Published in the Jerusalem Post, 20 January 2025
As the first phase of the
ceasefire and hostage handover comes into effect, media and public opinion is
divided on whether we are witnessing Hamas snatching victory from the jaws of
defeat.
Very early on Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu declared that one of his war aims was to destroy Hamas. Wounded, even disabled, Hamas may be, but it
is not destroyed. Playing the hostage
card to advantage, it is imposing its demands on the deal. Even so, one thing is reasonably certain –
Hamas will never again govern Gaza. The
future of post-war Gaza will lie in other hands, but exactly what follows the
permanent end of hostilities in Gaza remains to be resolved.
Meanwhile the formidable Hamas
fighting machine of October 6, 2023, armed to the teeth with state-of-the-art
Iranian weaponry, is a shadow of what it was.
On October 7 it sowed the wind,
and ever since it has been reaping the whirlwind. Its leadership has been
decimated. At least half of its original 25,000 manpower has been
eliminated, and its depleted ranks have been boosted by raw,
untrained recruits. No longer a structured militia, it has
become a degraded terrorist guerilla force.
The three-phase agreement hammered out in Qatar and announced on January 15 is clear on phase one.
All interested parties in the
Middle East, and the West generally, understand that agreement must be achieved
before too long on a clear-cut path to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of
the Gaza Strip. There is no shortage of ideas, plans, proposals, suggestions.
On December 1 the Israel Policy
Forum published a comparison of four extant plans for the post-war governance
of Gaza. They emanate from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the US’s
Biden administration, and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Egypt, the UAE
and the US were joint brokers of the ceasefire and hostage release
operation. The Israel Policy Forum paper reveals in some detail their
individual concepts of how Gaza is to be governed and reconstructed after the
war. The various formulae overlap to
some degree, but there are also some significant differences.
Egypt favors a community support
committee in Gaza to focus on transitional governance. Using local
expertise, the arrangement would have minimal international involvement, and
would unite Gaza with the West Bank. Following talks with Egyptian and
Fatah officials in Cairo in early December, Hamas officially approved this
plan.
The UAE’s idea is to impose
international control over Gaza on a temporary basis, eventually
transferring responsibility to the PA, provided the PA fulfills two
conditions: meaningful reforms, including a new prime minister; and allowing
regional and international forces to assume responsibility in the short term
for security and law enforcement. Gaza would be stabilized as a first
step toward a two-state outcome. Reconstruction would be led by
international donors..
The US position – or rather that of the Biden
administration, endorsed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in his farewell
speech on January 14 – is to establish hybrid international oversight for a phased
transfer of control to a reformed PA. The transitional mission
would be managed by an executive board with Palestinian and partner
representatives. The IDF would undertake a phased withdrawal in coordination
with the deployment of PA security forces. An international fund would
funnel donations for Gaza’s recovery through the PA. The ultimate aim would be to establish a
two-state solution.
The incoming Trump administration
has not yet revealed its hand on post-war Gaza.
The PA proposes that Gaza and the
West Bank unite, as a step toward the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian
state on territory recaptured by Israel from Egyptian and Jordanian forces in
the Six Day War, including East Jerusalem. International donors would support
reconstruction and economic development in Gaza. An international peace
conference would aim to establish a sustainable two-state solution, guaranteed
by Arab and international partners.
The Israel Policy Forum analyses
these four plans point by point in a table which enables each to be compared
with the others.
Meanwhile Reuters reports that alongside
the formal ceasefire negotiations in Qatar, which were joined on January 12 by
the heads of Mossad and Shin Bet, behind-the-scenes discussions have included the possibility of the UAE and the
US, along with other nations, temporarily overseeing the governance, security
and reconstruction of Gaza after the IDF withdraws and until a Palestinian
administration is able to take over.
Post-war planning for Gaza is not
confined to discussions in Qatar. It is
being carried out independently by other bodies. For example – and to mention but a few – the UN, the World Bank, and the EU, are
jointly heading a Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment process, and formulating a
Conflict Recovery Framework to be implemented when conditions in Gaza permit.
This partnership has been active since late 2023, and their draft
strategy aims to rebuild Gaza as an integral part of a fully independent,
contiguous, viable, and sovereign Palestinian state within a two-state solution.
These operations, which have been agreed with the PA, will support the PA’s own
planning for recovery and reconstruction in Gaza.
The French news medium Le Monde
recently reported that a group of
French experts, known as the International Coalition for Peace and Security, is
suggesting that a coalition of Arab and Western states assume guardianship over
Gaza while the PA reforms and renews itself. This proposal includes recognizing
a Palestinian state, securing a UN Security Council resolution endorsing a
two-state solution, and forming a coalition dedicated to peace and security.
Analysts at the Washington Institute have proposed establishing a Gaza
Interim Administration comprising three main components: a civilian
administration, a law enforcement body, and a counterterrorism force. This
structure would aim to dismantle Hamas's military capabilities, prevent future
attacks, and create conditions for a positive socioeconomic and political
reality in Gaza.
The best indication that Hamas has lost its political clout, and that a
viable plan for Gaza’s future will emerge and be implemented, is the recent
posting by President Trump on his social network. He asserted that his team “through the
efforts of Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, will continue to
work closely with Israel and our allies to make sure that Gaza never again becomes
a terrorist safe haven.”
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-838242
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