting his formidable political opponents, both at home and abroad. Skilfully he managed a constitutional coup which first placed him in the presidency, and then redefined the role, function and powers of the office. Since then he has not hesitated to use his dominant authority to imprison a wide range of political opponents and to cripple or silence as much of the critical media as possible.

        Although Erdogan is the sort of strong man that US President Donald Trump admires, their relationship deteriorated sharply during 2019. What irked Erdogan was US support for the Kurdish fighters who had played such a major role in defeating ISIS in Syria. Because the Kurds aspired for some form of autonomy both in Syria and in Turkey itself, where their demands had sometimes turned violent, Erdogan regarded them as his enemies. At one point the Kurdish issue had US and Turkish troops firing on each other across the Syrian-Turkish border.

        Then, perhaps to demonstrate his determination to pursue an independent line, Erdogan announced that he intended to purchase a Russian S-400 air defense missile system. Turkey is a member of NATO, and at the same time he was trying to buy the latest generation of US stealth jet fighters, the F-35.

        He was attempting the impossible. The S-400 system is specifically designed to detect and shoot down stealth fighters like the F-35. If Turkey acquired both, Russia would be able to learn all about the American-made fighter jets. So when it became clear that Erdogan had no intention of taking US objections into account and was insistent on receiving the Russian ground-to-air missile system, Washington cancelled the F-35 deal.

        And then, suddenly, in October 2019 the wind veered. Had Trump blinked? in a surprise move he succumbed to Erdogan’s urging and pulled American troops away from Syria’s northern border, Many saw the move as a betrayal of the West’s longstanding Kurdish allies.

        The sudden withdrawal cleared the way for Turkey to seize control of a band of Kurdish occupied territory along the border inside Syria – a move, incidentally, agreed with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. Also in October the FBI acceded, after years of hedging, to Erdogan’s request for an investigation into the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gulen, whom he accuses of masterminding a failed coup in 2016. Moreover Trump has held off imposing sanctions against Turkey for its purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system. while in Libya he stood aside as Erdogan intervened to support the UN-recognized head of state and prime minister, Fayez al-Sarraj, against warlord Khalifa Haftar.

        Behind Trump’s change of stance is, perhaps, an attempt to prevent a Turkey-Russia axis developing – a possibility that would not be welcome in Washington. Has he succeeded?

        The Russo-Turkey S-400 deal pulled the two nations into close affinity, but the political situation in Libya perfectly illustrates the convoluted nature of such Middle East relationships. Nominally, Russia and Turkey are on opposite sides of the conflict. Turkey supports the Government of National Accord (GNA); Russia is backing Haftar, the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in his bid to conquer Libya and become its leader. When Turkey supplied its state-of-the-art military technology to the GNA, Russia responded by sending fighter jets in support of Haftar’s LNA. 

        Yet the two nations are collaborating closely on attempting to secure an end of the conflict and a negotiated settlement. 

        Talks between Erdogan and Putin back in December 2019, nominally to inaugurate the TurkStream gas pipeline, resulted in a joint statement calling for a cease-fire in Libya. In January Haftar was induced to travel to Moscow to discuss an accommodation, but he backed out. 

        Far from discouraged, Russia pressed ahead. In May the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed on the need for an immediate ceasefire in Libya, and called for a resumption of the UN peace-making effort which had virtually ground to a halt. The same scenario was played out in June. On the 9th, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to work together to create a peace process in Libya.

        Some observers see disturbing similarities between Libya’s civil war and Syria's. The same foreign powers – Russia, Turkey, Iran – have intervened in pursuit of their own interests. Iran is believed to have supplied Haftar’s LNA with weaponry including anti-tank missiles. Erdogan and Putin may have extended to Libya the deals they made in Syria – for example, the use of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group.

        The BBC finds it significant that Haftar’s pullback from Tripoli, his LNA enhanced by Russian Wagner troops, was not harassed by Turkey's military drones. One commentator believes that Russia and Turkey are trying to carve up long-lasting spheres of influence in Libya, their eyes on the country’s vast oil and gas potential. What is certain is that the two nations have been discussing joint development of aviation and air defense systems This was confirmed on June 2 by the director of Russia’s military-technical co-operation service, Dmitry Shugayev, who went on to say that there was a great deal more potential for collaboration. 

       Turkey, NATO member though it is, has consistently plowed its own furrow, often to the exasperation of fellow members. For example, even when Western countries combined to fight Islamist terror groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State, Erdogan continued supporting the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots. Erdogan’s independent line has already rendered Turkey’s possible inclusion in the European Union a non-starter. How stable is his new-found friendship with Russia? In pursuing his nation’s self-interest as he now sees it, Erdogan is playing a dangerous game.

Published in the MPC Jounal, 19 June 2020:
https://mpc-journal.org/blog/erdogans-dangerous-game/

Published in the Eurasia Review, 20 June 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/20062020-erdogans-dangerous-game-analysis/

Published in The Times of Israel, 21 June 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/erdogans-dangerous-game/

"Annexation" in context

This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today, 16 June 2020

Sir

The letter from Crispin Blunt and others (June 13)** does not mention “Peace to Prosperity: a vision to improve the lives of the Palestinian and Israeli people” – the plan devised by the Trump administration.  It is within the terms of that plan that any extension of Israel’s sovereignty to parts of the West Bank is contemplated.

The British Government welcomed the American  plan as “a positive step forward”.    Dominic Raab, the Foreign Secretary, described it as “a serious proposal”.  Both Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz (Israel’s alternating prime ministers) were present when the plan was unveiled at the White House, and both accepted it.

The target of the plan is to achieve a contiguous, viable sovereign Palestine comprising  70 per cent of the West Bank together with a Gaza expanded by three substantial land swaps.

With the deal comes a huge financial boost to the Palestinian Authority, and an economic aid package akin to the Marshall Plan. 

The Palestinian leadership has rejected the plan. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE all gave it a reasonable reception, some urging the Palestinians to start negotiating on its basis.

Neville Teller

**It appears under the headline: "Opposing the Israeli government's land grab"

Assad faces the Syrian people’s fury

Early June saw Syria erupt into nationwide demonstrations against the president, Bashar al-Assad. A beleaguered population, exhausted by years of civil conflict, were at the end of their tether. Spiralling oil and food prices, deteriorating economic conditions and the collapse of the Syrian pound were hitting them hard. Until the civil war began in 2011, about 50 Syrian pounds bought one US dollar. In early June 2020, it took 2500, and the situation was deteriorating fast. 

        Popular demonstrations took place even in As-Suwayda, the Druze-majority province that had remained loyal to Assad throughout the war – and the call from all sides was for Assad to resign. Videos broadcast on social media showed people marching through a market in Suwayda chanting anti-government slogans like "Leave now Bashar", and "The people want the fall of the regime". Other videos showed protesters chanting "Out with Russia. Out with Iran", indicating popular frustration with the foreign powers that were sustaining Assad and his regime.

       Against every expectation back in the early days of the Arab Spring, Assad has not only clung to power but, with the help of Russia and Iran, has managed to claw back about 70 percent of Syria from the ISIS military and the Syrian rebels who rose up against his dictatorial regime in the first instance.

        The US alliance assembled to assist the democracy-demanding rebels was never fully committed. “No boots on the ground” was the understanding, and the assistance was restricted to logistical support and training. The highly successful on-the-ground fighting was left to the Kurdish Peshmerga troops in the Free Syrian army, and they were rewarded late in the day by President Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops, and a US-Turkey deal aimed at fragmenting the Kurdish occupied region in north-eastern Syria known as Rojava.

        The purchasing power of incomes within the areas being administered by the Assad regime have plummeted, and the UN says that the number of food-insecure people in the country has risen to more than nine million. Over 80 percent of Syrians are said to be living in poverty. Food, petrol, gas, and other basic goods are in short supply; electricity blackouts are widespread.

        The Damascus regime, under sanctions from both the European Union and the US, has lost 75 percent of its GDP since the war began. In dire financial straits, it might have hoped for relief from one or other of its major allies, Russia or Iran. But both of them, too, are subject to economic sanctions and in no position to extend effective financial support.

        The EU imposed restrictive economic measures against the Syrian regime and its supporters to express its displeasure at “the repression of the civilian population”. Sanctions currently in place include an oil embargo, restrictions on certain investments, a freeze of the assets of the Syrian central bank held in the EU, and export restrictions on equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression. In addition a travel ban and an asset freeze are in operation against 269 persons and 69 entities in Syria considered to be responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population, benefiting from or supporting the regime, and/or being associated with such persons or entities.

        As for US sanctions, mid-June is when a new batch – imposed under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Law − are due to take effect. Their purpose is to penalise foreign companies that deal with Syrian firms linked with the government. All of which is likely to exacerbate the regime’s economic problems, possibly to breaking point. (“Caesar” is a nod to the pseudonym used by the Syrian military police photographer who smuggled out nearly 55,000 photographs evidencing systematic torture perpetrated by the Assad government in prisons and detention facilities across the country).

        The last time Geir Pedersen, the UN Special Envoy for Syria, addressed the Security Council was in mid-May 2020. He had few words of comfort to offer. On the contrary, he told them, he had the new crisis of COVID-19 to contend with.

        “The coronavirus,” he said, “has added a new layer to the grave economic predicament.” Antonio Guterres, the UN secretary general, has appealed to all sanctions-imposing bodies to waive sanctions restricting the ability of countries to fight the pandemic. Pedersen, acknowledging that “relevant States” had given such assurances, said he was closely following their commitments to apply humanitarian exemptions.

       As for his remit under UN Resolution 2254 to facilitate peace talks, Pedersen virtually shrugged his shoulders.

        Which perhaps explains the action taken by Russia on 8 June 2020. Unable to assist with the economic disaster, Syria’s major ally launched a series of air raids on villages in Syria's northwest Idlib province, and on towns bordering neighboring Hama province. At least 12 towns were hit, and two civilians were killed.

        The attacks were the first since the ceasefire, brokered by Turkey and Russia in March 2020, halted a three-month air and ground campaign that killed hundreds of people and created the worst displacement crisis of the 10-year war. Nearly a million people were forced to flee, many seeking shelter in the already overcrowded camps near the sealed border with Turkey.

        This may be a push to try to secure Idlib finally for Assad, mopping up the rebel opposition forces and securing another chunk of pre-civil war Syrian territory for the regime. Even if successful, however, it is not likely to do anything to placate the nation’s fury at Assad and his government for the dire straits into which it has plunged the country. 

Published in the Eurasia Review, 13 June 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/13062020-assad-faces-the-syrian-peoples-fury-analysis/

Published in the MPC Journal, 15 June 2020:
https://mpc-journal.org/blog/assad-faces-the-syrian-peoples-fury/

ISIS is still alive and kicking

          During its heyday in 2014-2015, Islamic State (ISIS) conquered great tracts of Iraq and Syria and ruled over some 11 million people. It took four years for the US coalition, relying heavily on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), slowly but surely to win back ISIS-held territory, squeezing its fighters into an increasingly tight enclave. The final battle took place on Saturday, March 23, 2019, in the village of Baghuz on the banks of the Euphrates, on Syria’s eastern border. 

          As ISIS began to register its territorial losses, it adopted a new official slogan: “Remaining and expanding” (baqiya wa’tatamaddad). And this was the catchphrase hurled defiantly at US journalists visiting the al-Hol detention camp in northern Iraq on October 28, 2019, one day after US President Donald Trump had announced the death of self-styled caliph and leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a US raid in Syria,

          A few days later ISIS named its new caliph as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Speculation in the media immediately ran rife. Al-Qurashi was not a name known to counter-terrorism analysts, but they are well aware of the “smoke and mirrors” tactics of jihadist groups in the matter of names, pseudonyms and noms de guerre. Attention soon focused on the man who had been al-Baghdadi’s deputy – Amir Mohammed

Abdul Rahman al-Mawli, also known as al-Hajj Abdullah.

          There were two apparent reasons for providing al-Mawli with a pseudonym. In the first place, there was a ransom of $5 million dollars on his head – a sum offered for his capture by the US State Department's Rewards for Justice program. In the second, it was believed that al-Mawli did not fulfill one essential requirement for the position of caliph of the Muslim world – direct descent from the Quraysh Hashemite tribe, and thus from Muhammad himself. Only someone claiming this could be regarded universally as a legitimate caliph able to command the full support of jihadis around the world.

          As for al-Mawli, he had been a religious scholar in al-Qaeda, then joined its ISIS off-shoot where he rose to assume a senior leadership role. In 2014 he helped organize, and then justify, the abduction, slaughter, and trafficking of the Yazidi religious minority in northwest Iraq.

          Much of the Yazidi community lived in Sinjar, close to the Syrian border. After ISIS had taken Tal Afar and Mosul, the group murdered thousands of Yazidi men, and enslaved thousands of Yazidi women and children, in what the United Nations has called a genocide. A former ISIS operative, quoted by CNN, testified that al-Mawli, using the name al-Hajj Abdullah, played a leading role.

          Now he is beginning to exploit new opportunities that have opened up for ISIS to destabilise the Western world. The Covid-19 pandemic is one such.

          It is not generally known that ISIS publishes a weekly newsletter called Al-Naba (the Dispatch). Its purpose is to update even far-flung provinces about the group’s global campaign of violence, and to disseminate a common program to ISIS affiliates. In the March 19 edition it instructed its followers to “exploit disorder” in pandemic-weakened states.

          The editorial, titled “The Crusaders’ Worst Nightmare”, points out that across the world commerce is grinding to a halt, and people are shutting themselves in their homes. The editorial suggests that this is a golden opportunity. Muslims have a duty to protect themselves and their loved ones from the coronavirus, says Al-Naba. but also to act. ISIS supporters are urged to liberate Muslim captives from prisons and camps; to show no mercy to the “infidels” and “apostates” in their moment of crisis, but to attack and weaken them. The best way to avoid God’s punishment, including coronavirus, it says, is through obedience and the act of obedience most beloved to God is “jihad” and inflicting pain on His enemies.

          There is evidence that the call to arms has been heeded.

          On April 17, with the Philippines in a month-long quarantine, ISIS-linked gunmen opened fire on a military convoy in the remote province of Sulu. They killed 11 troops engaged in an operation against the leader of ISIS in the Philippines. They had been tracking him since he masterminded a deadly Cathedral bombing in January 2019.

          ISIS undertook two other attacks in April, both in countries in which they had apparently never operated before. In the Maldives, “soldiers of the caliphate” set several boats ablaze in a warning to the nation’s “apostate” government. And on April 24 Mozambique police reported a massacre of 52 villagers in the oil-rich Cabo Delgado region, an outrage claimed by a local affiliate of ISIS. In announcing the massacre, the Mozambique government added that it was the first time that ISIS had struck in their country,

          Europe has not been spared in this flare-up of ISIS activity. On April 15, German police arrested four suspected ISIS members in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia, who authorities believe were planning to attack American military facilities in the country.

          Rita Katz, director of the SITE Intelligence Group which tracks online networks affiliated with jihadist and white supremacist organizations, says: ““Since the pandemic started and weakened the capacity of law or security enforcement around the world, ISIS has persisted in operations across Afghanistan, West Africa, Central Africa, the Sahel, Egypt, and Yemen.”

          These attacks come on top of continued activity by ISIS in their heartlands of Syria and Iraq. Hit and run strikes have increased on Syrian Army positions and those of its allies near major towns along the banks of the Euphrates, and also their bases in the desert in south-eastern Syria. At the same time, ISIS has mounted offensives right across Iraq, resulting not only in Iraqi army casualties and those of allied paramilitary units, but often also claiming the lives of innocent civilians.

          The UN Monitoring Team tracks the global jihadi terror threat. According to a report submitted to the UN Security Council in January, ISIS's resilience is partly explained by its vast wealth. Now that the group no longer administers a large state, its former substantial overheads have been cut right back and, said the report, according to a conservative assessment by UN member states, ISIS still has $100 million in reserves.

          There is no room for complacency. ISIS still poses a major threat to the civilized world.

Published in the Eurasia Review, 6 June 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/06062020-isis-is-still-alive-and-kicking-analysis/

Published in the MPC Journal, 5 June 2020:
https://mpc-journal.org/blog/2020/06/05/islamic-state-is-still-alive-and-kicking/

Published in The Times of Israel, 8 June 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/isis-is-still-alive-and-kicking/

What Britain’s Jews want from their Israeli ambassador

 This article of mine appears in the Jerusalem Post magazine on Friday, June 5 as "British Jews' Expectations of an Israeli Ambassador"

          Mark Regev’s time as Israel’s Ambassador to the Court of St James’s – as the official designation goes, St James’s Palace being the official residence of the British monarchy – is drawing to a close. Having done sterling service representing Israel to the United Kingdom for the past four years, he is due to be replaced in August. If reports are to be believed Tzipi Hotovely is at this moment mulling over the offer of the post made to her by prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, shortly after his own reappointment.

          What are the qualities that Britain’s Jewish community look for in the man or woman sent to represent Israel’s interests in the UK? We can take for granted that they hope for an exemplary political track record, good character, probity and a lack of skeletons in the cupboard. Aside from these, the one outstanding requirement – as any Jewish Brit would endorse – is the ability to speak fluent, accentless Engish. 

          Why is this important? Because, to an extent unimaginable, and therefore totally unappreciated, to anyone not born and bred in the UK, the British ear is extraordinarily sensitive to how people sound. Just a few spoken words give rise in any British listener to a spectrum of emotional reactions. This phenomenon is rarely discussed by the inhibited British and therefore, not being understood, accorded little importance by government and other agencies seeking to influence UK public opinion. It is all bound up with the once deeply entrenched British class system which, though greatly diminished over the past half-century, lingers deep in the national consciousness. 

        George Bernard Shaw exposed the issue in his 1912 play “Pygmalion”, converted by Lerner and Lowe into the musical “My Fair Lady”. As Professor Higgins observes in verse and song: 

   “An Englishman’s way of speaking absolutely classifies him: 

    The moment he talks he makes some other Englishman despise him.” 

         That is an observation undoubtedly true in its time, and with a certain veracity even today. It undoubtedly extends beyond Englishmen. The UK’s airwaves are awash with politicians, activists and people of all sorts with a case to make. Their ability to carry conviction on British radio or television often depends less on what they say, as on how they say it.

          For much of the British public, hearing an accent not native to the UK causes a bulb in the mind to flash “foreigner – beware” (full marks to the minds in which it does not). The red danger signal may moderate to amber when it is clearly an Aussie or Kiwi (Australian or New Zealander) speaking – maybe also for South Africans and the soft Atlantic tones of Canadians. In most other cases the reaction is often scepticism, and the feeling that whatever is being said is not to be trusted. It takes a skilled advocate to overcome this hurdle.

          In short it is essential, to a degree that has too often been quite unappreciated, for people speaking on behalf of Israel in the British media to do so in a way that carries conviction to a British audience – and that means speaking in an accent that leads to the message being received favourably. Heavily accented English can never do that. Even an American accent raises negative reactions in many, though less so these days than in the past. Left wing opinion in the UK is inherently anti-American, and there are many who would discount the validity of any case put across in an American accent.

          This accent issue explains why Mark Regev, Israel’s present ambassador to the UK, has proved such an outstanding success.

          To his very considerable skills as a stalwart advocate on Israel’s behalf, he has brought the inestimable additional benefit of virtually accentless English (just the merest hint of an Aussie twang). Whenever he appears on the media, Britain’s Jewish community kvell (to use a Yiddish expression) – that is, experience pride and satisfaction. It is gratifying to see the case for Israel being put across to the UK public in a way highly likely to convince. They can rejoice in the routing of Israel’s detractors and delegitimisers.

          Success in the media on Israel’s behalf fosters an ever closer relationship between the British and Israeli governments. The warmth of those relations was on full display only a few weeks ago. April 28. 2020 marked the exact 70th anniversary of the opening of the first British Embassy on Tel Aviv’s Hayarkon Street, and the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between the UK and Israel.

          James Cleverly, the Minister who oversees Britain’s relationship with Israel, marked the occasion with an article in the Jerusalem Post, emphasizing the strength of British-Israeli cooperation across a whole variety of areas including scientific, high-tech, health, finance. and energy. Britain, he wrote, would continue to “cherish our friendship with Israel, stand united in the struggle against the insidious forces of hate and antisemitism and work towards an even brighter and better future for us all.”

          Mark Regev, writing in The Times, said that over the past two decades Anglo-Israeli relations had become closer than ever, and noted that since 2018 the annual value of trade between Britain and Israel has grown by 25 per cent to some £9 billion. As a sign of the times, he said, in 2019 Israeli and British fighter jets trained together for the first time.

          Not all of Israel’s ambassadors to Britain have been able to claim anything like the media success achieved by Mark Regev, nor the resultant excellent relations between the two governments. One recent holder of the office who can is Ron Prosser, who held the post from 2007 to 2011. His English was perfect, his accent RP – a term standing for “Received Pronunciation”, meaning universally accepted and classless. He was, and indeed remains, a powerful and convincing speaker.

          It is not only ambassadors who have made a name for themselves within Britain’s Jewish community for that winning combination of powerful advocacy allied to an impeccable English accent. One outstanding example is the late Abba Eban, whose speeches in the United Nations were widely admired and led to his enormous popularity in the UK.

          Israel’s sixth and seventh presidents, Chaim Herzog and Ezer Weizman

both served in the British Army during the Second World War, and spoke flawless English. Herzog, indeed, was born in Belfast, in Northern Ireland, and gained his law degree at University College, London. Both upheld Israel’s image within the UK with conviction, especially during the period that Herzog spent as Israel’s ambassador to the UN. Some powerful speeches by Herzog are still available on YouTube.

          How would Tzipi Hotovely match up to Britain’s stringent accent requirements, were she to agree to become Israel’s next ambassador to the United Kingdom? The answer is, remarkably well. For someone born and educated in Israel, she speaks extraordinarily fluent English with the merest trace of Israeli intonation. Where and how she learned her excellent English is not on the public record, but numerous YouTube examples of her media appearances testify to her complete mastery of the language.

          Available on line is what might prove to have been her initiation into the hazards of the British media. In May 2018 she was interviewed on the BBC World Service programme “Hard Talk” – a show that lives up to its name by subjecting its guests to tough, unremitting questioning. She came through with flying colours. She’s passed the test. Will she now slip into the driving seat?

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 4 June 2020:

https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/what-are-british-jews-expectations-of-an-israeli-ambassador-630265

Published in The Times of Israel, 10 June 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/what-britains-jews-want-from-their-israeli-ambassador/