The Axis of Resistance is crumbling

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 December 2025

          On November 25 Afshin Madadi, a journalist attached to the UK’s Daily Telegraph, reported on conversations he had held ​recently with senior Iranian officials in Tehran. ​His account was both unexpected and truly surprising.

          They told him that Iran has lost control of the Houthis – that the fighters in Yemen who regularly attack global shipping lanes have stopped taking orders from Tehran.

“The Houthis have gone rogue,” ​one senior Iranian official told Madadi, “…and are now really rebels.” Then he added: “It’s not just the Houthis. Some groups in Iraq are also acting as if we never had any contact with them.” 

The revelations went even further.  Between them the officials maintained that the ​Iranian leadership is struggling to hold together what is left of its “axis of resistance” forces all around the Middle East – in other words that the regime is also losing control in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. 

The Institute for the Study of War analyzed Madadi’s report.  In its evaluation it described his contacts as "unspecified Iranian officials", the suggestion being that limited credence should therefore be placed on what they said.  The Telegraph article, however, strongly suggests​ that these were senior confidential sources speaking on the very condition they remained anonymous and unidentifiable. 

Given the situation within Iran, no whistle-blower or informant could allow their identity to be revealed.  The regime treats unauthorized communication with foreign media, particularly Western outlets, as treasonable offenses liable to the death penalty. ​

Madadi provides no information about how contact was made with these officials or why they agreed to talk to him, but despite the known dangers, Iranian officials do reach out to Western journalists and also to anti-regime organizations sited abroad.  

GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran) is an independent Netherlands-based research foundation. In June 2024, it conducted a survey to measure support within Iran for regime change.  It found that more than 80% of those polled were in favor.

It is not, therefore, surprising that internal politics can result in moderates leaking information damaging to hardliners, especially those aligned with the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).​  Moreover some officials cultivate Western media contacts as insurance in case they need to flee Iran or seek asylum in the future.  ​Given Iran's systematic persecution of anyone suspected of providing information to Western media, the personal courage required for these officials to talk to the outside world, even if under the cloak of anonymity, should be recognized.

            As for the revelations passed on to Madadi, available evidence suggests there is indeed some substance to them.

The Houthis’ rift with Iran goes back to April, when the ayatollahs, fearful of being drawn into direct conflict with America, failed to come to their aid during heavy US strikes.  Ever since the Houthis, by broadening alliances and augmenting supply lines, have been trying to wean themselves off full blown Iranian support.

In response, Iran dispatched a senior IRGC commander, Abdolreza Shahlaei of the Quds Force, to Sana'a in mid-November in a bid to restore Iranian influence.

According to the Telegraph report, an Iranian official told journalist Madadi that Shahlaei was tasked with encouraging the Houthis to "cooperate more than before, as they are the only operational group left" in Iran's weakened proxy network.​ The fact that Tehran felt compelled to send such a high-ranking commander to Yemen highlights both the strained relationship and Iran's desperate attempt to maintain influence over its last major functioning proxy.​

   The Iranian officials who told Madadi about Houthi defiance also revealed that Iraqi militia groups are increasingly ignoring Tehran's directives.  These militias, according to recent reports, are being subjected to ever greater control by Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, backed by an Iraqi electorate increasingly favoring sovereignty over Iranian patronage.  To prevent Iraq from being drawn into the Israel-Iran conflict in June, Sudani reportedly blocked dozens of attempted attacks on Israel by his Iran-backed militias.​

Hezbollah, once the steel spine of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, is still reeling from Israel's September 2024 escalation which decimated its command structure and weapons stockpiles. The group lost its leader Hassan Nasrallah (killed September 2024), his presumed successor Hashem Safieddine, military commanders Ibrahim Akil and Ali Karaki, and most recently chief military commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai (killed November 23, 2025).  Hezbollah, which retains a fair amount of political power in Lebanon, is attempting to counter the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm the organization altogether.

Syria under its once-president Bashir Al Assad was often described as the lynch pin of the Axis of Resistance.  As well as serving as a base for IRGC operations, it provided Iran's essential land corridor for supplying weapons and materiel to Hezbollah in Lebanon.  After investing massive military support and billions of dollars to prop up Assad since 2011, Iran's abrupt withdrawal from Syria exposed Tehran's strategic and military weakness.  

In Gaza, the long-term viability of Hamas remains an open question.  There is evidence of attempts by the remaining leadership to re-establish control in the areas vacated by the IDF, but the organization as a whole has nominally signed up to the Trump 20-point peace plan which requires them to abandon any attempt to have a say in the governance of Gaza, and to disarm.   

          The Gaza ceasefire has effectively cut off what remains of Hamas from operational coordination with Iran.​

Finally, and perhaps most telling of all, the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June 2025 fully exposed the disintegration of the Axis. Israel conducted approximately 360 airstrikes across 27 Iranian provinces, targeting military installations, air defense systems and nuclear facilities, and killing at least 30 senior IRGC commanders and 11 nuclear scientists.​

Throughout this direct assault on Iranian territory, Iran's proxy network was nowhere to be seen. Despite decades of rhetoric about the Axis providing "forward defense" and deterrence, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis took virtually no offensive action against Israel or the US throughout the period Iran's nuclear facilities were under attack.

What was once a relatively coherent strategic network under Iranian guidance seems to have devolved, for the moment at least, into a collection of entities pursuing parochial interests, while maintaining loose ideological and material ties to Tehran.​

 
Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iran's axis of resistance is crumbling", 8 December 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-879462 

 

Hezbollah disarmament falters

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 December 2025

 Back in September Lebanon’s army chief Rodolphe Haykal presented the government with a plan to ensure that, by the end of 2025, Hezbollah would be fully disarmed and military hardware would be held exclusively by Lebanon’s state forces.  The cabinet authorized the army to begin implementing it immediately.

   Various leaks to the media gradually revealed that the army’s plan is called “Homeland Shield”, and that its strategy is to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons in five phases, starting south of the Litani River.

It also emerged that President Joseph Aoun has rejected the idea of replicating Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, where Iran-backed paramilitary groups have been integrated into Iraq’s security forces.  He is opposed to creating a distinct Hezbollah entity within the army. He wants Hezbollah fighters to be recruited into Lebanon’s armed forces only if they meet the same criteria as all other applicants – academic qualifications, entrance exams, and training.

According to the US military, the Lebanese Army has cleared away nearly 10,000 Hezbollah rockets and 400 missiles since the ceasefire in late November 2024.   Aoun has claimed that up to 85% of the area south of the Litani River is now free of Hezbollah weapons. 

On October 22, 2025, prime minister Nawaf Salam said that ultimately Hezbollah “will need to return to being a regular political party without a military arm.” Hezbollah leaders, however, have made it clear that they oppose being wholly disarmed.  Assuming that Lebanon will be permanently in conflict with Israel, they regard themselves as essential to the national effort.

The Meir Amit intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) was founded in 2001 to specialize in matters related to terrorism and intelligence.  In a report published on October 30, ITIC said it believed the Lebanese Army will aim to complete its operations south of the Litani by the end of 2025, but that in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, it will be hindered from acting because the government ​is shying away from a confrontation with Hezbollah that could escalate into civil war. 

In short, ITIC believes that the original army plan was far too ambitious in assessing that Hezbollah’s disarmament could be a​ccomplished by the year’s end, and that instead of all five phases, only phase one is likely to have been a​chieved.

ITIC believes Hezbollah may agree in principle to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, but in exchange for guarantees.  These would include protection against Israeli targeted ​assassinations, and the integration of the organization’s operatives into the security functions of the state.  The ITIC says it believes the Lebanese government, in an effort to show flexibility, will indeed try to persuade the international community, especially the US, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon.

Rumours abound in the Arab media about the uneasy standoff between Lebanon’s leaders and Hezbollah.  “Sources” assert that although the Army knows about many Hezbollah military stockpiles, it desists from raiding them because ​the offices of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament ​have agreed that any direct confrontation with Hezbollah could plunge the country into civil war.

The US has shown growing impatience with the Lebanese government’s velvet glove approach to carrying through Hezbollah’s disarmament.  General Haykal was scheduled to travel to Washington on November 18 for high-level meetings with US officials regarding military assistance, border security, and efforts to bring all armed groups in Lebanon under state authority. ​ Just before Haykal’s planned departure​, the trip was ​abruptly​ canceled.

The immediate trigger was a public statement by the Lebanese army on November 16 condemning Israeli attacks near the southern border.  Notably avoiding any reference to Hezbollah’s significant armed presence independent of the state, the statement referred to Israel as "the enemy."  

Understandably, US officials interpreted the army statement as aligning with Hezbollah's narrative. US policymakers and members of Congress criticized the Lebanese army. Senator Lindsey Graham publicly condemning Haykal’s leadership, calling the rhetoric a setback for efforts at regional stabilization.

This episode seems to have galvanized President Aoun and prime minister Salam into action. 

On November 20 Salam said at a governmental press briefing at the presidential palace in Baabda, Lebanon: “Lebanon is currently open to engaging with Israel in a partnership for disempowering Hezbollah.”  He added that Lebanon would seek US help in advancing negotiations in the context of escalating Israeli strikes on Hezbollah positions.

The next day in a televised speech, President Aoun is reported by international media as saying that Lebanon is “ready for negotiations” with Israel, focused on “ending Israeli strikes” and “Israeli withdrawal from five outposts in Lebanese territory”.

So what is the current position?

Open-source maps show that parts of southern Lebanon previously strongly associated with Hezbollah are now increasingly coming under the Lebanese Army’s control.  According to one source, out of some 265 identified Hezbollah positions in that zone, around 190 have been ceded to the Lebanese Army.

Meanwhile Hezbollah’s infrastructure has been significantly degraded.  In particular, Hezbollah’s elite unit, the Radwan Force, has taken a serious hit: reports indicate that up to 80% of its weapons systems and tunnel infrastructure have been damaged or lost.  Moreover it is estimated that some 4,500 of its operatives have been killed and about 9,000 wounded. representing a very large chunk of its active force.

And yet, despite losses, Hezbollah is not defunct. Analysts argue that though it is undoubtedly weaker, it remains resilient.  Its survival depends on achieving a balance between the pressure to disarm, financial constraints, and its role in Lebanese politics.

To do so, it is attempting a “reset”.  By acceding to a partial disarmament, it may be able to retain a reduced but still meaningful arsenal — enough to deter, survive, and remain politically relevant.

        On the other hand Israel is not letting up.  Israel continues targeting Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild, and on November 23 eliminated its senior commander, Haytham Tabatabai. 

The English poet Alexander Pope catches the position of the Lebanese government in a nutshell:  "Willing to wound, yet afraid to strike."   Its equivocation means that Hezbollah could yet survive in perhaps a more limited, but still highly dangerous, form.

Published in the Jerusalem Report, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Lebanon 'reset': Hezbollah may survive in more limited, but dangerous, form", 1 December 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-876711