UK-Israel Free Trade deal on hold

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 26 May 2025

In the afternoon of Monday, May 19, David Lammy, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, rose to his feet in the House of Commons and read out a statement condemning how the war in Gaza was being conducted by the Israeli government.

“Netanyahu’s government is planning to drive Gazans from their homes into a corner of the Strip to the south,” he said, “and permit them a fraction of the aid that they need…The planned displacement of so many Gazans is morally unjustifiable, wholly disproportionate and utterly counter-productive.”

“We cannot stand by in the face of this new deterioration,” said Lammy. “Therefore today, I am announcing that we have suspended negotiations with this Israeli government on a new free trade agreement…The Netanyahu government’s actions have made this necessary.”

 ​Clearly Britain’s Labour government has little sympathy with Israel’s Likud-led coalition​. Nevertheless it condemns Hamas’s bloodthirsty incursion into Israel on October 7, 2023.  UK ministers, from the prime minister down, reiterate time and again their support for Israel’s right to defend itself, and continue to demand that Hamas release all the hostages it snatched during its pogrom. Beyond this, however, there seems little, if any, empathy with the formidable problems that Israel faces, or with its efforts to deal with them.

The left wing of Britain’s Labour party is notoriously anti-Israel – a euphemism, many believe, for frank antisemitism.  This was demonstrated beyond any doubt during the five years the party was led by the radical Jeremy Corbyn (2015-2020). 

In May 2019 the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a body legally charged with promoting and enforcing the UK’s equality and non-discrimination laws, launched a formal investigation into whether Labour had "unlawfully discriminated against, harassed or victimized people because they are Jewish."

The legacy Corbyn bequeathed to Sir Keir Starmer, who succeeded him as Labour leader and is now Britain’s prime minister, was the EHRC report, published in October 2020.  In it the EHRC determined that the Labour party had indeed been "responsible for unlawful acts of harassment and discrimination" against Jewish people.  As a result, the party was legally obliged to draft an action plan to remedy the unlawful aspects of its governance. 

But pro-Palestinian sentiment was too deeply embedded in the Labour party for ​the leadership to ignore​ it.  The manifesto on which Starmer’s Labour party fought the July 2024 general election declared:  "Palestinian statehood is the inalienable right of the Palestinian people.”  It went on to commit a future Labour government to recognize a Palestinian state “as a contribution to a renewed peace process which results in a two-state solution, with a safe and secure Israel alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state.”

 Following the Hamas attack of October 7, Starmer stood shoulder-to-shoulder with then-UK prime minister Rishi Sunak, then-US president Joe Biden, and most Western political leaders, in proclaiming Israel’s right to defend itself.  His stance was not acceptable to two entities he faces on his own political terrain, and this remains his problem​ today.  One is the powerful hard-left element within his party; the other is the strong Muslim presence in some traditionally Labour constituencies.

Four years ago there were some 4 million Muslims in the UK, representing about 6% of the population.  The figures are almost certainly higher than that today, and in certain areas represent a significant proportion of the voting electorate.

Labour’s pro-Palestine component began to assert itself on October 7 itself, with scattered voices approving the Hamas attack.  The collateral civilian deaths and casualties arising from the IDF campaign were enough for the party’s support for Israel to begin to slide. Then came the first test of electoral opinion in the UK since October 7.  On May 2, 2024 local elections took place across the country.  The results, no doubt to Starmer’s dismay, indicated that Labour’s position on the Israel-Hamas war had dented its support in Muslim areas.  A BBC analysis found that in areas with a substantial Muslim presence Labour's share of the vote had slipped by 21% compared with the last time the seats were contested.

Ali Milani, chair of Labour Muslim Network, said Labour's positioning on Gaza "is going to have a serious electoral consequence.” 

He was not wrong.  In the general election in July 2024, which Labour won with a landslide, five independent pro-Palestine candidates unseated Labour incumbents in key constituencies. Four were Muslim; one was Jeremy Corbyn.

In the aftermath, Corbyn announced plans to form a parliamentary alliance with the four independent Muslim MPs. Th​is permanent anti-Israel bloc in the House of Commons, supported by many radical Labour MPs, has ​resulted in increased advocacy for Palestinian rights, and increased pressure on the UK's foreign policy decisions related to the Middle East.  It has contributed to the decision announced by Lammy to suspend the negotiations aimed at securing a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) between the UK and Israel.

A​s the UK left the EU, it signed a continuity agreement with Israel​ to ensure uninterrupted trade between the two countries.  Coming into effect on 1 January 2021, ​it coincided with the end of the Brexit transition period​ and maintain​ed the terms of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. ​ ​On July 20, 2022 ​ the UK and Israel embarked on the negotiations for a FTA ​. ​With both parties ​world leaders in hi-tech, the negotiators aimed​ ​particularly to enhance collaboration in technology, innovation, and digital services.

The talks were conducted against the backdrop of flourishing ​UK-Israel bilateral trade.  There had been year-on-year growth from 2014 to 2018, when the figure reached $10.5 billion​. Subsequently both Brexit and Covid caused the figure to fluctuate​. The best estimate of UK-Israel bilateral trade in 2024 is $7.2 billion.

The suspension of negotiations for a UK-Israel FTA will not necessarily have a major impact in the short term. Trade between the UK and Israel will continue under the UK-Israel Trade and Partnership Agreement, concluded at the time of Brexit.  Businesses will still be able to trade with relative certainty, and supply chains will remain intact. What might be affected is investor confidence.

If the suspension is maintained, however, the consequences for both parties could be significant.  The half-formalized FTA aimed to modernize and expand the​ bilateral  trade framework to cover areas such as digital trade, cybersecurity, med-tech, green energy, AI, intellectual property rights, fintech, optics and lasers, aerospace and defense, sustainability and government procurement.  Without the developmental boost that the FTA was calculated to provide, growth in these hi-tech areas, in which Israel is a world leader, will certainly slow down.  The UK, no less than Israel,​ will lose out.​  And so ​will the world at large​. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "UK freezes trade with Israel - and integrity with it", 26 May 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-855313

Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 May 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052025-uk-israel-free-trade-deal-on-hold-oped/

Israel's choices in Gaza

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 19 May 2025

          It boils down to two stark alternatives.  Negotiate a full hostage release, end the war and leave Hamas still functioning; or defeat Hamas, ensure the return of all the hostages, and help build a Hamas-free future for Gaza. 

The former course is currently being offered by Hamas at the negotiations in Doha; it means the terror organization would remain in being, free to continue its existential vendetta against Israel.

The latter course is being pursued now by the Israeli government and, if successful, removes the constant threat by rocket and missile attack that has endangered Israeli lives and property for nearly twenty years.  It removes a neighboring entity dedicated to Israel's destruction and the slaughter of its people.  

If it does succeed, it will not be without cost.  There will inevitably be much collateral death and injury, and Israel’s international reputation will be further damaged.  In pursuing this strategy Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is clearly modelling himself on Winston Churchill in the Second World War when he declared: “Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival."

The release by Hamas on May 12 of Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander after 584 days in captivity significantly energized and advanced ceasefire-hostage release negotiations between Israel and Hamas. 

Brokered by the US, Egypt and Qatar, they had just resumed in Doha on May 7 after a period of deadlock, but Alexander’s release acted as a catalyst in re-energizing the discussions.  Qatari spokesperson, Majed Al-Ansari, said Alexander's release "gave a push to Gaza ceasefire negotiations," adding that Qatar was working with mediators Egypt and the US to bridge the gap between the two sides.

That gap, however, remains dangerously wide.       

The latest US-backed proposal under discussion is the so-called Witkoff framework,  named for Steve Witkoff, President Donald Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East. It would see the release of as many as half of the remaining living hostages in exchange for a ceasefire lasting several weeks. During this period, Israel would engage in talks about ending the war, but without agreeing in advance to a permanent cessation of hostilities.

In fact Netanyahu refuses to commit to ending the war or withdrawing from Gaza as a precondition for further hostage releases.  In the days leading up to Trump’s tour of the Middle East, he delivered a clear ultimatum to Hamas.  They had until the end of Trump’s four-day visit to the region to accept the terms of the Witkoff plan, or Israel would unleash the full force of its Operation Gideon’s Chariots into Gaza. This military operation has as its objective to crush Hamas militarily and politically, secure the release of all hostages, and establish permanent Israeli control over recaptured areas in Gaza.

Netanyahu emphasized that if Hamas did not comply Israel would launch its major ground operation; in the meanwhile any ceasefire-hostage release negotiations would be conducted "under fire," meaning that there would be no pause in military activities except for brief periods to facilitate hostage releases.  That is what is now taking place.

It was on May 15, perhaps to mark what Palestinians term “Nakba Day” – their commemoration of the mass displacement that accompanied the birth of the State of Israel – that Israeli military operations in Gaza intensified. Widespread airstrikes targeted more than 130 militant sites, including rocket launchers and command centers. Ground operations were also conducted in areas like Rafah and Gaza City.

  As for Netanyahu’s ultimatum to Hamas, President Trump’s visit to the region has ended and, despite ongoing negotiations and US pressure, Hamas has still not agreed to implement the Witkoff framework.  

Hamas’s terms for releasing the remaining hostages are a guaranteed permanent ceasefire and full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.  So far, this has been its red line.  While the group has indicated that it is willing to discuss disarmament and the transfer of governing power to an independent Palestinian technocratic committee, it has consistently maintained that, for a comprehensive deal, ending the war and an Israeli withdrawal is non-negotiable.   Its reasons are not hard to discern.  Even though it has gone along with the demands, including from the Arab world, that it disarms, it cherishes the hope that it might somehow retain influence and a presence in a postwar Gaza.  This would only be possible if Israel had no presence there.

Egyptian and Qatari mediators, with US support, are attempting to bridge the divide by proposing an initial ceasefire longer than previous ones (potentially several months), during which substantive negotiations on a permanent end to the conflict would occur.  Mediators hope the extended truce will create space for further agreements.

On May 13, as part of Israel’s broader strategy to degrade Hamas’s command-and-control infrastructure and prepare for intensified military operations if peace talks fail, the IDF targeted Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Mohammed Sinwar.  The airstrike hit the Gaza European Hospital in Khan Yunis, where Sinwar was reportedly present in an underground command-and-control center located beneath the hospital.  His death awaits official Israeli confirmation, although Arab media have been reporting that he died in the air strike.

Israeli defense sources believe that two other leading Hamas figures were with Sinwar in the tunnels beneath the hospital during the strike, namely Muhammad Shabana, head of Hamas's Rafah Brigade; and Abu Obaida, Hamas's military spokesman. Both may have been killed with him.

Mohammed Sinwar’s elimination could possibly lead to greater negotiating flexibility from Hamas.  Media reports suggest that Sinwar has been one of the hardest-line figures in the Hamas leadership – arguably even more extreme than his brother Yahya, killed in October 2024. He was among the top operatives behind the onslaught on Israel on October 7, 2023, and has since shown no signs of moderation or willingness to compromise. On the contrary, he has demonstrated that to maintain Hamas’s grip on Gaza he is ready, indeed willing, to sacrifice tens of thousands of lives. He has repeatedly blocked a ceasefire, or any deal with Israel.

If he is indeed out of the picture, more pragmatic voices within the leadership might be heard.  Muhammad Ismail Darwish, Khalil al-Hayya and Nizar Awadallah - all of whom are in the Hamas talks team - have recently demonstrated some inclination to compromise and focus on negotiation over continued conflict.

In short the Israel-Gaza ceasefire and hostage release talks are active but stalled, with both sides holding firm on core demands.  For the moment Israel seeks a temporary truce tied to limited hostage releases;  Hamas insists on a permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal as conditions for release of all hostages.  Meanwhile international mediators continue efforts to find common ground, and Israel seeks final victory over Hamas.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Israel must make its next choices regarding Gaza very carefully", 19 May 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-854486

Normalization between Syria and Israel – it is possible

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 12 May 2025

         When President Donald Trump visits the Middle East in May 2025, he will find it much changed from the last time he was there in May 2017.  To take only one example, the long half-century of autocratic Assad family rule in Syria is over.  Today the nation is living with a new reality, and the rest of the world is trying to come to terms with it.  First among the confusing issues are the true intentions of the man who swept down from the north, leading his highly trained militia, and overthrew the regime of Bashir al-Assad in a matter of days.

Known then as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and invariably pictured in uniform, he has since cast aside both his military persona and his name. He now dresses in statesmanlike suits, and answers to the name Ahmed al-Sharaa.  Appointed Syria’s interim president in January 2025, he formed a transitional government in March, suspended the Assad-era constitution, produced an interim one, and pledged to draft a new constitution within a few years.

The interim constitution commits the nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, explicitly pledges to maintain freedom of opinion and expression, and establishes a People’s Committee to function as an interim parliament.   

On March 10, three days before al-Sharaa signed it, he signed a landmark agreement with the leader of the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF), Gen. Mazloum Abdi.  The SDF was in effective control of the Kurdish-occupied area in northern Syria known as Rojava. 

Basically the agreement recognizes the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian nation.  It stipulates that the Kurdish-led SDF is to be integrated into the nation’s military forces, and that all Rojavan civil and military institutions will merge with new state institutions. 

This joint decision has potentially vast implications. Syria’s new constitution, when it eventually appears, could propose a situation akin to that in Iraq, where a Kurdish-majority area has been recognized as a federal entity and accorded autonomy within the constitution. 

Al-Sharaa’s agreement with the SDF seems to substantiate his declared intention to rule over a pluralistic society.  He has promised amnesty for most former regime loyalists, and assured religious minorities that he will safeguard their rights. He has also stated that the new Syria would not be used as a launchpad for attacks on neighboring countries, including Israel.

It is inevitable that many in government and the media remain highly skeptical about al-Sharaa’s intentions, believing that the leopard cannot change its spots.  They look back to his history and see only a dyed-in-the-wool jihadist.

Born in Riyadh in 1982 to a Syrian family from the Golan Heights, al-Sharaa grew up in Damascus.  He went to Iraq when the US invaded in 2003, subsequently joined the jihadist group, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and was imprisoned by American forces from 2006 to 2011.  When released he returned to Syria and in 2012 founded the al-Nusra Front.  In 2016, he severed ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded his militia as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). ​ It was as the leader of HTS that he toppled the Assad regime.

His subsequent words and actions send a largely positive, but still mixed message. Major media outlets highlight his democratic pledges, yet question whether the moderate persona he is now projecting is a pragmatic facade. 

Confidence was badly shaken on March 6, when Alawite civilians in Syria’s coastal and central provinces were attacked and slaughtered by government forces.  This was followed by violent encounters with Druze rebels in Damascus on May 1. Two days followed of deadly sectarian violence involving the Druze minority and pro-government forces, and on May 3 Israel carried out an intense wave of airstrikes in Syria, claiming it was protecting the Druze minority. 

Those still mistrustful of al-Sharaa’s true intentions also point to the retention of Islamist clauses in the provisional constitution he has established.  Yet even the most cynical would find it difficult to deny that a new spirit is abroad in Syria.

A demonstration of Syria’s changed future occurred outside the UN building in New York on April 25.  Syria’s foreign minister, Asaad al-Shibani, watched as the two-starred red, white and black flag of Assad’s Syria was lowered, to be replaced by the three-starred green, white and black flag previously used by HTS.  This is now Syria’s official emblem.

“This flag is not a mere symbol,” said al-Shibani, “but rather a proclamation of a new existence ... embodying a future that emerges from resilience and a promise of change after years of pain.”

On April 25, the New Arab bore the headline: “US Congressmen claim Syria's Ahmed al-Sharaa open to Israel normalization”.  The story beneath reported that Congressman Cory Mills had held a 90-minute meeting with Sharaa, who had indicated that he was willing to normalize relations with Israel.  Mills was accompanied by fellow Congressman Marlin Stutzman who separately told The Jerusalem Post that Sharaa was interested in joining the Abraham Accords. 

"Sharaa said that he was open to the Abraham Accords,” said Stutzman, “which would put them in good standing with Israel, other Middle Eastern countries, and, of course, the United States."   

Both Congressmen are Republicans, and have Trump’s ear.  It is not impossible that he will take the opportunity of his visit to advance the idea of Syria-Israeli normalization with his hosts – Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

          There seems to be a solid base to work on. During al-Sharaa’s visit to French President Emmanuel Macron on May 7 both leaders confirmed that Syria has held indirect talks with Israel through mediators, aiming to reduce tensions, particularly after recent Israeli strikes near Damascus. Macron condemned these strikes, and Sharaa expressed openness to "technical discussions" with Israel.

No doubt the Golan would be included. Israel views the Golan as vital to its security, and annexed it in 1981.  During Trump’s first administration the US recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, a move that Biden’s administration did not overturn.  Any demand to reverse the situation would certainly scupper normalization discussions.  To achieve the benefits that would flow from normalizing relations with Israel, al-Sharaa would probably adopt the pragmatic approach favored by other Abraham Accord states, and put the issue on the side burner. 

There is no doubt that the tenor of remarks by al-Sharaa from the start of his governance seem to favor conciliation toward Israel and suggest a potential openness to the principles of regional normalization and cooperation embodied in the Abraham Accords.  If Syria’s interim president eventually delivers the inclusive, unified, well-governed state that he promises he will have proved himself the most remarkable leader to have emerged in the Arab world for generations.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Normalization between al-Sharaa's Syria, Israel possible after decades of hostilities", 12 May 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-853558

Published in Eurasia Review, 16 May 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/16052025-syria-israel-normalization-its-possible-oped/

Mohammed Dahlan – governor of Gaza?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 5 May 2025

For more than a decade one name keeps surfacing as a possible future Palestinian leader that could be acceptable not only to the Arab world but also to the US and Israel – Mohammed Yusuf Shakir Dahlan.

   Dahlan’s career to date is best described as checkered.  There have been ups and downs in his relations with the Palestinian world and also with the West and Israel.  Because his standing with both has varied from friend to foe and back again, he has, curiously enough, acquired a sort of across-the-board status and a certain credence.         

   His credibility as a player on the contemporary Israel-Palestine scene is boosted by the fact that he is a native Gazan, born in 1961 in the Khan Yunis refugee camp.  As a teenager Dahlan helped set up the Fatah Youth Movement, known as the Fatah Hawks. In his twenties he was arrested more than once by the Israeli authorities for political activism, but never for terrorist activities. He put his time in Israeli prisons to good use by learning Hebrew, which he speaks fluently.

In the early 1990s Dahlan was reliably reported to have helped in the negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords.  The first Accord, signed  in 1993, was violently opposed by Hamas, which severed relations with Yasser Arafat as a result.  Arafat chose Dahlan to head the Preventive Security Force in Gaza​, while Israel and the US​ supported and closely cooperated with ​him in his new role​ - particularly in countering Hamas.

         Building up a force of 20,000 men, he became so powerful that the Strip was nicknamed "Dahlanistan".  Now, a quarter of a century later, is the wheel coming full circle, and could Dahlan find himself once again governing Gaza?

In fact, his name has been bandied about in recent years ​for a much more important role – a possible successor to Palestinian Authority (PA) president, Mahmoud Abbas.

Dahlan first made political waves ​in 2001, when he began denouncing corruption in the PA and calling for reform.  A year later he resigned and, portraying himself as an outspoken critic of Arafat, campaign​ed on an anti-corruption and reform ticket. As a result Dahlan and his followers won over most of the Fatah sections in Gaza.

The 2006 Palestinian elections saw Hamas gain a majority in Gaza.  Dahlan called their election victory a disaster, and in January 2007 held the biggest-ever rally of Fatah supporters in the Gaza Strip, where he denounced Hamas as “a bunch of murderers and thieves”. His instinct was vindicated six months later when Hamas staged a bloody coup in Gaza, seized power and expelled those Fatah officials it had not murdered. Years later it was revealed that Dahlan played a key role in an abortive US plot to remove Hamas from power.

Yet, Palestinian politics being what they are, more recently there have been signs of a limited reconciliation between Hamas and Dahlan – a situation better described, perhaps, as tactical cooperation.  Around 2017​, reports emerged of Egypt-brokered talks between Hamas and Dahlan’s representatives, supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

It was to the UAE that Dahlan exiled himself when in 2011 he was expelled from Fatah.  Ever since October 2007, when the Bush administration reportedly pressured Abbas to appoint Dahlan as his deputy, Abbas regarded him as a dangerous rival. 

Biding his time, Abbas finally charged Dahlan in June 2011 with financial corruption and murder, going so far as to accuse him of killing the late leader, Yasser Arafat – an accusation that has led to ​no legal proceedings or formal charges.  French investigators in 2015 concluded that Arafat died of natural causes.

 While settling in the UAE, Dahlan became a close advisor to Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), then Crown Prince, now UAE president  Though never officially acknowledged, Dahlan is believed to have played a behind-the-scenes role in facilitating the normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel, resulting in the Abraham Accords in September 2020. 

Dahlan’s close relationship with the UAE has given him financial and political leverage, which he has used to support his political allies within Palestinian society.

In January 2025 the media reported that Hamas and Fatah had reached a draft deal to form a “community support committee” to administer post-war Gaza.  The concept was put to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and rejected, but potential leaders of a post-war Gaza began to be mooted.  

Acceptability to the US, the Arab world and Israel is the hurdle contenders would have to overcome, and few are better placed than Mohammed Dahlan.  Palestinian writer Fathi al-Sabah has said: “Dahlan does not aspire to assume leadership of the Gaza Strip in the post-war phase. Rather, he sees himself as a candidate to lead the entire Palestinian people, looking forward to the position of president of the Palestinian Authority.”

This not unworthy aspiration, if indeed Dahlan ​holds it, is far from inconsistent with accepting the prestigious, if onerous, task of leading his native Gaza out of war and into peace.  Success in that role would place Dahlan in pole position to succeed the 90-year-old Mahmoud Abbas, currently in the twentieth year of his 4-year term of office.

            For the present Dahlan is content to play the well-known political game – whatever high office you are aiming for, swear that nothing is further from your thoughts.

            On July 24, 2024, Dahlan posted this on his X account, referring to himself in the plural as the royal “we”: 

          “Various scenarios have been repeatedly presented or leaked to the media regarding the arrangements for the “day after” Israel’s devastating war on Gaza. Sometimes our name is used to thrill audiences. Therefore and once again, we reiterate that… our highest priority now is to end the war. We will not support any choice that has not been reached based on Palestinian national understandings [achieved] through a transparent democratic process…I have repeatedly refused to accept any security, governmental or executive role.”

            Rumors were obviously already rife.  Two days after his post, they were given substance in a long article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ).

“The question of who will govern Gaza,” it began, “has plagued efforts to end Israel’s nine-month war to destroy Hamas…Some negotiators are increasingly drawn to Mohammed Dahlan as a temporary solution to a dilemma facing postwar Gaza.”

Dahlan’s name is out there as a potential future Palestinian leader, one way or another.  He no doubt has in mind the ancient Greek saying: “There’s many a slip twixt the cup and the lip.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Could Mohammed Dahlan be Gaza's next governor?", 5 May 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-852618