Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 December, 2024
Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, agreed on November 26 and implemented in the early hours of the following day? Opinion is divided, views differing according to the holder's perception of Iran’s complex geopolitical interests in the region.
Some of the
media speculate that Iran saw the proposed ceasefire
as conflicting with its strategic interests by undermining its
leverage against Israel, and opposed it. Some argue that that an
enfeebled and disheartened Hezbollah, desperate for a respite from
Israel's onslaught, proceeded to negotiate the deal without a green light
from Tehran.
Most opinion takes a contrary view. The
defense editor of the UK’s Daily Telegraph believes Iran has been so
weakened through the defeats inflicted on its proxies that it was
forced into the ceasefire, and that it represents a major setback for the
ayatollahs. Given the destruction that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
have wreaked on the infrastructures of both Hezbollah and Hamas, he writes, “the
Iranian regime, which finds itself increasingly under pressure from a
disaffected populace, had little option but to bring hostilities to an end. All
the indications are that Iran, not Hezbollah, was the driving force behind
diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon, as it feared that its
standing in the region would be further eroded the longer the conflict carried
on.”
Some commentators have
perceived a split developing between Iran and its two main proxies, Hamas and
Hezbollah. They believe that a much weakened Hezbollah and the rump
of Hamas are both more than willing to prolong the conflict with Israel, believing
that the longer it lasts, the more pressure Israel will come under from world
leaders to make concessions. This, they think, is what is behind the Hamas
leadership’s constant refusal to accept ceasefire terms brokered by the Biden
administration.
There are, in fact,
reports that dissatisfaction with Iran’s agreement to a ceasefire is morphing
into talk of betrayal. It has certainly resulted in numerous breaches of the
ceasefire terms by Hezbollah, requiring an appropriate military response by the
IDF. If Hezbollah is indeed determined to resume hostilities against
Israel, the chance of extending the 60-day truce will eventually turn on a
struggle of wills with Iran.
Hamas’s savage assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, was probably intended to mark the start of a new era of Iranian strength. If so, subsequent events seem to demonstrate that it was the exact opposite – namely, that October 7 marked the highwater mark of Iran's power, and it was all downhill from then on. From the moment that Israel chased Hamas back into Gaza, Iran’s power base began to decline.
Over the past year the ayatollahs have had to watch their Hamas allies suffer
huge losses of manpower and facilities, culminating in the elimination of its
leader, Yahya Sinwar. In a long, hard struggle Hamas as a
military entity has been all but destroyed. It has also been ousted from
the governance of Gaza, which can no longer be regarded by Iran’s ayatollahs as
a launching pad for the invasion and destruction of Israel. Israel’s
determined and effective self-defensive action in response to October 7 has
clearly reduced Iran's strength and influence. The regime has also proved
powerless to prevent the decimation of Hezbollah’s senior command structure,
including the assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.
Some commentators are
linking the military successes in Syria by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS), referred to by the
media as the “Syrian rebels”, to Iran’s evidently weakened state and
Russia’s preoccupation with its struggles in Ukraine. Neither could offer Bashar al-Assad much
support as HTS forces advanced into the streets of Damascus, greeted by
jubilant crowds. Assad’s dictatorial regime has collapsed, while
Iran’s “ring of fire” has blown back on itself.
Syria, Lebanon, Hamas and Hezbollah now represent not an unassailable
Iranian regional powerhouse, but a
diminished and flagging regime..
Iran appears to
have made a serous, perhaps fatal, strategic miscalculation in April,
2024, when it decided to escalate its conflict with the West by launching its
first-ever aerial onslaught on Israel. That first attack was a
humiliating failure since some 99% of the missiles and drones were destroyed in
flight and failed to reach Israel.
The ayatollahs
compounded their failure by essaying a second bombardment on October 1.
Although more powerful missiles were deployed, the results were only minimally
more effective. The ultimate humiliation, perhaps, was that Iran’s direct
assaults on Israel triggered retaliatory airstrikes which prime minister
Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated struck Iran’s nuclear program.
While the regime has
managed to win some victories in the propaganda war – successfully persuading
many young, Left-wing people in the West that Israel is the aggressor in this
conflict – it has been discomfited on the battlefield. and diminished geopolitically.
The strategic goals it has worked toward for years have become pipe dreams in a
matter of months. Iran’s aim of regional domination seems less attainable than
ever.
The disintegration of
Iran’s carefully-constructed terrorist network in the Middle East could
even have profound implications for the survival prospects of the regime itself
and its ruling ayatollahs.
Openly calling for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic
are Iranian opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son and heir of the
last Shah of Iran, who heads a body called the National Council of Iran for
Free Elections, and his rival, Maryam Rajavi, the head of the National Council
of Resistance of Iran. Both claim to be acting as a government-in-exile.
In November Pahlavi called on Iranians to take the country back, adding that he
was ready to lead any interim rule.
Having expended billions
of dollars supporting terrorist proxies throughout the region, the ayatollahs
are likely to find themselves under increasing pressure from disaffected
voters. Inflation is currently running at 35 percent, and more than 20 percent
of young people are unemployed. Apart from the failing economy, the
regime is holding the lid on a seething cauldron of discontent about the
restrictions imposed on women by the religious police. Every so
often the people’s frustration explodes in the form of public protests which
are invariably put down ruthlessly by the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps).
With the Trump administration, which is likely to take a hard line on Iran, soon to assume power in Washington, the ceasefire deal in Lebanon could be the first indication that the ayatollahs’ days are numbered.
Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 December 2024, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire?":
No comments:
Post a Comment