Published in the Jerusalem Post, 22 September 2025
On August 5, the Lebanese
government, under pressure from the US as well as from Israeli strikes, ordered
the military to draw up plans to disarm all independent militias, including
Hezbollah’s, by the end of the year.
It took a full month, but at a
cabinet meeting on September 5, Rodolphe Haykal, the commander of the Lebanese
Armed Forces, presented the government with a plan to ensure that, by the
year’s end, weapons would be held only by the Lebanese state. The cabinet
authorized the army to begin implementing it immediately.
A few days later, Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi, again without disclosing details of the plan, declared that within three months the army will have fully disarmed Hezbollah in the area nearest the border with Israel – namely the region south of the Litani River.
Despite the emphasis on keeping
the plan secret, many details have subsequently become public – either
unintentionally or through deliberate leaks. Through various briefings and via
press coverage, it emerged that the army’s plan is called “Homeland Shield,”
and its objective is to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons in five phases. The
first phase begins south of the Litani River; the second includes the area
south of the Awali River.
Subsequently, even more precise
details emerged. Homeland Shield is a military road map whose destination is
national disarmament. The precise objective is to ensure that by the end of
2025, only the Lebanese army is weaponized.
In phase one, the Lebanese army
will focus on the disarmament of armed groups, specifically Hezbollah, in the
region south of the Litani River, cooperating with the 47-year-old peacekeeping
force UNIFIL, whose mandate is due to be terminated on December 31, 2026.
In phase two, operations will expand northward to include the corridor up to
the Awali River, covering the main approach to South Lebanon. The focus in
phase three will be on Beirut and its surrounding suburbs.
In phase four, disarmament will
pivot to the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, an area with key weapons depots
and logistical networks for armed groups. The final phase covers the remainder
of Lebanon, to ensure the complete nationwide enforcement of the state monopoly
on arms.
It has also emerged that the government’s intention is not integration. President Joseph Aoun has clearly rejected the idea of creating a distinct Hezbollah unit within the army, replicating Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, which are Iran-backed Shi’ite-led paramilitary groups integrated into Iraq’s security forces.
Instead, he envisions individual
Hezbollah fighters joining the Lebanese Armed Forces only if they meet the same
criteria as any other applicant – academic qualifications, entrance exams, and
training – just like the post–civil war integration of other militia members.
Monthly implementation reports are to be submitted to the cabinet by the army
command, but the cabinet and army leadership have decided, citing national
security and sectarian sensitivities, that details regarding precise
operational procedures will remain confidential.
The Homeland Shield plan is, to
put it mildly, controversial. During the cabinet discussions leading to the
decision, Shi’ite ministers staged walkouts.
Major Shi’ite political blocs – the bedrock of Lebanese support for Hezbollah – have rejected it. After learning that the cabinet had authorized the army to develop a plan to place all weapons under state control, Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary-general, announced he would defy the order.
“The government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam committed a grave sin by taking a decision to strip Lebanon of its weapons to resist the Israeli enemy…,” he pronounced. “This decision fully serves Israel’s interest. Therefore, we will treat this decision as if it does not exist.”
Army leaders dwell on the practicalities, emphasizing that full implementation
of the plan depends on the necessary resources being provided. They stress the
need to minimize the risk of direct internal conflict, and have begun to indicate
that the timetable may be flexible depending on political and security
developments.
Nevertheless, the program is well
under way and the army has taken measurable steps toward implementing the first
phase. Thousands of troops have been deployed to the south and, with some
external intelligence cooperation (notably from Israel via the US), the army
has dismantled hundreds of Hezbollah weapon sites and other infrastructure,
with over 500 said to have been demolished.
The government’s firmness in
implementing the Homeland Shield plan despite Hezbollah’s initial rejection
seems to have resulted in the group shifting ground somewhat. Without
retracting its opposition to the government’s plan, Hezbollah has recently called
the government’s move an “opportunity” to restore order or “return to wisdom
and reason.”
Even this concession, if that is what it is, is conditional on its own demands being met. It has said that before any serious discussion about disarmament can proceed, Israel must cease all military operations in Lebanon (air strikes, cross-border incursions, etc.), withdraw from occupied or disputed hilltop positions in southern Lebanon, and respect the ceasefire.
Hezbollah has, therefore, subtly suggested that it could be open to dialogue
with the government about a national defense strategy, provided its
preconditions are met. In short, the group rejects disarmament imposed by the
government, but indicates it might be acceptable in the context of “national
dialogue” about the defense of Lebanon.
Despite Homeland Shield’s hopeful
start, many commentators believe it is unlikely to be fully implemented by the
end of 2025, or possibly ever. They point to current official statements about
the plan that studiously avoid mentioning binding deadlines. Even supportive
ministers signal that progress will depend on “available capabilities,” with no
fixed timetable for completion.
Another factor militating against
a successful outcome is Lebanon’s system of governance, which relies on
consensus. In the past, this has effectively given Hezbollah and its allied
Shi’ite parties a veto over major reforms. It is true that on this disarmament
issue, Aoun and his cabinet seem determined to press ahead, but Lebanon’s
delicate political balance is easily disrupted.
Putting speculation aside,
however, the five-phase disarmament plan drawn up by the army is actually being
implemented. Hezbollah’s military presence is being eliminated from the region
south of the Litani, and there is every indication that phase two will follow
shortly.
No comments:
Post a Comment