Published in the Jerusalem Post, 10 June 2025
The US invaded Iraq in 2003 to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. When the fighting was over, the UN established UNAMI (the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq). It was created at the request of Iraq’s interim governing council to support the country’s reconstruction and political development. Later UNAMI’s role was expanded to embrace a constitutional review, regional dialogue, and human rights.
At the end of this year UNAMI
will be wound up. In May 2024 the Iraqi government petitioned the
Security Council to terminate its operations, citing the significant
progress Iraq had made in political stability and governance.
Iraq, said prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, had advanced beyond
the need for continuous outside support. As a result the Security
Council unanimously agreed that the mission would end on December
31, 2025.
Today, both politically
and economically, Iraq is relatively stable. The government has been in
office since October 2022, and the large-scale anti-government protests that
rocked Iraq in 2019–2021 have died down. All the same an under-current of
public discontent rumbles on, based on poor services, youth unemployment and
corruption in high places.
A glance at the map reveals
that Iraq lies cheek-by-jowl with its much larger neighbor to the east, Iran,
along a border some 1600 kilometers long. Ever since 2003 Iran has
exerted substantial influence across many aspects of Iraq’s economic,
political, and social life. Recently this influence has been meeting
increasing resistance.
Iraq imports a significant portion
of its electricity and gas from Iran, and Iranian-backed businesses
and financial institutions have a strong presence in the country. Iran
supports various Shia political factions and paramilitary groups and through
them has, in the past, exercised considerable influence on
Iraqi politics, including appointments, security policies, and
parliamentary votes.
However, Iran’s grip on the nation
is weakening. Many Iraqis, including nationalists and youth movements,
resent Iranian interference, particularly its role in violent crackdowns on
protests and perceived infringement on Iraqi sovereignty.
A major cause of tension within Iraq’s body politic are disagreements between the state and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
On June 5 Reuters reported that
Iraq's oil ministry had declared it was holding the KRG legally responsible for
the continued smuggling of oil from the Kurdish region. The dispute
centers on a 2022 ruling by Iraq's federal court that Kurdish authorities
should hand over their crude oil supplies to the central government. The oil
ministry is saying that the KRG’s failure to comply with the law has hurt the
public revenues, and has forced the government to cut output from other fields
to meet OPEC quotas.
With that internal
issue still to be resolved, Iraq is increasingly confident in its international
persona. It hosted the Arab Summit on May 17, held in Baghdad, which
considered among other issues Egypt’s plan for the reconstruction of Gaza once
the fighting is over. Significantly, that conference was attended by the
interim president of Iraq’s “new” neighbor to the north-west – post-Assad
regime Syria. The invitation was extended to Ahmed al-Sharaa by Iraq’s
prime minister, al-Sudani, when they met in Doha in April.
The Iraqi
government’s initial response to the overthrow of the Assad regime was
cautious. It closed border crossings and deployed troops to the
630-kilometer border with Syria. There has been a slow shift towards a more
pragmatic approach. Iraq has been sending officials on formal visits to
Syria, virtually acknowledging the legitimacy of the new regime.
Iran-affiliates in Iraq, all of
them Shi'ite, have opposed this, or indeed any normalization
with post-Assad Syria or its Sunni interim president. Over fifty
members of the Iraqi parliament signed a petition to reject al-Sharaa’s
attendance at the Baghdad summit, while the leaders of militia groups active in
Syria until recently, posted direct threats to Sharaa on their social media.
Writing on the Atlantic Council’s
website on June 4, Iraqi international relations analyst Shermine Serbest said:
“At this turning point in the region’s history, Iraq has a rare opportunity to
start a new chapter with Syria….Opening effective channels of communication
between the Iraqi and Syrian governments will be critical in efforts to
stabilize and normalize…Iraq should also work closely with the new Syrian
regime to establish a high-level security cooperation, including immediate
investments in border crossings and towns, to prevent the resurgence of
extremist groups and smuggling activities across the joint border…Baghdad
should continue to identify economic opportunities and solidify them
with memoranda of understanding, trade agreements, and investment
deals…Over the past thirteen years, Iraq’s role in Syria has been marked by
hardship and complexity. Now, the current Iraqi administration holds the
opportunity to turn a new page and help shape a future defined by peace and
regional cooperation.”
The remaining strength of
pro-Iran interests in Iraq will be tested in the next parliamentary elections,
slated for November 11, 2025. Under Iraq’s constitution these elections
will determine the composition of the 329-seat Council of Representatives of
Iraq. The elections are expected to be a significant indicator of Iraq's
political direction, especially concerning the balance between nationalist
movements and Iran-aligned parties.
Under Iraq’s constitution the
country’s president is not elected by popular mandate but by a vote in the
parliament. The most recent presidential poll occurred on 13 October
2022, resulting in the election of Abdul Latif Rashid for a four-year term.
Consequently, the next presidential election is expected to take place in 2026,
following the formation of a new parliament.
The wild card in Iraq’s electoral process is the enormously influential figure of Muqtada al-Sadr, paradoxically both a Shi'ite cleric and a strong anti-Iran nationalist.
As a result a three-party Iran-aligned coalition, the Coordination Framework, has exercised most political influence in the parliament. In what appears a somewhat perverse decision al-Sadr has announced that his movement will boycott the upcoming November elections, citing concerns over corruption and foreign influence. He may yet change his mind.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iraq's new chapter: UNAMI's exit and the battle for sovereignty," 10 June 2025:
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