Published in the Jerusalem Report, issue dated 25 December 2023
Stated briefly, Israel’s war aims as
articulated by prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, government ministers and
Israel Defense Force (IDF) leaders are to destroy Hamas and ensure the
safe return of the 240-odd civilians it is holding hostage.
The realization is
growing that by the time the IDF have succeeded, a plan for Gaza's future governance
must have been developed, agreed by those involved, and be ready for
Implementation. On November 2 the Reuters
news agency, citing authoritative sources, reported that the US and Israel were
exploring options for the future of the Gaza Strip, including a possible
multinational force to keep the peace until a more stable leadership is
established. Such a scenario builds on US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s concept, laid out during his recent visit
to Israel. He said that he understood that
Israel did not want to control Gaza, and he believed a revitalized Palestinian
Authority (PA) should eventually be in charge of the territory.
On November 6 both the rumoured US-Israel negotiations and Blinken’s suggestion were apparently nullified. In a TV interview Netanyahu said for the first time: “Israel will, for an indefinite period, have the overall security responsibility, because we have seen what happens when we do not have it.”
His statement was as surprising
for what he said as for what he omitted.
Maintaining that IDF forces would be stationed in Gaza for an indefinite
period after the fighting had ceased seems to imply an intention for Israel to repossess
the Strip. What Netanyahu omits is any
indication of how he sees Gaza being administered post-Hamas, and by whom. Who would be responsible for redeveloping the
ruined city, for housing the displaced people returning to their home areas,
for administering the essential services?
Surely Netanyahu does not envisage a military occupation of Gaza on the
lines of Area C in the West Bank.
Speaking in Japan on
November 8, Blinken, while acknowledging that "some transition
period" might be needed at the end of the conflict, virtually rejected
Netanyahu’s vision of continued and indefinite IDF presence in Gaza
post-war. He strongly advocated a united
and Palestinian-led government for a united Gaza–West Bank after the war ends,
as a step toward Palestinian statehood. “We’re very clear on no reoccupation,” he
said, “just as we’re very clear on no displacement of the Palestinian
population.”
A few weeks into the war, the Washington Institute published a thoughtful analysis of what might follow an Israeli victory over Hamas.
As a starting point they acknowledged that it would be a mistake for Israel to destroy Hamas and then leave Gaza as an ungoverned space without a clear sense of what comes next. They insisted that the US and others must ensure that a plan is ready to be implemented once the IDF withdraws. What the Institute did not consider was Netanyahu’s latest proposal – that the IDF might actually remain in place to guarantee that the Strip no longer posed any sort of security threat to Israel.
The
idea of a Gaza administered under some as yet undefined group or consortium,
with the IDF as its security force, bristles with difficulties, and is almost
certainly a non-starter. Moreover Blinken’s
idea that the PA would eventually take over the administration of Gaza simply could
not work with the PA in its present condition.
The PA is currently
riddled with corruption and inefficiency. President Mahmoud Abbas, who is scarcely
capable of controlling the situation in Areas A and B of the West Bank, areas
nominally under its control, is profoundly unpopular with the Palestinian
public. In the most recent poll of Palestinian opinion, nearly 80% said he
should step down. So an essential
prerequisite before Blinken’s ideas could be put into effect would be meaningful,
substantive PA reform. Without obvious
and significant changes to its administrative structure and methods of operation,
neither local Palestinians nor international donors would have confidence in
the its ability to extend its authority to Gaza.
The Washington Institute
hypothesized that a proposed Gaza Interim Administration (GIA) should have
three main components: a civilian
administration; a law enforcement system; and an international coalition for
reconstruction and development.
They believe that the
civilian administration of post-Hamas Gaza should be led and run by
Palestinians. The departments of a fully functioning local government – health,
education, transportation, judiciary, social welfare – should, they maintain,
be operated by a mix of technocrats and administrators from Gaza, the West
Bank, and the Palestinian diaspora.
They envisage public
safety and law enforcement being directed by a consortium of those Arab states
which have reached peace or normalization agreements with Israel. Only
those states, it opines, would have Israel’s confidence, which is essential for
the effort to succeed.
They suggest that a new Arab-run
agency responsible for repair, reconstruction, and development should be
established. Billions of dollars would be needed to reconstruct Gaza city
and to fund projects such as creating a new Gaza port and building new
industrial zones to provide employment options.
Finally, the Institute
believes that while Arab administrators, officers, and officials, obviously including
Palestinians, should take the lead in all these efforts, the US and other
supporters of a peaceful, constructive future for Palestinians would have a
vital role to play in conceiving the plans, and in supporting those entrusted
to carry them forward.
Whether the ideas put
forward by the Washington Institute come to fruition, or others, perhaps more
radical, emerge, how Gaza is to be governed after the IDF have achieved their victory
over Hamas clearly requires urgent and detailed consideration. Diplomatic
efforts, led by the US, must be initiated as soon as possible aimed at
establishing an effective mechanism for planning Gaza’s post-war future.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-779070
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