What is the Palestinian cause?

 This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post, 26 January 2022

         On December 30, 2021 Palestinian Authority (PA) president, Mahmoud Abbas, was on the phone to Russian president Vladimir Putin.  They discussed, among other matters, “the latest developments in the Palestinian cause.”  On January 11 Abbas was in Sharm-el-Sheikh in Sinai, meeting Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.  According to the Egyptian spokesman, Sisi stressed “the steadfastness of Egypt’s support for the Palestinian cause”.

What is the “Palestinian cause” to which Putin and Sisi, along with the UN, the US, the EU and many world leaders offer their support?  As reiterated time and again, it is the aim of establishing a sovereign state of Palestine on territory, attacked and occupied by Jordan and Egypt in 1948, that Israel overran during the 6-Day War in June 1967.  In other words, the two-state solution to the perennial Arab-Israel dispute. 

          But within the Palestinian body politic that is not the agreed definition of their cause. A large swath of Palestinian opinion shares the vision of Hamas and supporters of the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement, to say nothing of the Iran-supported jihadist groups within the Gaza Strip and beyond. Hamas, founded in 1987, initially took its lead from the pronouncement back in 1970 by Yassir Arafat, then chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): “Our basic aim is to liberate the land from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.... The Palestinian revolution's basic concern is the uprooting of the Zionist entity from our land and liberating it.”

         

         Hamas broke with Arafat completely over the Oslo Accord of 1993. On 5 September 1993, shortly after the terms were announced, Hamas issued its Leaflet 102 condemning both the agreement and the PLO leadership: “We will therefore insist on ruining this agreement, and continue the resistance struggle and our jihad against the occupation power… Arafat’s leadership is responsible for destroying Palestinian society and sowing the seeds of discord and division among Palestinians.”

          That disagreement is so basic that it has ensured the two main Palestinian political groups – Hamas and Fatah – have remained at each other’s throats for decades. All attempts at reconciliation have proved fruitless. Another effort is under way hosted by Algeria, but that is not likely to prove more successful.

          Hamas believes that the only effective way to achieve the desired outcome is through continual conflict and terrorism. Any pause in the battle must be temporary and provide a tactical advantage. The PA, however, continues to follow the Arafat strategy. At the Oslo meetings in 1993 and 1995 Arafat decided to woo world opinion by supporting the two-state solution overtly, with the covert intention of using that support as a first step toward eventually overthrowing Israel. Not long after the conclusion of Oslo 2, he held what was intended to be a secret meeting with Arab leaders in a Stockholm hotel. To his embarrassment, both his tactical plans and his strategic objectives were leaked to the Norwegian daily, Dagen. Among much else, he told Arab leaders that the PLO intends: “…to eliminate the state of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian state.”

            Following Arafat’s death the PA, and its new leader Mahmoud Abbas, took their lead from his prospectus.  

          A determined effort was made to win over world opinion to the idea of establishing a sovereign Palestine within the boundaries that existed before the 6-Day War in 1967 – that is, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.  Pressing for a Palestinian state within those boundaries inevitably meant acknowledging that a sovereign Israel existed outside them.  This is the pill that Hamas and like-minded rejectionists find impossible to swallow.  They refuse to recognize that Israel has any right at all to exist on “their” land, not even as one step toward its eventual destruction. Hamas never supported Abbas’s effort to gain recognition within the UN for the “State of Palestine”, because the state for which Abbas sought recognition was less than the whole. 

So while there is a consensus in Palestinian thinking about a utopian future, there is none about “the Palestinian cause”.  Opinions begin at the Hamas position and move on to what Mahmoud Abbas described in 2011 as “the Arabs’ biggest mistake” ­– the united Arab rejection of the UN partition plan of 1947.  An unrealistic minority would seek to undo that rejection and fight to  reduce Israel’s borders to the territory originally agreed by the Jewish Agency – a narrow coastal strip running along part of the Mediterranean, plus Tiberias and the Negev. Another fanciful minority would seek to establish a single independent democratic state, an idea promoted in the Palestine Arab Congresses held between 1919 and 1928. 

Abbas is on record in 2018 as favoring a three-way confederation of Jordan, Israel and a sovereign Palestine.  In a confederation, states retain their sovereignty but agree to collaborate on certain security, defense, economic or administrative matters, appointing a joint central authority to coordinate the arrangement. 

          On January 16 Abbas cancelled a meeting of the Palestine Central Council scheduled for later that week.  Reports suggested “tensions and differences among Palestinian officials and factions”.  In short, confusion reigns within the Palestinian establishment, not about the vision, but about how to reach it.  

          Eliminating Israel and acquiring the whole of Mandate Palestine from the River to the Sea may be the dream, but it is not the “Palestinian cause” as perceived and supported by much of world opinion.  While endorsing the idea of a sovereign Palestine, most world leaders also affirm their strong support for a sovereign Israel within internationally recognized borders – a proposition unacceptable to a significant proportion of Palestinian opinion.  Unless or until there is a sea-change, the only foreseeable outcome is endless conflict.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 26 January 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-694563

Published in Eurasia Review, 28 January 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/28012022-what-is-the-palestinian-cause-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 January 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/what-is-the-palestinian-cause/

Published in Jewish Business News, 28 January 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/01/28/what-is-the-palestinian-cause/

Which way for Sudan?

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post of 19 January 2022

Abdalla Hamdok’s career as Sudan’s prime minister is a roller-coaster of a story.  66-year-old Hamdok, who holds a doctorate in economics from Britain’s Manchester University, was a well-respected technocrat when, following the overthrow in April 2019 of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, he was called on to lead the government.  An agreement had been reached between the civilian element within Sudan, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), which had pressed for change, and the army, which engineered the coup.  The country was to be governed by a coalition of military and civilian powers who pledged themselves to move the country toward democracy and parliamentary elections in 2023. 

The military arm was led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who was also the head of the overriding administrative body, Sudan's Sovereign Council.  The arrangement was unstable.  Popular feeling grew increasingly impatient with the leadership’s failure to deal with the country’s severe economic problems and the obvious lack of progress toward any form of democracy. On October 22, 2021 national frustration erupted in a mass protest in the capital, Khartoum, estimated at a million strong, in support of full civilian rule.

Three days later Burhan dissolved the country's civilian cabinet, arrested prime minister Hamdok and other leading figures, and declared that the country was under military governance.  Hamdok was out.

Any hopes Burhan may have cherished of quickly consolidating his seizure of power were soon shattered.  He was faced with instant and near-universal condemnation. The UN, the African Union, the Arab League and Sudan's Western donors – including the US – all called for the return of Sudan to civilian rule. Within the country, popular opposition to the military takeover rose to boiling point. 

Burhan began to pull back.  On November 4 he spoke on the phone with US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken.  “The two parties agreed on the need to maintain the path of democratic transition,” said Burhan’s office immediately afterward.  Burhan then ordered the release of Hamdok and other government ministers he had deposed in the coup, and opened negotiations with them. 

On November 21 a 14-point political agreement was signed, enabling Hamdok to be reinstated as prime minister.  It also provided for the release of all political prisoners detained during the coup, and laid down the requirements for the transition of the country to democracy and full civilian rule.  Elections were to be held in July 2023.  “We will continue to work toward preserving the transitional period until all your dreams of democracy, peace and justice are achieved,” said al-Burhan. after Hamdok’s recall to office. 

It lasted just six weeks.  Late on Sunday, January 2, Hamdok appeared on state television to announce his resignation as Sudan’s prime minister.  Reports indicated that he objected to Burhan’s refusal to allow him to appoint his own cabinet, and opposed Burhan’s decision, announced on December 30, to restore former dictator Omar al-Bashir’s notorious national intelligence service (NISS). now to be known as the General Intelligence Service (GIS).  In any case the pro-democracy movement had regarded Hamdok’s return as a fig-leaf to legitimize the coup and ensure the military’s dominance.

With Hamdok gone, analysts say the military may look to co-opt a new civilian face to retrieve billions of dollars in much-needed foreign aid, which was suspended following the coup.

          One name being mentioned is Ibrahim Elbadawi, a former finance minister who served under Hamdok in 2019, but Burhan has been warned off simply imposing their nominee.  The US, the EU, the UK and Norway have threatened to withhold financial assistance if “a broad range of civilian stakeholders” was not involved in the process.

Meanwhile popular protests have shown no sign of slowing down, and the specter of civil war remains a real possibility.

Sudan, of course, is one of Israel’s new Arab partners under the Abraham Accords.  Where does this chaotic state of affairs leave its normalization deal with Israel?

Shortly after the overthrow of the Bashir regime in April 2019, a series of contacts and talks began between Khartoum and Jerusalem involving in-depth US and Emirati mediation.  Burhan and his military supporters wanted to distance themselves from the old Bashir regime, which had hosted Hamas and Islamic jihad, and allowed Sudan to become an open conduit for weapons and supplies passing to the Gaza Strip.  With a new regional order emerging, predicated on opposition to Iran and a working partnership with Israel, they seized on the chance to join.

It was in February 2020 that Israel’s then-prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met Burhan, head of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, in Uganda, where they agreed to normalize the ties between the two countries. 

An initial agreement on October 23, 2020 saw Sudan removed from the US government list of countries promoting terrorism, and on January 6, 2021 in a quiet ceremony #in Khartoum, Sudan formally signed up to the Abraham Accords.

Just how substantive is the Israel-Sudan normalization deal? Hamdok’s departure does not alter the basic situation, acknowledged by Birhan (whatever his true intentions):  Sudan is a nation in transition, on the road to parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2023 and intended to usher in full democratic civilian rule. 

          The normalization deal was concluded between Israel and the military leadership acting perfectly legitimately on behalf of the state of Sudan, but a democratic government, once in power, could doubtless either endorse or renounce it. Which way the chips fall will depend on how successful Israel is in the interim in demonstrating the advantages to Sudan of sticking with the deal.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line as "Sudan's political situation is a roller coaster ride", 19 January 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-693894

Published in Eurasia Review, 21 January 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/21012022-which-way-for-sudan-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 22 January 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/wp-admin/post.php?post=12995&action=edit

Published in Jewish Business News, 21 January 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/01/21/which-way-for-sudan/

Libya’s new president is on hold

This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post on 10 January 2022

In 2011 the Libyan people, with a little help from their friends, overthrew the dictator who had ruled them for some 50 years – Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.  It is well within the bounds of possibility that by now the Gaddafi regime could again have been in power in Libya, with a son of the former ruler its newly elected president.  Nor has that possibility been ruled out.  It may yet come to pass.

Presidential elections were due to take place in Libya on December 24, to be followed by a parliamentary poll.  Literally days before the scheduled vote, the chairman of the electoral committee told the assembly’s speaker: “after consulting the technical, judicial and security reports, we inform you of the impossibility of holding the elections on the date of December 24, 2021”.

One major difficulty was the fact that no official list of candidates had been agreed and, according to the rules governing the vote, candidates have the right to two weeks of official campaigning after the publication of the definitive list.

Initially no fewer than 98 people put themselves forward as prospective candidates in the presidential vote, and the electoral committee spent a great deal of time whittling the list down.  By mid-November two of the most prominent – the warlord Khalifa Haftar, and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, a son of the former leader, had been debarred from standing. 

Gaddafi brought a heavy load of unsavory baggage with him. In 2015, a domestic Libyan court had found him guilty of war crimes committed during the violent uprising against his father, and sentenced him to death in absentia. Gaddafi is also wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder and persecution.

One week after Gaddafi was disqualified from entering the presidential race, a court in the southern province of Sabha overturned the ruling, and his candidacy was reinstated.  Educated at the London School of Economics, Saif al-Islam, now 49, was widely seen as Gaddafi's heir apparent before the uprising. His faction, known as the Greens, enjoys support in some southern regions and in his hometown of Sirte. Gaddafi is the white hope of the old regime, who still retain a great deal of power and influence and want to lose none of it. 

His re-emergence has already had an impact.  People are forming alliances with or against him.  Whether he can actually win the presidential election is an open question, but he is clearly going to be a major player whenever the election does take place.

As for strongman Khalifa Hafter, he still hopes to run, even though a court in Misrata in western Libya recently sentenced him to death in absentia for bombing a military college in 2019.

Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011 led to nine years of increasingly bitter internal division and conflict. The country became the battleground for literally hundreds of militias and armed groups, each grabbing at a tiny bit of local power and often fighting among themselves in consequence.  In 2015, a UN initiative led to the establishment of a Government of National Accord (GNA), endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council as the sole legitimate executive authority in Libya.  It spent the next six years fighting off attempts by warlord Hafter and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), to overthrow the GNA and take control of the nation.

In the fall of 2019 Haftar began what he saw as the end game in his attempt to seize power and set himself up as Libya’s leader.  By the spring of 2020 he seemed on the verge of succeeding.  He was apparently within days of capturing the capital, Tripoli, but it never happened.  One reason is that in the fall of 2019 Turkey had offered to assist the GNA.  Under the terms of an agreement signed on 27 November 2019, Turkey undertook to provide the GNA with security and state-of-the-art military technology.  Ever since, the GNA began chalking up a series of successes against Hafter.

Finally the UN set up a body to mediate an agreement.  The two sides came to an understanding on October 23, 2020, and a ceasefire went into effect.  In the first week of March 2021 a UN observer mission flew an advance team into the Libyan capital, Tripoli, tasked with monitoring an agreement between the country’s rival armed factions.  In a highly volatile situation, with parts of the agreement already coming unstuck, a statement on the election commission's website indicates that the planned elections are being postponed way beyond January 24, 2022, the first date proposed.  The committee is saying it has still to adopt a series of judicial and legal measures "before proceeding to the publication of the definitive list of candidates and the start of their electoral campaign".

          Libyans seem to be in for a long wait before their new president, the first in their history to be elected by popular mandate, is sworn into office.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 9 January 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-692017

Published in Eurasia Review, 14 January 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14012022-libyas-new-president-is-on-hold-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 16 January 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/libyas-new-president-is-on-hold/

Published in Jewish Business News, 14 January 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/01/14/libyas-new-president-is-on-hold/

Lapid a hit in Britain

 This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post on 3 January 2022

Israeli presidents and prime ministers do not normally act as the advance guard for visits abroad by foreign ministers, but that is how events panned out in the dying days of 2021.  All three chanced, or managed, to visit the UK during the month of November.  By the time Yair Lapid touched down at London’s Heathrow on Sunday 28 November, both President Isaac Herzog and prime minister Naftali Bennett had come, held the friendliest of exchanges with UK prime minister Boris Johnson, and his new foreign secretary Liz Truss, and departed. Yair Lapid, his path made smooth for him, scored a remarkable success in the UK, the echoes of which still reverberate.

       "British-Israeli relations have entered a golden era” trumpeted a headline in the UK’s prestigious Jewish Chronicle a week or so after Lapid had left.  The article, by Jake Wallis Simons its editor, went on to claim that British officials and parliamentarians were “falling over each other in their love for the Jewish state.” 

            Warm sentiments begin at the top.  Before leaving for Britain, President Herzog said he and prime minister Johnson had known each other for many years, describing him as “a true friend of Israel.”  Turning to the issues he intended to raise, Herzog said: “I shall thank him for the British government’s decision to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization, with all that entails…I shall make clear that Israel cannot allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capability, and it expects its allies to be tough and assertive toward the Iranians, including in their dialogue with them.”

           Back in July, shortly after Naftali Bennett had formed his coalition government, Johnson was on the phone inviting him to the UK.  Bennett flew to Britain on November 2 to attend the international Cop26 meeting, hosted by the UK in Glasgow.  Meeting Johnson, Bennett said: “You're a huge friend to Israel; that's no secret.  What we'll be discussing is how we bring our relationship to the next level."

            With so much good will between Britain and Israel already expressed, and the groundwork firmly laid, Lapid did not face a difficult time when he landed in the UK on November 28.  Even so, he could scarcely have anticipated the diplomatic success he achieved.

   In his Jewish Chronicle article, Simons revealed he had been present at 10 Downing Street for a Hanukah reception attended by prime minister Johnson and Lapid. The chemistry between them, he wrote, was obvious.  “They had spent all day together, an honor that is not normally accorded to a visit from a prime minister of a country with a population of less than 10 million,” let alone, he might have added, a mere foreign minister.  Their close relationship, he asserts, is based on the time, 10 years before, when the two of them as journalists had enjoyed Tel Aviv’s nightlife together.  Lapid himself, in a media interview on December 24, confirmed that he has cherished a close personal friendship with Johnson for many years.

On the day after Lapid arrived, November 29, the Daily Telegraph achieved a journalistic coup – an article written jointly by the British and Israeli foreign ministers, Liz Truss and Yair Lapid.  Headed: “Together we can propel both our nations to safety and prosperity”, the piece heralded a new UK-Israeli agreement, to be signed later that day, which they described as “a major step forward, transforming our close friendship into an even closer partnership by formally agreeing a new strategic plan for the next decade spanning cyber, tech, trade and defense.”  Lapid later described this UK-Israel Strategic Partnership as “a major moment in the relationship between the United Kingdom and Israel.”

   The ministers noted that Israel and the UK have already built up their bi-lateral trade to an annual £5 billion (nearly $7 billion), and quoted two major examples:  the UK’s Rolls-Royce is supplying jet engines to Israel’s national airline, and the Israeli pharmaceutical giant Teva is supplying one in six of the medicines prescribed in the UK’s National Health Service.

   In a further agreement, Israel and Britain were opening negotiations on a new bespoke free trade deal which would help both nations seize new opportunities in the industries of the future.  Moreover, Israel will officially become a Tier One cyber partner for the UK.

   Lapid had stopped off in the UK on his way to attend the latest round of talks, being held in Vienna, on reactivating the nuclear deal between world powers and Iran.  One of the most eye-catching aspects of the joint article by the two ministers is a renewed commitment to stop Tehran ever getting nuclear weapons.  Making President Herzog’s earlier ask of Britain a reality, they affirmed that the UK and Israel will “work night and day to prevent the Iranian regime from ever becoming a nuclear power. The clock is ticking, which heightens the need for close cooperation with our partners and friends to thwart Tehran’s ambitions.”

The joint article concludes: “Israel and the UK are the closest of friends, and today we are deepening that partnership to become even closer. Together, we will forge ahead and ensure the future is defined by liberal democracies who believe in freedom and fairness.”

That is as firm an expression of friendship and solidarity between two nations as it is possible to envisage.  Notable by its absence is any reference to the Israel-Palestinian dispute, the two-state solution, the expansion of settlements, or any lack of proportionality in Israel’s response to being bombarded with rockets and missiles from the Gaza strip. Doubtless Britain has an official policy on these matters which possibly varies from Israel’s.  Given the new warmth in UK-Israeli relations, might a chance exist for the two nations to reach a common view even on these?  That is a matter for Lapid to ponder, while he awaits his turn in the prime ministerial chair.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on line:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-691392

The G7, the E3 and Iran

 

Much of the world is growing increasingly impatient as Iran plays for time on the diplomatic front while it forges ahead towards full nuclear capability.  Armed intervention to deter its activities becomes ever more likely.

On December 11 Britain hosted a two-day meeting of the G7 group of industrialized nations in its northern port city of Liverpool.   “We need to defend ourselves against the growing threats from hostile actors," said UK foreign secretary Liz Truss, as she opened the meeting of foreign ministers from the UK, US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan.

The main agenda item was the imminent threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the progress, or lack of it, on reviving the Iran nuclear deal was also a major topic of discussion. Truss met US Secretary of State Antony Blinken ahead of the G7 meeting, and they agreed on the need for Iran to engage meaningfully on a nuclear deal.  When the subject of Iran surfaced, Annalena Baerbock, the German foreign minister, warned that the talks in Vienna, where the seventh round of discussions on reinstating the 2015 nuclear deal were taking place, were close to collapsing.  To reporters she said that there was no progress in sight, and that "time is running out".

On December 14 the group known as the E3 (the UK, France and Germany), met at the UN in New York, and issued a statement.  “Iran’s nuclear program,” it ran, “has never been more advanced than it is today.  This nuclear escalation is undermining international peace and security and the global non-proliferation system…Iran’s continued nuclear escalation means that we are rapidly reaching the end of the road.”

To cut to the chase:  Iran is determined to acquire a nuclear arsenal; the West is determined that it shall not.  The West will do everything possible to thwart Iran’s ambitions, short of using armed force.  On the other hand, in the final analysis armed force is precisely what Israel is prepared to employ against Iran’s nuclear facilities, and there are signs that the US could endorse such action, or even facilitate it. However a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities could provide only a temporary disruption.  If it failed to deter, or to bring Iran into compliance with UN restrictions on nuclear development, further armed attacks would be necessary.

That is the unvarnished truth of the situation as the latest rounds of talks with Iran reach virtual stalemate in Vienna.  While the G7 meeting was in progress, Truss said:

"This is the last chance for Iran to come to the negotiating table with a serious resolution to this issue, which has to be agreeing the terms of the JCPOA (the acronym for the 2015 nuclear accord)… We will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon."

On the same day Iran's top negotiator in Vienna, Ali Bagheri Kani, alleged that European countries – thus explicitly excluding Iran-supporting Russia and China – had offered no constructive proposals to help to revive the nuclear deal.  "European parties fail to come up with any initiatives to resolve differences over the removal of sanctions," he said.

His choice of words is significant.  Iran’s tactic is to turn the purpose of the talks on its head. Vienna is an attempt to bring Iran back into restricting the development of its nuclear facilities, especially to prevent it acquiring the capacity to manufacture nuclear weaponry.  Iran’s emphasis is wholly on the removal of all sanctions imposed by the UN, the EU and the US, whether related to the nuclear deal or not.  This is to be its price for re-entering the JCPOA, or an amended version of it.

As the G7 meeting convened in the UK, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, was reported as saying that traces of nuclear material had been discovered in places in Iran that have not been declared before.  In addition an Iranian production facility in Karaj making centrifuge parts had had no cameras in place since June, when it suffered a sabotage attack. The agency was trying to come to an agreement with Iran on both issues.

At about the same time Israel’s defense minister Benny Gantz told reporters that he had instructed the IDF to prepare a strike against Iran.  He said he was confident that if diplomacy failed to break the stalemate, the US would itself start taking the military option more seriously.  Media reports claim that in meetings with Blinken and US defense secretary Lloyd Austin, Gantz actually presented a timeline for an Israeli attack on Iran, and that no attempt was made to dissuade him.

Asked by reporters if the US was discussing military options should the Vienna talks fail, Ned Price, the State Department spokesman, replied: "I wouldn’t want to speak to what we might be contemplating if diplomacy... isn’t viable in the near term. But we are discussing those alternatives. We are discussing those options with our close partners, with our close allies, and that includes with the Israelis.  We have already had good discussions with the Israelis about the path forward, and how we can work together to ensure that Iran is never able to acquire a nuclear weapon."

In her statement summing up the results of the G7 meeting that she had hosted, Truss said: “We welcomed the resumption of negotiations in Vienna on restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and reiterated that Iran must stop its nuclear escalation and seize the opportunity now to conclude a deal, while this is still possible.” 

What could, or should, follow if Iran failed to do just that was left unsaid.

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 January 2022
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01012022-the-g7-the-e3-and-iran-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 1 January 2022
https://mpc-journal.org/he-g7-the-e3-and-iran/

Published in Jewish Business News, 31 December 2021
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/12/31/the-g7-the-e3-and-iran/