Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2025
It was, doubtless, a combination of factors that led the Hamas leadership to conclude that their best interests lay in accepting the latest version of the ceasefire proposals first suggested by US special envoy Steve Witkoff. It came after months of arms-length and deadlocked discussions between Israel and Hamas, whose refusal to conclude a deal was reinforced when a flurry of nations proclaimed their intention to recognize a Palestinian state – France, followed by the UK, Malta, Canada, and Australia. These declarations effectively removed any incentive for Hamas to give away their main bargaining chip – the hostages – or even consider disarming, and for a time they ceased negotiating.
The dire effect
of this rush to recognition was revealed by Hamas’s messages of congratulation
to the governments concerned, and by Ghazi Hamad, a senior Hamas official based
in Qatar. During an interview on August
2 he is reported as saying: “The initiative by several countries to recognize a
Palestinian state is one of the fruits of October 7.”
Egypt, along with Qatar and
the US, has been central to recent mediation efforts. Egypt is also the progenitor of the only
viable plan for the
reconstruction, development and administration of post-war Gaza. So there was a certain logic in Egypt’s
recent assumption of the lead role in the ceasefire–hostage release
negotiations, with the focus shifting from Qatar’s capital, Doha, to
Cairo.
Taking the lead in mid-August, Egypt significantly
intensified pressure on Hamas to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza. On August 13 in Cairo Major General Hassan
Rashad, head of Egyptian intelligence, met with Hamas leaders – including
politburo chief Khalil al-Hayyeh – to push Hamas toward flexibility.
Egyptian officials warned Hamas
that there was a limited window of opportunity to reach an agreement. Israel was preparing its attack on Gaza
city. The deal on offer included suspending
Hamas’s armed activities for a transitional period, oversight by Arab and
international mediators, discussions about the temporary administration of Gaza
during the interim, its demilitarization, and the release of all remaining Israeli
hostages in two phases, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.
Linking its honest broker role
with its plans for the reconstruction of Gaza, Egypt reportedly told Hamas that,
contingent on a ceasefire agreement, it was ready to impose a temporary
administration for Gaza and take practical steps toward rehabilitation.
After a while reports from Cairo indicated
that Hamas officials were starting to ease some of their previous red-line demands,
particularly those that had led to the collapse of earlier talks.
At the heart of the emerging deal was
a 60-day ceasefire, serving as a window for hostilities to halt, aid to resume,
and negotiations to progress.
The hostage release terms,
however, are proving a new bone of contention.
The proposal accepted by Hamas specifies a two-phased sequence for their
release: 10 living hostages and the
bodies of others in the first phase; the remainder in a second. But Israel’s position on the release of the
remaining captives has recently hardened. A statement from the prime minister’s
office on August 16 said: “Israel will agree to a deal on condition that all
the hostages are released in one go”.
Whether Israel will backtrack on
this is possible but not likely. Meanwhile it has proceeded to implement its
plans to chase Hamas out of Gaza city.
Egypt’s reconstruction plan for Gaza was always intended to run alongside ceasefire negotiations. It was presented to a meeting of the Arab League on March 4, where it was approved unanimously.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who was present at the meeting, "strongly endorsed" the Egyptian plan, and pledged the UN’s full cooperation in implementing it. The president of the African Union, Joao Lourenco, also attended the Cairo summit and gave the plan his explicit support together with a commitment to help realize it. Since then it has been endorsed by the EU.
Egypt’s plan envisages a six-month
immediate phase which would concentrate on removing rubble, the provision of
temporary shelters, initial repairs to partially damaged homes, and restoration
of core infrastructure.
The first reconstruction phase which
follows is envisaged as lasting up to two years, and would include the construction
of around 200,000 new residential units and establishing vital supply networks.
The second reconstruction phase would
last two and a half years, and would involve the creation of an economic
infrastructure, including industrial zones, a commercial port, and an airport.
As regards governance, Egypt's
blueprint calls for a technocratic committee to manage initial reconstruction,
leading to the Palestinian Authority eventually taking over.
There has been some real progress
in implementing the initial stages of the Egypt reconstruction plan – progress
that has largely failed to reach the world’s headlines.
In February 2025, during the
ceasefire which lasted from mid-January to mid-March, construction vehicles
from Egyptian companies—particularly from the politically connected Organi
Group—began operating in Gaza. Their main activities were focused on clearing
rubble, especially along Salah al-Din Street, the key north-south artery in Gaza,
and preliminary site preparation for the construction of up to 200,000
temporary housing units for displaced residents.
Leading Egyptian construction
firms and engineering syndicates are keen to participate in implementing the
plan. The Talaat Mustafa Group, for example, proposed a $27 billion, three-year
initiative, involving 50 top contractors. Meanwhile the Egyptian Syndicate of Engineers
has teamed up with its Palestinian counterpart, and Egypt and Jordan have
initiated training programs for Palestinian police to prepare them for security
duties in Gaza. In addition, Egypt is
currently preparing for a large international donor conference to secure
funding and pledges for its $53.2 billion reconstruction plan.
In short, Egypt has begun taking concrete
steps to implement the early stages of its plan, but the major phases are
dependent on a stable ceasefire, donor commitments that translate into real
funding, and the establishment of an effective governing mechanism for Gaza.
Then
there is the report last October in the Wall Street Journal that during
meetings with Egyptian officials, Israel’s chief negotiator, David Barnea, head
of Mossad, offered safe passage to Hamas members in exchange for laying down
arms and releasing hostages.
More
likely, perhaps is stalemate on the ceasefire, and Israel proceeding with its
plan to invade Gaza and defeat Hamas.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 25 August 2025
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-865146
Published in Eurasia Review, 3 September 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/03092025-egypt-takes-the-lead-oped/
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