Hope of a democratic future?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 December 2024

            Abu Mohammed al-Julani surely never envisaged the rapidity with which the Assad regime would crumble under the assault he master-minded on November 27.

It must, however, have been clear to him that if he was ever to make a bid to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, this was the moment.  It was a golden opportunity.  The two powers that had come to his aid time and again in the past were both preoccupied with their own problems.  Russia was bogged down in the quagmire of the Ukrainian war;  Iran was shaken to the core by Israel’s success in neutering Hezbollah.  Assad could expect little comfort from either.  Moreover his own armed forces were weakened by years of war, and the regime’s economy was struggling under the burden of international sanctions.  

So, seizing the moment, Julani ordered his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia to break out of its stronghold in the Idlib area and storm Syria's second-largest city, Aleppo. The assault was unexpected, and government troops and security forces put up little resistance.

The next city south on the way to Damascus was Hama.  Here, alerted to what was clearly a determined offensive operation, the government managed to muster some token support from Russian planes and Iranian troops, but they were no match for the resolute HTS attack.  Hama fell to the rebels on December 5.  The regime was visibly disintegrating under the HTS assault. 

Two days later they captured the city of Homs after only a day of fighting, and early on Sunday, December 8,  HTS-led rebels entered Damascus and began releasing detainees at the country’s most notorious military prison, Sednaya.

Later that day they announced: "The tyrant Bashar al-Assad has fled."

At the end of the week Julani declared that he was intent on restoring some form of stable governance in Syria, and that he was communicating with Western embassies for assistance..

On December 14 he issued a statement claiming that his plans for the reconstruction and development of Syria were ready.  In preparing them up he had drawn on his seven years’ experience of administering Idlib province. Since 2017 HTS had been operating what it called the Salvation Government, a civilian administrative body which, on the lines of ISIS in its heyday, set up and ran education, healthcare, and public services, funded by taxes, tolls, and fees.  “Based on our administrative experience in Idlib,” said Julani, “we will advance in the rest of the country’s governorates.”

He used the same statement to assure world opinion that he was not to be thought of as extremist.  On the contrary he was  moderate, peace-loving and even-handed. “We are not going to get into a conflict with Israel,” he announced, adding – choosing his words with the utmost care – that he and his organization had “no hostility toward Iranian society.” 

He is at one with Israel on that.  It is the Iranian regime that is the rogue presence in the Middle East, dedicated to its declared objective of converting the whole world to Shia Islam, and of destroying both the US and Israel, to say nothing of Sunni Islamic states, in the process.  Now the ayatollahs are writing off the billions of dollars they have wasted in supporting Assad.  Moreover Syria’s ever-open door has been slammed shut, and a major conduit for supplying arms to their main proxy – Hezbollah in Lebanon – has been removed.  One of the pillars of their foreign policy has been kicked from beneath them.  The Iranian regime has been severely, if not fatally, weakened.

   Meanwhile Julani is turning into something of an enigma.  As part of an attempt to show that he has moved from heading a militant organization to a possible future as a political leader, he has quietly dropped his nom-de-guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, and has asked to be referred to by his real name, Ahmed al-Shara.  Some media outlets. including the BBC, are complying.  

In a radio interview with the BBC on December 18, he was the epitome of quietly spoken moderation, discussing his plans to involve the whole of Syrian society in establishing its future governance.  He had earlier reassured the minorities and non-Muslim sects in Syria that they would live in peace and security under his rule: “No one has the right to erase another sect or religion,” he said.  “[They] have coexisted in the region for hundreds of years.”

He has also positively rejected the idea of autocratic rule, stressing that Syria deserves a system of government based on institutions.

How much of this represents his true intentions is hard to assess, given that he and his HTS are rooted in a jihadist past.   Moreover the extremist groups allied to his organization have little sympathy with the softly-softly methods he is adopting to consolidate his position.

Julani’s honeyed words seem to have given new motivation to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.  Formed in 2012, at the very start of Syria’s civil war, the body represented all the political opposition factions that came together with the goal of overthrowing the Assad regime and establishing a free and democratic country.

As HTS forces proclaimed the capture of Damascus, the Coalition, although more or less moribund for years and much fractured, announced that it was committed to "completing the transfer of power to a transitional governing body with full executive powers, paving the way for a free, democratic and pluralistic Syria."  Its statement made no mention of Julani or the HTS, but its vice-president, Dima Moussa, told the BBC that the "transition requires coming together of all Syrian people, including those who are carrying arms."

The Coalition then proceeded to draw up and issue its own proposals for Syria’s future.  On December 12  Anas Abdah, a member of the Coalition’s political committee, unveiled a comprehensive plan for managing the transitional phase in Syria. 

Abdah explained that Julani’s government “is a caretaker administration until early March. During this period, preparations will be made to establish an inclusive transitional government to manage the transitional phase.” 

          Abdah stressed that maintaining the continuity of institutions is a key guarantee of stability and preventing the collapse of the state.  He suggested that the post-March 2025 transitional governing body should prepare for a national, inclusive conference aimed at building a national consensus.  This conference, he proposed, would pave the way for a constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution that reflects the aspirations of the Syrian people. Based on the principle of equal citizenship without discrimination, this draft constitution would be the subject of a nationwide referendum. 

Nothing of these ambitious, possibly illusory, proposals has so far been referred to by Julani. Whether they ever see the light of day depends on whether he sees himself as a more moderate version of Assad, or as the political head of a democratically elected, representative government.  His real intentions, for now, are shrouded in mystery.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Is there hope for a democratic future for Syria?" 23 December 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-834492

 

Syria’s lost democrats

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 December 2024:

Well before the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia found itself victorious in its struggle against the Assad regime, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, its head, told CNN:  “The goal of the revolution remains the overthrow of this regime.”

But Julani omitted to say what he wished to replace it with. Despite all his softly spoken reassurances about his liberal intentions, all the evidence points to a political takeover ​of the country by the leader of the military coup – in fact a Sunni jihadist replacement of Assad.  ​Despite talk of inclusivity, there is little sign of the political presence of the many other Syrian groups and organizations scattered across the country. 

The interim prime minister that Julani has appointed, Mohammed al-Bashir, was plucked from administering an HTS-held area in northwest Syria​.

In recent years, HTS has attempted to gain local legitimacy by governing in a less extreme manner than, say, the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Through the Salvation Government, an HTS-influenced  civilian administrative body, it has – on the lines of ISIS in its heyday – established bureaucratic institutions for education, healthcare, and public services, funded by taxes, tolls, and fees.​  

HTS is rooted in a Salafi-jihadist ideology, and although Julani has renounced his former connection with al-Qaeda and attempts to present himself in a more moderate light, his organization is essentially Islamist.​  What is likely to emerge ​in Syria is a Sunni Islamist state, governed according to its own interpretation of Islamic Sharia law.   

With HTS in the ascendant, it is salutary to remember that the Syrian armed conflict began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the dictatorial government of President Bashar al-Assad​, with the establishment of democracy as its key demand.  

In March 2011 a few teenagers – fired no doubt by the revolutionary fervor sweeping the Middle East at the time – daubed some inflammatory slogans on a school wall in the southern Syrian city of Daraa.  Unfortunately for them, the Syria that President Bashar al-Assad had inherited in 2000 from his autocratic father was a tightly controlled police state, in which a powerful and all-encompassing security machine ensured that the slightest hint of opposition to the régime was ruthlessly crushed.

The youngsters were hunted down, arrested​, tortured​ in unspeakable ways, and killed. When details of their ordeal became known, protesters took to the streets. The security forces, unable to break up the demonstration, eventually fired into the crowd. That was enough to spark widespread rebellion. Groups antagonistic to Assad’s government began nationwide protests. Gradually, popular dissent developed into an armed revolt.

After months of crackdown by the government's security forces, various armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) began forming across the country, marking the beginning of the Syrian insurgency.  By mid-2012, the uprising had escalated into a full-blown civil war with the aim of overthrowing the despotic Assad régime and substituting a democratic form of government.

Had assistance of any sort been forthcoming from the US or other Western governments at that early stage, Assad could have been defeated.  But US President Obama hesitated, and then continued vacillating even after it was clear in August 2013 that Assad had used chemical weapons against his opponents, utterly indifferent to the extensive civilian casualties that ensued.  Obama hesitated because he was intent on forging links with Iran leading to a nuclear deal, and Iran regarded Syria as a vital component in what was known at the time as its “Shia Crescent.”

Meanwhile the shining sword of democracy, the weapon the rebels in 2011 hoped would bring down Assad’s dictatorial regime, had become heavily tarnished. Those who are now labelled “Syrian rebels” are not fighting for democracy. The original FSA, once dedicated simply to establishing democracy in Syria, has over the nine years of civil conflict lost its cohesion and been transformed into an amalgamation of different groups for many of whom establishing an open democratic form of government is far from their aim.

Will a second democratic casualty of the civil war be Kurdish hopes of autonomy in the region they have established in north-eastern Syria?  The Kurd-occupied ​territory, which is about 25-30 percent of the old Syria, is currently a semi-autonomous region formally designated the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria or, more simply, Rojava.  It is, however, in the sights of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has said he will never accept a Kurdish quasi-state ruled by the PYD party, which he considers a terrorist organization, along the Turkish border.

Speaking to reporters on December 6, Erdogan endorsed and supported the HTS advance into Syria.  “Our wish,” he said, “is that this march in Syria continues without accidents or disasters”– another voice with little or no interest in ensuring a democratic future for Syria. 

Erdogan is wedded to the Muslim Brotherhood, and has every sympathy with the HTS’s objectives.

Even as Assad was fleeing the country, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) began offensive operations against the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are mostly ethnic Kurds.  The SDF had stormed Deir Ezzor city, situated on the river Euphrates​ and part of Iran’s supply corridor connecting to Lebanon – a facility the regime has now lost.​   ​They were ousted by the HTS on December 10​, and a mini civil war was only prevented when​, on December 11, the US ​intervened to mediate a deal between the​ SNA and the SDF.

So what has happened to the original democratic Syrian opposition of 2011, made up of activists, intellectuals, and defectors pressing for a transition to democracy and an end to Assad’s authoritarian rule?  It consisted of the Syrian National Council, which later became part of the Syrian National Coalition,  Local Coordination Committees, which organized protests and civil resistance, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an informal group of defected soldiers and armed civilians.

It was a loosely allied group, and its component parts struggled with ideological, political, and ethnic divisions, resulting in a lack of unified leadership and goals.  Elements like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (now HTS) capitalized on the chaos and perverted their cause. As a result the original democratic opposition has largely been sidelined, while efforts to achieve a political resolution through UN-mediated peace talks, such as the Geneva process, made little progress and have now been overtaken by events.

In short the original Syrian democratic opposition has been overshadowed by the militarization of the conflict, the rise of extremist groups, and the intervention of foreign powers. It still exists in a fragmented form, but can it reorganize itself into some sort of cohesive entity in time to claim a seat at the table, ​should an opportunity actually arise to negotiate Syria’s future?  ​Is it realistic to hope for a democratic state of Syria emerging from ​the military coup?  ​The more probable outcome is that Syria’s future will be some sort of autocracy headed by HTS leader Julani.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Syria's lost democrats were overshadowed by the rise of extremist groups", December 16, 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-833561

Iran and the ceasefire

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 December, 2024

Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, agreed on November 26 and implemented in the early hours of the following day?  ​Opinion is divided, views differing according to the holder's perception of Iran’s complex geopolitical interests in the region.

  ​Some ​of the media speculate that Iran saw the ​proposed ceasefire as conflicting with its strategic interests by undermining its leverage against Israel,​ and opposed it.​  Some argue that that an enfeebled and disheartened Hezbollah​, ​desperate for a respite from Israel's onslaught, proceeded to negotiate the deal without a green light from Tehran.  ​

Most opinion takes a contrary view.  The defense editor of the UK’s Daily Telegraph  believes Iran has been so weakened ​through the defeats inflicted on its proxies that it was forced into the ceasefire, and that it represents a major setback​ for the ayatollahs.  Given the destruction that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have wreaked on the infrastructures of both Hezbollah and Hamas, he writes, “the Iranian regime, which finds itself increasingly under pressure from a disaffected populace, had little option but to bring hostilities to an end. All the indications are that Iran, not Hezbollah, was the driving force behind diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon, as it feared that its standing in the region would be further eroded the longer the conflict carried on.”

Some commentators have perceived a split developing between Iran and its two main proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah.   They believe that a much weakened Hezbollah and the rump of Hamas are both more than willing to prolong the conflict with Israel, believing that the longer it lasts, the more pressure Israel will come under from world leaders to make concessions. This, they think, is what is behind the Hamas leadership’s constant refusal to accept ceasefire terms brokered by the Biden administration. 

There are, in fact, reports that dissatisfaction with Iran’s agreement to a ceasefire is morphing into talk of betrayal. It has certainly resulted in numerous breaches of the ceasefire terms by Hezbollah, requiring an appropriate military response by the IDF.  If Hezbollah is indeed determined to resume hostilities against Israel, the chance of extending the 60-day truce will eventually turn on a struggle of will​s with Iran.    

  Hamas’s savage assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, was probably intended to mark the start of a new era of Iranian strength.  If so, subsequent events seem to demonstrate that it was the exact opposite – namely, that October 7 marked ​the  highwater mark​ of Iran's power, and it was all downhill from then on. From the moment that Israel chased Hamas back into Gaza, Iran’s power base began to decline. 

Over the past year the ayatollahs have had to watch their Hamas allies suffer huge losses of manpower and facilities, culminating in the elimination of its leader, Yahya Sinwar.  I​n a long, hard struggle​ Hamas as a military entity has been all but destroyed.  It has also been ousted from the governance of Gaza, which can no longer be regarded by Iran’s ayatollahs as a launching pad for the invasion and destruction of Israel.  Israel’s determined and effective self-defensive action in response to October 7​ has clearly reduced Iran's strength and influence.  The regime has also proved powerless to prevent the decimation of Hezbollah’s senior command structure, including the assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

Some commentators are linking the military successes ​in Syria by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), referred to by the media as the “Syrian rebels”, to Iran’s evidently weakened state and Russia’s preoccupation with its struggles in Ukraine.  Neither could offer Bashar al-Assad much support as HTS forces advanced into the streets of Damascus, greeted by jubilant crowds. Assad’s dictatorial regime has collapsed, while Iran’s “ring of fire” has blown back on itself.  Syria, Lebanon, Hamas and Hezbollah now represent not an unassailable Iranian  regional powerhouse, but a diminished and flagging regime..  

Iran​ appears to have made a serous, perhaps fatal, strategic miscalculation in April, 2024, when it decided to escalate its conflict with the West by launching its first-ever aerial onslaught on Israel.  That first attack was a humiliating failure since some 99% of the missiles and drones were destroyed in flight and failed to reach Israel.

The ayatollahs compounded their failure by essaying a second bombardment on October 1.  Although more powerful missiles were deployed, the results were only minimally more effective.  The ultimate humiliation, perhaps, was that Iran’s direct assaults on Israel triggered retaliatory airstrikes which prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated struck Iran’s nuclear program.

While the regime has managed to win some victories in the propaganda war – successfully persuading many young, Left-wing people in the West that Israel is the aggressor in this conflict – it has been discomfited on the battlefield. and diminished geopolitically.  The strategic goals it has worked toward for years have become pipe dreams in a matter of months. Iran’s aim of regional domination seems less attainable than ever. 

The disintegration of Iran’s carefully-constructed terrorist network in the Middle East could even have profound implications for the survival prospects of the regime itself and its ruling ayatollahs.

         Openly calling for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic are Iranian opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son and heir of the last Shah of Iran, who heads a body called the National Council of Iran for Free Elections, and his rival, Maryam Rajavi, the head of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Both claim to be acting as a government-in-exile.  In November Pahlavi called on Iranians to take the country back, adding that he was ready to lead any interim rule.

Having expended billions of dollars supporting terrorist proxies throughout the region, the ayatollahs are likely to find themselves under increasing pressure from disaffected voters.  Inflation is currently running at 35 percent, and more than 20 percent of young people are unemployed.   Apart from the failing economy, the regime is holding the lid on a seething cauldron of discontent about the restrictions imposed on women by the religious police.  Every so often the people’s frustration explodes in the form of public protests which are invariably put down ruthlessly by the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).

With the Trump administration, which is likely to take a hard line on Iran, soon to assume power in Washington, the ceasefire deal in Lebanon could be the first indication that the ayatollahs’ days are numbered.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 December 2024, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire?":

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-832571

Published in Eurasia Review, 17 December 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/13122024-iran-and-the-ceasefire-oped/#google_vignette

Published in the MPC Journal, 18 December 2024

https://mpc-journal.org/iran-and-the-ceasefire/

Reviving the 'Deal of the Century'?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 2 December 2024

            On his first time around the presidential election circuit, Donald J Trump placed such emphasis on his desire to broker a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians, that once he was elected I decided to follow his progress on this matter with especial care.  The result was my book “Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020” (see right), which I brought to a conclusion with a summary of the Israel-Palestinian peace plan that had been assiduously put together over the preceding four years by Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

With prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his side, Trump presented the plan to the world on January 28, 2020.  It was greeted with howls of derision from Palestinian​s and their supporters around the Middle East and beyond, all vowing to thwart it if any attempt was made to put it into effect.  

Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, appeared on television a few minutes after the Trump presentation, rejecting it root and branch:

“I say to Trump and Netanyahu​," he declared, "Jerusalem is not for sale, all our rights are not for sale and are not for bargain…We say a thousand no’s to this deal.”​  He was referring to the extraordinarily generous economic element of the plan, which aimed to create a vibrant, flourishing Palestinian state over ten years. 

Abbas’s reaction was far from the view of some influential figures in the Middle East and across the world. Bahrain and Oman signaled their approval by actually sending representatives to the White House ceremony.  Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE all issued statements welcoming the plan.

For example, the statement issued by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs ran: "The kingdom appreciates the efforts of President Trump's administration to develop a comprehensive peace plan between the Palestinian and the Israeli sides, and encourages the start of direct peace negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, under the auspices of the United States."

The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a similar statement: "Egypt recognizes the importance of considering the US administration's initiative from the perspective of the importance of achieving the resolution of the Palestinian issue, thus restoring to the Palestinian people their full legitimate rights through the establishment of a sovereign independent state in the Palestinian occupied territories in accordance with international legitimacy and resolutions."

The UK offered typically restrained approval.  Trump said that then-UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, had called him earlier to offer support.  Dominic Raab, Britain’s then-foreign secretary, welcomed the plan as “a serious proposal” and urged the Palestinians not to reject it out of hand.  The Australian government also welcomed the peace proposal, calling it a positive move and encouraging both parties to consider it as a basis for dialogue.

So the plan certainly had a degree of regional and international approval in 2020.  Much water has flowed under the bridge since then.  In 2024’s changed circumstances. with the Hamas organization decapitated and Gaza on the verge of reconstitution, Trump’s "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People" would certainly need amendment, but could it provide the basis for a renewed peace process? 

The  plan is divided into two parts: economic and political.  The economic portion was the first to be released, in June 2019.  Subtitled “A New Vision for the Palestinian People,” the 40-page document set out in considerable detail a scenario under which, with a huge input of funding, prospects for the Palestinians would be immeasurably transformed for the better.  In present circumstances what would additionally be required is a fully-funded program – to which, no doubt, Israel would contribute in full measure – designed to reconstruct Gaza’s cities in as short a timeframe as feasible.

As for the original program, in the document’s words: “with the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over 10 years, Peace to Prosperity represents the most ambitious and comprehensive effort for the Palestinian people to date.  It has the ability to fundamentally transform the West Bank and Gaza, and to open a new chapter in Palestinian history – one defined not by adversity and loss, but by freedom and dignity.”

            A main goal  was to connect Palestinian-occupied areas to regional and global markets, included integrating Gaza and the West Bank “through an efficient, modern transportation network, including a transportation corridor directly connecting” the two areas.  “Billions of dollars of new investment will flow into various sectors of the Palestinian economy,” said the document, which also detailed how “hospitals, schools, homes and businesses will secure access to affordable electricity, clean water and digital services.”

Additionally the plan envisaged improving the well-being of the Palestinian people through educational programs, vocational and technical training, expanding the female labor force, reducing Infant mortality  and increasing average life expectancy.

            The details were no sooner released than they were rejected out of hand by Palestinian spokespeople.  Abbas declared: “there can be no economic solution before there’s a political solution.”  Demonstrations opposing the plan were held in the West Bank and Gaza.

The political component of the plan, unveiled in 2020, while asserting that “any workable peace agreement must address the Palestinians’ legitimate desire for self-determination,” sweeps aside the issue of the “occupied territories” – namely the areas conquered from the Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian armies in the Six-Day War of 1967.  Maintaining that the succession of UN Resolutions claiming these areas as Palestinian are self-contradictory and demonstrably ineffective, the plan proposes its own path to a peaceful compromise. Israel would be allowed to incorporate West Bank settlements into Israel proper, and in compensation would yield an equivalent amount of territory adjacent to, and south of, the Gaza Strip.

So the plan envisages the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank on the areas outside the settlements, plus a greatly expanded Gaza.  All the Palestinian territories would be made contiguous by way of a network of highways, bridges and a road tunnel linking the West Bank to Gaza.  Additionally the Palestinians would have a capital in eastern Jerusalem based on northern and eastern neighborhoods that are outside the Israeli security barrier.

This prospect is made dependent on the Palestinian leadership renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel as the Jewish state.  The plan allows four years for these conditions to be met.

Back in 2016 Trump said: “I would love to be the one who made peace with Israel and the Palestinians.  That would be such a great achievement.”  If he remains as wedded to the idea in his second term, he would surely base his renewed effort on the painstaking work already undertaken by Jared Kushner.  With the bones of a plan already devised, and the political landscape much changed, he might find the Palestinian leadership more amenable to negotiation than in 2020.  Trump may yet act as honest broker in bringing a “Deal of the Century” to fruition.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Can Trump's  'deal of the century' be revived and bring Middle East peace?", 2 December 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-831551

Published in Eurasia Review, 7 December 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/06122024-will-trump-revive-the-deal-of-the-century-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 8 December 2024

https://mpc-journal.org/will-trump-revive-the-deal-of-the-century/