Monday, 26 June 2023

Sweden’s NATO dilemma

 

Sweden believes it has gone very nearly as far as it is possible to go in meeting the demands of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has a casting vote on whether the country’s application to join NATO is successful.

In May 2022, responding to the threat posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine a few weeks before, Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO.  The move was greeted with some apprehension by Sweden’s Kurdish citizens.  To the Kurdish community NATO meant Turkey, a long-time NATO member – and Turkey had for many years been fighting Kurdish separatists within the country, and also Kurdish Peshmerga forces along the Turco-Syrian and Turco-Iranian borders.

Erdogan, who held up progress on both applications for months, has insisted that Sweden take effective action against its Kurdish minority as the price for lifting his veto.  Even though the Swedish government decided on June 11 to extradite a Turkish citizen resident in Sweden who had been convicted in 2013 of a drug crime in Turkey, what Sweden has done so far has not satisfied Erdogan.  He recently reversed his objection to Finland’s application, but continues to blackball Sweden.  The matter has turned into a conflict between Sweden’s widely acknowledged humanitarian, tolerant, liberal values, and Erdogan’s determination to crush the movement for Kurdish independence at all costs.

The forthcoming NATO summit, scheduled for July 10, will be dealing with vital issues arising from Russia’s partial and illegal occupation of Ukraine.  The organization as a whole very much hoped that the meeting would see it significantly strengthened by the acquisition of two new members.  That will not now take place.  At a press conference on March 17 with his Finnish counterpart, Erdogan praised Finland's "authentic and concrete steps" on Turkish security, and withdrew his opposition to its joining NATO.  He continued to maintain that Sweden has a way to go before he is satisfied.  On June 9 Erdogan said: “Sweden at the moment is a country that terror organizations use as a playground. In fact, there are terrorists even in this country’s parliament.”

He was referring to the leading Swedish politician Amineh Kakabaveh, a member of parliament, who grew up in a poor Kurdish home in western Iran. She is a strong advocate for Kurdish self-determination in the Middle East and a fierce critic of Erdogan.

Kurds represent some 20 percent of Turkey’s 84 million population, and nationalist demands from the more extreme Kurdish elements seem to the Turkish establishment to represent a threat to the integrity of the state. The PKK, founded in 1978, is a political group seeking Kurdish independence and has not been averse to pursuing its political ends by way of armed terrorist attacks within Turkey.  Erdogan has responded by proscribing the PKK as a terrorist organization (a designation now widely adopted internationally), and to combat the PKK and its associate bodies where they are strongest – in northern Syria and Iraq.

Erdogan has made no secret of the fact that he considers Sweden has become a safe haven for members of the PKK.  Although Sweden condemns terrorist activities, it does host those Kurdish bodies known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG) that in the years 2014-2019 fought alongside the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS – and indeed chased them out of Syria. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), their political wing, is a recognized group in Sweden and has an office in Stockholm.  Many Swedes believe, along with professor Khalid Khayati of Linköping University that “It would be unfair and inhuman to consider that group as a terror organization.”

Erdogan claims that elements of the PKK are being sheltered under the wing of the YPG which, together with the PYD, he describes as a terrorist body, and has been demanding that Sweden withdraw its support from them all and also extradite a list of named individuals to Turkey.  As Mark Almond observes in the London Daily Telegraph on June 16, the problem is that Erdoğan, emboldened by an unprecedented third election victory, is more intent than ever on pursuing policies that challenge not only the West, but the very democratic and human rights principles that the NATO alliance is there to defend. “We can debate the rights and wrongs of Sweden’s asylum policy for Kurds,” writes Almond, “but can any advocate of the rule of law agree to let a foreign government decide whom it should expel from its territory?”

            Of all the countries that Kurds fled to during the past turbulent half-century, it was in Sweden that they found the warmest welcome and real freedom from political repression. Sweden is now host to 100,000 Kurds, and the Kurdish community has become well integrated into Swedish society, politically, socially and culturally.

            The NATO quandary is of concern to the whole country.  It touches on Sweden’s long-standing willingness to avoid firm positions on controversial issues – in other words, neutrality.  After all, Sweden managed to remain neutral throughout the Second World War.  One observer believes that this moral ambivalence worries many Swedes.  He reckons the question on many Swedes’ minds now is “Are we willing once again to shrug our shoulders at moral issues for the sake of joining NATO?” and he believes the answer of most would be: “If the price for NATO membership is the sacrifice of Kurds, then it's not worth it.”

            A dilemma is a problematic situation with no clear solution.  Do the advantages to Sweden itself, and to the western world, of joining NATO outweigh the generous, open-hearted, democratic instincts of the Swedish people in supporting the Kurds and their efforts to gain independence, or at least autonomy?  If so, Sweden needs to ascertain  just how far Erdogan would have them go in restricting the liberty of their Kurdish minority, and act accordingly.  If not, the Swedes themselves, NATO and the western world will have to be content with the situation as it has always been, with Sweden outside NATO, but collaborating with it as closely as possible.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 26 June 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-747647

Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 June 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/30062023-swedens-nato-dilemma-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 5 July 2023:
https://mpc-journal.org/swedens-nato-dilemma/

Tuesday, 20 June 2023

Is an Israel-Palestinian deal possible?

       Published in the Jerusalem Post , 20 June 2023   


          An historic 10-year anniversary is on the horizon.  It was on July 29, 2013 that negotiators on behalf of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) sat down together to talk peace – the last time they did so. Hamas succeeded in scuttling the talks so effectively that for a decade the very idea of a peace process has simply faded away.

Now China is actively attempting to revive it.  Following an April announcement by China’s foreign minister, Qin Gang, that China was ready to facilitate peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, PA President Mahmoud Abbas undertook a state visit to Beijing from June 13 to 16.  President Xi Jinping is known to favour resolving the Palestinian issue by way of the two-state solution, and Abbas had no sooner arrived in Beijing than a meeting with Xi was announced. And Xi is indeed quoted as supporting an “independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

The two presidents no doubt took on board the main lesson from the last attempt to revive the peace process – that it would stand or fall on successfully emasculating or circumventing Hamas and its followers.  A decade ago Abbas had been hoodwinked and out-maneuvered by the Gaza-based rulers of half the Palestinian population, wholly opposed as they are to any two-state solution, since one of the two states would be Israel which they are committed to eliminating.

At around this time ten years ago, the heightened diplomatic activity leading to the historic Israel-Palestinian peace negotiation meeting was at its most intense. On June 27, 2013, US Secretary of State, John Kerry, said, prior to joining Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, for a long working dinner: “I would not have returned here five times – I would not be here now – if I didn’t have a belief that this is possible.”  Kerry was referring to the US objective of securing a peace agreement ending the interminable Israel-Palestinian dispute, and establishing a sovereign Palestinian state.

From the moment in January 2013 that US President Barack Obama assumed office for his second term, he made it clear that his administration would accord a high degree of priority to tackling the Israel-Palestine issue.  In point of fact he had attempted to do just that back in January 2009 on first becoming president, but subsequent events had demonstrated all too clearly that his first effort went disastrously wrong.  He would not make the same mistakes a second time.

It was on January 22, 2009, that newly-elected President Barack Obama named George Mitchell his “special envoy to the Middle East” charged with seeking a “comprehensive peace”. In March 2009 the Obama administration explicitly incorporated into US policy the 2002 Arab League peace plan under which the Arab world undertook formally to recognise Israel and enter into normal relations in exchange, inter alia, for Israel’s withdrawing from territories captured in the 1967 war to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. 

George Mitchell’s unremitting efforts did result, in September 2010, in the first of a few face-to-face meetings between Netanyahu and Abbas, but they soon petered out.  They foundered on Obama’s condemnation of the resumption of construction in Israel’s West Bank settlements, following the 10-month building freeze that he had persuaded Netanyahu to institute.  The consequence was to block the peace process for the next two-and-a half years.

Which was doubtless why, in his second attempt to grapple with the formidable Israel-Palestinian issue, Obama nominated his newly appointed Secretary of State, John Kerry, to carry it forward. 

Kerry quickly made clear that he did not intend to base his new peace effort on the 2002 Arab League peace plan.  Instead, the US quietly unblocked almost $500 million aid to the PA, frozen by Congress for months, and Kerry promised further economic assistance.  Israeli construction in the West Bank was given no prominence in US pronouncements. 

Kerry’s efforts paid off, and on July 29, 2013 peace negotiators for Israel and Palestine – Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat respectively – shook hands in Washington to launch "sustained, continuous and substantive" talks on a long-sought Israel-Palestinian peace treaty.  A mere nine months was the period optimistically allotted to reaching agreement between the two sides.  If the negotiating teams were to travel right up to the wire, they had until April 30, 2014.

          Their journey shuddered to a halt on April 23. Taking the diplomatic world by surprise, that day witnessed a sudden meeting in the Gaza Strip between Fatah and Hamas, the so-far irreconcilable wings of the Palestinian body politic. The next day saw the announcement of an “historic reconciliation” that would lead to a united Palestinian government within five weeks, and presidential and parliamentary elections within six months.

          Hamas had played a master stroke, blowing any hope of an Israel-Palestinian peace deal out of the water. The inevitable result was an immediate cessation of the negotiations begun with such high hopes just nine months before.

           President Abbas “can have peace with Israel,” said Netanyahu in a TV interview, “or a pact with Hamas. He can't have both…I will never negotiate with a Palestinian government that is backed by Hamas terrorists that are calling for our liquidation."

          In point of fact, Abbas has always had a straight choice – beat Hamas or join them. Since the moment in 2007, when Hamas reneged on its pledge to form a united government with Fatah and instead chased them from the Gaza Strip in a bloody fratricidal coup, the two organizations have been at daggers drawn.

           How could it be otherwise, even though the ultimate aim of both is precisely the same – a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea”? For while Fatah has decided that embracing the two-state solution is the best tactic toward achieving their ultimate objective, Hamas rejects Israel’s right to exist at all and is committed to its destruction.

           It seemed inconceivable that Hamas would sit round a cabinet table, with Abbas at its head, and agree to discuss how a sovereign Palestine might live side by side with an Israel finally recognized as a permanent presence in the region. Hamas would have had to turn somersaults to adhere to these requirements.

          Given that the two-state solution is an article of faith for China, as for much of world opinion, the Chinese and all those holding it will have to face up to an awkward truth. Until Hamas has been disempowered, and those Palestinians within and outside Gaza who adhere to its beliefs outflanked, two states can never become practical politics.

          But if two states did somehow emerge, all those supporting it would need to remember that, for a large proportion of Palestinians, Israel occupying part of what was mandate Palestine is but a way station on history’s long march.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 20 June 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-746874

Published in Eurasia Review, 23 June 2023
https://www.eurasiareview.com/23062023-is-an-israeli-palestinian-deal-possible-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 28 June 2023:
https://mpc-journal.org/is-an-israel-palestine-deal-possible/

Tuesday, 13 June 2023

The State of Iraq

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 13 June 2023

On May 30, in a two-minute session, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for another year until May 31, 2024. 

The head of UNAMI, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, was empowered to continue her efforts to provide advice, support, and assistance to the government and people of Iraq by promoting national and community-level reconciliation; aiding the electoral process; facilitating regional dialogue between Iraq and its neighbours; protecting human rights; and promoting judicial and legal reforms.

UNAMI’s mandate refers only obliquely to the one overriding factor in Iraq’s situation –  the influence of Iran.  Iran dominates almost every aspect of the country’s governance, and Hennis-Plasschaert has told the Security Council that “pervasive corruption is a major root cause of Iraqi dysfunctionality.”

 Although Iraq’s last election in October 2021 gave a majority of seats to the main anti-Iranian political bloc, that of Shia Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, it did not give al-Sadr victory.  A long period of political stalemate followed the poll. No president or prime minister was appointed and no government formed. 

Through poor judgment or bad advice, al-Sadr threw away his winning hand.  A series of impulsive political decisions, some of which he probably regrets, finally handed power to the main pro-Iranian bloc, the Coordination Framework.  Once the political logjam was broken, a Kurdish politician, Abdul Latif Rashid, was approved as president, and a pro-Iranian, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, was appointed prime minister. 

Iran has burrowed deep into Iraq’s body politic and its administration.  More than a dozen Iraqi political parties have ties to Iran, which funds and trains paramilitary groups aligned with them. Some groups have explicitly pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  Prime minister al-Sudani is said not to be comfortable with these loose cannon, but he has avoided confronting them directly.  In outlining his government’s intentions, he has gone no further than stating that his government will try to put an end to weapons over which there is no state control. 

It is not easy to deduce the reasoning behind some of al-Sadr’s surprising decisions.  For example, when Iraq’s 2021 general election had led to more than a year of political deadlock, what led al-Sadr to order the members of his bloc to resign from parliament?  How did he envisage benefiting politically?

It is difficult to believe he was unaware that under Iraqi law, if an MP resigns, the second-placed candidate in the election takes the empty seat. The process of filling the seats vacated by al-Sadr’s 74-seat bloc led to a new wave of intense debate and protests, but finally the pro-Iran Coordination Framework became the majority bloc in parliament.  It then nominated al-Sudani as prime minister.

This resulted in violent clashes between al-Sadr’s supporters and pro-Iranian factions, mainly in Baghdad’s Green Zone, the administrative center of the country.  Then, in August 2022 came another dramatic announcement from al-Sadr the motive for which is difficult to discern.  He suddenly announced that he was  retiring from politics.  Whether he meant to quit his political career altogether, or merely withdraw from what he regarded as Iraq’s corrupt political scene, was not clear.  In any case he lost none of his prominence in Iraqi life as a result, and the violence subsided.

More recently another startling al-Sadr announcement hit the headlines.  On April 13, 2023 he declared  that he was suspending his organization for one year in an effort to curb “corruption”.  Since he was still associating himself with his political group, he has clearly reneged on his earlier decision to leave politics, but the true import of this latest announcement remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile the new Iraqi cabinet, approved by parliament in October 2022, is implementing a reform package. It is seeking to reform the economic and financial sectors, tackle unemployment, create work opportunities, and enhance public services. On March 13, al-Sudani announced that the government had finalised its draft budget law for 2023-2025 which aims to address these priorities.

The programme also commits the government to amending electoral legislation and holding parliamentary elections within a year. Consequently, parliament voted on March 27 to adopt a proportional representation system of voting and to reform the electoral division of the country.

On the economic front, the government has announced a series of agreements with international energy companies to boost the production of domestic oil, gas, and renewables. Long-running tensions between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over the sharing of oil revenue persist, however.

Iran’s heavy hand is apparent in shaping Iraq’s security priorities.  In September and November 2022 Iran mounted a series of air strikes against Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.   Shortly afterwards al-Sudani met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran.  In a joint news conference after the meeting, al-Sudani announced that Iraq will strengthen its security cooperation with Iran and prevent “the use of Iraqi lands to threaten Iran’s security”.

On March 19 Iraq and Iran signed a border security agreement.  According to a statement released by al-Sudani’s office, they agreed to coordinate efforts in "protecting the common borders between the two countries and consolidating cooperation in several security fields."  An Iraqi security official added: “Under the signed security deal, Iraq pledges it would not allow armed groups to use its territory in the Iraqi Kurdish region to launch any border-crossing attacks on neighbour Iran."

To mark the 20th anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq on March 30, 2003, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, visited the country for the first time in six years, reiterating in a joint press conference with al-Sudani on March 1 “the commitment of the United Nations to support Iraq in the consolidation of its democratic institutions, and advancing peace, sustainable development and human rights for all Iraqis”.  He side-stepped the all-pervading influence of Iran.

One week later, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also travelled to Baghdad and reaffirmed the US commitment to retaining its current military presence of 2,500 troops in the country.  In supporting the continued presence of US troops in Iraq, al-Sudani is at odds with several Iran-aligned groups.  He regards them as vital in the continued fight against ISIS militias.

On March 20, Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzya, held a press conference to mark “the 20th anniversary of US aggression against Iraq.”  The irony involved in Russia condemning aggression was no doubt unintentional.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online under the title: "The state of Iraq's international standing", 13 June 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-746058


Published in Eurasia Review, 16 June 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/16062023-the-state-of-iraq-oped-2/

Published in the MPC Journal, 22 June 2023:
https://mpc-journal.org/the-state-of-iraq-2/


Tuesday, 6 June 2023

Are the Taliban open to persuasion?

 

            Out of the blue, on June 1 the news broke that secret talks had taken place in mid-May between the head of the Taliban and the prime minister of Qatar. 

            A cloak of secrecy had been cast over this first known meeting of Haibatullah Akhunzada, leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with any foreign statesman.  News of the talks was withheld from the public for nearly three weeks.  Then a whistle blower contacted Reuters news agency and, on condition of anonymity, let the cat out of the bag.

The source must have been very close to the action, for he (presuming it was a he) provided a list of the issues discussed and the outcome of the discussions.  The agenda included the need for the Taliban to end their prohibition on girls' education and women's employment.  The source also volunteered the information that US President Joe Biden's administration had been briefed on the talks and was "coordinating on all issues discussed,” including the idea of sponsoring further dialogue with the Taliban.

If this meeting indeed represented a first effort by the Taliban administration to break out of its isolation and engage with the rest of the world, then the source's comments suggest that Washington may be prepared to respond. 

The Taliban’s treatment of women and girls has been condemned by much of world opinion, and is a key reason why no country has recognized the Taliban regime.  In the time since the Taliban seized power in August 2021, Afghanistan has become the most repressive for women and girls in the world.

Girls are banned from secondary and university education, and women are barred from working, studying, traveling without a male companion, and even going to parks or bath houses. Women must cover themselves from head to toe, and are forbidden from working in national and international non-governmental organizations – a decision that has disrupted the delivery of much-needed humanitarian aid to the population.

 According to a recent UN report, the Taliban’s treatment of women and girls could amount to a crime against humanity. The US has long urged the Taliban to reverse its ban on girls' schooling and women working, and to restore their freedom of movement.  In support of this, the US has imposed heavy sanctions on the Taliban regime, including commercial restrictions and a freeze on its assets.

Bringing the Taliban leader to the table represents a diplomatic coup for Qatar – a further step toward establishing it as a major player on the world stage, a position it has fought to achieve over most of the past thirty years. 

Qatar’s tactics have sometimes puzzled, sometimes infuriated, its neighbors. But then, as one of the world’s wealthiest nations – and certainly number one on a per capita basis – Qatar has reckoned for a long time that it could afford the luxury of proceeding along its own preferred path, without too much concern for what others thought. 

For example, Qatar’s strategy of backing Islamists − from Hamas in Gaza, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to hard-line Syrian opposition fighters − while at the same time offering itself as a key US ally, was rooted in pragmatism: Qatar wanted to extend its influence in the region by being friends with everybody. “We don’t do enemies,” Qatar’s one-time foreign minister is reported to have said, “we talk to everyone.” 

Although the US and Qatar have often failed to see eye to eye, the connections are strong.  At al-Udeid, about 20 miles from Qatar’s capital, Doha, the US Air Force has a base servicing its Central Command which covered US forces in Afghanistan. But while welcoming the US Air Force, Qatar also allowed the Taliban to establish a political office in Doha.

“Major non-NATO Ally” (MNNA), a US legal designation conferred on only 20 countries, is a powerful symbol of close relations, and provides foreign partners of the US with a range of benefits and privileges, especially in the areas of defense, trade and security cooperation.  On March 10, 2022 Biden formally confirmed his grant of the MNNA status to Qatar, probably in recognition of the important role it played in the events leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.  Collaborating closely with the US, Qatar acted as mediator between the Taliban and what was left of the previous Afghan administration in assisting the evacuation of refugees.

It is these connections that Qatar has fostered with both the US and the Taliban that confer significance and viability on the recent conversation between Qatar’s prime minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, and Akhunzada.  Nor did they take place in a vacuum.  They were a sequel to a closed-door international summit on Afghanistan, held in Qatar on May 1 and 2, and hosted by UN Secretary-General, António Guterres.

No less than 20 nations participated, including the US, the UK, Russia, China. Japan , Germany and France.  The UN described the summit as an event where nations and organizations were trying to reach unified stances on human rights, governance, counterterrorism and anti-drug efforts related to Afghanistan.  The Taliban themselves, who were not invited, dismissed it out of hand.

 “If they are not ready to hear us and know our position regarding the issues,” said Suhail Shaheen, head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha, “how can they reach a convincing and palatable solution?... Afghanistan is an independent country. It has its own voice; we want them to listen to our voice.”

Having successfully organized a major international conference on the Afghanistan situation, and with close connections to the Taliban, the Qatari leadership must have seen a conversation with its leader as a next logical step.  They now find themselves as virtually the middlemen between the US and the Taliban, possibly expected by both sides to carry their good offices to the next stage.

            And indeed the signs are that both sides are taking the possibility of an accommodation seriously.  Fearful of souring the chances of success, no-one is saying anything.  Reuters reported that the White House had declined to discuss the talks, and that the State Department and the Qatar embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment. The Taliban, also, refused to issue a statement. 

          So there is a chance, remote perhaps, of achieving a breakthrough that could end the abhorrent treatment of women and girls, ease Afghanistan’s grim humanitarian and financial crises, and bring the country in out of the cold.  That opportunity rests on a knife edge.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 June 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-745295

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 June 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/09062023-are-the-taliban-open-to-persuasion-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 13 June 2023:
https://mpc-journal.org/are-the-taliban-open-to-persuasion/

Published in Jewish Business News as "Are the Taliban open to new ideas?", 7 June 2023:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2023/06/07/are-the-taliban-open-to-new-ideas/