Published in the Jerusalem Post, 24 March 2025
It is now common practice to refer to Ahmad al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim
president. Following the fall of former president Bashar
al-Assad, Sharaa was appointed on January 29, 2025 by the Syrian General
Command – the collective leadership of the rebel factions that had coordinated
Assad’s overthrow. Tasked with forming a temporary legislative
council and overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, he
was given a timeline of up to three years to rewrite the constitution, and
up to four to hold elections.
Al-Sharaa is not a man to let
grass grow under his feet. He decided to start the process by producing
an interim constitution. On March 13 he signed a 44-article document,
possibly pointing the way toward the new draft constitution when it finally
emerges for consultation.
The interim document commits the
nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, and explicitly pledges to
maintain freedom of opinion and expression. It establishes a People's
Committee to function as an interim parliament, and extends the timeline for
organizing elections from four to five years.
Despite the claimed good
intentions of the new leadership, skepticism persists among religious and
ethnic minorities about how inclusive the new
structure will be – fears possibly enhanced by the ruthlessness with
which Sharaa crushed an insurgency launched on March 6 by local militias loyal
to Assad. Rights groups say that hundreds of civilians, mostly from the
Alawite minority sect to which Assad belongs, were killed in retaliatory
attacks. Conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite adherents of Islam – which
this was – can be truly brutal and bloody.
One minority group, however, has
real cause to rejoice at al-Sharaa’s declared commitment to inclusivity in the
new Syria – the Kurds.
Back in 2012, with Syria's civil war in its early stages, government forces were withdrawn from facing ISIS in the north and deployed to counter the anti-Assad rebels. Kurdish forces flooded in to fill the power vacuum and began attacking the ISIS caliphate. By 2014-2015, with ISIS in retreat, the Kurds’ battle for Kobani drew US support. Soon after, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurdish troops, was established with American backing to complete the defeat of ISIS. In 2019 the SDF captured the final ISIS stronghold in Baghouz.
Now the SDF governs a large,
semi-autonomous region in north-east Syria called Rojava. Most of
its population, numbering up to 4 million, are of Kurdish
origin though it also accommodates a variety of other sects. It
occupies some 25% of what was originally sovereign Syria.
On March 10, three days before
Sharaa signed his new interim constitution, he signed a formal agreement with
the SDF leader, General Mazloum Abdi. It stipulates that the Kurdish-led
SDF is to be integrated into the nation’s military forces. In addition the
agreement calls for the integration of all “civil and military institutions” in
north-eastern Syria.
That commitment has potentially
vast implications. The “civil institutions” in north-eastern Syria
encompass the semi-autonomous Rojava region, and include oil and gas fields,
border crossings and airports. Syria’s new constitution, when it eventually
appears, could propose a situation akin to that in Iraq, where a
Kurdish-majority area has been recognized as a federal entity and accorded
autonomy within the constitution.
Ever since the fall of the Ottoman
Empire after the First World War, the Kurds of Iraq had pressed for autonomy,
if not independence. In 1970, after years of conflict, the Iraqi government and
Kurdish leaders reached an Autonomy Agreement, but it was never fully
implemented. Following the 1991 Gulf
War, a US-led coalition granted the Kurds virtual autonomy, and this status was
ratified after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
In 2005, the new Iraqi
constitution formally recognized the Kurdistan Region, which stretches across
the north of the country, as an autonomous federal entity with its own
government, parliament, and security forces (the Peshmerga). The Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) was granted authority over internal matters, while
Baghdad retained control over foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy.
That something similar could
eventually be offered to the Kurds of Syria becomes a real possibility with the
agreement reached between al-Sharaa and the SDF. Such an outcome would be a nightmare from the
point of view of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Turkey, a long-time supporter of
the rebel movement that overthrew the Assad regime – the HTS (Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham) – now has strong political influence with al-Sharaa, its
leader. Erdogan no doubt hopes to use it to control his perennial
Kurdish problem by continuing to occupy the swaths of Syria that he has
overrun. But despite his dominant political position in post-Assad
Syria, it is far from certain that he will be able to do so.
Erdogan
has consistently viewed the People's Protection Units (YPG), the dominant force
in the SDF, as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant group
that has been a constant political irritant with its demand for Kurdish
autonomy within Turkey.
Accordingly in 2016 Erdogan
instituted Operation Euphrates Shield, capturing an area in north
Syria. He followed this two years later with Operation Olive Branch
during which he overran Afrin. In 2019, after the US announced its
withdrawal from parts of northern Syria, he launched Operation Peace Spring,
establishing a so-called "safe zone" on the Syrian side of the
Turkish-Syrian border. He aimed to use it to resettle Syrian
refugees currently in Turkey.
Erdogan has more or less
annexed all the areas he has overrun. They are now governed by
Turkey-backed local councils, use the Turkish lira as currency, and are heavily
influenced by Turkish infrastructure projects, including schools, hospitals,
and post offices. It is doubtful if
these could survive a new Syrian constitution.
Even more disturbing from Erdogan’s point of view, is that Rojava in northern Syrian abuts the KRG in northern Iraq, and that the idea of their amalgamating at some point in the future to form a Kurdistan Free State becomes a real possibility.
The implications for Turkey of such a development would be profound, and present Erdogan with one of the biggest geopolitical challenges of his presidency. The most likely scenario would be for him to take a hardline military approach, but this could come at the cost of worsening Turkey’s relations with its allies and deepening domestic unrest.
Meanwhile it certainly looks as
though Kurdish autonomy could be recognized and ratified in Syria’s new
constitution.
Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "How can there be a brighter future for Syria's Kurds?", 24 March 2025
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-847213
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