Published in the Jerusalem Post, 2 June 2026
One
noteworthy feature of the SMDA pact is an explicit collective‑defense clause
that closely echoes NATO’s Article 5, namely that “any attack on one country
will be viewed as an attack on both.” This has led some commentators to
dub the agreement an Islamic NATO.
This
Pakistan-Saudi arrangement, according to Pakistani ministers, is not only capable
of being expanded, but action is in hand to do so. Turkey and Qatar have been mentioned
as the first states to turn the bilateral pact into a collective‑security
grouping. Egypt is a fifth potential
member.
Back
in January Turkey was said to be in advanced discussions to join the SMDA pact.
It seemed a natural and appropriate extension of an existing partnership. Turkey
is Pakistan’s second‑largest arms supplier, and the military‑industrial connection
is flourishing in terms of aircraft, drones, and naval assets.
In an interview with Reuters, reported on January 15, 2026, Pakistan’s Minister for Defense Production, Raza Hayat Harraj, said: “The Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Turkey trilateral agreement is something that is already in the pipeline.”
His words presaged an axis that grouped
key Sunni powers (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar, potentially Egypt) on
one side of a regional balance, with Iran’s mainly Shi’ite, but essentially
anti-Israel, network (Iran, Iraq‑based pro-Iran militias, Hamas, Hezbollah,
Houthis, etc.) on the other.
However, something of a change of
tone seemed to emerge in a interview given to the Bloomberg news agency by
Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif on May 13. While discussing the idea
that Turkey and Qatar may join the mutual defense cooperation pact between
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Asif said “if Qatar and Turkey also join this
existing agreement, it will be a welcome development” – a comment that clearly viewed
their participation as a possibility rather than “in the pipeline,” as his
ministerial colleague had claimed back in January.
Whether there has been a cooling
of enthusiasm on Pakistan’s part is difficult to assess. It is just possible that the glitch is caused
by the prospect of a tighter Turkish-Saudi connection. They remain, in many arenas, competitors for
leadership of the Sunni world. Moreover, despite the recent rapprochement, relations have been anything but warm over some
of the past eight years.
It was on October 2, 2018 that Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated inside the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul. Turkey reacted with fury. In a series of speeches and leaks, Turkey’s President Erdogan called the murder “savage,” said it was ordered from the “highest levels” of the Saudi state, and demanded the extradition of the Saudi suspects.
Turkish authorities opened a
criminal investigation, searched the Saudi consulate and the consul’s
residence, and leaked detailed allegations to the media about Khashoggi’s
strangling, dismemberment and the pre‑planned nature of the operation. Turkey then launched a trial in absentia of
26 Saudis, deepening the rift with Saudi Arabia, which insisted its own courts
had jurisdiction.
The thaw took a few years to develop. Finally on April 7, 2022 an Istanbul court
halted the trial and transferred the Khashoggi case to Saudi Arabia. On the 28th Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia, met
King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and said he hoped “to
launch a new era”. On June 21, 2022,
MBS paid his first visit to Turkey since 2018.
On the face of it, Turkish-Saudi relations should be firmly re‑established, but negotiations aimed at bringing Turkey into the Pakistan–Saudi security pact have been dragging on now for half a year, and the arrangement is still not ready to be implemented. Instead, the political narrative has drifted toward a flexible framework in which Turkey would be less than a full partner.
If actually completed
on the lines originally envisaged, the new Sunni axis would amalgamate four
formidable components: Saudi and Qatari financial resources and arms‑procurement;
Turkey’s NATO‑standard conventional forces and advanced defense‑industrial
base; Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and ballistic‑missile capabilities; and
Egypt’s massed conventional army, control of the Suez corridor, and diplomatic
weight in Arab and Gulf security affairs.
These powerful elements could
theoretically give it the ability to deter conventional attacks and influence
conflicts across the Middle East and beyond. In reality,
however, converting the security pact into a tightly disciplined
combat-ready military alliance is less than likely. Internal
divergences, domestic constraints, and each state’s ties to Washington,
Beijing, Moscow and Brussels would rule it out.
Even so, several interested
parties and groupings perceive this Sunni axis as at least potentially
threatening.
Iran and its allies would
naturally be apprehensive about the emergence of a Sunni power bloc
opposed to the Iranian regime’s bid for regional and religious dominance
in the Middle East, and widely seen as a counterweight to Iran’s
Axis of Resistance.
Indian analysts have already warned
that a consolidated Pakistan–Saudi–Turkey security structure, backed by oil
wealth and Pakistani nuclear capability, would upset the current security
balance and challenge India’s defense environment.
Some Israeli strategic
commentators believe that a more cohesive Sunni military grouping involving
Turkey and Qatar could constrain Israel’s operational freedom. Both Turkey and Qatar have a history of supporting
Hamas.
Some eastern Mediterranean states,
such as Greece, Cyprus and Armenia, are already at odds with Ankara, and view with
concern the prospect of Turkey being backed in the future by Gulf money and
Pakistani deterrence.
But all this calculation seems
premature. Extending the Pakistan-Saudi defense and security pact to
embrace other Sunni states, such as Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, seems far
from imminent. Even Turkey, apparently on the verge of full accession back
in January, is still hovering in the wings, talking about the possibility.
In short, if the enhanced alliance emerges it would indeed be a significant new factor in the region’s political alignment. Even in prospect it is enough to shape calculations in Tehran, New Delhi, Jerusalem and Washington.
But a new Sunni axis simply does not yet exist.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-897859
