Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 September, 2024
Jordan went to the polls on September 10. This parliamentary election marked two significant milestones for the nation. It resulted in a strengthening of Islamist — and therefore anti-Israel — power within Jordan’s political arena. And it saw the Hashemite kingdom take its first, hesitant step towards its declared intention of converting itself into a constitutional monarchy within the next decade.
When he took over the throne in February 1999, King Abdullah II inherited a royal autocracy. In line with Arab rulers for centuries past, the monarch had, and still possesses, absolute powers. He appoints and can dismiss the government, he appoints the members of the upper house of the legislature, he initiates legislation – the lower chamber is limited to approving, rejecting or amending it.
The Arab Spring, starting in 2011, witnessed popular insurrections across the Arab world and the fall of a succession of Arab leaders. Abdullah’s reaction was to promise his people slow, but steady, movement toward a more democratic constitution for Jordan. Ten years later there was little evidence of any change, and in April 2021 a shocking conspiracy to replace Abdullah with his half-brother, the former Crown Prince Hamzah, was revealed.
A relative of Abdullah, together with the king’s former top confidant, were charged with devising a “criminal project” involving Prince Hamzah, once heir to the throne. Found guilty of sedition and incitement against the crown, the men each received a jail sentence of 15 years with hard labor. Prince Hamzah was not arrested, and Abdullah announced that the dispute with him would be resolved within the royal family.
One
result was that in June 2021 Abdullah set up a 92-member commission, headed by
former Prime Minister Samir Rifai, charged with creating a plan to modernize Jordan’s
elections and the laws governing political parties. The
commission decided that within a decade Jordan’s long-established royal
autocracy would be converted into a constitutional monarchy. Governments would no longer be appointed by
the king, but would be formed from the nationally elected members of parliament.
With that decision as a ground plan, a sub-committee
approved an election law that, among other things, provided for gradually
increasing political party representation in parliament. This would occur over
the following three elections, until finally the sort of democratic arrangement
applying in the UK or Sweden would be reached.
The leader of the largest political party emerging from the election
would become prime minister and form a government.
The recent election
marked the first phase in the planned reform.
It allocated 30% of the 138 parliamentary seats to political
parties. Phase two is scheduled to occur
in the 2028 election, when they will occupy 50%. The process is planned to culminate in the
elections in 2032, when political parties will occupy 65% of the seats.
By then, if the current
results are any indication, Jordan’s parliament and possibly its government would
be in the hands of Islamists. The
Islamic Action Front (IAF), a political offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has
been in the forefront of growing calls in Jordan to repeal the Jordan-Israel
peace treaty. Ever since the Hamas
pogrom of October 7 demonstrators have been
surrounding the Israeli embassy in Amman, demanding its closure and the repeal
of the treaty.
So far these calls have
been strongly resisted by the government, representing Abdullah’s view that the
treaty is a bulwark against regional instability. If Abdullah yielded even a fraction of his
power to a political leader elected and mandated by popular vote, there would
be a real danger of Jordan turning its back on the peace treaty. Abdullah will be aware that copper-bottomed guarantees
safeguarding his ultimate authority will have to be built into Jordan’s planned
constitutional reform – if, indeed, it actually proceeds past phase one.
While there is general
support for the 10-year reform process, there are opponents who are skeptical
of the strength of the will for political reform.
Nedal Mansour, a human
rights activist and leader in the country’s civil society movement, is reported
as saying there is little reason for Jordanians to believe that change will
actually happen.
“People are not
convinced that there is a serious will for reform. They feel that they are
buying time by talking about gradual reform…Why should we wait another 10
years? The fact is that nothing has happened in terms of reform in the past 20
years; why will the system be any different in the coming years?”
In the event, the September 10 election resulted in Jordan's leading Islamist opposition party, the IAF, winning 31 out of the 138 parliamentary seats. The party had 10 seats in the previous parliament. The turnout was only some 32% of the 5 million-plus eligible voters.
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Half the 11 million
strong Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin, and during the election
campaign the Islamists had capitalized on people’s growing anger over the continuing
war in Gaza. The IAF’s strategy may have
fostered unfortunate results.
On the Sunday before the
election, September 8, a truck approached the Allenby Bridge from the Jordanian
side. It stopped not far from the
crossing into Israel, and video footage shows the driver walking toward the
terminal, raising a weapon and firing three times. Each shot was fatal, and he killed three
Israeli civilian guards: Yohanan Shchori, Yuri Birnbaum, and Adrian Marcelo
Podzamczer.
Security personnel
returned fire, and the gunman – later identified as Maher Jazi, a Jordanian –
was killed.
Hamas officials did not
claim responsibility for the attack, but described it as a "natural
response" to the war in Gaza. A recent news report indicates that the joint
Jordanian-Israeli investigation into the shooting is currently focused on whether
the perpetrator acted alone or whether some extremist group, operating from
within Jordan, has embarked on a series of terrorist attacks against Israel.
Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear that Jordan is currently in a febrile state, with the king and the government attempting to prevent widespread pro-Hamas sentiment from boiling over into active protests or worse. The IAF’s formal access of increased power and influence, following the parliamentary elections, is not calculated to pour oil on the troubled waters. Meanwhile Jordan’s constitutional and political future looks even more uncertain
Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Jordan's political future looks uncertain as Islamists make gains in recent election", 16 Sep 2024:
.Published in the MPC Journal, 23 September 2024:
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