UK’s Labour pledges to recognize Palestine

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 June 2024

  Britain is in the throes of a general election.  The nation goes to the polls on July 4.  All the indications are that the Labour party will sweep the board with a resounding win, and that its leader, Sir Keir Starmer, will be Britain’s next prime minister.

   On June 13 the party published the manifesto on which it is fighting the election.  Amid a plethora of domestic and international policy commitments, the manifesto turns briefly to the Middle East.  "Palestinian statehood,” it declares, “is the inalienable right of the Palestinian people. It is not in the gift of any neighbour” [in other words, Israel], “and is also essential to the long-term security of Israel.”

  The manifesto commits a future Labour government to recognizing a Palestinian state “as a contribution to a renewed peace process which results in a two-state solution, with a safe and secure Israel alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state.”

   Appalled by the Hamas attack of October 7, Starmer stood shoulder-to-shoulder with UK prime minister Rishi Sunak, US president Joe Biden, and most Western political leaders, in proclaiming Israel’s right to defend itself.  His stance was not acceptable to two entities he faces on his own political terrain.  One is the powerful hard-left element within his party that, since taking over as leader from Jeremy Corbyn, he has managed to disempower and partially subdue.  The other is the strong Muslim presence in some Labour-held constituencies.

    Labour’s pro-Palestine component began to assert itself on October 7 itself, with scattered voices approving the Hamas attack.  The collateral civilian deaths and casualties arising from the IDF campaign was enough for the party’s support for Israel to begin to slide.  For a few weeks the official Labour line was to call for humanitarian pauses in the fighting, a position that was not anti-Israel enough for some, and prompted Labour resignations in councils and from its parliamentary front bench.  Finally, on February 24, Labour policy officially changed to a call for “an immediate humanitarian ceasefire”.  

   Then came the first test of electoral opinion in the UK since October 7.  On May 2, 2024 local elections took place across the country to select councillors, mayors and other local government representatives.  The results, no doubt to Starmer’s dismay, indicated that Labour’s position on the Israel-Hamas war had dented its support in Muslim areas

  The BBC analyzed 58 local council areas where more than 20% of the residents identify as Muslim. It found that Labour's share of the vote had slipped by 21% on 2021, the last time most seats were contested.

Ali Milani, chair of Labour Muslim Network, said Labour's positioning on Gaza "is going to have a serious electoral consequence.  If I was a Labour MP in Bradford or Birmingham or Leicester or parts of London or Manchester [strong Muslim areas],  I would be seriously concerned.”

This is the background to the recognition pledge contained in the Labour party manifesto.

The composition of British society is changing fast.  In 2011 some 2.7 million UK citizens  identified as “Muslim”, making up 4.9% of the total population.  By 2021 overall numbers of self-identifying Muslims had reached 3.9 million, forming some 6.5% of the UK total   That is a constituency that Labour clearly believes cannot be ignored electorally, especially those areas where Muslims congregate to form a majority of the local population,

   By comparison the total number of people self-identifying as Jews in the UK in 2021 was about 270,000, making up some 0.42% of the total population. 

    The stark figures do not, of course, tell the whole story as regards political clout.  As in any society, British Jews punch well above their weight in the many and varied fields they engage in, while all political and social organizations formally abhor antisemitism or any form of discrimination based on ethnic, racial or religious grounds.

   The main difficulty with statements about Middle East affairs from concerned, but uninvolved, parties is the lack of flesh on the bones of advice.  For example, no one who has recognized Palestine as a sovereign state is able to define its borders, while advocates of the two-state solution when speaking of borders usually refer vaguely to the situation just prior to the Six Day War.

On June 5, 1967 the whole of the West Bank and east Jerusalem was controlled by Jordan, while Gaza was part of Egypt’s Sinai region.  This position had remained unchanged since the Israeli, Jordanian and  Egyptian armies stopped fighting during the course of 1949.  Then, for nigh on twenty years, Jordan and Egypt retained control of the land they had conquered after attacking Israel in 1948, yet neither separately nor together did they make any move to establish a Palestinian state.

In the Six Day War Israel reconquered these areas, as well as a great deal more.  Once in Israel’s hands, the West Bank and Gaza somehow morphed into “occupied Palestinian land” (which no-one previously claimed them to be; indeed West Bank Arabs remained Jordanian citizens until 1988).  The idea of an Arab Palestine has since become a political reality.

Labour’s recognition pledge takes no account of the fact that the Palestinian leadership is currently divided between the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas, that Palestinian opinion heavily favors Hamas, that the PA as a whole, as well  as its leader, President Mahmoud Abbas, are regarded as corrupt and are deeply unpopular.

On the other hand, the argument that eventually recognizing a Palestinian state would somehow be to reward Hamas for its bloodthirsty attack of October 7 does not hold water.  The two-state solution is the last thing Hamas desires.  If it were ever established, it would represent a bitter blow to Hamas’s fundamental purpose – to eliminate Israel altogether.  As far as Hamas, and its  fundamentalist supporters are concerned, establishing two states would be like a red rag to a bull.  The fight to eliminate Israel would continue unabated.   

Unlike the recent moves by Ireland, Spain, Norway and Slovenia which recognized the non-existent Palestinian state outright, the Labour commitment to recognizing a Palestinian state is nuanced.  It will occur as part of a peace process, and as such echoes the position outlined in January by Lord Cameron, the UK foreign secretary.  Palestinian statehood should be part of a process, he declared, and recognition would come at what has been described as “an appropriate time in peace talks”. 

By adopting this more considered position, Starmer is certainly risking alienating both his left wing and his Muslim constituency.  It is a fine line he is treading.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Keir Starmer is treading a fine line in pledging recognition of a Palestinian state", 18 June 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-806620

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 June 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-806620

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29062024-uks-labour-pledges-to-recognize-palestine-oped/#:~:text=The%20manifesto%20commits%20a%20future,viable%20and%20sovereign%20Palestinian%20state.%E2%80%9D

Publlshed in the MPC Journal, 30 June 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/uks-labour-pledges-to-recognize-palestine/

Say “Pimm’s” - and you conjure up an English summer

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine, 14 June 2024

            Strange to relate – strange, that is, to anyone born and raised in the UK – the name  “Pimm’s” means zilch to many Americans. To Brits the world over Pimm’s is absolutely synonymous with the English summer.  Its only rival as a favourite summertime treat is strawberries and cream, which reaches its frenzied zenith of popularity at the Wimbledon tennis tournament in June.

            What is Pimm’s?  It is an alcohol-based fruit drink that keeps the English summer social season afloat.  From the Royal Ascot races to Wimbledon, from Henley Royal Regatta to Cowes week, from the Chelsea Flower Show to the Glyndebourne opera, Pimm’s is always on tap, and always being downed by the bucketful. 

            Back in 1823 James Pimm was a fishmonger who opened an Oyster House in South London.  He conceived the idea of selling, alongside his oysters, a drink to aid digestion.  So he concocted a gin-based liqueur infused with various herbs, spices and quinine.  This he bottled and labelled “Pimm’s No 1 Cup”.

            Using his liqueur as the base, he then devised a delicious beverage, topping it up with sparkling lemonade, and piling chopped up summer fruits on top.  And that in essence is what Pimm’s No 1 is today.  A mainstream current recipe specifies one part of Pimm’s to three parts of sparkling lemonade, topped with slices of orange, strawberry and cucumber together with a sprig of mint.

            Over the two centuries since it first saw the light of day, the original gin-based Pimm’s has seen the birth of six variants.  Only two – Cups 3 and 6 – remain in production in addition to Pimm’s No 1.

            Pimm’s Nos 2, 4, and 5 hit the market in the  1930s and left it in 1970.  To produce them the original recipe was altered by replacing the gin with, respectively, Scotch whisky, dark rum and rye whisky.  Pimm’s No 3, which replaces the gin with brandy, has been introduced and withdrawn several times but, now dubbed Pimm’s Winter Cup, it has its fervent admirers and is currently available.

Pimm’s No 6 Cup is a vodka-based variant which has had a chequered career, but it is now back by popular demand.  The less said about Pimm’s No 7 (a tequila-based variant) the better.

            What is the sensual experience of actually imbibing a glass of Pimm’s? 

            To start with, it is an episode to be savoured.  You can’t down it in one.  You have a tall glass of sparkling liquor in front of you, with slices of fruit and cucumber floating on top and a sprig of mint adorning one side.  A few ice cubes are usual, though (it being England) not obligatory. Too much ice can deaden the taste.  Often ice-cold lemonade straight from the fridge will produce the result.

The first sip fills the mouth with a light alcoholic beverage, gently infused with herbs and spices, the taste absolutely delicious from having been filtered through fresh fruit.   As you sip your way through, you see the level of sliced orange, strawberry and cucumber slowly sinking in the glass.  With your last swallow comes the climax of your Pimm’s encounter.  Your final experience is to slide those delectable alcohol-imbued fruits from the glass and chew your way through them.  Whether the whole event takes five minutes or half an hour, it is a unique experience, and unlikely to be forgotten.

            At home on a sun-drenched afternoon, people will usually make up a jug of Pimm’s and take it out to the garden to keep their guests well topped up.  A standard recipe for a jugful is 200 ml of Pimm’s to 600 ml of lemonade, with plenty of fruit, cucumbers and mint to shovel in on top.

            Finally, for the avoidance of all doubt, I must add that Pimm’s is totally unrelated to that other famous sparkling British alcoholic drink, Buck‘s Fizz.

Buck's Fizz is an alcoholic cocktail made of about two parts champagne (sometimes some other sparkling wine)  to one part orange juice.

The drink is named after  London's Buck's Club, where it is said to have first been served in 1921 by a barman named Malachi "Pat" McGarry.  McGarry features in the works of P G Wodehouse as the barman of the Drone’s Club.  The original Buck's Club recipe is said to contain additional ingredients known only to the club's bartenders.

Buck's Fizz is often drunk at Christmas and on New Year’s eve.  It has no relationship at all to Pimm’s.  Pimm’s time is summertime.  Cheers!

Will Hamas be dislodged from Gaza?

  Published in the Jerusalem Post, 11 June 2024

             It now seems clear that on October 7 Hamas, no doubt urged on by Iran, bit off a good deal more than it could chew.

Its leaders in Gaza (Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif), together with its leaders-in-exile living in luxury in Qatar (Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal), may have been led by Iran to expect a widespread uprising of the Arab world in support of their massive killing spree in Israel. They may have envisaged their invasion advancing into the country supported by uprisings in the West Bank, an invasion by Hezbollah in the north, perhaps joined by Syrian troops up in the Golan, irregular Jordanian fighters in the east and even Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood militias from the west.  Perhaps Iran already had in mind, and promised them, a crushing blow on Israel by launching a direct aerial attack, reversing its long-standing policy of using only proxies in its anti-Israel operations.

This scenario, mouth-wateringly tempting for Hamas, simply failed to materialize.  Action of some sort did manifest itself, but on nothing like the scale or with the coordination that would have been politically or militarily meaningful.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, informed  of Hamas’s plans only half an hour before the attack began on October 7, soon dissociated himself from the assault. 

All the same, since October 7 Hezbollah’s continuous skirmishes over the Israel-Lebanon border have been stepped up, and some 60,000 Israelis have been evacuated from their homes, and are still unable to return.  On June 4 Reuters reported that large swaths of northern Israel were engulfed by wild fires set off by rockets launched by Hezbollah. It’s far from an invasion, but it needs to be quelled.

   Immediately after October 7 the Houthi rebels, ensconced in areas of west Yemen, declared war on Israel.  Then, responding to a call by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, they initiated a program of harassing international shipping in the Red Sea.  On May 29 the official Iranian news agency confirmed that Iran has supplied the Houthis with Ghadr rockets, described as Iran’s first anti-ship ballistic missiles. 

In response American and British fighter jets and US ships have hit a wide range of underground facilities, missile launchers, command and control sites, a Houthi vessel and other facilities.   The  Houthis cannot long sustain all-out combat with combined US-UK forces.

Meanwhile on April 13 Iran decided to ratchet up Hamas’s flagging effort by launching a first-ever direct aerial assault on Israel.  Around midnight it sent some 170 drones, over 30 cruise missiles, and more than 120 ballistic missiles the 1,000 kilometers toward Israel.  The Iranian leadership no doubt expected a massive military and propaganda  triumph.  In the event  the operation was a miserable failure.  To supplement Israel’s Iron Dome defense, America and Britain sent jet fighters to help shoot down the missiles.  At the same time, surprisingly, Jordan refused to allow Iran to use its air space for the operation, while several Gulf States, among them Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, passed on intelligence about Iran's plans.  As a result about 99% of the aerial armada never reached Israel. 

By June 1 reality must surely have begun to dawn on both Iran and its proxies.  They were, in the time-honored phrase, on a hiding to nothing.  Like the sorcerer’s apprentice. Hamas had conjured up a situation way beyond what it had expected or could control.  All but four of its 24 battalions had been dismantled, and the four remaining battalions, “completely operational” according to the IDF, are in the southern city of Rafah, and are now in the IDF’s sights.

            So the announcement by US President Joe Biden on June 1 of a ceasefire proposal that could lead to the end of the war must – whatever the public posturings may indicate –be under serious consideration by Hamas.   The four-and-a-half page plan had been sent to Hamas for review the previous day. 

            Biden said the plan encompassed three phases.  The first, which would last for six weeks, would include a "full and complete" ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from "all populated areas" of Gaza and the "release of a number of hostages including women, the elderly, the wounded in exchange for release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners."

Biden added that in this phase, Palestinian civilians will return to their homes, while humanitarian assistance will increase to 600 trucks carrying aid into Gaza every day.

For Hamas a guaranteed breathing space of six weeks would come as a welcome relief, especially since Israel would be withdrawing from populated areas at the same time. However also built into the first phase is the obligation for Israel and Hamas to undertake talks designed to get to the next stage of the proposal. 

The possibility of the talks stalling has been built into the plan.

"The proposal,” said Biden, “says…the ceasefire will still continue for as long as negotiations continue," adding that the US, Qatar and Egypt will ensure that talks continue during this period until "all agreements are reached" to start the second phase.

 Of course, Hamas could decide to stick with the “temporary“ ceasefire indefinitely.  But if they did, they would forego the second phase, which would see Israeli forces withdraw completely from Gaza accompanied by the release of all remaining hostages who are alive.

"As long as Hamas lives up to its commitments,” said Biden, the temporary ceasefire would become the permanent cessation of hostilities.

n the third phase, said Biden "a major reconstruction plan for Gaza would commence,” and the remains of hostages who have been killed would be returned to their families.

In the deal to rebuild Gaza, Arab nations and the international community will participate in a "manner that does not allow Hamas to re-arm," said Biden, or as he put it earlier: “without Hamas in power.”  That suits Biden as much as it does Israel, for he knows that Hamas will have no truck with the two-state solution that he espouses so fervently. 

Hamas initially said that it viewed the proposal "positively", but by June 4 the media were reporting that Hamas was apparently stalling.

Doubtless the Hamas leaders have their own “day after” aspirations.  They may reconcile themselves to losing the governance of Gaza, but probably envisage basing themselves elsewhere and continuing the fight from there.  It is morally certain they have no intention of abandoning their core objective of overthrowing Israel and eliminating the Jewish presence from the Middle East. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "A Day After possibility: will the IDF dislodge Hamas from Gaza?", 11June 2024:

www.jpost.com/opinion/article-805759

Disempowering Hamas

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 June 2024

             “The day after” is the current buzz phrase in political circles. It refers to the period immediately after Hamas has been well and truly dislodged from the governance of the Gaza Strip.  While ideas abound as to what could or should take over, it is true to say that absolutely no steps seem to have been taken to realize any of them.

            On Friday, May 31 US President Joe Biden took the initiative.

   “It’s time for this war to end,” he announced, “and for ‘the day after’ to begin.”

   He proceeded to outline what he termed “an approved Israeli proposal” made up of three phases which would lead to a return of all the hostages, alive and dead, a “cessation of hostilities permanently” and, on “the day after”, the rebuilding of Gaza without Hamas in power.

The office of prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that he had “authorized negotiators to present proposals for the return of hostages held in Gaza.”

            Meanwhile the date draws ever closer for Netanyahu to avert, or to accept, minister Benny Gantz’s threat to resign from the coalition government over the lack of decision.

   It was on May 18 that Gantz told a press conference he wanted Netanyahu, by June 8 at the latest, to commit to an agreed vision for what would follow the Gaza conflict.  It would include stipulating how the territory would be administered, and by whom, the day after the war with Hamas was declared over.  

Gantz wanted the war cabinet to draw up a six-point plan, and if his expectations are not met, he said, he will withdraw his centrist party with its 12 Knesset seats from the government.  His exit would not topple the coalition – it would be left with 64 out of 120 Knesset seats – but would shake it severely, perhaps to extinction.

On May 30, pre-empting his own ultimatum, Gantz’s National Unity Party, in collaboration with other opposition parties, submitted a bill in the Knesset to dissolve parliament.  If passed, this would mean a general election within months.

Not generally known is that on May 15, the day before Gantz’s announcement, defense minister Yoav Gallant had demanded clarity on post-war plans, insisting that Netanyahu abandon any military reoccupation of Gaza – a concept the prime minister had said might be necessary for an unspecified period after the war.

For Netanyahu to renounce totally the idea of any Israeli presence in Gaza on “the day after” would almost certainly alienate ultra-nationalist parties that have gone so far as to call for Gaza to be annexed and settled. They are also unlikely to endorse Biden’s new initiative.   However losing them from the coalition would not, as was once thought, be the coup de grace for Netanyahu’s government.  On June 1, in the light of Biden’s announcement, opposition leader Yair Lapid vowed to back Netanyahu if he proceeds with a ceasefire and exchange deal.

The problem with Gantz’s “day after” vision is that no Arab state, individually or collectively, has yet produced any plan or strategy to manage the fallout from the war, to participate in any “day after” administration of Gaza, or to support Palestinian statehood.  Arab states in general, and the Abraham Accord states in particular, have had to tread a precarious path since October 7.  Arab popular opinion is overwhelmingly supportive of Hamas and opposed to Israel’s incursion into Gaza, and Arab governments, though content enough to see Iran and its allies under fire, have been careful to avoid endorsing Israel’s military campaign.

The prestigious UK think tank, Chatham House, believes that regional Arab states should work together in support of Palestinians.  “The time for states to act is now,” they write.

They explain that so far these Arab states have relied on the US-led efforts at brokering a ceasefire-focused plan, and have accordingly refused to discuss “day after” reconstruction or political or security scenarios.

“Those states,” says Chatham House, “…refuse to bankroll reconstruction efforts without guarantees that Israel will not initiate further bombing cycles.”  Clearly believing that Hamas in some form is likely to still be in existence after the war, “only with a ceasefire in hand,” they say, “will they [the Arab states] begin considerations of their part in the complex political settlement process. This strategy, however, is fraught with risks that could delay any potential prospect of peace – including further deferring the broader vision of regional integration that had included Israel…Investment in “the day after” must begin today.”

The US shares this view. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken told a Senate committee hearing last week:  "It is imperative not only that the conflict in Gaza ends as soon as possible, but that Israel comes forward with a clear plan for how Gaza is going to be governed, secured, redeveloped,"  Without that, he said, Israel would face unacceptable options: long-term military occupation and insurgency, the return of Hamas, or anarchy and lawlessness.

The US is pressuring Arab states to agree an international force that could establish security in Gaza in the short term. The US would not put its own troops on the ground, but wants countries including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and the UAE to do so instead.

The fly in that ointment is that these countries have made clear they would take part only if the West recognized the state of Palestine, that there was an agreed pathway to a two-state solution, and they came at the invitation of some kind of Palestinian leadership. That could only mean the Palestinian Authority in some form or other, and Netanyahu has ruled the PA out as a partner in any sort of “day after” strategy.

One Arab diplomat is quoted by the BBC as saying:  "The day after cannot be separated from the political process.  It must be part of a comprehensive package. No-one will put one foot on the ground unless there is a political process."

Some Arab states feel – reversing the commonly-held view – that normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia may be key to getting Israel's agreement to a wider political settlement. There is discussion, too, about what role Turkey could play, using its leverage over Hamas to agree some kind of post-war deal. 

         But the idea of Hamas having any say at all about the future of Gaza runs totally counter to the political consensus within Israel. Until Hamas has been completely disempowered, both militarily and politically, and removed forever from playing any role in the administration of the Gaza Strip, there can be no “day after”.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online as: "There is no 'day after' until Hamas is gone, 3 June 2024:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-804714

Published in Eurasia Review, 7 June 2024:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/07062024-disempowering-hamas-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 11 June 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/disempowering-hamas/