“I want to speak
directly to the residents of the Gaza Strip,” he said, “and tell them: There is
another way. We know how to protect ourselves from anyone who threatens us, but
we also know how to provide employment, a livelihood and a life of dignity to
those who wish to live by our side in peace. There is another way to
live. The way of the Abraham Accords, of the Negev Summit, of innovation and
prosperity, of regional development and joint projects. The choice is yours.
Your future is in your hands.”
The presentation of his
message may have been dramatic and unusual, but the content was not. It was
entirely in line with the vision for a long-term settlement between Israel and
the Gaza Strip that, as Israel’s foreign minister, he set out on September 12,
2021.
He was addressing a
conference of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman
University, a private university situated in Herzliya. Dubbing his plan "economy for
security", he was essentially proposing a pragmatic deal – the
reconstruction of Gaza in exchange for the disarmament of Palestinian armed
factions.
"Since Israel left
the Gaza Strip in 2005,” said Lapid, “we have been dragged into round after
round of violence causing suffering for our people and harming our economy. The
policy Israel has pursued up until now hasn't substantially changed the
situation. The closures haven’t stopped the smuggling and production of
weapons. Last night we once again struck Gaza after yet another rocket was
fired, and residents ran to their shelters. We need to change direction. What
should we do? The short answer is that we need to start a large, multi-year process
of economy for security. It is the more realistic version of what in the past
was called 'rehabilitation for demilitarization.'"
Lapid explained that
his plan encompasses two stages. The first will address the immediate
humanitarian crisis in Gaza, tackling basic human needs there.
"The electricity system will be repaired,
gas will be connected, a water desalination plant will be built, significant
improvements to the health-care system and a rebuilding of housing and
transport infrastructure will take place. In exchange, Hamas will commit to
long-term quiet."
The second stage
includes a comprehensive economic jump-start for the Gaza Strip. Lapid proposed
that "as part of the second stage the artificial island project off the
coast of Gaza will be advanced, which will allow for the construction of a
port. A transportation link between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will be
built. International investment inside Gaza and joint economic projects with
Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority [PA] will be advanced. Industrial
and employment zones will be built near the Erez border crossing."
Lapid’s proposed way
forward was not to attempt negotiating any of this directly with Hamas, but to gain
international consensus on the plan, and then the support of a group of
like-minded nations in persuading Hamas into accepting it. Finally he added the message that he has now
put directly to the Gazan population – that he hoped Gazans understood what
they were missing out on as a result of terrorism, and that they realized how
much they stood to gain if terrorism was ended.
Lapid emphasized that a
plan like this had never before been presented officially by an Israeli
government. It seemed clear from the earnestness with which he spoke, and the
degree of detail he set out, that Gaza reconstruction was to feature in future
Israeli regional policy. Indeed, Lapid indicated
that the process of implementing the policy had already started. He revealed that in recent weeks he had held
a series of conversations with partners in the Arab world and the West about
his plan.
The reactions of Hamas
and of the Palestinian Authority (PA) were entirely negative, but for different
reasons. Hamas viewed Lapid’s plan as a
bribe aimed at buying off the support of Gazans for the “armed struggle”.
“The
enemy has resorted to various proposals in order to weaken the resistance,”
said Hamas spokesperson Hazim Qasim. “Its resort to such a plan indicates its
inability to deal with the resistance and our Palestinian people.”
And
yet there are some who believe that Hamas’s decision not to involve itself in
the conflict between Islamic Jihad and Israel was precisely because of Israel’s recent
policy of economic incentives for Gaza, including a substantial increase in the
number of permits allowing Gazans to cross into Israel for work.
As for the PA, Lapid’s
plan would see them take charge of implementing Gazan reconstruction on the
ground. The PA, for whom the idea of cooperating with their regional rivals
Hamas was, perhaps, a non-starter, saw the whole Lapid policy as an effort to
bypass peace negotiations leading to a comprehensive resolution of the
Israel-Palestinian dispute.
Speaking to the
Palestinian cabinet, PA Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh rejected the Lapid
plan as half-baked. He believed that the
reconstruction of Gaza could only follow a full-scale peace accord. “Gaza’s
problem is political,” he said. “There must be a serious political process
based in international law, to end the occupation and lift the blockade… this
would make the reconstruction of Gaza possible and sustainable.”
It was precisely this negative, blinkered, non-aspirational attitude of the Palestinian leadership that induced Lapid to address the Gazan people direct, and to pin his hopes on assembling sufficient international support to see his proactive plans for a reconstructed and thriving Gaza Strip made reality.
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