US Secretary of State John Kerry
has sternly warned the world’s media to desist from idle speculation about the
progress of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. All parties to the discussions are sworn to
secrecy, he announced, and authoritative statements will emanate from
him and him alone. He must have known he
was whistling in the wind. With
information deliberately withheld, speculation and rumour are bound to flourish.
Even before substantive
discussions began, there was a widespread feeling that the parties to the
current negotiations have been round the course many times, and that something
innovative or new was required to break through long-standing and apparently
immutable positions.
Around the time of the last
serious attempt at face-to-face discussions, something out of the ordinary was indeed
being aired – something that received very little news coverage at the time,
possibly because the talks themselves collapsed so completely.
Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) began in Washington on 2
September 2010 in an atmosphere of high expectation. At that meeting George Mitchell, Obama’s special Middle East envoy, announced
that Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Palestinian Authority (PA)
President Mahmoud Abbas, had agreed to meet again in a fortnight, and every two
weeks after that.
And then everything ground to a halt. Israel ’s
“goodwill gesture” − a 10-month moratorium on construction
in the West Bank − came to an
end, and Netanyahu’s fragile coalition would not countenance its
resumption. Abbas declared that he could
not continue with negotiations unless all construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem was halted. Total impasse.
But the start of face-to-face
discussions had apparently generated some innovative thinking. A very odd, but
apparently serious, possibility was reported by the London-based newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat on 29 October 2010. The
paper reported that in its secret negotiations with the American administration
aimed at clarifying the nature and demarcation of a Palestinian state, Israel had been discussing the option of leasing
land in east Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley
from the Palestinian state for up to 99 years.
Palestinian sources apparently confirmed the story.
According to one of the sources, this
initiative, which he said was "American, not Israeli," had been on
the table for a while "in order to reach common ground with the Israeli
side regarding the borders issue, and to reach an agreement on what will remain
under Israeli sovereignty." When
quizzed, officials in Washington
refused to confirm or deny the report.
Could this possibility re-emerge? Has it legs strong enough to stand?
The prime example of one sovereign
state leasing territory from another is, of course, Hong
Kong . In the full
flood of its imperial expansion, Britain
defeated China in the Opium
Wars, and China was forced
to cede both Hong Kong and the peninsula
of Kowloon . During the following decades, Hong Kong flourished,
but the island lacked resources such as water and farmland, and Britain pressed China to cede more land. In 1898 it
succeeded in gaining rights in areas known as the New Territories
on a 99-year lease, due to expire in 1997.
To complete the story, as 1997 approached, it became clear that should Britain
attempt to hand back only the New Territories , China
would demand Hong Kong and Kowloon
as well. So, in late-1984, an agreement
was reached: China would
take over the entire colony on 1 July 1997, but Hong Kong 's
unique free enterprise economy would be maintained for at least 50 years. Hong
Kong would become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China with the official slogan,
"One country, two systems".
Does the Hong Kong model provide any sort of template for a future
Israeli-Palestinian accommodation? Of
course, extremer right-wing Israeli political opinion will immediately demand:
“Why on earth should we lease our own land from the Palestinians?” But if this ever was a US proposal, it was clearly designed to address Israel 's key
security concern. Netanyahu had made it
clear that any peace deal must incorporate border security for Israel , to prevent both weapon smuggling and
infiltration by Hamas or other extreme Islamists into a new sovereign Palestine . The leaseback option, it might have been
opined, could provide a medium- to long-term solution to that problem, providing
sufficient breathing space (up to a
century) to allow Israel
and the PA to finalise the borders of the new state.
But there is nothing new under the
sun − so it is not perhaps surprising to find that as long ago as 2005 a plan
was seriously being discussed
within the Israeli Labor Party for the biggest Jewish
settlement blocs in the West Bank to be "leased" from the
Palestinians.
The London Independent newspaper reported in December 2005 that a group advising Amir Peretz, then Labour Party leader,
had been considering a proposal for a long-term leaseback of the main
settlement blocs on the model of the 99-year Hong Kong
agreement. Clearly the proposal was an attempt to square
the circle between Palestinian insistence that any two-state solution should
broadly conform with Israel's pre-1967 borders, and the view of a wide segment
of Israeli opinion that as many settlements as possible should remain in
Israeli hands.
Since then, however, Abbas has on several occasions acknowledged that in
any final agreement the major Israeli settlements would probably remain in
Israeli hands, subject perhaps to a land-swap deal. The same, though, would not be true of the
plethora of smaller settlements scattered across the West
Bank , and it may be that a lease-back deal affecting some of them
could form part of a final accord.
TheHong Kong precedent is not a blueprint
for achieving a wholesale Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. It might just provide a useful, if temporary,
element in constructing a workable solution.
The
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 6 August 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/The-Hong-Kong-Solution-322198?prmusr=mn6GPEivKn%2b0bSloftzfFl8OSK6jgoqG3tQvELs%2b5X2M4tAiXZRBOP6LAMyf2vrm
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