Monday, 21 July 2025

Sharaa – friend or foe?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 July 2025

           Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al‑Sharaa (previously known as militia leader al-Jolani), is potentially a major threat to Israel’s security.  At the same time he is potentially a welcome addition to those Muslim leaders prepared to normalize relations with Israel.

Sweida, where violent confrontations have been occurring recently between Druze and Bedouin, is one of Syria’s 14 provinces. It is located in the southernmost part of the country and borders Israel’s Golan Heights. Druze comprise most of its population.  Any destabilization within the province threatens to spill across the border, particularly if Islamist groups still active inside Syria exploit the chaos.  Any security vacuum in Sweida could allow Iranian-backed militias or jihadist factions to establish a foothold near Israel’s northeastern frontier.

            On Sunday, July 13 members of a Bedouin tribe attacked and robbed a Druze man on the province’s main highway.  Sweida, a tinder-box ready to be ignited, erupted. The memory was still raw of the deadly confrontations between Druze residents and Sunni Bedouin armed groups that occurred between April 28 and May 2 – all due to a fake audio clip – and the heavy-handed intervention by Syrian government forces which carried out so-called extrajudicial “field executions” of 19 Druze civilians.  More than 100 Druze were killed in the subsequent fighting.

            At the time, Israel publicly pledged to defend the Druze and warned Syria that further violence against them would prompt a military response.  During the outbreak of sectarian violence in Suweida on July 13 more than two hundred people were killed.  Over the next few days militias affiliated with the new regime in Damascus attacked members of the Druze community.  In Israel members of the Druze minority organized demonstrations, demanding that the government act immediately to protect their co-religionists across the border.

Israel lived up to its promise.  It mounted air strikes, targeting Syrian tanks moving south from Damascus, as well as other Syrian Army vehicles and an airfield in southwestern Syria. On July 15, during the attacks, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Israel Katz issued a joint statement:  “Israel is committed to preventing harm being inflicted on the Druze in Syria, owing to the deep covenant of blood with our Druze citizens in Israel and their historical and familial link to the Druze in Syria. We are acting to prevent the Syrian regime from harming them, and to ensure the demilitarization of the region adjacent to our border with Syria.”

The same day, Syria’s defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, secured an agreement between the combatants – the Syrian army, Druze armed factions and Bedouin tribes – and a ceasefire was declared. 

Unfortunately it soon broke down, and Israel continued its campaign by targeting key Syrian government structures in Damascus, including the Defense Ministry headquarters and areas in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire in Sweida continued and, backed by US mediation, an agreement was reached between the Syrian army and Druze factions.  Under the deal government forces began withdrawing, leaving security in the hands of Druze elders and local factions, as part of a “total and immediate halt to military operations”.

Seeking to cement the ceasefire, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and envoy Tom Barrack engaged in urgent talks with both Israel and Syria.  According to Reuters, they agreed “specific steps that will bring this troubling situation to an end tonight,” suggesting a US-brokered de-escalation pact that may include an Israel promise to halt further airstrikes.

Meanwhile, on the evening of July 16, Sharaa gave a televised address to the nation.  What he said was entirely in line with what he has been asserting as his intentions from the moment he was appointed Syria’s interim president on January 29, 2025.

His first major decision had been to suspend the Assad-era constitution.  In his six months as interim president he has made no less than eight official visits abroad, signed agreements to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces into the state, and overseen the drafting of an interim constitution for a five-year transition period.  This document of intent commits the nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, explicitly pledges to maintain freedom of opinion and expression, and establishes a People’s Committee to function as an interim parliament.   

He seems to have made every effort to distance himself from his al-Qaeda roots, and to present a moderate and pragmatic image.  In public statements he has emphasized his intention to protect minorities and transform Syria into a pluralist state. 

In speaking to the Syrian people on July 16, Sharaa asserted the nation’s sovereignty, but nevertheless praised mediation from foreign sources.  In line with his declared aim of national unity and the protection of minorities, he said: “We are keen on holding accountable those who transgressed and abused our Druze people, as they are under the protection and responsibility of the state.”  He said that responsibility for security in Sweida, “will be handed to religious elders and some local factions based on the supreme national interest.”

In a statement virtually seeking conciliation with Israel, he said that the nation did not fear war, “but we have put the interests of the Syrians before chaos and destruction.”

Before the recent upsurge of violence, several pointers had suggested possible Israel-Syria reconciliation.   

For example, on April 18 US Congressman Cory Mills held a 90‑minute meeting with Sharaa in Damascus during which, Mills reported, Sharaa expressed openness to normalizing relations with Israel, stating Syria could consider joining the Abraham Accords under the right conditions.

Then, during Sharaa’s visit to French President Emmanuel Macron on May 7, both leaders confirmed that Syria has held indirect talks with Israel through mediators.

These positive indications were confirmed on July 19 when, following several days of negotiations, a ceasefire agreement was reached, brokered largely by the US, in which both Syria and Israel pledged to halt offensive operations.  The agreement included terms allowing limited redeployment of Syrian security forces to Sweida, with the understanding that Druze factions would retain some internal security roles. After the truce, Israel permitted Syrian government troops to re-enter Sweida with a limited mandate, aiming to stabilize the situation and safeguard state institutions.

There is no doubt that the tenor of remarks by Sharaa from the start of his governance seem to favor conciliation toward Israel. They suggest a potential openness to the principles of regional normalization and cooperation embodied in the Abraham Accords.  The current Israeli-Syrian truce is another hopeful sign.  If Sharaa eventually delivers the inclusive, unified, well-governed state that he promises, he will have disproved those who currently regard him with suspicion and believe that he can never rid himself of his Al-Qaeda past.


Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Syria's President Sharaa - friend or foe?", 21 July 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-861604

Published in Eurasia Review titled: "Al-Sharaa - true or false?", 24 July 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/19072025-al-sharaa-true-or-false-oped/ 

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