This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post on 30 August 2021
Its position has a
solid track record behind it. Over the
past year Qatar has hosted talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government,
and before that, initiated by the Trump administration, between the Taliban and
the United States. Doha, Qatar’s
capital, was the setting for that series of face-to-face negotiations. They
resulted in the formal agreement of February 29, 2020 that envisaged an orderly
withdrawal of US and other foreign forces, backed by an undertaking by the
Taliban to engage in peace talks with the Afghan government. President Biden, failing to follow through on
the Trump deal and then announcing that the US would leave by the end of August
2021 regardless, effectively gave the Taliban carte blanche to topple
the government and take over the country.
The Taliban’s founder and political head, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who
had exiled himself to Qatar, returned to Afghanistan a few days ago.
Mediation between the
Taliban and what is left of the previous Afghan administration now rests on
Qatar. Washington acknowledges Qatar’s
key role in the crisis. On August 20 Biden
spoke on the phone with Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim al-Thani, thanking him for Qatar's
efforts in the peace process.
Even before the Afghanistan debacle, Qatar had
become recognized as a regional power broker because of its major role in the
delicate Israel-Hamas-Palestinian situation in Gaza. On
August 19 Qatar achieved a breakthrough when it signed a deal with the United
Nations to resume supplying cash to Gazan families. The deal, which involves
providing more than 100,000 families with $100 per month, may not have been
sufficient to prevent further border skirmishes, but some commentators believe
it has averted a resumption of full-scale hostilities between Hamas and Israel,
allowing the Egyptian-led peace negotiations to continue.
How has this Gulf state – a small peninsula projecting into the Persian Gulf – won for itself such an influential position?
Its bid for global status can, perhaps, be traced back to 1995
when Sheik Hamad al-Thani ousted his father, who was on an extended summer
vacation in Europe, and pronounced himself Emir. Surviving a countercoup backed
by Saudi Arabia, Sheik Hamad, together with his wife and prime minister, set
out to convert Qatar into a high-powered modern state.
His first big
achievement was to launch the Al Jazeera television news network. Al Jazeera claimed from the start that its
journalists and editors provided an objective service independent of state
control – a claim often contested over the years. Today the media giant that it has become
still proclaims “Al Jazeera is an independent news organization funded in part
by the Qatari government.”
In
pursuit of its aspiration to become a major player in the region and
beyond, Qatar’s tactics have sometimes puzzled, sometimes infuriated, its
neighbours. But then, as one of the world’s wealthiest nations – and certainly
number one on a per capita basis – Qatar has reckoned for a long time that it
could afford the luxury of proceeding along its own preferred path, without too
much concern for what others thought.
For
example, Qatar’s strategy of backing Islamists − from Hamas in Gaza, to the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to hard-line Syrian opposition fighters − while at
the same time offering itself as a key US ally, was rooted in pragmatism: Qatar
wanted to extend its influence in the region by being friends with everybody.
“We don’t do enemies,” Qatar’s one-time foreign minister is reported to have
said, “we talk to everyone.”
Qatar’s
wayward policies, especially with regard to Islamist groups, had long
infuriated its neighboring Arab states, and on 5 June 2017 Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
the UAE and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar for a second time,
and virtually imposed a trade blockade.
For three-and-a-half
years Qatar withstood the worst that the Saudi-led alliance could inflict, and
in January 2021 diplomatic relations were restored without any concessions on
Qatar’s part. In the interim Qatar had
transformed itself into a major diplomatic player and a generous donor of
foreign aid. Its ultra-modern capital
Doha was full of skyscrapers, the country had become a commercial hub, and it was
well on its way to becoming a cultural, sports and tourist center for the Gulf as
a whole – a position likely to be consolidated when Qatar hosts the FIFA World
Cup in the winter of 2022.
The tournament kicks off
on Monday, November 21 and the final will be played at the Lusail Stadium in
Doha a week before Christmas on Sunday December 18. Although Israel does not
have diplomatic relations with Qatar, the head of the Qatari organizing committee,
Hassan al-Thawadi, confirmed back in 2019 that Israelis will be able to enter the
country as tourists to attend World Cup matches. "Everyone is welcome,” he said. ”We do
not mix sport and politics, but we would hope that Palestinians are able to
make it too."
The US and Qatar have
often failed to see eye to eye, but the connections are strong. At al-Udeid, about 20 miles from Doha, the US
Air Force has a base servicing its Central Command which covered US forces in
Afghanistan. But while welcoming the US Air Force, Qatar allowed the Taliban to
establish a political office in Doha.
Qatar's declared aim has
been to create a space in the Gulf region where differing parties, even rivals
and enemies, could do deals. In this it
has succeeded. The effort has been long and sustained. Khalid al-Attiyah, the then Qatari foreign
minister, spoke about it eight years ago at Britain's Royal Institute of
International Affairs, Chatham House.
"Our country
considers that political solutions require the representation and participation
of all parties to the conflict, no matter how difficult and
controversial," he said. "It is our belief that only such
preconditions can allow for viable, legitimate and ultimately long-term
resolution to conflicts."
A quarter of a century ago Qatar set its sights on playing in the big league. Few would deny that it has won its place there.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 30 August 2021:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with-opinion-678058
Published in the Eurasia Review:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/27082021-qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with-oped/
Published in the MPC Journal
https://mpc-journal.org/qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with/
Published in the Jewish Business News:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/08/27/qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with/
No comments:
Post a Comment