Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 April 2026
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The Lebanese government, under its president Joseph Aoun, has been making a determined effort to assert its authority over the rogue Iranian-backed terrorist Hezbollah organization that once operated inside Lebanon as a virtual “state within a state”. Although much weakened by Israel’s military and other more covert operations, Hezbollah is still too powerful to be controlled by the government. Since it entered the war on March 2 in support of Iran, it has been launching an average of 150 rockets a day into northern Israel, some coordinated with Iranian missile attacks.
The Lebanese presidency and
cabinet have declared Hezbollah’s cross‑border attacks “unlawful” and not
authorized by the state, stressing that no non‑state actor has
the right to drag Lebanon into war.
On March 9 Aoun outlined a four‑point
plan calling for a “total ceasefire,” Hezbollah’s disarmament, and
international support to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, coupled with
direct Lebanese‑Israeli talks under international auspices. In an online conference with senior EU
officials, Aoun described the plan as a path towards "permanent security
and stability arrangements on our borders", but declared it was conditional
on a halt to Israeli strikes inside Lebanon.
Perhaps as a sign of the sincerity of his intentions, on March 24 Aoun declared Iran’s ambassador-designate Mohammad Reza Sheibani persona non grata, and gave him five days to leave the country. Lebanon objects to the close connection between Hezbollah and Iran’s hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, accusing the IRGC of “commanding Hezbollah’s operations” in the current conflict.
On March 30 it emerged that
Sheibani, backed by Iran and its Hezbollah supporters, had refused to leave. Iran has stated unequivocally that its
ambassador to Lebanon would remain in post.
A standoff between the Lebanese government, in its efforts to control
Hezbollah, and Iran – which regards Lebanon as its colony – has developed. Lebanon has not enforced its own decision – for
example by closing the Iranian embassy, or attempting an arrest of Sheibani. In fact the situation has settled into a
symbolic but revealing deadlock.
Israel and
Lebanon are similarly in a state of frozen animation, and have been for nearly
80 years. The two countries are still
technically at war – the war launched on the nascent state of Israel in 1948 by
the joint Arab armies. In all that time
no peace treaty or armistice has been negotiated between them, and there have
been no diplomatic relations or official channels of communication. Any interchanges have been indirect, via the
UN, international mediators, and back‑channel contacts. Only UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and
subsequent arrangements have provided a formal framework for the cessation of
hostilities along the border.
All of which makes Aoun’s recent
apparent overture the more unusual. Whether it can lead to direct negotiations
is highly unlikely, given the current situation. Israel is establishing a security buffer zone
inside southern Lebanon, which it describes as a temporary defense measure
rather than a permanent occupation. At the same time it is undertaking extensive
airstrikes against Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters, including in
Beirut.
Even so, on March 13 the
Qatar-funded Caliber news medium reported that Aoun had proposed a one-month
truce with Israel, pledging to use the period to achieve the disarmament of
Hezbollah. This proposal was
communicated to Israel through US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michael Issa, but like
so many emanating from the Lebanese government, has simply withered on the
vine.
The official Israeli position is
that the Lebanese government, in accordance with a number of prior agreements
and commitments, is responsible for disarming Hezbollah. If it cannot achieve
that, Israeli officials have argued that the war will end only when Hezbollah
no longer poses a threat to Israel from Lebanese territory.
In short, Israel has not signaled any readiness to enter political talks with Beirut a long as its relationship with Lebanon is dominated by active hostilities. But the door is not shut fast. Even though Lebanon’s infrastructure is affected by the ongoing military offensive, and civilian deaths and displacements continue to mount, Israel does not describe current operations as a conflict with the Lebanese state, but as self‑defense against Hezbollah.
The
political gap between the Lebanese and Israeli governments is wide, but not
unbridgeable. From Israel’s perspective Hezbollah
is lodged firmly within the Lebanese arena, and it holds the Lebanese state
responsible for its disarmament. The
Lebanese administration does not disagree, for it is trying to distance the
state from Hezbollah’s actions, is openly seeking help to bring the terrorist
organization under state control, and has signaled its readiness to negotiate.
On March 31 the EU’s Diplomatic
Service issued a statement on behalf of 10 states, including the UK, asserting
that the responsibility for the current conflict in Lebanon “lies with
Hezbollah,” adding “We strongly condemn Hezbollah’s attacks in support of Iran
against Israel, which must cease immediately.”
They expressed their “full support to the government and people of
Lebanon,” and called for “direct political negotiation between Lebanon and
Israel, that can contribute to putting a durable end to this conflict and set
the conditions for peaceful regional coexistence.”
There is another factor at
play. Lebanon’s next parliamentary
elections, originally scheduled for May 2026 but now delayed until 2028, could consolidate
Hezbollah’s strength, or signal its decline. Aoun has managed to achieve a breathing space
of two years in which to ensure that the state gains the upper hand in its
struggle with Hezbollah. It is because
he acknowledges that the government is not powerful enough to achieve this
without help, that he has floated the idea of direct Lebanese‑Israeli talks under
international auspices.
Negotiations, perhaps leading to
joint military operations, could eliminate Hezbollah’s constant onslaught on
Israel’s northern border, and would justify Israel’s withdrawal from the buffer
zone it is establishing in southern Lebanon.
If such talks were ever to be arranged, Hezbollah would undoubtedly
attempt to disrupt them, so Israel's participation would have to be dependent
on firm security guarantees, perhaps underwritten by international
enforcement.
Unlikely the possibility of face-to-face talks may seem, but should the potential, however remote, of a collaborative Lebanese-Israeli effort to strike down Hezbollah – with Israel for once in lockstep with international opinion – be rejected out of hand?
Published in the Jerusalem Post on 9 April 2026, and in the Jerusalem post online titled: "Lebanon vs Hezbollah: A standoff between state sovereignty and Iranian influence" on 7 April 2026:
