Published in the Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2025
High drama in Lebanon: On August 5, in response to mounting US pressure to commit to a disarmament timetable for Hezbollah, the Lebanese government convened a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace in Baabda, just outside Beirut. The meeting started at 3 pm. It was still in progress when, at 5 pm, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem appeared on al-Manar TV, Hezbollah’s official television channel, to reject all calls for Hezbollah to disarm, and to issue stark threats to Israel.
If Israel launched a new,
large-scale aggression against Lebanon, declared Qassem, Hezbollah, alongside
the Lebanese army and the Lebanese people, would defend themselves.
“This defense will lead to
missiles falling inside the Israeli entity,” he threatened, “and all the
security they have built over eight months will collapse within an hour.”
Bold words, but largely bravado
and bluster. Qassem was implying that Hezbollah still enjoys the closest of
partnerships with the Lebanese government.
In truth Hezbollah’s former
iron grip over the nation has been greatly eroded, and the newly elected government is
beginning to assert its authority in areas where for decades Hezbollah’s word
has been law. The “state within a state” is waning, and a truly sovereign
state of Lebanon may be re-emerging.
After hours of impassioned debate, the cabinet reached a majority decision. The Lebanese army would be instructed to develop a comprehensive plan by the end of August for establishing a state monopoly on arms, to be in place by the end of 2025. The declared objective is to bring all weapons in the country under the control of six designated state security forces, thereby ending the autonomy of non-state actors, most notably Hezbollah. Shi’ite ministers representing Hezbollah reportedly walked out of the cabinet meeting in protest before the vote.
At around 7.30 pm prime minister
Nawaf Salam held a press conference and announced the decision. Hezbollah rejected it completely. The next morning, in a written statement, it
declared: “We will treat this decision
as if it does not exist."
For two years Hezbollah and its
political allies held Lebanon in a political deadlock, refusing to allow a
presidential election. It was only after the November 2024
Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire that Hezbollah allowed Joseph Aoun to be elected
President and the new government to be installed.
Since then Lebanon’s leadership has been conducting negotiations with US Special Envoy Tom Barrack on a phased plan to disarm Hezbollah and re-establish the Lebanese state’s monopoly on weapons. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have reportedly dismantled over 90% of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, although north of the Litani River Hezbollah retains substantive arms and capabilities.
Hezbollah is no longer what it was,
politically or financially. No longer
able to dictate government policy, it does retain a significant bloc in
parliament known as Loyalty to the Resistance. As regards its finances, the
Al-Qardh Al-Hasan Association (AQAH) operated as Hezbollah’s de facto bank. In July Lebanon’s central bank banned licensed
banks from dealing with AQAH.
Hezbollah’s popularity with the
Shia population has historically been rooted in its extensive network of social
services. It operated hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies, often providing
medical care more cheaply than private institutions, and often at no cost for
party members. Funded largely by Iran, it also ran schools, educational
facilities, and youth programs.
Media reports indicate a
significant reduction in Iranian financial support and, as of mid-2025, Hezbollah’s
health, social service and educational network has been significantly
diminished. Many of its hospitals and
clinics have been damaged or destroyed.
Access to health care is limited. Mobile clinics and international aid groups
are filling some gaps, but routine treatments for chronic diseases have been
interrupted.
A large number of schools,
particularly in the south, have been damaged or repurposed as emergency
shelters, and many children are not receiving education. Hezbollah’s ability to lead reconstruction
and social support has clearly been weakened.
Reports indicate a consequent loss of confidence among its traditional
support base, particularly among Shi’ite civilians.
The new Lebanese administration is
focused on strengthening state institutions. Recent diplomatic efforts have
explicitly linked Lebanese demands for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon
with a commitment to extend state authority and restrict Hezbollah’s
independent operations and social authority.
Historically, Hezbollah’s social
programs addressed the neglect by central government of the Shia community. By providing jobs, welfare, and direct aid,
Hezbollah created a “shadow citizenry” closely tied to its institutions,
reinforcing its political and social influence.
According to a 2024 poll, about 85% of Lebanese Shia polled expressed trust in the group.
However, overall national support was much lower. Only about 30% of Lebanese said they trusted
Hezbollah, while 55% reported no trust at all. Support among Sunnis, Druze, and
Christians was minimal (below 16% in each group).
Municipal elections in 2025 showed that Hezbollah and its ally Amal
still dominate in southern Lebanon, but reformist and opposition candidates
made gains, even in some traditional Hezbollah strongholds. This suggests that Hezbollah’s
legitimacy, even within its core constituency, has been damaged by its loss of
charismatic leadership and its degraded military position. It has been further weakened by its inability
to protect or rebuild Shia communities devastated by war, and by its perceived
role in causing Lebanon’s economic crisis of the past few years.
In 2023 inflation rose to a
staggering 221.3%. It was reduced to
45.2% in 2024, but by May 2025 government action had brought it down to 14.4% –
still too high for stability, but at least under control.
Lebanon’s economy, too, has shown
signs of fragile recovery since the ceasefire. After a severe contraction of
7.1% in 2024, the economy is projected to grow by 4.7% in 2025, marking its
first growth since 2017. This rebound is driven by improved political
stability, a recovery in tourism, stronger consumer spending, and modest
capital inflows.
But although growth has returned for the first time in years, and
inflation is down significantly from its peak, Lebanon’s economy remains
fragile. Sustained recovery will depend
on political stability and more by way of reform. And that depends above all on preventing
Hezbollah from regaining anything like the power it has enjoyed in Lebanon for
the past quarter-century.
Will the newly elected president and government be consistent in their
determination to wrest the nation’s sovereignty from Hezbollah’s grasp? If their reforms stall, or if Hezbollah
stages the comeback Qassem seeks, the Lebanese government could once again find
itself the junior partner of a dominant power with its own agenda.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 11 August 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-863772
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