Tunisia - a ticking time-bomb

During Ramadan this year, just before nightfall when Muslims break their fast, dozens of Tunisian policemen swooped on the home of 81-year-old Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of the country’s biggest political party Ennahdha, and took him to jail. A few days later he was charged with plotting against state security.  On May 15 he was found guilty of incitement and sentenced to a year in prison..

Tunisia’s president, Kais Saied. has been targeting Ennahdha politicians and his other critics ever since seizing power in 2021.  Since February some 20 opposition leaders, dissidents, activists and journalists have reportedly been arrested.  Observers have said the charges are often trumped up and that Saied is simply on a vendetta to silence his critics.

   Tunisia’s deteriorating situation was discussed at a specially convened forum in London on May 18.  Seifeddine Ferjani, son of a jailed politician, said: “There are deeply worrying signs of the way Tunisia operates now, such as using anti-terror squads to arrest liberal dissidents…I think that Tunisia is a ticking time bomb.”

Ghannoushi’s daughter, Soumaya, said Saied has “devoured” Tunisia’s democracy bit by bit, accusing him of manufacturing crises in order to distract the nation from its real problems.

According to Saied the murder of five people on May 9 outside el-Ghriba synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba was "intended to sow discord, and sabotage the tourist season in the run-up to summer."

In fact the killings were apparently motiveless.  They were carried out by a member of Tunisia’s National Guard stationed at its naval center in the nearby town of Aghir.  His murder spree began when he shot a fellow guard and seized his ammunition.  He then made his way to el-Ghriba synagogue, swarming with hundreds of visitors on the annual Lag B’Omer pilgrimage.  Once there, he fired indiscriminately at security units set up to control the crowds, gunning down three security officers and two visitors, before he himself was shot and killed. Four other visitors and four security officers were also injured.

   El-Ghriba, which means "The Mysterious" in Arabic, is one of the oldest synagogues in the world. It is reputed to have been built by Jews who fled Jerusalem after the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE, and tradition maintains that it incorporates a stone or gate brought from King Solomon‘s temple. Its ark contains what is thought to be one of the oldest Torah scrolls in existence. The synagogue is considered a holy site by both Jews and Muslims who share it as a place of worship.  In Tunisia the Jewish community, although much reduced, remains a vibrant part of the country’s culture.

How much longer the liberal atmosphere of Tunisia’s 12-year fledgling democracy will last is anybody’s guess. 

Between 1956 and 2011 Tunisia operated as a one-party state under an all-powerful president. The national uprising in 2011 is widely thought to have been the spark that triggered the Arab Spring, and its greatest success. President Abidine was swept from power, and a multi-party democracy was established.  Tunisia’s first democratic parliamentary elections came in 2014, and its first elected president was Beji Caid Essesi.  Unfortunately he died in 2019, and in the subsequent presidential elections Kais Saied, reputed at the time to be incorruptible, enjoyed a landslide victory.

What followed is giving cause for concern. On July 25, 2021 Saied suspended parliament, fired the prime minister and began ruling by decree. Since then, Tunisia has reverted to the sort of authoritarian one-party state of earlier times, and the economy has worsened to the point where European economic experts warn of an impending meltdown.  Yet in April, Saied appeared to reject the terms of a much-awaited $1.9 billion bailout from the IMF.  “Diktats from abroad” that would increase poverty were “unacceptable”, he said.  Tunisians had to rely on themselves.

Josep Borrell, the EU diplomacy chief, warned in March that Tunisia was heading towards economic collapse, an assessment echoed by Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state, who said the Tunisian economy risks “falling off the deep end” without IMF help.

As the political atmosphere grows ever more febrile, civil rights organizations that thrived after the revolution say they expect to become the president’s next targets. Romdhane Ben Amor, spokesman for the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, says pro-Saied social media accounts have accused them of being agents and traitors.

“We also receive threatening messages privately which accuse us of serving foreign agendas,” he adds. “Pressures on us have increased since we opposed the president’s February speech against migrants.”

He was referring to a speech by Saied on February 21 during a National Security Council meeting. “Hordes of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa” said Saied, had come to Tunisia “with  the violence, crime, and unacceptable practices that entails”. This was an “unnatural” situation,” he said, and part of a criminal plan designed to “change the demographic make-up” and turn Tunisia into “just another African country that doesn’t belong to the Arab and Islamic nations any  more.”

His remarks not only provoked a crisis with the African Union, but triggered street attacks against Black African migrants, students and asylum seekers. In opposition to Saied’s followers, hundreds of Tunisians poured onto the streets to protest.  Police officers detained and deported scores. 

“President Saied must retract his comments,” said Heba Morayef, Amnesty International’s Director for the Middle East and North Africa.  He  must “order investigations to clearly signal that anti-Black racist violence will not be tolerated. The president must stop finding scapegoats for Tunisia’s economic and political woes.”

For two weeks, the authorities denied that racist violence against Black Africans had occurred.  When the extent of international opposition became clear, the authorities announced, “new measures” on 5 March to facilitate the legal residency of migrants, as well as a process of repatriation for those “wishing to voluntarily leave the country.”

Unfortunately, the attacks and violence have continued. Where on earth is Tunisia  heading?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 31 May 2023 as "A ticking time bomb":

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-744637

Published in Eurasia Review,  3 June 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/03062023-tunisia-a-ticking-time-bomb-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 17 June 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/tunisia-a-ticking-time-bomb/

The malign objectives of the PIJ

         

         In February 2003 the leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in North America, Sami Al-Arian, was indicted by the US Attorney General on 17 counts.  In his published indictment the Attorney General, John Ashcroft, revealed that during the course of its investigation, the US Justice Department had discovered a previously unknown document called "Manifesto of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine".  Declaring that the PIJ  “is one of the most violent terrorist organizations in the world” Ashcroft, quoting from the manifesto, described the organization’s aims. The PIJ rejects "any peaceful solution to the Palestinian cause" and affirms "the Jihad solution and the martyrdom style as the only choice for liberation."  Referring to the United States as "the Great-Satan America", the manifesto states that the sole purpose of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is to destroy Israel and end all Western influence in the region.

            In fact the PIJ has always identified one further step.  Having eliminated Israel, the organization intends to replace it with a hardline Sunni Islamist state stretching from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean sea.  

Active since the early 1980s, for much of the time the PIJ scarcely figured in the terrorist big league. Media attention was mainly focused on al-Qaeda, ISIS, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hamas and Hezbollah.  PIJ would spring to prominence only occasionally as it promulgated some particularly heinous atrocity.  

That changed on May 2, when prominent PIJ leader Khader Adnan, on hunger strike in an Israeli jail, died after refusing to eat for 87 days.

Adnan, who had been in and out of Israeli prisons some 12 times over the years, had been charged with inciting violence.  The PIJ decided to register their anger at his death by launching some 100 rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel, regardless of where they landed or who they killed or injured. 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) decided to meet aggression with aggression, and on May 9 targeted and killed three leading PIJ figures.  During the subsequent conflict 15 other PIJ terrorists were killed as Israel struck 371 terrorist targets, including PIJ command posts, rocket facilities, and attack tunnels.

The PIJ, suddenly in the world’s headlines, retaliated by firing nearly 1500 rockets from Gaza into Israel.  Iron Dome air defenses successfully intercepted most, but there were three direct hits - one in Sderot, another on a Rehovot apartment building killing an 80-year-old woman, and a third which killed a Gazan man working in open fields in Israel.  

The media reported that hundreds of the PIJ rockets launched against Israel misfired and landed inside the Gaza Strip.  The IDF believes that about a quarter of all the missiles fell short.  In one incident two teenagers were killed when a failed rocket crashed into a residential area of Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza.

The PIJ, apparently firmly established and in the ascendant, is in fact positioned on shaky ground. Its onslaught on Israel, based as it is in Gaza, depends on the continued tolerance of Hamas, while for its finances and military supplies it is wholly reliant on Iran.  Neither are rock solid in their support.

The PIJ is not entirely under the thumb of Hamas.  Its headquarters are in Damascus, while its senior leadership also directs policy from Lebanon, but its active military operations against Israel are centered in the Gaza Strip.  Gaza of course is in the iron grip of Hamas.  Is there room for two active terrorist bodies in the same small parcel of land? 

Apparently so, for the PIJ is clearly tolerated by Hamas and allowed to carry out its anti-Israel operations.  But all is not sweetness and light between the two bodies. During the recent flare-up Hamas provided no facilities or equipment to the PIJ, and it stayed out of the conflict.  Moreover, rumor has it that Hamas pressed the PIJ to agree an early ceasefire. Commentators noted that in celebrating its supposed achievements during the conflict, PIJ thanked Iran, Hezbollah, and Qatar by name, but did not mention Hamas.

Hamas and the PIJ certainly have the common aim of attacking Israel indiscriminately, but there are key differences between them. PIJ, which is focused solely on military confrontations, has the most to gain from promulgating violence against Israel, while Hamas, the civilian government in Gaza, has the most to lose.  In the past, escalations between Israel and the PIJ have jeopardized Hamas’s cash flow from its ally Qatar, decimating public services and vital infrastructure.

So Hamas has recently sought to keep a lid on conflict with Israel, aware that it could cost thousands of Gazans permits to work inside Israel and deepen the fatigue of a population that has already suffered four devastating wars.  But to preserve its reputation as the main Palestinian resistance movement, Hamas has professed support for its rival through an umbrella group known as the “joint operations room.”

“Publicly, Hamas has to support Islamic Jihad,” said Erik Skare, author of a book on the group’s history and researcher at the University of Oslo.. “But it’s also telling them…to avoid a major escalation. It is urging Islamic Jihad to show restraint.”

            PIJ, a Sunni body, which sprang from the loins of the Muslim Brotherhood, is very largely financed, equipped and supported by the leading Shi’ite state in the region, namely Iran.  The bond uniting them – a hatred of the US and a desire to remove the state of Israel from the Middle East – is sufficiently strong at present to overcome their fundamental religious differences. Should they ever come close to achieving their common purpose, though, their alliance could never survive.

Indeed the fatal flaw in their relationship was publicly revealed back in May 2015. When Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), assembled a coalition to oppose Iran’s proxy, the Houthis, from taking over Yemen, Iran expected full-hearted support from the PIJ.

But the opposing forces on the ground represented to many Muslims the eternal Sunni-Shia conflict. The PIJ, caught between the rock of supporting a Shi’ite militia, and the hard place of offending Iran, decided to stay neutral.  The Iranian leadership was furious and, well aware that the PIJ was heavily dependent on Iranian finance, cut off its funding.. The Palestinian newspaper al-Quds revealed that Iran switched its support to an offshoot of PIJ  called as-Sabinn  (Arabic for "the patient ones").

The freeze lasted more than a year. It was only in mid-2016, following a visit to Iran by the organization’s then-leader, Ramadan Shalah, that Iran renewed its full support for PIJ.

          The PIJ’s hatred of Israel is boundless, and in its depraved operations it targets all Israelis without distinction. Indeed in the 1990s, and again during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005, PIJ positively targeted civilians. One of its deadliest terror attacks was the suicide bombing at “Maxim” restaurant in 2003, in which 21 civilians, including the elderly and young children, were murdered. The PIJ viewed the deaths of the civilians as a great operational success.

          Then came the Netanya mall bombing in 2005, which killed five Israelis and wounded 50, a 2006 suicide bombing on a Tel Aviv shawarma restaurant which killed 11 and injured 70, and the shooting at the Max Brenner Café in Tel Aviv on June 2016 which left four people dead seven others injured. Moreover, launching rockets and missiles into Israel regardless of where they might fall and who they might kill, has for years been a staple of PIJ - and Hamas - activity.

          For Israel, faced with an enemy like the PIJ which explicitly rejects any peaceful solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, there can be only one objective – to identify and exploit its weaknesses, and to defeat it.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 24 May 2023
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-744005

Published in Eurasia Review, 26 May 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26052023-the-malign-purposes-of-the-pij-oped/

The Cyrus of our time

 This article appears in the new issue of the Jerusalem Report, dated 29 May 2023

Reza Pahlavi, the man born to be Shah of Iran and who, for the first nineteen years of his life, was its Crown Prince, paid a first-ever visit to Israel on April 17 to attend Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremonies. 

When his father, faced by an army mutiny and violent public demonstrations, went into voluntary exile on January 17, 1979 young Pahlavi was a trainee fighter pilot at a US air base in Texas.  Two weeks later Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Islamic revolution, took control of the country.  Neither Pahlavi nor his father ever set foot in Iran again. 

Ahead of his visit Pahlavi said: “I am travelling to Israel to deliver a message of friendship from the Iranian people…I want the people of Israel to know that the Islamic Republic does not represent the Iranian people. The ancient bond between our people can be rekindled for the benefit of both nations. I’m going to Israel to play my role in building toward that brighter future.”

His supporters like to brand Pahlavi “the Cyrus of our time”, comparing him to Cyrus the Great, a revered ruler who founded the Persian empire millennia ago.  Pahlavi used the comparison, but with a Jewish twist, when tweeting a picture of himself at the Western Wall on April 18 wearing a kippa. He reminded his followers that 2,500 years ago Cyrus the Great liberated the Jewish people from their exile in Babylon and helped them build the second Temple in Jerusalem.

“It is with profound awe that I visit the Western Wall of that Temple,” said Pahlavi, “and pray for the day when the good people of Iran and Israel can renew our historic friendship.”

He quoted a verse from the Bible: “So said Cyrus, the king of Persia, ‘All the kingdoms of the earth the Lord God of the heavens delivered to me, and He commanded me to build Him a House in Jerusalem, which is in Judea.’”

As part of his historic visit, Pahlavi also attended a Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony at Yad Vashem, standing alongside prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog.

To end his own exile has been Pahlavi’s main purpose in life for the past 44 years. Though living in the West under the constant threat of assassination, he has campaigned constantly for the overthrow of the rule of the ayatollahs and to return home to create a new modern, liberal democracy that respects human rights, freedom and equality. 

In pursuit of his aim he leads a body called the National Council of Iran for Free Elections (NCI).  The Council, an umbrella group of exiled opposition figures, seeks to restore Pahlavi to the leadership of Iran, either as Shah or as president.  Meanwhile it acts as a government-in-exile, and claims to have gathered "tens of thousands of pro-democracy proponents from both inside and outside Iran."  

As an underground movement, operating through social media and word of mouth, Pahlavi says it has drawn support from within the regime.  “We have former diplomats, media people, branches of the military, including the Revolutionary Guard.”

He believes the ayatollahs are pressing down the lid of a simmering cauldron of dissatisfaction among a large proportion of the Iranian people, a cauldron that will one day boil over and sweep them away. It is certainly true that the Islamic revolution has never been completely clear of internal opposition, which has often erupted into open violence.  For example, widespread demonstrations followed the 2009 presidential election, which it was generally believed was subject to vote rigging and election fraud.

By January 2018 ever-rising food and commodity prices and a deteriorating economic situation again led to popular protests which threw Iran into turmoil.  These economic grievances soon morphed into opposition to the regime in general and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in particular. Dissent was voiced especially against the regime’s involvement in foreign enterprises, including direct engagement in the Syrian civil conflict, and costly military and logistical support for Hezbollah in Syria, for the Houthis in Yemen and for Hamas in Gaza.  The vast sums expended in these operations were seen as being at the direct expense of the Iranian population. 

These mass anti-government demonstrations rumbled on into the early months of 2020.  Among the slogans chanted by protesters across the country and reported in the media  were: “Bring back the Shah” and “Reza Shah, rest in peace”.

Then on September 13, 2022 Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, was arrested by Iran’s infamous morality police.  Her nominal offense was that she was wearing her hijab “improperly”.  Mahsa was taken to the Vozara Detention Centre.  Three days later she died.

Inspired by their young women, the Iranian nation erupted in protest. Thousands took to the streets in cities across the country.  Very soon the demonstrations had spread to all 31 of the country's provinces.  At first they were directed against the severe dress code imposed on women and enforced by the morality police.  But soon the protesters began targeting the regime itself and the Supreme Leader.  Posters with the slogan “Death to the Dictator” began appearing, and videos posted online showed demonstrators burning images of Khamenei and calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty.

A major problem for Reza Pahlavi and his government-in-exile is that he is not the only contender for power in a democratic post-ayatollah Iran.  Seeking the same outcome, and declaring itself a parliament-in-exile, is an organization calling itself by the worryingly similar title of “The National Council of Resistance of Iran” (NCRI).  

          Founded in 1981, the NCRI seeks to establish a pluralistic, multi-party and democratic system in Iran. It declares that after the overthrow of the ayatollahs’ regime it would run the country for no more than six months, during which its primary task would be to set up free and fair elections for a national assembly. Its President-elect is a remarkable woman, Maryam Rajavi, who is utterly opposed to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam.

One main difference between the two Councils is that the NCRI does not embrace the possibility of a return to the monarchy. It was founded on the basis of “No to the Shah and no to the Mullahs”. In fact it states that “the model of monarchy, which is also a model of dependence and despotism, has failed.” The idea of a constitutional monarchy, because it is alien in the Middle East, does not enter their thinking, and it aims to establish a republic in post-ayatollah Iran. Pahlavi, however, says that would be fine with him. He stands ready to serve his country regardless, as sovereign or as president.

 “Everybody knows that I carry the monarchic heritage,” he says, but “if the country is more ready for a republic, even better. That’s great.”

At the moment Pahlavi’s emollient words seem unlikely to influence the uncompromising political objectives underlying the NCRI.  Rajavi may see herself as the eventual President of a liberalized Iran, and would find no role for Pahlavi. If that is how the NCRI thinks, it is a dangerously blinkered view.  Politically, personally and nostalgically Pahlavi has a large following within Iran, and his presence leading an anti-regime movement, or at least in a leadership role, would carry great weight.  The NCRI ignores this political reality at its peril.

At the moment the two Councils are far apart.  Yet clearly their fundamental aims overlap to a considerable extent.  It seems obvious that to achieve success in their common purpose the two Councils must come together and thrash out an agreed policy.  Ideally they should open negotiations as soon as possible with the aim of amalgamating.  

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 19 May 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-743440

Published in the MPC Journal, 17 June 2023:
https://mpc-journal.org/the-cyrus-of-our-time/

Sudan in meltdown

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 May 2023

On May 6 delegates from the two military groups slogging it out for control of Sudan met for pre-negotiation talks in Jeddah, each side represented by a three-person team.  The discussions are being masterminded by the US and Saudi Arabia, who began by urging the combatants to agree to an effective short-term ceasefire while the talks take place.  That exhortation has so far fallen on deaf ears, but both teams agreed that they bear a heavy responsibility to help alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people, including the urgent need to reach agreement on delivering emergency aid.

On May 12 the BBC reported that the warring factions had signed an accord to protect civilians and admit badly needed humanitarian assistance. They are still discussing a proposal for a truce and a mechanism to monitor it.

Although formally the two sides are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in effect they are the respective leaders - Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the de facto ruler of Sudan, and his rival, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as "Hemeti", who is still nominally Burhan’s deputy on the ruling Council.

Army chief Burhan will insist that he represents the legitimate government which Hemeti is seeking to overthrow.  Hemeti will demand equal status for the two sides.  Since his paramilitary RSF fighters control much of Khartoum, he will want a freeze on the current military position.  Burhan will want a return to the positions before the clashes began.

As for the political issues that will need to be addressed, each will demand an agenda that suits their interests.  There is one matter on which Burhan and Hemeti agree -­ neither wants the sort of democratic government that has been the nation’s objective ever since the overthrow of Sudan’s dictator, Omar al-Bashir, on April 4, 2019.  Even so, national and international pressure may force both to go along with the goal of a fully democratic state based on free and fair elections.

“Though the mills of God grind slowly,” wrote the American poet Longfellow, “yet they grind exceeding small.”  It took a full 30 years for Bashir to receive just retribution for the excesses of his regime, but in the end it came.

            Back in June 1989 Bashir headed a military coup in Sudan.  Ousting the previous regime, he assumed full executive and legislative powers, declared himself president and established a dictatorship.  For 30 years he held Sudan in an iron grip.

Bashir’s rule came to an end in April 2019, when widespread popular uprisings precipitated a coup by the army.  The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), an umbrella group agitating for complete change in Sudan, were determined that this uprising would not be hijacked by another military junta.  So a Transitional Military Council was set up in August 2019 to help the country move to democracy.  The Council appointed Abdalla Hamdok as prime mininster.

Few politicians in modern times have experienced such a see-saw of events.  He was appointed in August 2019, but despite the FFC’s best intentions there was indeed a coup in October 2021 led by army chief Burhan.  Hamdok was deposed and arrested.  Intensive negotiations between the FFC and the military followed.  An agreement of sorts was concluded, and on November 21 Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister.  The following March he survived an assassination attempt.  On January 2, 2022, he resigned.  He remains a potent factor, though, on the political scene.

The agreement between the Sudanese military, led by Burhan, and the FFC led to the  establishment of a new transitional administration. Its declared intention was to lead the country toward a democratic and civilian government, but in reality it was dominated by Burhan, who became the effective leader of the country. 

What followed was economic instability and political unrest, and it was not long before armed militia troops headed by Hemeti began attacking SAF forces.  Soon the two armed groups were engaged in a vicious civil war.  

Sudan, of course, is nominally one of Israel’s new Arab partners under the Abraham Accords.  Where does this chaotic state of affairs leave its normalization deal with Israel?

Shortly after the overthrow of the Bashir regime in April 2019, the US and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) brokered contacts between Israel and Sudan’s transitional administration dominated by Burhan.  He and his military supporters wanted to distance themselves from the old Bashir regime, which had hosted Hamas and Islamic jihad, and had allowed Sudan to become an open conduit for weapons and supplies passing to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.  So Burhan and his supporters seized the chance to join the new regional order that was emerging, predicated on opposition to Iran and a working partnership with Israel.

It was in February 2020 that Israel’s then-prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met Burhan, head of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, in Uganda, where they agreed to normalize the ties between the two countries. An initial agreement on October 23, 2020 saw Sudan removed from the US government list of countries promoting terrorism, and on January 6, 2021 in a quiet ceremony in Khartoum, Sudan formally signed up to the Abraham Accords.

Just how substantive is the Israel-Sudan normalization deal? Whatever the outcome of the conflict between Burhan and Hemeti, Sudan is a nation in transition, on the road to parliamentary elections intended to usher in full democratic civilian rule.  The then military leadership that concluded the normalization deal with Israel was acting perfectly legitimately on behalf of the state of Sudan.  A democratic government, once in power, could doubtless either endorse or renounce it.  Which way will the chips fall?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post on-line as "Which way will the chips fall while Sudan is in meltdown?" on 16 May 2023:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-743150

Published in Eurasia Review, 20 May 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/20052023-sudan-in-meltdown-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 18 May 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/sudan-in-meltdown/

Published in Jewish Business News, 18 May 2023:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2023/05/18/sudan-in-chaos/

Cementing ties with Iran's neighbours

          On 19 and 20 April Israel’s foreign minister, Eli Cohen, visited two of Iran’s close neighbours in central Asia.  Facing each other across the Caspian Sea are Azerbaijan, which borders north-western Iran, and Turkmenistan, which borders its north-east.  Both were among the fifteen republics once swallowed up by the USSR, and both regained their independence in 1991. 

Subsequently both avoided falling under the domination of their increasingly powerful neighbour, Iran. For that reason they became of great strategic importance to Israel, which has taken pains to maintain good relations with them. 

Cohen went first to Azerbaijan.  Israel has had a close strategic and business partnership with the Azeris for more than thirty years, but not a diplomatic one. That deficiency was remedied less than a month before Cohen’s visit, when Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Israel – the first ever of a Shi’ite Muslim nation.  Up till then Azeri-Israeli diplomatic relations had been a somewhat one-sided affair.  Israel, which was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence in December 1991, actually established its own embassy in the capital, Baku, back in 1993.  A whole range of political and practical difficulties had frustrated Azerbaijan’s reciprocal gesture, until this March.

Israel supported Azerbaijan with increased shipments of weapons during the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with Armenia.  Partly because of this, Azerbaijan emerged victorious from the six-week conflict and regained control over long-disputed territories. 

“Israel showed we were there with Azerbaijan at a time of need,” said Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, George Deek.  “For them, it was proof of a real friendship.”

Even though commercial ties between the two countries are strong (Israel imports 30% of its oil from Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan acquires nearly 70% of its arms from Israel), Cohen declared that the opening of the Azeri embassy in Tel Aviv symbolized a new era in relations between the two countries. On his visit to Azerbaijan Cohen was accompanied by a 20-strong delegation representing the Israeli cyber, defence, homeland security, water management, and agriculture industries. The delegation met with Azeri business and government leaders, and discussions ranged widely and included Azerbaijan’s desire to expand Israeli imports to include the cyber and solar energy fields. The two sides also agreed to cooperate on space exploration.

Underlying the close business and working relationship, of course, lies the threat posed to the region by Iran.  When meeting Azerbaijan’s foreign minister, Jeyhun Bayramov, Cohen spoke about the dangers. “Israel and Azerbaijan share the same perception of the Iranian threats,” he said. “The Iranian ayatollah regime threatens our regions, finances terrorism and destabilizes the entire Middle East.”

Media reports suggest that the Azeris have been allowing Israel to launch reconnaissance missions into Iran from its territory.  More than this, some reports speculate that any future Israeli strike on the Iranian nuclear programme could enjoy the same privilege.

From Azerbaijan Cohen flew to Turkmenistan, becoming the first Israeli foreign minister in 30 years to do so.  He met President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and opened Israel’s first permanent embassy in the capital, Ashgabat.  Israel and Turkmenistan established diplomatic relations back in 1993, but it was only some ten years ago that Israel sent its ambassador to the country, and he has been operating out of temporary premises ever since.  

"Turkmenistan is an…energy powerhouse in a strategic location," said Cohen. "The opening of our permanent embassy today strengthens the relationship between the two countries."

The event was also of symbolic significance.  Located a mere 15 kilometres from the Iranian border, the new embassy is the closest to the Islamic Republic of any Israeli diplomatic mission. It sends a message to Iran’s leaders that Israel is a present and growing influence in the region.  The importance of the occasion was recognized by other states concerned by the threat posed by Iran, and ambassadors from a number, including the US, Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates attended the opening ceremony. 

Cohen was joined at the event by his Turkmen counterpart, Rashid Meredov.  The two cut the ribbon together.  “We have a very good relationship with the State of Israel,” said Meredov.  “We will do everything toward expanding and strengthening our relationship…”

A topic common to Cohen’s discussions with both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan was the prospect of connecting Israel’s natural gas deposits to their pipelines, thus increasing the potential for delivering Israeli gas to Europe.

Another possibility would involve Turkey, which enjoys close linguistic, cultural and political ties with the Central Asian states.  With Europe eager to divest from Russian energy, Turkey has become a potential gateway through which the continent could be supplied with oil and natural gas from alternative sources, including both Israel and Central Asian states.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are very different in nature.  Azerbaijan is a secular democratic republic headed by a president – since 2003, Ilham Aliyev. Its constitution promises its citizens “full civil and political rights, regardless of ethnic origin, religion, class, profession, or sex”.  The thriving Jewish community, one of the largest in the Muslim world – up to 18 thousand – enjoys complete freedom of religion and worship.

Turkmenistan, on the other hand, is a closed society with an authoritarian political system and centralized economy. The country’s gross domestic product is heavily dependent on the export of natural gas, but the nation’s massive revenues are not reflected in the lifestyle of most Turkmen.  The official US government website maintains that corruption is rife within virtually all layers of society in Turkmenistan, while the government’s overall human rights record remains poor, including its restrictions on religious freedom.

           Despite the differences between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Israel has always understood the political importance of maintaining close relations with both.  As regional peace and stability are increasingly threatened by Iran, it becomes more important than ever for Israel to improve and develop existing ties with the two states. Ideas to do so are already afloat.  Turkmenistan’s President Berdimuhamedov has said he is considering following Azerbaijan and opening a Turkmenistan embassy in Israel, while Israel’s President Isaac Herzog has said he intends to visit Azerbaijan later this year.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 May 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-742442

Published in Eurasia Review, 12 May 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/12052023-cementing-ties-with-irans-neighbors-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 12 May 2023
https://mpc-journal.org/cementing-ties-with-irans-neighbours/

Published in Jewish Business News as "Building bridges with Iran's neighbors", 11 May 2023:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2023/05/11/building-bridges-with-irans-neighbors/

Lebanon is in trouble

            Lebanon is in the midst of a long-standing political impasse.  It has a caretaker government and no head of state.  In addition, its economy is close to collapse, while a corrupt political class is clinging to the power and influence it has exercised for generations.  On top of all that, a financial scandal that had been simmering away for months has suddenly boiled over. A judicial delegation from France, Germany and Luxembourg are investigating accusations against the Governor of Lebanon’s central bank, Riad Salameh, who is accused of embezzling bank assets, money laundering and mismanaging public funds. On April 25, on the delegation’s third visit to the country, Lebanese judicial authorities agreed to cooperate with them.

            It was in July 2020 that a group of Lebanese lawyers launched a formal accusation against Riad Salameh and his brother Raja of allegedly defrauding the central bank of more than $300 million (over NIS 1,000,000,000).  The 72-year-old governor is accused of charging bond buyers a commission, described as a fee, and transferring the funds to a company owned by Raja which then laundered them across at least five European countries.  Both Salameh brothers deny wrongdoing.

            The European delegation had returned to Lebanon to interrogate suspects and witnesses.  On April 25 Raja, the governor’s brother, claiming to be ill, failed to attend a scheduled hearing. It was this that apparently led Lebanese judicial officials and the European delegation to agree to amalgamate their separate investigations.

Reporting the affair, Reuters say that French court documents indicate that money from Raja’s company was used to make numerous real estate purchases across Europe and the UK.  The Salameh brothers and an assistant, Marianne Houayek, have been charged with financial crimes in two separate cases in Lebanon, but have not yet been formally charged in the investigating European countries.

This financial scandal can only strengthen the persistent public accusations of corruption at the highest levels of Lebanese public life.  With Hezbollah a major force in Lebanon’s political structure, they are scarcely surprising.  For example, there continues to be no substantive progress in the inquiry into responsibility for the August 4, 2020 Beirut port explosion.  Hezbollah and Hezbollah-allied individuals were fingered early in the investigation, but have been successful so far in blocking it.

The first investigating judge, who soon had named individuals in his sights, was removed, to be replaced by judge Tarek Bitar in February 2021.  Like his predecessor, he was immediately faced with a series of legal challenges and complaints filed by some of the officials he intended to question.  As a result, the investigation was suspended in December 2021.  On January 23, 2023 Bitar attempted to restart the inquiry, and issued charges against current and former senior officials, including the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, Ghassan Oueidat.

On January 25, Oueidat imposed a travel ban on Bitar and charged him with “rebelling against the judiciary, and usurping power”.  In early February, Bitar postponed the hearings he had scheduled for that month, reportedly until the dispute with Oueidat was resolved. In response to these developments, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch repeated previous calls for the Human Rights Council (HRC) to establish an impartial international fact-finding mission into the port explosion.

            Meanwhile nothing is being done to tackle Lebanon’s crumbling economy.  The International Monetary Fund has offered a $3 billion bailout package, conditional on a host of structural and financial changes. But with the country lacking both a president and a fully empowered Cabinet, no progress has been made on reforms that could help remedy the situation.  Without a political solution on the horizon, the Lebanese pound continues to depreciate ­– and with it the salaries and pensions of the country’s security personnel, public sector workers and military. On March 22, hundreds of soldiers and army pensioners mounted an unprecedented protest outside the prime minister’s headquarters.

   The political impasse seems equally insoluble. Lebanon has had no effective government since Hassan Diab resigned as prime minister in August 2020, days after Beirut’s massive blast.  It has had no head of state since President Michel Aoun’s term ended on October 31, 2022.  The country is being run by way of a caretaker administration headed by Najib Mikati, Lebanon's richest man.  He was appointed prime minister by Aoun in September 2021, as the country struggled with a collapsing economy and the failure to achieve political reform.

One reason for Lebanon’s political crisis is that Hezbollah has infiltrated deep into Lebanon’s body politic and its administrative structure.  Acting at the behest of its Iranian sponsors, Hezbollah’s influence on Lebanon has been, and remains, dire. One prime example is how it involved Lebanon in the Syrian civil war in support of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Upholding Bashar al-Assad’s regime was in Iran’s interest, never in Lebanon’s, yet its young men fought and died there.

 Hezbollah is key to frustrating any agreement on Aoun’s replacement as president.  Hezbollah and the Amal Movement party, which together constitute Lebanon’s Shia base,  support politician Sleiman Frangieh. Despite Hezbollah’s best efforts on his behalf, vehement opposition from the majority of the country’s Christian, Sunni and Druze political blocs has left Frangieh short of the 65 votes required to be elected.  Frangieh, whose grandfather served as president in the 1970s, is heir to an old Lebanese Christian political dynasty and a friend of Syria’s Assad.

Lebanon is without a proper government because it is without a president.  After the parliamentary elections in May 2022, prime minister Mikati failed to form an administration that met with President Aoun’s approval, a constitutional requirement.  When Aoun’s own franchise ran out without a resolution, the existing government went into caretaker mode.

A fair number of outside interests are trying to devise ways of extricating the country from its most pressing difficulties. Yet to succeed the impetus for change and reform must come from Lebanon itself. Somehow the power and self-interest of the old establishment has to be overcome.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 2 May 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-741796

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 May 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/08052023-lebanon-is-in-trouble-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 10 May 2023

https://mpc-journal.org/lebanon-is-in-trouble/

Published in Jewish Business News as "Troubled Lebanon", 4 May 2023
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2023/05/04/troubled-lebanon/