Erdogan prepares for a new land grab

            On 19 November Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan began launching air, drone and artillery strikes on north-eastern Syrian towns and cities.  Over four days at least 100 strikes were recorded, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the US-backed force in the area, began reporting military and civilian deaths.  Erdogan has now announced that the air strikes were only the beginning, and that he is preparing to launch a land operation when the time is right. 

“We are continuing the air operation,” he said in a speech to his AK party members in parliament, “and will come down hard on the terrorists from land, at the most convenient time for us,”

He asserts that Turkey is more determined than ever to secure its southern border by seizing a “security corridor” running along it west to east –f territory that is nominally part of sovereign Syria.  “We have formed part of this corridor,” he announced, and “will take care of it starting with places such as Tal Rifaat, Manbij and Ayn al-Arab (Kobane), which are the sources of trouble.”

The SDF, which incorporates a large force of Kurdish fighters known as the YPG, is viewed by Erdogan as an arm of his domestic Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. The PKK, a militant political group seeking Kurdish independence, or at least autonomy, has not been averse to pursuing its political ends by way of armed attacks within Turkey.  Erdogan has been fighting it at home for decades, and has proscribed it as a terrorist organization.  For some years he has also been combatting Kurdish militias in northern Syria and Iraq, drawing no distinction between them and the PKK.  What puts Turkey at odds with much world opinion is that the US, the EU and many other Western countries back the Kurd-dominated SDF in the common fight against Islamic State (ISIS).

            Although Erdogan’s air offensive has clearly been planned for a long time as a preliminary to a full-scale ground offensive, the trigger was a bomb attack in the afternoon of November 13 in the center of Istanbul.  Six people lost their lives.  Official Turkish statements laid the blame firmly at the door of the PKK and YPG, although both organizations have denied any involvement in the incident.  No group has claimed responsibility. Meanwhile Istanbul's Chief Public Prosecutors' Office has opened an investigation.

Erdogan’s first military incursion beyond Turkey’s borders was in 2016, when his troops invaded Syria’s quasi-autonomous Kurdistan region – the area known as Rojava.  It resulted in Turkish forces seizing and occupying Kurdish-inhabited territory which, he announced, was to be a sort of buffer or “safe zone” protecting Turkey’s southern border.

That operation, and two subsequent efforts, obviously did not satisfy Erdogan. On April 18, 2022 Turkey launched a new ground and air offensive, named Operation Claw Lock, this time against Kurdish militants in northern Iraq.  Supported by helicopters and drones, Turkish jets and artillery struck suspected targets of the PKK, and then commando troops crossed into Kurdish-occupied Iraq by land or were airlifted by helicopters.

It was in August that Erdogan announced that he was planning a new military offensive in northern Syria.  He has lived up to his word.

Meanwhile the US-supported SDF is braced for an assault by Turkish forces that Washington has said not only risks a breach with its NATO ally Turkey, but a resurgence of ISIS in Syria. According to the Pentagon’s press secretary: “Recent airstrikes in Syria directly threatened the safety of US personnel who are working in Syria with local partners to defeat ISIS and maintain custody of more than ten thousand ISIS detainees. … Immediate de-escalation is necessary in order to…ensure the safety and security of personnel on the ground committed to the defeat-ISIS mission.”

In an interview with the Washington Post on November 23, General Mazloum Kobane Abdi, the SDF’s top commander, arguing that Western pressure could avert a ground operation, urged Western allies to oppose further Turkish attacks,

“It’s not news to anyone that Erdogan has been threatening the ground operation for months,” said Abdi, “but he could launch this operation now. This war, if it happens, won’t benefit anybody. It will affect many lives. There will be massive waves of displacement, and a humanitarian crisis.”

Russia has added its voice to the plea to Erdogan to cancel his planned invasion.  Talks about the Syrian civil war and Syria’s future are on-going between Iran, Turkey and Russia in the Kazakh capital, Astana.  On November 23 the senior Russian negotiator, Alexander Lavrentyev, said that Moscow had asked Ankara to refrain from a full-scale ground offensive in Syria. “We hope our arguments will be heard in Ankara,” said Lavrentyev, “and other ways of resolving the problem will be found.”  Sound advice, equally applicable nearer home.

There has always been an ulterior motive for Erdogan’s land grabs along his southern border.  In addition to weakening his Kurdish opponents, he is seeking a way to rid Turkey of the millions of Syrian refugees who fled their country during its eleven years of civil strife.  His idea has been to resettle them below the Turkish border in the so-called “safe zone”. The refugees, however, are far from keen to move to what is a heavily militarized and highly populated war zone, even if it is a return to their native land, Syria. 

If he does carry out his plan, Erdogan will undoubtedly enhance his political standing at home, ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2023.  So it is more likely than not that Erdogan’s new ground offensive will take place and that, in addition to widespread disruption and loss of life in northern Syria, vast numbers of reluctant Syrian refugees will be relocated to his “safe zone”.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 29 November 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-723590

Published in MPC Journal, 11 December 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/erdogan-prepares-for-a-new-land-grab/

Published in Eurasia Review, 10 December 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/10122022-erdogan-prepares-for-a-new-land-grab-oped/

Published in Jewish Business News, 9 December 2022: 2022:https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/12/09/erdogan-prepares-for-a-new-land-grab/

Where’s the justice in an ICJ opinion?

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 23 November 2022 

On November 11 a UN Special Committee voted in favour of requesting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to provide an advisory opinion about whether Israel’s 55-year occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem constitutes de facto annexation. 

The motion was supported by 98 countries and opposed by 17, while 52 abstained. The Palestinian foreign minister Riyad al-Malki, jumping the gun, declared: “This decision opens a new era in which Israel will be called to account.”  In fact, the next step is for the committee’s resolution to be debated by the UN General Assembly, and only if the voting figures remain similar and the motion is passed will it move to the ICJ in The Hague. The court could then take months – possibly years – to draft an advisory opinion.

It is pertinent to question the value, and indeed the objectivity, of opinions provided by the ICJ.  Israel has historically faced an in-built majority against it within the organs of the UN.  Critics of the ICJ have always maintained that its jurists favor the interests of the states that nominate them.  The current membership includes jurists from Lebanon, Somalia, Uganda, Brazil and Russia.

In March 2020 the ICJ submitted observations in support of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over Palestine which, the ICJ determined, comprises the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza.  It further opined that “Palestine is a State under international law…The decades-long belligerent occupation of Palestine…has no decisive legal effect on the validity of its claim to sovereignty and statehood.”  However Drake University, in its paper “The Legal Status of Palestine” concludes:  “Palestine is an autonomous entity, not a state… Palestine cannot legally be considered a state under international law.”

In 2004 the UN General Assembly requested an opinion from the court about Israel’s security barrier in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  The ICJ determined that the barrier was illegal.  One international law journal declared: “the context overtook the law in the production of the opinion, and has thereby distorted the result. As a consequence, the ICJ has done significant damage to its credibility and to the aspects of international law traversed in the opinion.”

There is, in short, a certain lack of confidence in the impartiality of determinations by the ICJ.   If the ICJ is indeed going to be asked to give a judicial opinion on a matter as fundamental as the legal status of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, it would not be unreasonable for Israel to request the right to argue its case before the court, and for its arguments be given full weight in any advisory opinion.  It is not satisfactory for Israel’s case to be determined behind closed doors by jurists some of whom do not enjoy the confidence of those being adjudged.  The issues the ICJ may soon be considering are too important to be determined by a mechanism that does not command universal confidence as to its objectivity. 

The historical, political and legal issues are extremely complex.  An Israeli take on them was set out in convincing detail in a recent study by Professor Abraham Sion which he called: “To whom was the promised land promised?” 

          Sion is a former deputy state attorney of Israel, and is a professor emeritus of law at Ariel University.  If the world were governed by reason, logic and conscientious adherence to the rule of law, Sion’s book would be a game changer. 

He submitted the entire legal process leading to the establishment of the State of Israel to meticulous forensic examination, and he demonstrates beyond any doubt that judicial rulings from the UN, the EU, the ICJ and elsewhere have often been at odds with a scrupulous interpretation of their legal basis.  Over the past few decades international bodies have reached a consensus that the West Bank and East Jerusalem are Palestinian territory, and that Israeli towns and cities in Judea and Samaria are illegal.  Sion uncovers the solid legal building blocks that have been ignored or overlooked and that prove different. 

In short, he demonstrates with chapter and verse that the almost universally accepted consensus on Israel’s legal position regarding the West Bank, settlements and Jerusalem is legally flawed. 

In undertaking his scrupulous legal analysis, Sion’s original purpose was to ascertain who owned the legal right to the territory of Mandatory Palestine under international law.  He identified the two competitors as the Arab nation on the one hand and the Jewish people on the other.  Concerned solely with the legal position, and not with political or related issues, he set out to establish the legal rights under international law of both parties. Sion demonstrates that in concluding that Israel is illegally occupying territory, international bodies never refer to the treaties that shaped the legal structure of the Middle East.  He shows that the rights derived from those binding international commitments were still valid when Israel occupied the West Bank.

Sion is not alone in reaching conclusions like these, but of course they have never been tested openly in any international judicial forum.  If in due course the UN General Assembly asks the ICJ for an opinion, how could the court possibly render a valid legal determination without having the issues raised by Sion and many others argued before it?  

On the very day that the UN committee voted to appeal to the ICJ for an opinion –Thursday, November 11 – the ICJ began public hearings in The Hague in a long-running dispute between Venezuela and the former British colony of Guyana on the issue of the border between them.  Each party is presenting its case to the court in preliminary hearings scheduled to last until November 22.  The proceedings are not only open to the public, but they are being videoed and publicized widely on social media.

The precedent has been set.  Any judicial consideration by the ICJ of the Israel-Palestinian boundary dispute requires no less.  It is unacceptable for the ICJ to deliver an opinion on this seminal issue reached in private and without the benefit of representations.  If the ICJ agrees to proceed, the parties must be permitted to present their case to the court in sessions open to the public. Moreover, in the interests of fairness, the members of the court selected to consider the issue must be acceptable by all the parties concerned as truly objective and unbiased. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 November 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-723103

Published in Eurasia Review, 2 December 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/02122022-wheres-the-justice-in-an-icj-opinion-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 4 December 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/wheres-the-justice-in-an-icj-opinion/

Published in Jewish Business News, 2 December 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/12/02/wheres-the-justice-in-the-international-court-of-justice-icj-opinion/

The Arab League walks a tightrope

 
          The first meeting of the Arab League in three years took place on November 1 and 2.  The venue was Algeria, chosen to commemorate its War of Independence against France, which began on November 1, 1954.

   On this occasion, although all 22 member nations with the exception of Syria were represented, the usual turnout of kings, sheiks, emirs and presidents was far from complete.  One long-time absentee was Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad.  Syria’s suspension from the League, imposed in 2011 for the regime’s brutality against Arab Spring activists, was not lifted despite the best efforts of Algeria’s President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.  He had attempted earlier in the year to persuade other Arab states to readmit Syria, but major Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, support Sunni Muslim rebels fighting al-Assad.

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI was not present. Algeria and Morocco are currently at daggers drawn over a variety of issues, not least Morocco’s claims on Western Sahara. 

          Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) leader, Mohammed bin Zayed, both decided not to attend.  Their absence, and indeed that of the King of Morocco, forced the attention of members and observers to the great elephant squatting in the room throughout the conference - the Abraham Accords, a phenomenon beyond the bounds of belief at the last Arab League summit in 2019.

            It was on September 15, 2020 that the Abraham Accords were signed in a ceremony hosted by the US in the White House. As part of the agreements, both the UAE and Bahrain recognized Israel's sovereignty, opening the way for establishing full diplomatic relations followed by highly lucrative trade, economic and hi-tech deals.  Since then, Morocco and Sudan have signed up to the Accords, while other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar have gone a long way toward normalizing business and security relations with Israel.

In signing the Accords, none of the four Arab states renounced their support for Palestinian aspirations.  All, though, had determined that a settlement of the Israel-Palestinian issue was not an essential precursor to adopting a pragmatic view of the benefits to be derived from cooperating with Israel across a whole variety of fields – not least in opposing the ambitions of Iran to dominate the region.

This was not the opinion of much of the membership of the Arab League, and certainly not that of its host, Algeria’s President Tebboune.  In his opening remarks Tebboune asserted: “Our main and first cause, the mother of all causes, the Palestinian issue, will be at the heart of our concerns and our main priority”.  In the event, though, ways of advancing the Palestinian cause were not discussed, nor did members address the chasm separating Arab states over normalization with Israel.  The conference maintained a precarious balance by simply ignoring the difficult issues, and issued a final declaration that confined itself to reiterating the League’s full support for the establishment of an independent state of Palestine within what it termed “the 1967 borders” (although borders they never were, as the 1949 Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement made very clear).

In accordance with its long-established practice, the League sidestepped the glaring anomaly between supporting a two-state solution and supporting the “Palestinian cause”.  The “cause” is to establish a sovereign Palestine “from the river to the sea”; the two-state solution requires the recognition of a sovereign Israel on land which the cause regards as Palestinian.  Any Palestinian leader who signed up to a two-state solution would be regarded as a traitor to the Palestinian cause. 

Palestinian aspirations and the Abraham Accords were not the only delicate issues that the League failed to confront head-on.  Another was the relationship between the Arab world and Russia in view of the invasion of Ukraine.  The League meeting took place against the backdrop of rising inflation, food and energy shortages, drought and the soaring cost of living across the Middle East and Africa.  Comment during the conference did not move far beyond Tunisian President Kais Saied’s remarks in his opening address.  The war in Ukraine, he said, "has exacerbated the food and energy security crisis."  Several Arab countries are heavily dependent on Ukrainian and Russian wheat exports, and members concentrated on how to relieve the shortages.

As for supporting the Ukrainians, the Arab world has been notably deficient. The West quickly united against Russia after it invaded Ukraine, but many in the Arab world hesitated. The first Security Council resolution against the invasion of Ukraine was proposed on February 25, and the UAE, a key US ally, abstained.  On February 28, Egypt called for a meeting of the Arab League to discuss the situation in Ukraine. A statement issued after the meeting failed to condemn Russia’s invasion, and offered little support to the Ukrainians.

Arab states clearly wanted to keep their options open and avoid alienating Moscow if at all possible. That soon changed. It was made clear to the Arab states that if they wanted to maintain their close ties with the West, neutrality was not acceptable where Russia’s invasion is concerned.  So when the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia passed overwhelmingly on March 2, its backers included the UAE, as well as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Clearly, Western – particularly American – pressure had succeeded. 

Even so, during the conference Arab leaders simply ignored the rights and wrongs of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They chose not to discuss, let alone support, Ukraine in its fight against its Russian invaders. The final declaration made no mention of the war, nor has any Arab country up to now offered military aid to the Ukrainians. 

The Arab League has elevated equivocation to a fine art.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 November 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-721627

Published in MPC Journal, 19 November 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-arab-league-walks-a-tightrope/

Published in Jewish Business News, 18 November 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/11/18/the-arab-league-walks-a-tightrope/

UK's Chief Rabbi and the Abraham Accords

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Post dated 14 November 2022

           The 9th annual assembly of the Abu Dhabi Peace Forum was held this year in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from November 8–10.  Founded in 2014 as a Forum for the Promotion of Peace in Muslim Societies, its original purpose was “to serve as a space for the discussion of humanitarian problems and intellectual and religious conflicts in Muslim societies.”  Last year its remit was broadened and its title amended to embrace issues of global concern.  With a variety of armed conflicts raging across the world, more than 100 million displaced refugees, and growing food and energy shortages, this year’s assembly met to discuss "Global Conflict and Universal Peace: Urgent Needs and Opportunities for Partnership". 

It brought together religious leaders, politicians, officials, representatives of national and international organizations, and peace activists – in all some 500 participants from 60 countries. Among them, making the occasion unique and historic, was Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis, Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, to give him his full official title. 

Britain’s first Chief Rabbi was appointed in 1704.  In all the subsequent 318 years, no holder of that office has ever paid an official visit to an Arab country – until November 8 this year. That was the day Mirvis arrived in the UAE and addressed the Abu Dhabi Peace forum.  In scenes that would have been unbelievable, indeed impossible, only a couple of years before, Rabbi Mirvis had been greeted by the Forum’s founder and president, Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah, one of the world’s most revered Islamic scholars, and was accorded a seat next to him in the sumptuously furnished ballroom of Abu Dhabi’s Ritz Carlton.

Mirvis greeted the attendees with the words “Salam aleikum, shalom aleichem.” and then, in a mixture of Hebrew, Arabic and English, he called on leaders of all faiths to build on the historic peace brought about by the Abraham Accords, signed two years before. 

“I am only standing here before you thanks to the courage of great and outstanding leaders who have reached for the stars,” he said.

The Abraham Accords are, of course, primarily an expression of political, economic and security pragmatism – a recognition of the benefits for the signatories and the region as a whole that flow from cooperation rather than indifference and a failure to engage.  Normalization of relations with Israel did not involve the Arab states in renouncing deeply held views on the Israel-Palestinian dispute, but they agreed that resolving that long-standing problem was not a necessary pre-requisite.

Mirvis has taken the Abraham Accords at their word, as it were.  He has used the rationale behind its title – namely the common Abrahamic basis for Judaism, Christianity and Islam – as the basis for a plea to strengthen tolerance and understanding between those faiths and their followers, and indeed between all faiths.

He told his audience that it was thanks to the Accords that he was able to visit the UAE and speak in an official capacity, but also that the Accords had opened a “window of opportunity” to strengthen Jewish-Muslim relations.”  He urged his audience to remember the common thread linking their faiths – namely Abraham. “All of us here are children of Abraham, our father.”

In an interview before setting out for the UAE, Mirvis revealed that many of his meetings with religious leaders around the world on interfaith cooperation and understanding happen only “on condition of secrecy”, and even then are cancelled at the last minute.  The result of secret meetings, he said, is that “it doesn’t make an impact because it stays among the faith leaders at the top of that pyramid and it just doesn’t filter down.”  But that is changing, he believes.  “We are now seeing, gradually, more and more faith leaders come out into the open.”

Mirvis also made this point at the Forum.  He said more needed to be done to bring people together at a grassroots level. “Where we are up to is not good enough. We have harmony between faith leaders but it has to filter down.  It is good and pleasant for brothers to sit together in peace in this hall, but we want this to happen between all Jews and all Muslims and all Christians.”

Ari Gordon, US director of Muslim-Jewish relations at the American Jewish Committee, described the Chief Rabbi’s appearance at the Peace Forum as a “watershed moment. It was moving to see the warm greeting Chief Rabbi Mirvis received from Sheikh Bin Bayyah, and even more so the enthusiastic applause from hundreds of Muslim scholars upon hearing his call from Jewish tradition for cooperation across lines of faith.  For the Jewish delegates, his voice on the main stage was ennobling, and for those who have little exposure to Jews or Judaism it opens a path to learn more and to correct misconceptions.”

By attending the Peace Forum, and by extending a hand of friendship, tolerance and understanding to the Muslim faith leaders and others at the gathering, Chief Rabbi Mirvis very specifically associated his presence and his message to the ground-breaking political achievement represented by the Accords.  He has demonstrated that the Abraham Accords have religious and social possibilities not initially apparent, and has taken a global lead in a bid to exploit them.  His initiative is surely to be commended.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 November 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-722283

Published in Eurasia Review, 26 November 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26112022-uks-chief-rabbi-and-the-abraham-accords-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 November 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/uks-chief-rabbi-and-the-abraham-accords/

Published in Jewish Business News, 25 November 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/11/25/uks-chief-rabbi-and-the-abraham-accords/

Was OPEC's decision to cut oil production "purely economic"?

          OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) is composed of 13 of the world’s leading oil-producing nations.  With the aim of coordinating action and controlling the market, OPEC regularly invites 10 smaller oil producers to an expanded summit, known as OPEC+.  The last such meeting took place on October 5.

With the global economy struggling, largely due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US had for weeks pressured Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s leading light, not to cut production, a move that would inevitably lead to a rise in oil prices.  In the event Washington’s lobbying was disregarded, and the OPEC+ summit decided to reduce production by 2 million barrels per day.  

President Joe Biden’s press secretary, Jen Psaki, reacted angrily.  She accused OPEC of siding with the Russians, because higher oil prices could only to generate more revenue for Russia to fund its war in Ukraine.  The recriminations seemed a trifle disingenuous, since Russia is itself an influential member of OPEC+, but the charge has substance.

Crude oil prices, which were peaking at around $120 back in June, have reacted to fears of a global economic recession, rising US interest rates and a stronger dollar by falling to about $90.  Cheaper oil and gas for the consumer acts as a restraint on inflation. When the OPEC+ cuts in production start to bite, prices will certainly begin to rise.  The main beneficiaries will be Russia and Saudi Arabia. 

Despite the heavy burden of sanctions, Russia still enjoys a vast, if diminished, income from its oil exports which enables it to maintain its military adventure in Ukraine.  The inevitable increase in the oil price following the decision by OPEC+ will no doubt be greatly welcomed by President Vladimir Putin – something he vigorously denies. 

On October 11 he defended the planned cuts, saying “our decisions … aren’t directed against anyone.”  He described the OPEC+ agreement as being aimed at ensuring stability in global energy markets.  The purpose, he maintained, was the economic necessity of balancing supply and demand, thus giving confidence to both the consumers and the producers of energy.

As for Saudi Arabia, one commentator pointed out that the Saudis need the money. “They need to keep the price as high as possible. They have so many schemes and projects in the kingdom … so they need all sorts of cash in order to keep that going.”  He was referring to the ambitious and immensely costly Saudi 2030 project being master-minded by Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).

The US regards the OPEC decision as a snub by the Saudis.  With the US midterm elections just around the corner, Biden is aware of the negative effect higher gas prices will have on voters.  He has threatened the Saudis with “consequences”, without so far specifying what these might amount to.  Prominent Democratic senator Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested the US should immediately freeze all cooperation with Saudi Arabia, including arms sales.

The flood of disapproval and criticism spurred Saudi Arabia to issue a statement on October 12 justifying the decision by OPEC+.  It began by totally rejecting any suggestion that Saudi Arabia was taking sides in international conflicts or was politically motivated against the US, pointing to how it has voted in support of UN resolutions on the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

As for the decision to reduce oil production, the statement pointed out that it had been taken unanimously by all members of the OPEC+ group, and was based on purely economic considerations such as limiting volatility in the oil market, and maintaining the balance of supply and demand.

Needless to say, the Saudi statement did nothing to curb the continuing crossfire of accusation and counter-accusation. The West accuses Russia of weaponizing energy, creating a crisis in Europe that could trigger gas and power rationing this winter.  Moscow accuses the West of weaponizing the dollar and financial systems, and distorting global economics through its sanction regimes.

In fact, the OPEC+ decision is not quite as clear-cut as first appears.  While it will certainly result in a decrease in oil production overall, some countries managed to negotiate an exemption.  Libya and Nigeria, for example, will be allowed to increase their current outputs in recognition of local difficulties affecting oil production.  More worryingly, so will Iran, which has declared the agreement a diplomatic triumph.

The concession to Iran was provided on the assumption that the current talks on reviving the nuclear deal could succeed.  If so, a large tranche of sanctions on Iran would be lifted, allowing its oil industry to revive. Since Iranian crude could then supply countries seeking to free themselves from Russian energy dependence, this is an outcome welcomed by some voices in the West.  One oil industry analyst believes that Iran has built up a sizeable flotilla of cargoes, amounting to some 93 million barrels of Iranian crude, that could reach the market fairly quickly, should a nuclear deal be concluded. 

The OPEC+ decisions perform a complex balancing act.  On the one hand, overall oil production is to be reduced, guaranteeing a rise in consumer oil and energy prices to the political benefit of both Saudi Arabia and Russia.  On the other, Iran is being positioned to weigh in with substantial new oil supplies that could bring relief to European and world markets urgently seeking alternative energy sources.

In short, neither Saudi Arabia nor Russia can claim that the decisions taken at the OPEC+ meeting on October 5 were “purely economic”.  

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 November 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-721132

Published in Eurasia Review, 11 November 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/11112022-was-opecs-decision-to-cut-oil-production-purely-economic-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 13 November 2022:

https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/6109609079602445946/2627141077894353957

Published in Jewish Business News, 11 November 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/11/11/was-opecs-decision-to-cut-oil-production-purely-economic/

King Charles III - what can the UK and the world expect?

This article appears in the issue of the Jerusalem Report dated 21 November 2022

"I'm not that stupid,” said the then-Prince Charles in a BBC interview in 2018. “I do realize it's a separate exercise being sovereign. The idea that somehow I'm going to carry on exactly in the same way is complete nonsense."

His comment reflects the fact that during his 70-year apprenticeship as heir to the British throne, he acquired the reputation for espousing a variety of causes close to his heart, and lobbying for them in ways which sometimes aroused surprise, or even controversy.  A question often asked in those years was whether he ever would, or indeed could, change direction.

Like his father, Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, Charles as heir to the throne had no constitutional role.  Elizabeth II, the British monarch, was head of state.  Philip her consort, and Charles her heir, had either to live purposeless lives or else forge meaningful careers for themselves.  It is a tribute to them that they both managed to do this.

As Prince of Wales, Charles was the patron or president of more than 400 organizations, and in 1976 he founded his own flagship charity, the Prince's Trust, to connect with what he called the "hardest to reach in society".  It has helped close to a million disadvantaged young people from some of the poorest parts of the country transform their lives by providing them with education, skills and employment.  He set it up against government opposition.

"The Home Office didn't think it was at all a good idea,” he once said. “It was quite difficult to get it off the ground."

As Prince he was able to act independently.  As monarch – and about this he is fully aware – he must act only on government advice.  That lesson was made clear at the moment of his accession, when a projected trip to the Middle East was cancelled.  Charles, a lifelong environmental campaigner, had planned on giving a speech at the 27th UN Climate Change Conference (COP27), taking place in Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh between November 6-18.  He cancelled the trip, the media reported, on the advice of then-prime minister, Liz Truss, probably taking into consideration the political implications of the new monarch’s first overseas visit.

It was in 1984 that Charles first burst into the headlines as an independent and controversial voice with what became known as his carbuncle speech.  Of all the things he has ever said in public on matters of policy, this is what will probably never be forgotten, both for his colorful language and for the impact it had on UK society.  It proved to be the opening of his decades-long campaign of opposition to modern architecture.

The occasion was the 150th anniversary of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), the setting Hampton Court Palace. Charles had been invited to present the Royal Gold Medal for Architecture to the Indian architect Charles Correa.  Rather than handing over the award with a few gracious words, as was expected, Charles seized the opportunity to denounce a proposed extension to the National Gallery. The National Gallery flanks one side of Trafalgar Square, in the very center of London’s West End.  Designs for an extension to house Britain’s collection of early Renaissance paintings had been put up for competition, and out of seven entries the design  submitted by the architectural firm ABK had been adjudged the winner.  Plans were proceeding for its erection. 

          Choosing his words carefully, what Charles objected to was attaching a modernist structure to buildings constructed in the architectural style of a century-and-a-half earlier. “I would understand better this type of high-tech approach,” he said, “if you demolished the whole of Trafalgar Square and started again with a single architect responsible for the entire layout. But what is proposed is like a monstrous carbuncle on the face of a much-loved and elegant friend.”

          A veritable hurricane of comment, both denunciation and approval, followed, but in the end the ABK scheme was abandoned in favor of a more modest design.  Charles’s interest in architecture, though, continued unabated. In 2009 eminent British architect Richard Rogers blamed the prince for having him removed from a project to redesign Chelsea Barracks in West London. “We had hoped that Prince Charles had retreated from his position on modern architecture,” he told the media, “but he single-handedly destroyed this project.”  

A few years after his carbuncle speech, Charles’s concerns about modern architecture led him to take the lead in an experiment in urban development – constructing a completely new town from scratch.  Poundbury, in the county of Dorset, is designed entirely on traditional architectural lines, and is generally judged to be a great success.  The work was sponsored by the royal Duchy of Cornwall, which is historically the preserve of the Prince of Wales. Charles handed the Duchy and its interests to his son, Prince William, shortly after acceding to the throne.

          Over the years Charles has far from confined his passions to architecture. He has proved a tireless activist in support of a range of issues that concern him, from organic farming to homeopathy, from youth to the environment. He soon learned that his unique position in the Establishment meant that his opinions were always heard and often made a difference. He lobbied in a variety of ways, one of which itself caused major controversy a few years ago – the so-called “black spider memos” affair.

As a key weapon is his lobbying arsenal, Charles took to addressing government ministers, from the prime minister downwards, in a continual stream of memos and letters, handwritten by him in black ink. These documents, which came to be known as his “black spider memos”, were sent by Charles in a private capacity, but when news about them reached the media in 2005, it was thought they might represent the exercise of undue influence over British government ministers, and demands were made for them to be made public.  Battles between the media and the government ensued, finally reaching the courts.

After several legal cases the Supreme Court in March 2015 allowed for the publication of the letters.  However on their release, the memos were variously described in the media as "underwhelming" and "harmless", and one paper claimed that their release had "backfired on those who seek to belittle him".

Charles has always been aware of the importance of religious belief in people’s lives, and has actively supported the organizations representative of the many faiths active in modern Britain.  He has shown a particular interest in the Jewish community, and the late Chief Rabbi, Lord Jonathan Sacks, was a personal friend – a friendship now extended to the UK’s new Chief Rabbi, Ephraim Mirvis.  Charles’s coronation is scheduled for Saturday May 6, 2023.  To assist Mirvis observe the Sabbath, the King and Queen Consort have invited him and his wife Valerie, after they have attended Shabbat service with local communities, to stay with them at Clarence House on the Friday night.  Westminster Abbey, where the coronation will take place, is less than a mile away.

In addition to being head of state, the British monarch is head of the Church of England, and the sovereign’s title – emphasized in the coronation ceremony – is Defender of the Faith.  Several years ago Charles indicated that he would rather be known as defender of faith than simply defender of British Protestantism.  Although he has not pressed this idea further, it does demonstrate that as king he is likely to embrace what is now a multicultural, multi-faith Britain.  

Charles is not likely to lose his innate sympathy with the many causes close to his heart, but he has certainly taken on board the fundamental difference in how he may do so, compared with his previous incarnation.  William Shakespeare, as ever, has precisely the right words, which he puts into the mouth of the young Henry V as he is about to be crowned:

                    Presume not that I am the thing I was,
                    For God doth know, so shall the world perceive
                    That I have turned away my former self.

          During the coronation ceremony Charles will be asked if he is willing to assume the awesome responsibilities of being the sovereign head of state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of his other realms and territories, and head of the Commonwealth. In doing so he will certainly be bringing a difference in tone to the monarchy – a greater awareness of, and in many cases a greater sympathy with, the issues that most concern today’s Britain. Over the years of his apprenticeship, the public has come to respect him for his causes, and in many cases come to see that he was ahead of his time in advocating them – issues like organic farming, climate change, wildlife preservation, and alternative therapies. Beneath the robes of state he will of course be the same man, but no one is more acutely aware than he that in future his actions must be subject to his new status.

Why Israel should give Zelensky what he wants

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 October 2022

Ever since it invaded Ukraine, Russia has succeeded in preventing Israel from providing meaningful support to the Ukrainians, using its presence in Syria and Israel’s security interests there as its justification.

Following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Israel set up a "deconfliction mechanism" with Russia to prevent inadvertent clashes when Israel struck Iranian deployments and arms transfers in Syria. Officially Russia never condoned the Israeli strikes, consistently calling them “violations of Syrian sovereignty” (ironic terminology in view of its subsequent incursion into Ukraine).  Unofficially, Russia agreed to turn a blind eye, provided it was given sufficient advance warning of forthcoming Israeli actions.

The Russian embassy in Israel once explained: "Our military officials discuss the practical issues of this substantively on a daily basis. This mechanism has proven to be useful and will continue to work."

Israel rarely comments on individual strikes, but has acknowledged carrying out hundreds to counter Iranian efforts to turn Syria into an advanced military hub in its own right, and as a route to supply hardware to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel is obliged to make every effort to prevent possible future attacks on the nation.

So, in the national interest, Israel has continued to strike at Iranian military hardware being transported across, or stored within, Syria.  For example, Syria claims that Israel carried out a strike against Damascus International Airport on October 21.  According to the respected Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Israel also targeted sites on September 15, near the airport where Iranian-backed groups were stationed. During August Israeli airstrikes were twice reported to have targeted Aleppo airport.  In June, the Syrian Observatory reported that Israeli strikes put Damascus airport out of service for nearly two weeks when weapons depots belonging to Iran-backed militias were targeted.

 Just before Russia invaded Ukraine, Israel condemned any potential incursion as "a serious violation of international order".  In response, Moscow summoned the Israeli ambassador for talks, and in the UN Security Council the Russian spokesman condemned Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.  The message was clear enough.  Subsequently, though foreign minister Yair Lapid did denounce Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel has remained largely silent on Russia’s actions, while Moscow has indicated that it would continue coordinating with Israel in Syria.

Events, however, have not stood still. It is now clear that Russia has purchased thousands of Iranian drones which it is using against Ukrainian civilians in the course of its military actions.  There are reports that Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) technicians are actually on the ground in Ukraine, helping the Russians deploy the drones.  On October 16 the Washington Post reported that Iran is expected to enhance its support.  In addition to the Shahed-136 "kamikaze" drones and the Mohajer-6 attack drones it has already provided, Iran is expected to start supplying Russia with precision-guided, short- and medium-range missiles.

With Russia and Iran growing ever closer, how long can the delicately balanced Russo-Israeli arrangement in Syria continue?  Will the Iranians start demanding a price beyond dollars for supplying their military equipment to Russia?  In short, can the agreement hold, or will Israel finally have to run the risk of clashing with the Russian military?  If so, how much of a risk would that be?  Would Russia actually initiate such clashes?

The same questions would arise if Israel took the initiative and provided Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, with the defensive hardware he is asking for. 

On October 15 the Ukrainian government sent Israel an official request for air defence systems that will allow it to counter Iranian ballistic missiles and attack drones used by Russia in Ukraine.  The letter confirms that Russia has started using Iranian-made drones against cities and civilian infrastructure.

"According to available information,” the letter runs, “…there is a high probability of prompt deliveries to the Russian Federation of Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles from Iran."  In order to protect its civilians, Ukraine wants to initiate cooperation with Israel on air and missile defence.

"Ukraine is highly interested in obtaining from Israel…defence systems, in particular: Iron Beam, Barak-8, Patriot, Iron Dome, David's Sling, Arrow Interceptor, and Israeli support in training for Ukrainian operators."

The letter made the point that experience gained by Iran of using these weapons in Ukraine would "significantly contribute in strengthening Iran’s potential of producing offensive weapons and, as a result, will increase the security threats for the State of Israel and the Middle East region."

The day before the letter was sent, Israel's defence minister Benny Gantz said in a meeting with EU ambassadors that Israel supports Ukraine via humanitarian aid and the delivery of life-saving defensive equipment, but emphasized that Israel will not deliver weapon systems to Ukraine due to a variety of operational considerations. 

"We will continue to support Ukraine within our limitations," said Gantz.

The question is: have Israel’s limitations been drawn too narrowly?  To what extent can Israeli anti-missile defence systems be considered offensive military equipment?  They can only be deployed after rockets, missiles or drones have actually been launched.  They are, as the saying goes, “exactly what’s written on the tin” - namely defensive.  In which case, there can be no  reasonable objection to providing the Ukrainians with this means of defending themselves.  Given the unjustifiable misery Putin has inflicted on Ukraine and its people, Israel would surely be justified in complying with its urgent request for assistance – and dealing with any consequences.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online, 25 October 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-720475

Published in Eurasia Review, 5 November 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/04112022-why-israel-should-give-zelensky-what-he-wants-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 5 November 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/why-israel-should-give-zelensky-what-he-wants/

Published in Jewish Business News, 4 November 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/11/04/why-israel-should-give-zelensky-what-he-wants/