Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 November 2023
A much-trumpeted
speech on November 3 by Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was, in
the event, rather less than overwhelming.
For starters there was
no sign of Nasrallah himself. Thousands of Hezbollah fighters and
supporters packed a square in the southern suburbs of Beirut to greet their
leader, but their leader wasn’t prepared to greet them. Instead
they faced a monster TV screen. They viewed, and cheered, a videoed
speech recorded in some secret location – perhaps a bomb-proof
bunker. According to one media commentator Nasrallah himself has not been
seen in public for a decade. This address to supporters was his first
since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, and expectations were high in some
parts of the media that he was about to announce the opening of a second front
against Israel.
However he made clear in
his opening remarks that Hamas’s October 7 invasion of Israel, the subsequent
massacre of 1400 civilians and the abduction of over 240 hostages – an
operation which, predictably, he praised – was a purely Palestinian
enterprise. And, he implied later in his remarks, Palestinian he wanted
the subsequent conflict to remain. He made it clear that Iran and
Hezbollah had had no part in its planning or execution, and neither found it
expedient in present circumstances to support Hamas by opening full-scale
hostilities against Israel. Although he made no reference to Washington’s
clear warning that such a move would bring dire consequences, there is little
doubt that the message had been received and understood.
So hostilities would be
confined to the recent artillery and rocket exchanges across the
Lebanese-Israeli border and the Iranian drone strikes against US stations in
Syria and Iraq. A second front, open
warfare with Israel, was demoted to a final resort, triggered by vague,
unspecified circumstances. The speech no
doubt came as a disappointment to Hamas leaders who have been pushing, covertly
and openly. for active Hezbollah support.
The Lebanese people are
in the midst of a familiar emotional dilemma – on the one hand sympathy with
Hezbollah’s support of the Palestinian cause; on the other, intense suspicion
of Hezbollah and its baggage-train of Iranian requirements in the regime’s
self-interest. For example, public
opinion questioned from the start why thousands of Lebanese youth were sent off
to fight in Syria under Hezbollah and Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps), in support of the ambitions of the Iranian regime to dominate the
region. The Lebanese public, which has
little love for Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad, failed to see how its own
interests were being served by fighting to sustain him in power.
Hezbollah has entrenched
itself deeply into Lebanese society. It
has a dominating position in the financial, economic and political fields, and itself
operates a range of social support services.
It has truly become a state within a state, sustained by its own armed
militia which is independent of the official Lebanese armed forces (under the
presidency of Michel Aoun, a Hezbollah supporter, they did cooperate). Indeed Hezbollah has acquired so much
military power and political influence that it is very nearly ruling Lebanon on
its own, especially since the country has lacked a president and an effective
government for more than al year.
Moreover it serves Hezbollah’s and Iran’s interest for the stalemate to
continue, and every attempt to beak the political deadlock has been thwarted by
Hezbollah and its allies.
Just a few months ago the respected Washington Institute published a devastatingly frank assessment by its counterterrorism and intelligence academic expert, Matthew Levitt, concerning the deep-rooted troubles that are paralyzing Lebanon.
“Let’s be clear,” he
writes, “corruption is at the heart of Lebanon’s economic and political crises.
This economic and political rot is deeply entrenched and is protected by
powerful political bosses across the spectrum… yet no Lebanese party presents a
greater security threat to Lebanon domestically, and to its neighbors in the
region, than Hezbollah – in part because Hezbollah is the de facto militant
enforcer of the corrupt political system from which it and other sectarian
political parties benefit.”
Levitt explained in a
recent media interview that while Hezbollah can prevent government decisions
that are against its interests, “it’s not held accountable for what the
government does or does not do, and it’s independently able to make decisions
of war and peace, life and death, for the entirely of Lebanon – without
consulting either the people or the government.” In short, it has power without responsibility,
operating its own mini-administration across the nation with a great degree of
impunity.
Hezbollah is therefore
little concerned with the worst economic crisis to grip the country for decades.
The value of the country's currency has dropped by over 90 percent since 2019,
with essential goods and services increasingly difficult to access. In
addition, hours-long power outages are routine in Beirut and other cities. Lebanon’s declining economic, political, and
security conditions are rarely referred to by Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan
Nasrallah, nor does he mention the resultant demonstrations and labor strikes that
are plaguing the country. In fact demonstrations
in reaction to deteriorating socio-economic conditions and perceived government
mismanagement have been a regular occurrence in Lebanon since 2019.
Major economic and
political reforms will be required to help reverse the crisis, unlock
international financial assistance, and address protesters' demands. However,
Lebanon is locked in a political stalemate which makes reform, or indeed remedial
action of any significant sort, impossible.
Nasrallah, clearly with
Iran’s concurrence, has wisely decided to hold back on any full-scale conflict
with Israel, since he would need support from a people mired in economic, social
and political unrest and struggling with a cost of living crisis. The last thing they need is to be dragged into a war on top of their other
woes. if Nasrallah tried to involve
them, he might find himself facing a popular revolt.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 7 November 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-772005
https://www.eurasiareview.com/09112023-lebanon-why-no-second-front-oped/
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