Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 December 2024:
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Well before the Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham (HTS) militia found itself victorious in its struggle against the Assad
regime, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, its head, told CNN: “The goal of the
revolution remains the overthrow of this regime.”
But Julani omitted to say what he wished to
replace it with. Despite all his softly spoken reassurances about his liberal
intentions, all the evidence points to a political takeover of
the country by the leader of the military coup – in fact a Sunni jihadist
replacement of Assad. Despite talk of inclusivity, there is little sign
of the political presence of the many other Syrian groups and
organizations scattered across the country.
The interim prime minister that Julani has appointed, Mohammed al-Bashir, was plucked from administering an HTS-held area in northwest Syria.
HTS is rooted in a
Salafi-jihadist ideology, and although Julani has renounced his former
connection with al-Qaeda and attempts to present himself in a more moderate
light, his organization is essentially Islamist. What is likely to emerge in
Syria is a Sunni Islamist state, governed according to its own
interpretation of Islamic Sharia law.
With HTS in the ascendant, it is salutary to remember that the Syrian armed conflict began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the dictatorial government of President Bashar al-Assad, with the establishment of democracy as its key demand.
In March 2011 a few
teenagers – fired no doubt by the revolutionary fervor sweeping the Middle East
at the time – daubed some inflammatory slogans on a school wall in the southern
Syrian city of Daraa. Unfortunately for them, the Syria that President
Bashar al-Assad had inherited in 2000 from his autocratic father was a tightly
controlled police state, in which a powerful and all-encompassing security
machine ensured that the slightest hint of opposition to the régime was
ruthlessly crushed.
The youngsters were
hunted down, arrested, tortured in unspeakable ways, and killed. When
details of their ordeal became known, protesters took to the streets. The
security forces, unable to break up the demonstration, eventually fired into
the crowd. That was enough to spark widespread rebellion. Groups antagonistic
to Assad’s government began nationwide protests. Gradually, popular dissent
developed into an armed revolt.
After months of
crackdown by the government's security forces, various armed groups such
as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) began forming across the country, marking
the beginning of the Syrian insurgency. By mid-2012, the uprising
had escalated into a full-blown civil war with the aim of overthrowing the
despotic Assad régime and substituting a democratic form of government.
Had assistance of any
sort been forthcoming from the US or other Western governments at that early
stage, Assad could have been defeated. But US President Obama hesitated,
and then continued vacillating even after it was clear in August 2013 that Assad
had used chemical weapons against his opponents, utterly indifferent to the
extensive civilian casualties that ensued. Obama hesitated because he was
intent on forging links with Iran leading to a nuclear deal, and Iran regarded
Syria as a vital component in what was known at the time as its “Shia
Crescent.”
Meanwhile the shining sword of democracy, the weapon the rebels in 2011 hoped would bring down Assad’s dictatorial regime, had become heavily tarnished. Those who are now labelled “Syrian rebels” are not fighting for democracy. The original FSA, once dedicated simply to establishing democracy in Syria, has over the nine years of civil conflict lost its cohesion and been transformed into an amalgamation of different groups for many of whom establishing an open democratic form of government is far from their aim.
Will a second democratic casualty of the
civil war be Kurdish hopes of autonomy in the region they have established in
north-eastern Syria? The Kurd-occupied territory, which is about
25-30 percent of the old Syria, is currently a semi-autonomous region formally
designated the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria or, more simply,
Rojava. It is, however, in the sights of Turkey’s president, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, who has said he will never accept a Kurdish quasi-state ruled
by the PYD party, which he considers a terrorist organization, along the
Turkish border.
Speaking to reporters on December 6, Erdogan endorsed and supported the HTS advance into Syria. “Our wish,” he said, “is that this march in Syria continues without accidents or disasters”– another voice with little or no interest in ensuring a democratic future for Syria.
Erdogan is wedded to the Muslim Brotherhood, and has every sympathy with the HTS’s objectives.
Even as Assad was
fleeing the country, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) began
offensive operations against the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF), who are mostly ethnic Kurds. The SDF had stormed Deir Ezzor
city, situated on the river Euphrates and part of Iran’s supply corridor
connecting to Lebanon – a facility the regime has now
lost. They were ousted by the HTS on December 10, and
a mini civil war was only prevented when, on December 11, the
US intervened to mediate a deal between the SNA and the SDF.
So what has happened to
the original democratic Syrian opposition of 2011, made up of activists,
intellectuals, and defectors pressing for a transition to democracy and an end
to Assad’s authoritarian rule? It consisted of the Syrian National Council,
which later became part of the Syrian National Coalition, Local
Coordination Committees, which organized protests and civil resistance, and the
Free Syrian Army (FSA), an informal group of defected soldiers and armed
civilians.
It was a loosely allied
group, and its component parts struggled with ideological, political, and
ethnic divisions, resulting in a lack of unified leadership and goals.
Elements like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (now HTS) capitalized on the chaos and perverted
their cause. As a result the original democratic opposition has largely been
sidelined, while efforts to achieve a political resolution through UN-mediated
peace talks, such as the Geneva process, made little progress and have now been
overtaken by events.
In short the original Syrian democratic opposition has been overshadowed by the militarization of the conflict, the rise of extremist groups, and the intervention of foreign powers. It still exists in a fragmented form, but can it reorganize itself into some sort of cohesive entity in time to claim a seat at the table, should an opportunity actually arise to negotiate Syria’s future? Is it realistic to hope for a democratic state of Syria emerging from the military coup? The more probable outcome is that Syria’s future will be some sort of autocracy headed by HTS leader Julani.
Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Syria's lost democrats were overshadowed by the rise of extremist groups", December 16, 2024:
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