A bid for the Presidency

          “I accept this nomination for President.” No, not Joe Biden at the virtual Democratic convention on August 20, agreeing to run for the presidency of the United States. This is Mohammed Dahlan, bidding to succeed Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian National Authority and self-styled State of Palestine, yet again. Yet again, because there are grounds for believing that he has tried at least once before, and perhaps more often than that. For years rumours of plots and counterplots have eddied around this charismatic Palestinian politician, whom PA President Mahmoud Abbas regards as his greatest enemy, but who might very well eventually succeed him.

          Who is Mohammed Dahlan?

          Born in 1961 in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, as a teenager he helped set up the Fatah Youth Movement. In his twenties he was arrested by the Israeli authorities on numerous occasions for political activism, but never for terrorist activities. He put his time in Israeli prisons to good use by learning Hebrew, which he speaks fluently.

          After the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, Dahlan was chosen to head the Preventive Security Force in Gaza. Building up a force of 20,000 men, he became one of the most powerful of Palestinian leaders. It was during this period that he was formally tarred with the terrorist brush.  On the basis of convincing evidence from security sources, he and his deputy, Rashid Abu Shadak - who has a less savoury background -  were accused in November 2000 of being behind the bombing of an Israeli school bus which killed two adults and wounded several children. Israel's then-prime minister, Ehud Olmert, ordered the bombing of Dahlan's Gaza headquarters in reprisal.

          Gaza had been nicknamed "Dahlanistan", reflecting the extent of his authority, but in 1997 it had emerged that he had been diverting taxes to his personal bank account. That incident appeared to have effected a sea-change in Dahlan. In 2001, in a virtual challenge to Yassir Arafat, he began calling for reform in the Palestinian National Authority. A year later he resigned and, portraying himself as an outspoken critic of Arafat, repeatedly tried to campaign on a reform and anti-corruption ticket. As a result Dahlan and his followers won over most of the Fatah sections in Gaza.

          The 2006 Palestinian elections saw Hamas gain a majority in Gaza. Dahlan called their election victory a disaster, and in January 2007 held the biggest-ever rally of Fatah supporters in the Gaza Strip, where he denounced Hamas as 'a bunch of murderers and thieves'. His instinct was vindicated six months later when Hamas staged a bloody coup in Gaza, seized power and expelled those Fatah officials it had not murdered. Years later it was revealed that Dahlan played a key role in an abortive US plot to remove Hamas from power.

          In October 2007 the Bush administration reportedly pressured PA president Mahmoud Abbas to appoint Dahlan as his deputy. Some Fatah officials asserted that the US and some EU countries made it clear that they would like to see Dahlan succeed Abbas.

          Aware of this, the PA president perceived Dahlan as his rival for office, and took action. In June 2011, following allegations of financial corruption and murder, Dahlan was expelled from Fatah’s ruling body. Abbas accused him of murdering the late Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, though he never charged him formally. It was on corruption charges that Dahlan was tried by the PA in absentia.

          Over the years rumours have persisted about Dahlan’s involvement in all manner of conspiracies. For example, his name has become attached to the 2016 attempted coup in Turkey against the regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It is alleged that Dahlan headed a multinational plan to overthrow Erdogan, led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and backed by Russia and Iran. In December 2019 Turkey offered a $1.7m reward for tracking Dahlan down, and issued warrants charging him with perpetrating the 2016 coup attempt.

          Whether or not Dahlan’s fingers were in this particular pie, there is no doubt that his international influence extends far and wide. Dahlan has lived in the UAE for many years, and is an adviser to the crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan. He has ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Syrian opposition, and is closely connected also with Serbia and Montenegro.

          In May 2016 the media website Middle East Eye gave credence to yet another rumour circulating around Dahlan. Asserting that Egypt, Jordan and the UAE had been liaising in a plan for Dahlan to be next head of the PA, it maintained that Hamas was on side, prepared to overlook its long history of hostility to Dahlan. The planned post-Mahmoud Abbas era would leave Dahlan, his arch-rival, in control of the Palestinian presidency, the PLO and the PA. It reported that the UAE had held talks with Israel about the strategy to install Dahlan, and that the three principals intended to inform Saudi Arabia once they agreed its final shape.

          This, like previous similar stories, came to nothing. Now, with the new UAE-Israel deal, the idea of a Dahlan bid for the Palestinian presidency resurfaces, stronger than ever. For the word is abroad that Dahlan played a key role in bringing the deal to fruition. Palestinian officials are quoted as saying they have no doubt about it.

          Dahlan has set himself at odds with the current Palestinian establishment by not opposing the deal, but coming out in somewhat equivocal support.

          “The UAE,” he said, as if speaking for the administration as a whole, “will use its efforts to directly pressure the American administration and others to end the annexation plan completely and replace Trump’s settlement plan with decisions of international legitimacy and the Arab Peace Initiative.”

          If Dahlan succeeds this time in establishing himself as Abbas’s successor in long-postponed presidential elections, he may prove to be the new broom so long needed on the Palestinian political scene. Dahlan is no conviction politician, and has indictable episodes in his past. He is a wheeler dealer, rather in the Trump mould. He, more than any Palestinian politician, seems to have the qualities needed to sweep aside the outworn attitudes of the leadership that have shackled the Palestinian people for decades, and embrace a more realistic approach to reaching an accommodation with Israel and the brighter future that is surely attainable for the whole region.

Published in the Jerusalem Post as: "Is Mohammed Dahlan the next Palestinian president in waiting?", 14 October 2020:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/is-mohammed-dahlan-the-next-palestinian-president-in-waiting-645599

Published in the Eurasia Review, 29 August 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/29082020-a-bid-for-the-presidency-analysis/

Published in the Jewish Business News, 28 August 2020:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2020/08/28/a-bid-for-the-presidency/

Published in The Times of Israel, 30 August 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/a-bid-for-the-presidency/

Charting Trump's Deal of the Century

In this article I explain how and why I came to write "Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020" about Trump's Israel-Palestine peace deal.

          Donald J Trump assumed the presidency of the United States of America on Friday, 20 January 2017. Over the 241 years of its existence, there had never been a more controversial contender for that office. What split the nation during the election campaign, and continued to do so during his presidency, was not so much Trump's politics – though they were certainly not to everyone’s taste – as his personality. Indeed, scarcely a politician at all, he was certainly not a presidential candidate in the traditional mould. He was essentially a successful go-getting entrepreneur and showman, with many of the characteristics, good and bad, of the high-powered business leader. 

          Whatever his faults though, Trump possessed one attribute that many of his opponents, as well as his closest allies, were generally agreed on – he was an accomplished deal-maker. He had mastered the craft of finessing negotiations. Deal-making had been the key to his business success which. though controversial had been considerable. And way back in the 1980s he had co-authored “The Art of the Deal”, a treatise which reached number 1 on the New York Times Best Seller list and stayed there for 13 weeks.

          So during Trump’s presidential election campaign, when he was considering the complex political agenda he would face if he gained office, it was perhaps the deal-making potential of the perennial Israel-Palestinian situation that particularly attracted his attention. Highly skilled as he was in the arcane arts of wheeling and dealing, the possibility of brokering a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians – an endeavor attempted without success by so many of his predecessors in office – engaged Trump’s interest from early on.

          On the campaign trail back in February 2016 Trump, with what seems like relish, spelled out the challenge it would pose. “That’s probably the toughest deal in the world right now to make,” he said, in his inimitable style. “It’s possible it’s not makeable because, don’t forget, it has to last. A lot of people say an agreement can’t be made, which is OK – sometimes agreements can’t be made. I will give it one hell of a shot. I would say if you can do that deal, you can do any deal.”

          Later in the campaign, as Trump earmarked his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, to lead the peace-making effort, he said: “I would love to be the one who made peace with Israel and the Palestinians. That would be such a great achievement.”

          Once in the White House, Trump placed the Israel-Palestinian dispute high on his agenda. Within five weeks of taking office he had invited Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to Washington, and in a media conference made it clear that – in classic deal-maker mode – he was less interested in any particular formula than in actually achieving an agreement. Thus, putting clear blue water between himself and the global consensus, he would neither endorse the classic two-state solution as the only possible way to resolve the conflict, nor would he rule it out. But what he did realize, early on, was that any deal would need to be fortified by some sort of Arab consensus.

          Early in May 2017, Trump invited Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, to the White House. In their subsequent press conference they vowed to work together to strike a peace deal with Israel that would bring stability to the Middle East.

          “We will get it done,” said Trump. “We will be working so hard to get it done. It’s been a long time. But we will be working diligently.”

          “I very much look forward to working with you,” replied Abbas, “in order to come to that historical agreement, historic deal to bring about peace.”

          Sweet words which were soon to turn sour. Although in his election campaign Trump had signalled his intention of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and of moving the American embassy there, mention of these pledges was not permitted to spoil the show of unanimity. It was only when Trump actually carried out the recognition pledge in December 2017 that Abbas turned on him.

          At the time though, focused on carrying through his deal-making intention, one day after his meeting with Abbas Trump announced that he would visit the Middle East. He did so in the middle of May 2017, and in addressing some 50 leaders of the Arab world in Riyadh he reiterated his ambition to achieve a Palestinian-Israeli deal.

          By that time it seemed to me that Trump really did intend to follow through on his wish to foster a deal. Unlike the majority of media opinion in early 2017, which pretty universally held out no hope of his succeeding, it seemed to me that there was no predicting the outcome, good or bad, or how long it might take. So I decided to chart his progress, and it was in a mood of qualified optimism that I set out to record events as they unfolded.

          As I began one thing was clear – to be meaningful, an account of Trump’s developing initiative needed to be set in the context of the changing political situation in the Holy Land itself, in the Middle East generally, and sometimes beyond. Any valid assessment of the developing “deal of the century”, as Trump dubbed his peace effort, would have to take account of the ever-shifting political kaleidoscope. Accounting for Trump’s eventual success or failure in coming up with a plan would make sense only in that context.

          I certainly did not expect that the journey would take four long years. Because it did, the canvas which portrays the development of Trump’s peace plan has as its background a great sweep of contemporary history. It encompasses, among a host of other events great and small, the defeat of the Islamic State caliphate, the recognition by the US of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the consequent outburst of Hamas-inspired violence in the Gaza Strip, the moving of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the withdrawal of Trump from the Iranian nuclear deal, the centenary of the Balfour Declaration and the refusal of the UK government to apologize for it, and the growing recognition by the Arab world that in Iran it shared with Israel a common enemy. It was against this and much else that Trump’s peace plan took shape.

          In “Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020” I try to set in context the story of how the Deal of the Century came into being.

Published in the Jewish Business News, 26 August 2020:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2020/08/26/charting-trumps-deal-of-the-century/
Or:  http://ow.ly/Tb5d30r6z3g

Israel is not your enemy

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post weekend edition dated August 21, 2020 under the title: "The UAE deal signals to the Middle East that Israel is not the enemy"

        The surprise announcement on August 13, 2020 of UAE’s deal with Israel sent shock waves pulsating across the Muslim world. The novel message ‒ novel in being promulgated publicly for the first time ‒ was “Israel is not our enemy; it can be our friend and partner.” That message was, of course, far from novel to the leaders of the region, with whom Israel has been engaged in active and fruitful cooperation for many years ‒ the rulers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Jordan. 

        In other quarters, the message fell on deaf ears. The deal was instantly condemned by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the two giant nations that together half embrace the Arab world: Turkey and Iran. These countries are not natural allies. Adherents of Islam they both may be, but Turkey is a Sunni Muslim state while Iran, claiming leadership of the Shia Muslim world, seeks to dominate the whole. Significantly, neither is an Arab nation ‒ which doesn’t inhibit either from meddling in intra-Arab disputes. Iran is engaged directly and by way of proxies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon; Turkey is currently intervening in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, to say nothing of picking a fight with Greece and Cyprus by undertaking energy exploration in their territorial waters.

        And yet, despite Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, taking every opportunity of denouncing Israel on the world stage, trade turnover between Turkey and Israel in 2019 was an all-time record, topping $5.8 billion.

        In fact active cooperation by the Muslim world with Israel, if often covert, is extensive and could provide a firm base on which to develop the collaboration implicit in the UAE-Israel deal.

        For example, ever since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became president of Egypt in 2014, Egyptian and Israeli forces have been acting in close collaboration, countering jihadist assaults in North Sinai aimed at overthrowing the regime and reinstalling a Muslim Brotherhood administration.

        The position of Saudi Arabia towards Israel has changed remarkably in the past few decades. Despite both countries' efforts to keep their relationship under covers, there are well-documented reports of extensive behind-the-scenes diplomatic and intelligence collaboration. Indeed in an interview in 2018, Saudi’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, extended to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a whole, the idea of active association with Israel. The GCC is comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Until August 13, none had diplomatic relations with Israel.

        Even so, there was that surprising trip in October 2018 by prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Oman ‒ a trip that was kept secret until after it had happened. Like most Arab countries, Oman did not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel.

        As for Qatar, a “gentleman’s agreement” with Israel seems to have existed for a good few years. Qatar is a firm supporter of Hamas, and has been pouring money into its coffers. Much ‒ but not all ­‒ is earmarked for humanitarian and infrastructure projects in the Gaza Strip, and also to pay for fuel, meet the salaries of civil servants and provide aid to tens of thousands of impoverished families. Israel has made no effort to curtail this supply of ready funds, some of which have doubtless been applied to uses of which Israel would not approve. It is estimated that Qatar has supplied Hamas with about $1 billion since 2012, and that Israel has, if anything, encouraged its largesse.

        Cooperation between Israel and Jordan is regulated by the peace treaty of 1994. Adjacent neighbors, the two nations work closely together on a practical basis, while maintaining their opposed political stances. These joint initiatives extend from security to lucrative commercial agreements, from gas supplies to communications to Jordanian control of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem.

        As for the newly-forged UAE-Israel deal, something of the sort might have been foretold back in November 2019 when Israeli athlete Alon Leviev won gold in a ju-jitsu contest in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the 7-emirate federation that is the UAE. He not only received the gold medal beneath the Israeli flag, but Hatikvah, Israel’s national anthem, was played across the arena. Just a few years ago all Israeli symbols were banned in the UAE.

        Despite ‒ or perhaps because of ‒ the torrent of abuse being poured on the UAE-Israel deal by the hard-line rejectionists, long-held assumptions about Israel in the Muslim world will inevitably be reassessed . The holy cow slaughtered by the new agreement is the long-held article of faith in extremist Muslim circles that Israel has no place in the Middle East, that it is a colonial enterprise shortly to be overthrown through armed resistance. Allied to that is the oft-reiterated dogma that so-called "normalization" with Israel is a betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

        The new UAE-Israel understanding sweeps both creeds to one side – and the whole Muslim world can see that it does. Arab states that accept the new reality can glimpse a bright future beckoning. Together with Israel, they could participate in re-shaping the Middle East into a thriving, expanding, hi-tech and commercial hub that might rival Singapore or Hong Kong, bringing previously unimaginable prosperity to the region. For Lebanon, the key would be to break free of the shackles of Hezbollah; for Iraq to remove the pernicious stranglehold of Iran. The penny might drop even for the PA. Announcing the UAE-Israel deal, President Trump alluded to “many more countries” in the region normalizing ties with Israel, and “some very exciting things, including ultimately with the Palestinians.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2020:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/the-uae-deal-signals-to-the-middle-east-that-israel-is-not-the-enemy-639394


Published in The Times of Israel, 24 August 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/israel-is-not-your-enemy/

Can Lebanon ever be free?

                    
        Virtually the entire Lebanese population is up in arms against the so-called “ruling class” – the old political establishment. Self-serving, corrupt, indifferent to the economic and social misery being inflicted on the suffering population, Lebanon’s government has just been ejected from power by popular demand. 

        Lebanon has been much in the news in recent weeks. The humanitarian disaster that followed the Beirut port explosion on August 4, and the political aftermath, has received massive coverage by the world’s media. Comparatively few have taken much account of the huge elephant in the room – Hezbollah. The deposed government was heavily infiltrated by Hezbollah adherents and, in the case of some (including the still incumbent president, Michel Aoun) heavily supportive of Hezbollah. Yet the organization, and the role it has played in encompassing this crisis for Lebanon, receives comparatively little attention.

        Over the past few decades Hezbollah, a rapacious predator, has been consuming the political, military and administrative organs of the state, until only the outer shell of an independent sovereign country now remains. At one time the perception was that Hezbollah had created a “state within a state”. Many now believe that the Lebanese state and Hezbollah are in effect indistinguishable.

        In theory Lebanon should be a template for a future peaceful Middle East. It is the only Middle East country which, by its very constitution, shares power equally between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims and Christians. Theory, however, has had to bow to practical reality. Lebanon has been highly unstable for much of its existence, and its unique constitution has tended to exacerbate, rather than eliminate, sectarian conflict.

        Modern Lebanon, founded in 1944, was established on the basis of an agreed "National Pact". Political power is allocated on a religious or "confessional" system, with seats in the parliament allocated 50-50 as between Muslims and Christians. The top three positions in the state are allocated so that the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim.

        Theoretically no system could seem more just, more designed to satisfy all parties in a multi-sectarian society. But in practice, having a weak central government and sharing power has proved a constant irritant.

        Around 1980 Iran’s first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini ‒ flushed with the success of his 1979 Islamic revolution ‒ decided to strengthen his grip on Shia Islam by consolidating a number of Lebanon’s militant Shi’ite Muslim groups. He formed and funded a body calling itself Hezbollah, or “the Party of God”.

        Hezbollah declared that its purpose, in line with Khomeini’s, was to oppose Western influences in general and Israel’s existence in particular. Soon Hezbollah was acting as Iran’s proxy in perpetrating a campaign of terror against their two perceived enemies. Kidnappings, bombings and assassinations were carried out across the world, some directed specifically against Israeli or Jewish targets, some indiscriminate, slaughtering Westerners and Muslims alike.

        It is no surprise, therefore, that Hezbollah in its entirety has been designated a terrorist body by much of the civilized world, including the Arab League.

        How complete is Hezbollah’s takeover of the state of Lebanon? The organization, backed by Iranian finance, has exploited the state’s inherent weakness by establishing a vast network of social services, providing healthcare, education, finance, welfare, and communications. As regards the military, there are two fully equipped fighting bodies in Lebanon – the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah, which has been supplied by Iran with tanks and other military vehicles stationed in Syria, together with a large rocket arsenal and thousands of anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, It is particularly concerning that the LAF has compromised its role as the nation’s defense force by collaborating with the Hezbollah military. President Aoun has said he regards Hezbollah’s military capabilities as not merely complementary, but essential, to the LAF. No wonder there are voices in Washington demanding an end to the financial aid poured into the LAF.

        In acting as a proxy for Iran, Hezbollah has put a foreign power’s interests well above Lebanon’s. It recruited thousands of young Lebanese and sent them to fight in Syria, side by side with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Grieving families have been asking why their sons needed to die. How was supporting President Bashar Assad of Syria ‒ a country whose troops had to be forcibly ejected from Lebanon back in 2005 ‒ in the national interest?

        Where can Lebanon look for help out of its multi-faceted crisis? Western governments are certainly prepared to open their purse strings to relieve the humanitarian disaster that followed the port explosion – but, they have made clear, only if the money is guaranteed to flow directly to the victims and not into the coffers of a corrupt government.

        In addition, the US is considering cutting off its military aid to a Lebanese army that is in cahoots with Hezbollah, and thus with Iran. Financial assistance with the systemic economic failure of the state is not readily forthcoming. The country is teetering on the brink of bankruptcy.

        A substantial anti-Hezbollah sentiment ‒ such as the reforming and activist group Liquaa Teshrin ‒ is seeking popular support for the country to break loose from its Hezbollah shackles. It is, though, far from clear whether the terrorist organization is too fully embedded within the country and its institutions to be prized out. Iran will certainly fight tooth and nail to sustain the dominant position that its puppet, Hezbollah, has gained within Lebanon.

        What concatenation of circumstances would be necessary to enable Lebanon to break free, cast Hezbollah aside, and regain its sovereignty?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 August 2020:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/can-lebanon-ever-be-free-638992 

Published in The Times of Israel, 20 August 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/can-lebanon-ever-be-free/

Published in the Eurasia Review, 21 August 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/21082020-can-lebanon-ever-be-free-oped/

Who killed Rafik Hariri?

          The wheels of justice, like the mills of God, are known to grind slowly, but the judicial process to determine who was guilty of the assassination of Lebanon’s one-time prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and to bring the culprits to justice, has seemed interminable. 

          Just before noon on St Valentine’s day 2005 – 14 February – a motorcade swept along the Beirut seafront. In one of cars sat Hariri, returning home from a parliamentary session in central Beirut. As the line of vehicles reached the Hotel Saint Georges, a security camera captured a white Mitsubishi truck alongside the convoy. Seconds later a massive explosion shook the city. In the midst of the carnage Rafik Hariri, along with 22 other people, lay dead. Some 200 were injured. The blast left a crater on the street at least 10-metres wide and two meters deep.

          Ten days later then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, sent a fact-finding mission to Beirut to discover who was responsible for the attack. In doing so he was certainly unaware that he was giving birth to what might be termed a new judicial industry – the Lebanon Inquiry process. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the STL) was voted into existence by the UN Security Council in 2007 and formally established in 2009. Now, if its elaborate website is anything to go by, it is comparable to some large commercial enterprise.

          After 11 years, 415 court sittings and the testimony of no less than 297 witnesses, the STL announced that it would deliver its verdict on Friday, 7 August. Three days before, on 4 August, came the unprecedented and devastating explosion in Beirut. As a result, and out of respect to the victims, the STL announced that it would postpone delivering its verdict until August 18.

          Operating on a budget of over $150 million, half of which is provided by the Lebanese government, the STL court, which consists of 11 judges – seven international and four Lebanese – sits in The Hague. Hearings are broadcast through the STL website. The tribunal runs its own public affairs office, which arranges briefings and interviews for journalists, providing them with press releases, court papers, photographs, audio-visual material, fact sheets and basic legal documents. In addition, located within the STL building is a media center whose facilities include Wi-Fi internet access, television screens to follow the hearings, and recording facilities in Arabic, English and French.

          How ­– and more important perhaps, why – did this complex judicial operation emerge from Kofi Annan’s decision, immediately following the assassination, to send a small investigative team to Beirut?

          That team spent a month attempting to get at the truth, but in the end, recognizing the logistical and political difficulties, submitted a report recommending an independent international enquiry. Kofi Annan followed the group’s advice. He assembled another, more highly-powered, team of Investigators. Six months later its report concluded that the white truck seen on the security camera outside the Hotel Saint Georges had carried some 1,000 kilograms of explosive. Since Hariri's convoy contained jamming devices intended to block remote control signals, they concluded that the attack was carried out by a suicide bomber. The report cited a witness who said the bomber was an Iraqi, who had been led to believe that his target was the Iraqi prime minister, Ayad Allawi.

         The report concluded that top Syrian and Lebanese officials had been planning the assassination from as far back as mid-2004. Its findings were based on key witnesses and a variety of evidence, including patterns of telephone calls between specific prepaid phone cards that connected prominent Lebanese and Syrian officials to events surrounding the crime.

          So already in 2005 the finger was pointing at Syria and its Hezbollah supporters inside Lebanon. In fact, Lebanese public opinion pre-empted this conclusion. Lebanon’s powerful neighbor Syria had been enforcing Big Brother control over Lebanese affairs for decades. Rafik Hariri had been actively seeking to loosen Syria’s oppressive grip, and had become something of a thorn in the side of the Syrian president, Bashar Assad.

          Following Hariri’s assassination a massive protest was organized in Martyrs’ Square in the heart of downtown Beirut, denouncing the atrocity and demanding that Syrian troops be expelled from the country. This so-called Cedar Revolution caught the world's attention. A diplomatic coalition was formed, with the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia at its helm. On 26 April 2005, after some three months of civil agitation, the last Syrian troops left Lebanon.

          It took another four years of fact-finding by the UN International Investigation Commission (UNIIC) before sufficient additional and convincing evidence had been collected to enable the STL to be set up. Even so, largely because of blocking tactics employed by Hezbollah officials inside Lebanon, the five identified defendants were never apprehended, and the trial has been held in their absence. They are named as: Salim Ayyash, Mustafa Badreddine, Hussein Oneissi, Sassad Sabra, and Hassan Merhi.

          The trial of Ayyash et al began on 16 January 2014. In preparing the case the prosecution had carefully steered clear of accusations against Syria, trying to avoid a diplomatic confrontation with President Bashar Assad and Syria’s supporters. Subsequently the STL permitted the prosecution to seek to expose Assad’s role in the assassination, and it soon became clear that the prosecution believed Assad wanted Rafik Hariri killed, and used Hezbollah and his own security apparatus to achieve his objective. Based on recent court proceedings it seems likely that on August 18 Assad and Hezbollah will be facing a verdict of having planned and executed the murder of Rafik Hariri.

          As a postscript, it should be noted that the announcement of the verdict is most unlikely to signal an end to the STL judicial enterprise. Under its terms of reference, either the prosecution or the defence can appeal the verdict, the sentence, or both. These particular wheels of justice are likely to be grinding on for a good few years yet.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, 13 August 2020:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/who-killed-rafik-hariri-638399

Published in The Times of Israel, 14 August 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/who-killed-rafik-hariri/

Published in the Eurasia Review, 15 August 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/15082020-who-killed-rafiq-hariri-analysis/

Saudi Arabia's nuclear intentions

        On August 4, 2020 the Wall Street Journal reported its discovery that Saudi Arabia, with help from China, has built a facility for extracting yellowcake from uranium ore. Uranium yellowcake is an ingredient used in fueling nuclear reactors. The sparsely populated site is a remote desert location near the small city of Al Ula. 

        Just how long the facility ‒ secret till now ‒ has been up and running was not disclosed, but its existence indicates that the kingdom's nuclear programme is moving ahead, perhaps with the aim of Saudi Arabia eventually developing its own nuclear weapons. This possibility has been on the cards ever since the ill-conceived deal that ex-US President Barack Obama, in conjunction with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, masterminded with Iran back in 2015.

        Saudi-Iranian rivalry dates back to well before the Iranian revolution of 1979, but the Iranian nuclear deal undoubtedly aggravated and intensified Saudi Arabia’s concerns about the intentions of the revolutionary regime. It believes that Iran is seeking to dominate the Middle East politically and to extend Shia Islam across the Muslim world, and uses terrorism and subversion to achieve its aims. Logic dictated that the best way to counter these unacceptable objectives would be by matching Iran’s nuclear intentions.

        As far back as 2013 the BBC was quoting reports that nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi Arabia “are now sitting ready for delivery.” In a domestic TV programme the BBC said that Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, had told a conference in Sweden that if Iran got the bomb, "the Saudis will not wait one month. They have already paid for the bomb. They will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring."

        Saudi Arabia’s intention to do just that goes back even further. For years it provided generous financial support to Pakistan’s defence sector, and Saudi’s defense minister visited Pakistan’s nuclear research centre in 1999 and 2002.  In 2009 Saudi’s then King Abdullah is quoted as saying that if Iran crossed the threshold, "we will get nuclear weapons.”

        In that 2013 BBC television programme a Pakistani intelligence officer said he believed "the Pakistanis certainly maintain a certain number of warheads on the basis that if the Saudis were to ask for them at any given time they would immediately be transferred."

        Now, perhaps, Saudi Arabia is set on a path intended to lead to the development of its own nuclear weapons programme.

        Of course it is all a foreseeable consequence of Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal. For a president who came to office vowing to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, what Obama achieved was to leave in place Iran’s 5,000 centrifuges and a growing research and development program, and the assurance that in a brief 15 years Iran would be free to resume its nuclear weapons programme. Leaders of the Sunni Arab states including Saudi Arabia argued at the time that the long-term effect of the deal would be a drive for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

        The Washington Post believes that for the present Saudi Arabia is focused on becoming what is known as a nuclear “hedger”, that is, a country without a dedicated nuclear weapons program, but which can weaponize relatively quickly, thanks to an advanced enrichment and reprocessing capability ‒ a status already achieved by Iran. Hedging permits a country to develop peaceful nuclear power that could be switched to military uses, while avoiding the financial and political costs of going for a full-scale nuclear military capability.

        Back in 2019, the Washington Post identified positive steps taken by Saudi Arabia in the previous few years to enter the nuclear power market, and to foster competition among potential suppliers. In 2015, as a first step towards achieving full nuclear fuel cycle capability, Saudi acquired a research reactor from Argentina. It then solicited bids for the supply of nuclear power reactors and an enrichment plant. In addition to Pakistan, countries such as France and South Korea began expressing an interest in selling nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, and by mid-2019 the US, Russia and China had apparently joined the bidding war. China, perhaps within its Belt and Road project, won the commission to construct Saudi’s uranium yellowcake facility.

        The Trump administration seems agreeable to the idea of supplying nuclear capability to Saudi Arabia without imposing too severe restrictions on its future use, perhaps as a means of deterring approaches by the kingdom to other potential suppliers who might not be in a position to impose effective leverage in a future crisis.

        By early 2020 US companies were in serious negotiation with Saudi authorities about a planned tender for nuclear reactor construction in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile several US senators have warned the administration against a nuclear cooperation deal with Saudi Arabia, fearing it could set off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But that possibility has been present ever since the nuclear deal with Iran was passed. It is the Obama legacy.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 August 2020:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/what-are-saudi-arabias-nuclear-intentions-637757

Published in the Eurasia Review, 7 August 2020:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/07082020-saudi-arabias-nuclear-intentions-analysis/

Published in The Times of Israel, 10 August 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/saudi-arabias-nuclear-intentions/

Winning back Britain’s Jews – Sir Keir Starmer makes a start

This article of mine appears in the next edition of the Jerusalem Report dated 17 August 2020

                             
          Well before Jeremy Corbyn – against all the odds, and against the wishes of many of his parliamentary colleagues – became leader of Britain’s Labour party in September 2015, worrying symptoms of a contagious antisemitism had begun to manifest themselves within its left wing. 

          In the early 2000s Ken Livingstone, an outspoken hard left politician, served two terms as London‘s Mayor. While in post he invited and showered praise on the Egyptian extremist cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who described Adolf Hitler as having put Jews “in their place”, and supported suicide attacks on all Israelis, including women. On another occasion Livingstone compared a Jewish journalist to a concentration camp guard. In May 2014, he informed the BBC that the Thatcher government had won votes in the London constituency of Finchley because the Jewish community had got richer.

          Livingstone was only one manifestation of what was already perceived by many as a rising tide of antisemitism within Labour. It is scarcely surprising that in the May 2015 general election Jewish support for Labour – in the past the natural home for the Jewish vote − plummeted to 15%, compared to 64% for the Conservatives.

          The spectre of antisemitism was to continue to haunt Labour with increasing intensity, until the general election of December 2019 delivered a sort of coup de grace − an electoral defeat of historic proportions. Antisemitism − its generally acknowledged presence within the party, and the urgent need to eliminate it − had been a major issue during the campaign.

          Shortly after the general election, Corbyn announced his intention to retire as leader. This triggered a new leadership contest. The candidates were eventually whittled down to three. Broadly speaking, they covered the spectrum of opinion within the party. Rebecca Long-Bailey, a fervent supporter of Corbyn, represented a continuity of his hard-left policies; Lisa Nandy, who had once resigned from Corbyn’s shadow Cabinet, had a more social democratic than hard-left political stance; Sir Keir Starmer, although careful throughout the campaign to avoid overt criticism of Corbyn, was perceived as a middle-of-the-road social democrat. All three were, however, agreed on one issue – the urgent necessity to eliminate antisemitism in the Labour party – and all pledged, hand on heart, to do so.

          In the event, Starmer emerged from the poll as the clear winner. in his first speech as leader he said: “Antisemitism has been a stain on our party. I have seen the grief that it's brought to so many Jewish communities. On behalf of the Labour Party, I am sorry. And I will tear out this poison by its roots, and judge success by the return of Jewish members and those who felt that they could no longer support us.” Less than three months later, he found himself having to demonstrate that he truly meant what he had said. 

          Immediately after his election on 4 April 2020, Starmer sought to unite the party by appointing to senior positions in his shadow cabinet both his rivals for the leadership. Rebecca Long-Bailey took up the post of shadow Education minister.

          However, nothing could really reconcile Labour’s hard left to Starmer’s measured political stance. Their misgivings were probably enhanced by his decision, in the national interest, to be generally supportive of the government during the coronavirus crisis, albeit holding it to account for any perceived failings. Whatever the factors at play, within a month of Starmer’s election two leading figures on the hard left of Labour had announced their resignations – Jon Lansman, the founder of Momentum, the body that had projected Corbyn to power, and Jenny Formby, the General Secretary of the party, and a long-time colleague of Corbyn. 

          The first test of Starmer’s mettle came on June 25, when the well-known British film and television actress, Maxine Peake, gave a wide-ranging interview to the Independent, an on-line daily newspaper. The murder by Minneapolis police of the African American, George Floyd, was headline news at the time. Peake, who had campaigned for Corbyn in the general election, said: “Systemic racism is a global issue. The tactics used by the police in America, kneeling on George Floyd’s neck, that was learnt from seminars with Israeli secret services.”

          At this point in its account of the interview, the Independent added in brackets: “A spokesperson for the Israeli police has denied this, stating that “there is no tactic or protocol that calls to put pressure on the neck or airway.”

          Shortly after the interview was posted on line, Rebecca Long-Bailey retweeted it with the comment: “Maxine Peake is an absolute diamond.”

          A storm of comment ensued. Jewish groups demanded Long-Bailey delete her tweet and apologize. Instead she sent another message saying she did not endorse “all aspects of the article.” 

          Less than three hours later, Starmer’s office announced that he had asked Long-Bailey to step down as shadow Education minister. “The article Rebecca shared earlier today contained an antisemitic conspiracy theory. As leader of the Labour party, Keir has been clear that restoring trust with the Jewish community is a number one priority.”

          In an online press briefing, Starmer explained. “I did it because she shared the article which has got, in my view, antisemitic conspiracy theories in it. My primary focus is on rebuilding trust with the Jewish communities. I didn’t think sharing that article was in keeping with that primary objective.”

          Starmer’s swift action brought praise from Jewish groups and from Labour MPs who had been critical of Jeremy Corbyn’s handling of complaints about antisemitism in the party.

          Marie van der Zyl, the president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, said the decision showed Starmer was “backing his words with actions on antisemitism."

          The all-party parliamentary group against antisemitism. co-chaired by Labour’s Catherine McKinnell and the Conservative Andrew Percy, issued a joint statement welcoming his “zero-tolerance approach and decisive action”. 

          Margaret Hodge, the Labour MP who was one of Corbyn’s most resolute critics on the issue, tweeted: “This is what a change in culture looks like. This is what zero tolerance looks like. This is what rebuilding trust with the Jewish community looks like.”

          Initially, Peake’s allegation was thought to be based on a report from Amnesty International, but it was not long before Amnesty International stated: “Allegations that US police were taught tactics of ‘neck kneeling’ by Israeli secret services is not something we’ve ever reported.” By then Peake had tweeted that she had been "inaccurate in my assumption of American police training and its sources." 

          Starmer’s decisive action outraged Corbyn-supporting colleagues. Long-Bailey had been their outrider in the shadow cabinet. Her removal confirmed their worst fears about Starmer’s intentions for the future of the Labour party.

          John McDonnell, shadow Finance minister under Corbyn, tweeted: “I don’t believe… Rebecca Long-Bailey should’ve been sacked. I stand in solidarity with her.” He later joined a petition calling on Starmer to reinstate her. Momentum’s reaction was that Starmer “says he wants party unity, then sacks the most prominent left-winger on the frontbench for no good reason. It’s a reckless overreaction.”

          Meanwhile Corbyn supporters must be aware that, hovering in the background, is the soon-to-be-released report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) into whether Labour had "unlawfully discriminated against, harassed or victimized people because they are Jewish."

          The EHRC, founded in 2007, is charged with ensuring that equality laws are enforced, and that discrimination and harassment are eliminated. It was given legal powers to compel employers and organizations to cease discriminatory practices and to make such changes as are necessary to prevent future discrimination or non-compliance. In May 2019, in a highly unusual incursion into the affairs of Britain’s political parties, the EHRC announced that it was setting up an inquiry into Labour’s handling of the antisemitism issue. Its report, which will of necessity set out the results of its investigation into the inner workings of the Labour party under Corbyn’s leadership, is unlikely to make agreeable reading for his supporters.

          Doubtless Keir Starmer was not unhappy to be provided with an opportunity to demonstrate that the new broom intended to sweep clean. He has started out on the hard uphill task of reshaping Labour into a political party capable of winning back the trust of the British electorate, and with it the confidence of its Jewish community. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 3 August 2020:
https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/winning-back-britains-jews-sir-keir-starmer-makes-a-start-637356

Published in The Times of Israel, 7 August 2020:
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/winning-back-britains-jews-sir-keir-starmer-makes-a-start/