Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 October 2022
Ever since it invaded
Ukraine, Russia has succeeded in preventing Israel from providing meaningful
support to the Ukrainians, using its presence in Syria and Israel’s security interests
there as its justification.
Following Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Israel
set up a "deconfliction mechanism" with Russia to prevent inadvertent
clashes when Israel struck Iranian deployments and arms transfers in
Syria. Officially Russia never condoned the Israeli strikes, consistently
calling them “violations of Syrian sovereignty” (ironic terminology in view of
its subsequent incursion into Ukraine). Unofficially, Russia agreed to turn
a blind eye, provided it was given sufficient advance warning of forthcoming
Israeli actions.
The Russian embassy in
Israel once explained: "Our military officials discuss the practical
issues of this substantively on a daily basis. This mechanism has proven to be
useful and will continue to work."
Israel rarely comments
on individual strikes, but has acknowledged carrying out hundreds to counter
Iranian efforts to turn Syria into an advanced military hub in its own right,
and as a route to supply hardware to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel is obliged to
make every effort to prevent possible future attacks on the nation.
So, in the national
interest, Israel has continued to strike at Iranian military hardware being
transported across, or stored within, Syria. For example, Syria claims
that Israel carried out a strike against Damascus International Airport on
October 21. According to the respected Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights, Israel also targeted sites on September 15, near the airport where
Iranian-backed groups were stationed. During August Israeli airstrikes were
twice reported to have targeted Aleppo airport. In June, the Syrian
Observatory reported that Israeli strikes put Damascus airport out of
service for nearly two weeks when weapons depots belonging to Iran-backed
militias were targeted.
Just before Russia
invaded Ukraine, Israel condemned any potential incursion as "a serious
violation of international order". In response, Moscow summoned the
Israeli ambassador for talks, and in the UN Security Council the Russian
spokesman condemned Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. The message
was clear enough. Subsequently, though foreign minister Yair Lapid did
denounce Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel has remained largely silent on Russia’s
actions, while Moscow has indicated that it would continue coordinating with
Israel in Syria.
Events, however, have
not stood still. It is now clear that Russia has purchased thousands of Iranian
drones which it is using against Ukrainian civilians in the course of its
military actions. There are reports that Iran’s IRGC (Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps) technicians are actually on the ground in Ukraine,
helping the Russians deploy the drones. On October 16 the Washington
Post reported that Iran is expected to enhance its support. In
addition to the Shahed-136 "kamikaze" drones and the Mohajer-6 attack
drones it has already provided, Iran is expected to start supplying Russia with
precision-guided, short- and medium-range missiles.
With Russia and Iran growing
ever closer, how long can the delicately balanced Russo-Israeli arrangement in
Syria continue? Will the Iranians start demanding a price beyond dollars
for supplying their military equipment to Russia? In short, can the
agreement hold, or will Israel finally have to run the risk of clashing with
the Russian military? If so, how much of a risk would that be?
Would Russia actually initiate such clashes?
The same questions would
arise if Israel took the initiative and provided Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr
Zelensky, with the defensive hardware he is asking for.
On October 15 the Ukrainian government sent Israel an official request for air defence systems that will allow it to counter Iranian ballistic missiles and attack drones used by Russia in Ukraine. The letter confirms that Russia has started using Iranian-made drones against cities and civilian infrastructure.
"According to
available information,” the letter runs, “…there is a high probability of
prompt deliveries to the Russian Federation of Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar
ballistic missiles from Iran." In order to protect its civilians,
Ukraine wants to initiate cooperation with Israel on air and missile defence.
"Ukraine is highly
interested in obtaining from Israel…defence systems, in particular: Iron Beam,
Barak-8, Patriot, Iron Dome, David's Sling, Arrow Interceptor, and Israeli
support in training for Ukrainian operators."
The letter made the
point that experience gained by Iran of using these weapons in Ukraine would
"significantly contribute in strengthening Iran’s potential of producing
offensive weapons and, as a result, will increase the security threats for the
State of Israel and the Middle East region."
The day before the
letter was sent, Israel's defence minister Benny Gantz said in a meeting with EU
ambassadors that Israel supports Ukraine via humanitarian aid and the delivery
of life-saving defensive equipment, but emphasized that Israel will not deliver
weapon systems to Ukraine due to a variety of operational considerations.
"We will continue
to support Ukraine within our limitations," said Gantz.
The question is: have
Israel’s limitations been drawn too narrowly? To what extent can Israeli
anti-missile defence systems be considered offensive military equipment?
They can only be deployed after rockets, missiles or drones have actually been
launched. They are, as the saying goes, “exactly what’s written on the
tin” - namely defensive. In which case, there can be no reasonable
objection to providing the Ukrainians with this means of defending
themselves. Given the unjustifiable misery Putin has inflicted on Ukraine
and its people, Israel would surely be justified in complying with its urgent
request for assistance – and dealing with any consequences.
Published in Eurasia Review, 5 November 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/04112022-why-israel-should-give-zelensky-what-he-wants-oped/
No comments:
Post a Comment