Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2025
After the Syrian people themselves, it is Turkey that has emerged as the biggest winner from the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime. As soon as Assad fled to Moscow, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan knew that fate had played into his hands.
It was as far back as March 2012 that Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Assad, but within a few days of the regime’s overthrow it had re-established its diplomatic representation in Syria, and Turkey's foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, and the head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, were in Damascus visiting Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), the victorious rebel movement.
Turkey
was able to share the joy and elation of the Syrian people because it had long
supported HTS, as well as other Syrian opposition forces that aimed to replace
Assad's regime. So with the ascent of HTS and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa
(formerly known as al-Julani), Erdogan knew that he was well placed to play a
pivotal role in shaping Syria's future governance and policies, and – he
doubtless hoped – align them with Turkish strategic objectives.
Commercial benefits
were also in Turkey’s sights. On
December 27 Reuters quoted Turkey’s energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, as
saying that Turkey aims to provide electricity to Syria. Bayraktar added that Turkey may also work with
Syria's new leadership on oil and natural gas, developing its energy
infrastructure, including potential oil pipelines connecting the two countries.
Speakers on the online
media network NPR were saying on December 27 that Turkish construction
companies are poised to go into Syria, and that Turkish businesses are talking
about moving factories across the border.
This would certainly create much needed jobs for Syrians, but they
pointed out that before initiatives like this could be put in place, an
effective infrastructure would be needed, such as consistent water and
electricity supplies and efficient internet services, and that these basics are not
widely available at present.
In
the new situation Turkey would appear to have the upper hand over the fraught
issue of the large Kurdish occupied region known as Rojava in the north-east of
Syria, adjacent to the Turkish-Syrian border.
It occupies nearly 30% of the original sovereign Syria. Erdogan views the Kurdish occupied region as
a security threat, because of its links with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK),
widely regarded as a terrorist organization, and believes it could inspire
Kurdish separatists inside Turkey.
Ever since 2015, the
Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have collaborated with the US-led
coalition, leading ground operations that demolished the ISIS caliphate. This
military achievement boosted the Kurdish standing in the US and more widely, and
revived their aspirations to achieve autonomy in the area they occupy, on the
lines of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that enjoys a
quasi-state status in Iraq.
Where Erdogan may miscalculate the extent of his increased influence within Syria is in relation to al-Sharaa’s intentions. Erdogan may be perceiving the HTS achievement as a traditional military coup aimed at projecting its leader to a position of autocratic power. But ever since Assad’s fall, al-Sharaa has presented a moderate face to the world, consistently declaring that he intends to be as inclusive as possible in establishing Syria’s new governance. He has said several times that Kurds are “part of the Syrian homeland” while assuring the nation that “there will be no injustice”.
How will his sweet words
play out against Turkey’s pivotal influence and resistance to Kurdish autonomy
in Rojava? On December 17 the Wall
Street Journal reported that US officials are growing increasingly worried
that Turkey might soon launch a "full-scale incursion" into territory
held by Syrian Kurds. They may have been reacting to Erdogan’s wide-ranging
speech that day in which he declared “As a nation we cannot limit our
horizons.”
He may be riding high at
the moment, but he would do well to take note of the old saying: “Pride comes
before a fall.” For the Kurds will not
forget that something akin to the semi-autonomous situation of their
compatriots in Iraq was actually offered to them by the Assad regime. In March 2015 the then Syrian information minister
announced that the government was considering recognizing Kurdish autonomy
"within the law and constitution." Later, in September 2017, Syria's then foreign
minister stated that Damascus would consider granting Kurds greater autonomy
once ISIS was defeated. Events overtook these aspirations, and nothing of the
sort materialized. But they might
provide al-Sharaa with a template for a future accommodation with the Kurds
within the constitution of a unified and restored Syrian state.
The pragmatic nature of
politics means that Turkey’s augmented political and diplomatic standing has
been immediately recognized by world leaders.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Hungarian prime minister Viktor
Orban, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, have all reached
out to Erdogan since the military coup.
On December 16 the EU
instructed a senior diplomat to engage directly with the provisional government
set up by HTS, while von der Leyen traveled to Ankara for a meeting with
Erdogan. He came away from the
discussion with €1 billion of EU cash to support the 3.5 million Syrian
refugees in Turkey, and to assist in their repatriation.
The fall of the Syrian regime has been a major blow to Russian interests. President Vladimir Putin's vital naval and air bases in Syria, assured under the Assad regime, have become vulnerable.
He had big plans, both economic and political, for the Middle East, and the military bases in Syria were crucial to their achievement. He may need Erdogan’s support to retain them, but there is always the chance that the Kremlin can conclude a deal with Syria’s new government.According to Reuters,
Russia has moved its naval vessels out to sea from the Tartus naval base, and
drawn down equipment from its Khmeimim air base, but intends to keep
both. With no indication that Putin is using Erdogan as a go-between, he
is reported to have contacted Syria’s new leader, al-Sharaa, requesting a
renewal of the deals made with Assad. An arrangement in 2015 gave Russia
full control of the Khmeimim air base, while under the Tartus Naval Agreement
of 2017 Russia was granted 49-year access to the Tartus naval base, with an
automatic 25-year extension option.
According to an unnamed
Syrian rebel official quoted by Reuters, the new Syrian government has not made
a final decision on Russia’s request. This issue, like so much else about
the future of Syria and the Syrian people, has yet to be resolved.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Turkey's position boosted by HTS coup in Syria", 6 January 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-836207
No comments:
Post a Comment