When the news broke on December 7 that the Syrian port of Latakia had been bombed, and that an Israeli military spokesperson had declined to comment, a natural first reaction was that this air strike was the latest of hundreds over the past few years, targeting Syrian government facilities in receipt of Iranian-supplied military hardware. Although Latakia port is a vital gateway into Syria for goods of all kinds, it had not featured as a main reception point for Iranian weaponry, and had not been attacked in the past. Perhaps intelligence had revealed suspect cargo arriving from Iran.
Then warning lights
began flashing in the media. Weren’t
Latakia and the Russian military somehow connected? Was this attack much more dangerous than at
first appeared? Was Israel sailing too close to the wind?
The key to the delicate
situation lies in the Russian military presence in Syria. Close Russo-Syrian relationships go back a
long way – as far back as July 1944, two years before the French finally
withdrew and Syria was an independent state.
Soviet support sustained the new nation in its early years, and in 1971
Syria’s then president, Hafez al-Assad, granted the USSR permission to open a naval
military base in the port city of Tartus, giving it a presence in the
Mediterranean and easy access to the Suez Canal. To bolster their close connection, in 1980 Syria
and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. With the Russian Federation recognized by
Syria as the legal successor to the Soviet Union, that treaty remains in
operation to this day.
This intimate
relationship, secured by pact, played an important part in the decision by
Russian president Vladimir Putin to back Syria’s Bashar al-Assad from the start
of the Syrian civil war, and later in Russia’s military intervention in 2015 in
support of Assad against the groups seeking a democratic future for their
country. It also explains how Putin was
able to consolidate, and later extend, his military presence in Syria.
When Putin intervened in
the fighting, Russian air cover was located in the airbase at Hmeimim, which is
situated in Latakia province, about 15 miles south-east of Latakia city. During a surprise visit to Hmeimim in
December 2017, Putin announced that he had signed a new 49-year deal with the
Syrian government. Russia’s air base at
Hmeimim, together with its naval facility in Tartus, were to be expanded and
could henceforth be used "on a permanent basis."
A glance at the map of
Syria’s Mediterranean coastline shows Latakia, Hmeimim and Tartus running
north-south down a 52-mile stretch of coast road. In short Russia’s vital naval and air bases
in Syria are literally within striking distance of Latakia port, hit by
airstrikes in the early hours of December 7.
Although Israel rarely
acknowledges or discusses such operations, it is generally accepted that Israel
has staged hundreds of strikes on targets inside government-controlled Syria
over the years. What Israel does say is
that its strikes on Iran-provided facilities and weapons inside Syria are
justified to protect its citizens on the country’s northern borders, and that
it attacks arms shipments it believes are bound for Syrian government forces,
Hezbollah or Iranian-backed militias.
Israel rarely launches strikes close to the permanent Russian military
and naval bases in government-controlled Syria.
The situation may appear
alarming, with the potential to spiral out of control, but there is in fact a system
in place aimed at avoiding any accidental clashes between Israel and Russia in
Syria.
Back in September 2015
then-prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited Putin in Moscow. Briefing Israeli reporters after the meeting,
Netanyahu said he had come with the aim of preventing misunderstandings between
IDF and Russian forces in Syria, and that he and Putin had “agreed on a
mechanism to prevent such misunderstandings”. They had decided that to avoid
accidentally trading fire in Syria, their military activity would be
coordinated.
That understanding was confirmed
as recently as October, when prime minister Naftali Bennett met Putin in
Sochi. They agreed that the two nations
would continue to implement the so-called “deconfliction mechanism” that
prevents Israeli and Russian forces from clashing in Syria. Housing minister
Ze’ev Elkin, who accompanied Bennett, confirmed that the “very wide” talks
regarding the situation in Syria were focused on “safeguarding the coordination
mechanism.”
The media reported that during
the meeting Putin agreed to Israel maintaining its freedom of action in Syria,
but had asked for additional advanced warning of strikes.
There
is little doubt. therefore, that had Israel intended to bomb Latakia port on
December 7, Russian military intelligence would have been informed well in
advance, and that their nearby airbase at Hmeimim would have been in no danger. A safeguard system is up and running, but the
potential for disaster lies just a human error away – as, for example, in 2018
when a Syrian air defense gunner, aiming for Israeli jets on a bombing run, downed
a Russian military plane instead, killing all 15 people on board.
Until
Syria can be stabilized and disconnected from Iran’s baleful involvement,
avoiding a potentially disastrous military clash between Russia and Israel is
dependent on the current precarious arrangements. The main consolation is that they have not
failed, so far.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and Jerusalem Post on-Line, 19 December 2021:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/could-israeli-strike-against-syria-harm-relations-with-russia-comment-689202
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