Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 March 2025
Will the Gaza ceasefire deal
survive its first phase? That was the unanswerable question hanging over the
formal end of phase one on March 2 and the scheduled start of phase two.
Some commentators believe that
Israel simply wants to extend phase one for the time being. They point out
that, under the terms of the agreement, Israel was supposed to begin
withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor – the strip of land on the Gaza side
of the border with Egypt – on the last day of the first phase and complete
their evacuation within eight days. But on February 27 an Israeli official told
the media that to prevent weapons smuggling, the IDF will be remaining in
position.
That decision may have been in
reaction to an announcement by Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem on February 18. He
suddenly declared that Hamas was interested in speeding up the hostage release
process – but in return for a major concession.
Hamas, he said, had submitted a new proposal to the mediators offering to release all the remaining hostages in phase two. The quid pro quo, said Qassem, would be for Israel to agree to an immediate permanent ceasefire and a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor.
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This “offer” would place Hamas in
a much stronger position to secure its long-term intention of remaining the
ruling power in Gaza.
On February 19, Rami Igra, former
head of the Mossad’s Prisoners and Missing Persons Division, warned in a radio
interview that Hamas is seeking to establish a Hezbollah-style rule in Gaza.
Using the PA as a front, Hamas aims to retain effective control; to be, in
effect, “the power behind the throne.
By infiltrating the government in
Lebanon, Hezbollah was able to build itself into a formidable power bloc,
rivaling the state itself and its institutions.
“They want to continue ruling
Gaza,” said Igra. “They will do everything to make that happen.”
Israel is unlikely to be wooed
into a premature withdrawal from Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has
said repeatedly that the IDF will not evacuate the Strip completely until it is
clear that Hamas’s military and political capabilities have been so degraded
that it can no longer rearm or govern Gaza.
The mediators – the US, Egypt, and
Qatar – will soon have to grapple with the problem of how Gaza is to be
governed when the war ends – and get both sides to agree about it.
There is no support from the Arab world for Hamas to stay in control. Some Arab
states wish to see neither Hamas nor the PA controlling a post-war Gaza; some
Arab commentators have favored a role for a perhaps reformed PA.
Trump’s proposal for the US to
take over the Gaza Strip and evacuate the population generated instant
rejection from the Arab world. In reaction, some Arab nations initiated
substantive discussions aimed at developing a comprehensive plan for Gaza’s
future governance and reconstruction, but based on upholding the rights of the
Gazan population. Some speculate that it was Trump’s intention from the start
to goad the Arab world into considering Gaza’s future and how to achieve it.
It is significant that US
Secretary of State Marco Rubio seems far from wedded to Trump’s vision of
Gaza’s future. On February 13, he said on an American radio show “If the Arab
countries have a better plan, then that’s great.”
On February 20, Saudi Arabia
hosted a summit in Riyadh, bringing together leaders from Egypt, Jordan, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its primary purpose was to consider Egypt’s
counter-proposal to Trump’s suggested solution.
After intensive diplomatic
activity, Egypt presented a comprehensive three-phase reconstruction plan for
Gaza, and has apparently garnered support from European nations, including
France and Germany, as well as regional Arab countries. It favors the creation
of “secure areas” within Gaza to house displaced residents temporarily as
essential infrastructure is rebuilt.
A significant aspect of the
proposal is the establishment of a new Palestinian administration in Gaza,
distinct from both Hamas and the current PA, to oversee the reconstruction
efforts. A police force composed of former PA officers would be established.
Egypt’s plan maintains that Hamas has agreed to a governance structure that
excludes its participation. Financial backing for the reconstruction, estimated
at $53 billion, is expected to come from the oil-rich Gulf states.
Some, but not all, of the
proposals in Egypt’s plan received instant endorsement from the conference
participants. The leaders reached a consensus on the necessity of sidelining
Hamas, but some apparently favored reinstating the authority of the PA in Gaza
during the reconstruction phase.
A follow-up summit, scheduled for
March 4 in Cairo, is aimed at finalizing a unified Arab plan for Gaza’s
reconstruction, crucially reaffirming opposition to any forced displacement of
its population.
Since Egypt, along with Qatar and
the US, is acting as a mediator in the indirect negotiations between Israel and
Hamas over the Gaza ceasefire deal, the Arab “day after” plan being constructed
under Egypt’s leadership will probably be put to both sides in due course.
How Israel will react is far from clear. During a joint press conference with
Rubio on February 16, Netanyahu said: “We have a shared strategy, which cannot
always be detailed to the public – including when the gates of hell will open.
And they will open if all our hostages are not returned, every last one of
them.”
Two days later, following a meeting of Israel’s Security Council, Foreign Minister Gideon Saar told reporters: “We need a total demilitarization of Gaza and no presence of the Palestinian Authority.”
So it seems clear that, as part of
phase two, if it eventually comes into effect, Israel will be demanding the
release of all hostages in addition to the dismantling of the Hamas military
and, possibly, the expulsion of the Hamas leadership from Gaza. Only then would
Israel consider withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor.
Hamas is not likely to accept
these demands. However, while keeping its true long-term aims under wraps,
Hamas might go along with the Egyptian proposals, especially if they emerge as
a unified Arab plan.
All in all, the auguries for a
successful outcome to phase two – even if negotiations get under way – are not
good.
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