Hezbollah disarmament falters

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 December 2025

 Back in September Lebanon’s army chief Rodolphe Haykal presented the government with a plan to ensure that, by the end of 2025, Hezbollah would be fully disarmed and military hardware would be held exclusively by Lebanon’s state forces.  The cabinet authorized the army to begin implementing it immediately.

   Various leaks to the media gradually revealed that the army’s plan is called “Homeland Shield”, and that its strategy is to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons in five phases, starting south of the Litani River.

It also emerged that President Joseph Aoun has rejected the idea of replicating Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, where Iran-backed paramilitary groups have been integrated into Iraq’s security forces.  He is opposed to creating a distinct Hezbollah entity within the army. He wants Hezbollah fighters to be recruited into Lebanon’s armed forces only if they meet the same criteria as all other applicants – academic qualifications, entrance exams, and training.

According to the US military, the Lebanese Army has cleared away nearly 10,000 Hezbollah rockets and 400 missiles since the ceasefire in late November 2024.   Aoun has claimed that up to 85% of the area south of the Litani River is now free of Hezbollah weapons. 

On October 22, 2025, prime minister Nawaf Salam said that ultimately Hezbollah “will need to return to being a regular political party without a military arm.” Hezbollah leaders, however, have made it clear that they oppose being wholly disarmed.  Assuming that Lebanon will be permanently in conflict with Israel, they regard themselves as essential to the national effort.

The Meir Amit intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) was founded in 2001 to specialize in matters related to terrorism and intelligence.  In a report published on October 30, ITIC said it believed the Lebanese Army will aim to complete its operations south of the Litani by the end of 2025, but that in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, it will be hindered from acting because the government ​is shying away from a confrontation with Hezbollah that could escalate into civil war. 

In short, ITIC believes that the original army plan was far too ambitious in assessing that Hezbollah’s disarmament could be a​ccomplished by the year’s end, and that instead of all five phases, only phase one is likely to have been a​chieved.

ITIC believes Hezbollah may agree in principle to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, but in exchange for guarantees.  These would include protection against Israeli targeted ​assassinations, and the integration of the organization’s operatives into the security functions of the state.  The ITIC says it believes the Lebanese government, in an effort to show flexibility, will indeed try to persuade the international community, especially the US, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon.

Rumours abound in the Arab media about the uneasy standoff between Lebanon’s leaders and Hezbollah.  “Sources” assert that although the Army knows about many Hezbollah military stockpiles, it desists from raiding them because ​the offices of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament ​have agreed that any direct confrontation with Hezbollah could plunge the country into civil war.

The US has shown growing impatience with the Lebanese government’s velvet glove approach to carrying through Hezbollah’s disarmament.  General Haykal was scheduled to travel to Washington on November 18 for high-level meetings with US officials regarding military assistance, border security, and efforts to bring all armed groups in Lebanon under state authority. ​ Just before Haykal’s planned departure​, the trip was ​abruptly​ canceled.

The immediate trigger was a public statement by the Lebanese army on November 16 condemning Israeli attacks near the southern border.  Notably avoiding any reference to Hezbollah’s significant armed presence independent of the state, the statement referred to Israel as "the enemy."  

Understandably, US officials interpreted the army statement as aligning with Hezbollah's narrative. US policymakers and members of Congress criticized the Lebanese army. Senator Lindsey Graham publicly condemning Haykal’s leadership, calling the rhetoric a setback for efforts at regional stabilization.

This episode seems to have galvanized President Aoun and prime minister Salam into action. 

On November 20 Salam said at a governmental press briefing at the presidential palace in Baabda, Lebanon: “Lebanon is currently open to engaging with Israel in a partnership for disempowering Hezbollah.”  He added that Lebanon would seek US help in advancing negotiations in the context of escalating Israeli strikes on Hezbollah positions.

The next day in a televised speech, President Aoun is reported by international media as saying that Lebanon is “ready for negotiations” with Israel, focused on “ending Israeli strikes” and “Israeli withdrawal from five outposts in Lebanese territory”.

So what is the current position?

Open-source maps show that parts of southern Lebanon previously strongly associated with Hezbollah are now increasingly coming under the Lebanese Army’s control.  According to one source, out of some 265 identified Hezbollah positions in that zone, around 190 have been ceded to the Lebanese Army.

Meanwhile Hezbollah’s infrastructure has been significantly degraded.  In particular, Hezbollah’s elite unit, the Radwan Force, has taken a serious hit: reports indicate that up to 80% of its weapons systems and tunnel infrastructure have been damaged or lost.  Moreover it is estimated that some 4,500 of its operatives have been killed and about 9,000 wounded. representing a very large chunk of its active force.

And yet, despite losses, Hezbollah is not defunct. Analysts argue that though it is undoubtedly weaker, it remains resilient.  Its survival depends on achieving a balance between the pressure to disarm, financial constraints, and its role in Lebanese politics.

To do so, it is attempting a “reset”.  By acceding to a partial disarmament, it may be able to retain a reduced but still meaningful arsenal — enough to deter, survive, and remain politically relevant.

        On the other hand Israel is not letting up.  Israel continues targeting Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild, and on November 23 eliminated its senior commander, Haytham Tabatabai. 

The English poet Alexander Pope catches the position of the Lebanese government in a nutshell:  "Willing to wound, yet afraid to strike."   Its equivocation means that Hezbollah could yet survive in perhaps a more limited, but still highly dangerous, form.

Published in the Jerusalem Report, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Lebanon 'reset': Hezbollah may survive in more limited, but dangerous, form", 1 December 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-876711  

The global network of Israel’s friends

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 24 November 2025

With Israel the object of so much vilification from prominent individuals, organizations, UN agencies, and judicial bodies, it is good to consider the work of the worldwide pro-Israel advocacy organization called the Israel Allies Foundation.

          The IAF coordinates the pro-Israel activities of scores of parliamentary groups across the globe. Sharing a faith-based belief in Israel’s right to exist in peace, the members of these groups translate their support into political action within their home countries’ legislatures. In the US and some other countries, such groups are known as caucuses; in others, they’re known as lobbies or pressure groups.

          On November 10, Albania’s parliament in Tirana became the 64th national parliament to welcome an IAF caucus, bringing together members of its Socialist and Democratic parties.

The IAF traces its beginnings to 2004, when a group of Knesset members, noting the growing support for Israel in the Christian world, formed the Knesset Christian Allies Caucus. Spanning the spectrum of political parties in Israel, the group aimed to develop better ties between Knesset members and pro-Israel Christian leaders worldwide. In 2006, the US House of Representatives formed the first reciprocal lobby – the Congressional Israel Allies Caucus.

          The IAF itself was formed in 2007 and since then has established a widespread network of pro-Israel politicians. The organization says its purpose, based on Judeo-Christian values, is to promote cooperation among politicians worldwide who support the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace with secure borders.

          Over the past year, the IAF has undertaken an impressive programme. It convened top lawmakers in a concerted effort to oppose determinations of the International Criminal Court widely perceived as hostile to Israel. It published the 2025 edition of the “Israel’s Top 50 Christian Allies” list to honor faith leaders supporting Israel worldwide, and in July, it launched new caucuses in six African countries: Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Seychelles, Gabon, and Guinea, expanding faith-based support for Israel on the continent.

          In addition, it coordinated the passage of high-profile parliamentary resolutions condemning antisemitism, especially in Canada, and organized joint marches with both Jewish and Christian parliamentarians against Holocaust denial and hate crimes.

          Not least, it has organized international diplomacy conferences, such as the Oslo Symposium, held in February/March 2025, to counter antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Europe. The Symposium, largely indebted to the Norway-Israel Allies Caucus, saw intensified efforts to strengthen Israel-Norway relations and counter rising antisemitism and diplomatic friction arising from the Gaza conflict.

          In May, the US Congressional Israel Allies Caucus celebrated Israel’s Independence Day with a major advocacy day involving more than 300 rabbis, pastors, congresspeople, and international guests. It followed this with a reception on Capitol Hill. With bipartisan participation from lawmakers and international dignitaries, the event showcased cross-continental support for Israel.

          The IAF’s pro-Israel advocacy program is set to gather momentum in 2026. A major $200 million US-Israel joint fund for quantum and AI research – possibly expanded to include Gulf states and other Abraham Accords nations – is planned to begin operations in the new year. The fund aims to facilitate joint research and development, regional research hubs, and broader geopolitical alignment and is backed by Israeli, American, UAE, and Saudi stakeholders.

          Perhaps the most important, and potentially the most impactful, undertaking of the IAF has been its partnership with the Genesis Prize Foundation in support of the “Isaac Accords.” The Isaac Accords, modelled on the Abraham Accords, are a diplomatic initiative by Argentinian President Javier Milei aimed at strengthening ties between Israel and a range of Latin American countries.

          Milei officially launched the Isaac Accords on August 12, 2025, announcing the initiative as a comprehensive effort to deepen diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between Israel and select Latin American countries.

          “The Isaac Accords,” he said at the launch, “are a vehicle to promote bold vision and encourage other Latin American leaders to stand with Israel, confront antisemitism, and reject the ideologies of terror that threaten our shared values and freedoms. They seek to foster close cooperation between Latin American governments and Israel in areas crucial to development, security, and prosperity.”

          The American Friends of the Isaac Accords (AFOIA), founded by The Genesis Prize Foundation using Milei’s prize funds, is supporting the program, which includes cooperation in areas such as agriculture, cyberdefense, finance, water technology, energy, healthcare, education, and culture.

          The AFOIA also provides grants and supports programs connecting Israeli technological and medical expertise with Latin American markets, mobilizing pro-Israel politicians, and building educational and grassroots exchanges. The Accords have already launched several collaboration projects, including the ILAN Israel Innovation Network and new healthcare, education, and political engagement programs.

          In short, the Isaac Accords aim to broaden economic, diplomatic, cultural, and educational cooperation at a time when much of Latin America is distancing itself from Israel. They intend to create a multilateral network of support for Israel in Latin America built on biomedical, tech, educational, and diplomatic projects, with both clear achievements and expansive ambitions for the coming years.

          The initiative began with Israel, Argentina, Uruguay, Panama, and Costa Rica and has ambitions to expand to Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and possibly El Salvador by 2026. Also in the frame for the future are the three Latin American countries that have moved their Israel embassies to Jerusalem: Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay. They joined the US, Kosovo, and Papua New Guinea in bringing the number of Jerusalem-sited embassies to six.

          Paraguay’s President Santiago Pena formally inaugurated the embassy in Jerusalem on December 12, 2024, a result of Paraguay’s longstanding pro-Israel policy.

          So despite a global context where some Latin American states are cutting or downgrading ties with Israel, the Isaac Accords have consolidated a core bloc of pro-Israel countries and elevated bilateral trade and innovation exchanges.

          As for the Israel Allies Foundation Europe, it plans further expansion in 2026 of its network of parliamentary caucuses. It will be targeting countries that currently lack active parliamentary IAF groups in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, and possibly Scandinavia. Alongside extending the current network, the IAf intends to reinforce existing caucuses throughout Europe by way of a proactive policy of regional conferences and thematic campaigns.

          How goes that British saying? More power to their elbow!

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Israel Allies Foundation expands global pro-Israel network", 24 November 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-874864

Published in Eurasia Review, 28 November 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/28112025-the-global-network-of-israels-friends-oped/

Rebuilding Gaza

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 17 November 2025

Sooner or later the regeneration of Gaza will have to be tackled.  Before too long, assuming the ceasefire holds, the nations which support President Donald Trump’s peace plan will be initiating a reconstruction program – a task so huge in scale and cost that it nearly beggars the imagination.  In mid-October the UN Development Program (UNDP), World Bank, and EU jointly raised their estimate for full reconstruction to about $70 billion, replacing the earlier $53 billion estimate.

Preliminary but essential steps, especially in Gaza City but also throughout the Strip.  will be to remove the mountains of rubble, clear away unexploded ordnance, and provide temporary housing for families returning to mere bomb sites.

            After that, an early priority will be to build hundreds of thousands of new permanent housing units.  Allied to this will be the construction of necessary infrastructure such as water and sewage, electricity and gas grids, roads, telecommunication networks, shops and markets.  Egypt’s widely backed plan for the reconstruction of Gaza, officially adopted and endorsed by the Arab League on March 4, remains a central blueprint for the coordinated multi-national recovery agenda for Gaza.  It envisages “a commercial port and an airport”, together with industrial and commercial zones to include factories and warehouses.

   The whole reconstruction project is expected to last at least a decade, and the US-backed Board of Peace is being established to supervise the financing and contracting process.​

WIRED, a respected monthly publication, is focused on how technology can impact positively on culture, business, and science. On October 14 it featured a comprehensive plan to reconstruct Gaza.  Conceived by a small group of entrepreneurs, it had, they affirmed, been shared with Trump administration officials.  When discussing the lucrative contracts that will be on offer once the program gets under way, it highlighted more than two dozen multinational corporations (some of whom told WIRED they did not know they had been named).

 In fact the Gaza rebuilding environment is already a fiercely contested global marketplace. The reconstruction process has triggered intense lobbying and bidding from dozens of international consortia.​ Leading Turkish and Egyptian construction firms are already openly competing for contracts against major players from the US, Britain, the EU, the Gulf states, and beyond. 

Gulf states, especially Qatar and the UAE, have pledged funds and are pressing to influence the process.  Western diplomatic efforts, such as joint investment conferences hosted by Britain, Egypt, and Palestinian authorities, underline the competitive scramble for Gaza contracts.

Turkey’s involvement in Trump’s peace plan is heavily driven by self-interest — a mix of geopolitical ambition, economic opportunity, and domestic political gain.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan views the peace initiative as a vehicle for reasserting Turkey’s regional power and enhancing its industrial sector. Turkish officials have openly said they aim to play a leading role in rebuilding Gaza, and Turkish construction and aid organizations are already active. Turkey’s Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) has begun clearing debris and reopening roads in Gaza, and Turkish authorities have stated they are ready to “mobilize companies, institutions, and financial mechanisms” for the wider reconstruction. Turkish firms are preparing bids for contracts covering infrastructure, housing, ports, and utilities.​

Egyptian contractors are also aggressively positioning themselves for the rebuilding phase. Cairo-based firms are compiling bids and prequalification documents, aiming to leverage Egypt’s proximity, supply chains, and construction materials surplus.

US firms are expected to participate. Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff confirmed that while “contractors from all of the Middle Eastern countries” are already in discussions, American companies — particularly in technology, infrastructure, and logistics — will have access through the Board of Peace procurement process. Major pro-Trump tech investors are rumored to be preparing to fund reconstruction-linked ventures.​

Erdogan’s ambition to dominate the Sunni Muslim world has long been an irritant in Arab circles.  On October 20, Arab political commentator Ayman Abdel Nour said:  "Erdogan is a master in…taking advantage of events, turning them to his own interest and taking credit for them.  Obviously the Gulf countries were not happy about Turkey taking a leading role on Gaza, but at the same time they wanted this conflict to end, to see an agreement and to see Hamas sidelined."

Lebanese analyst Sarkis Naoum said that while Arab states shared an interest with Turkey in ending the war, recalling the long history of Ottoman imperial rule in the region Turkey’s increased prominence was a worry for them.

Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel has been amply demonstrated time and again, yet even as he vilifies prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in public, he has consistently demonstrated a calculated pragmatism.  Turkish and Israeli defense and intelligence contacts remain in place and operational, particularly in counterterrorism and energy coordination.  

In his recent article on Turkish-Israel relations, Joseph Epstein describes this dynamic as “cooperation through gritted teeth”.

Basically Erdogan, while publicly maintaining his antisemitic or anti-Zionist narrative, actually pursues a strategy, incorporating cooperation with Israel, aimed at securing geopolitical and economic benefits.​ Erdogan’s anti-Israel stance, says Epstein, is largely public posturing that disguises a transactional engagement strategy.

Erdogan’s agreement to back Trump’s Gaza peace plan, for example, gained him renewed goodwill in Washington, helped toward lifting US sanctions, securing F-16 and F-35 fighter aircraft, and obtaining mediation influence in postwar Syria and Gaza.  By vilifying Israel publicly while cooperating with it under US sponsorship, he satisfies nationalist and Islamist audiences at home, preserves strategic flexibility abroad, and repositions Turkey as an indispensable intermediary in the new Middle East order.

The list of potential commercial and industrial organizations keen to become involved in the lucrative opportunities soon to be on offer in Gaza is large and growing.  Companies like the Saudi Arabian Saudi Tabreed (district cooling) and the state-owned United Arab Emirates Masdar (renewable energy) are in the running to benefit from Gaza's multi-billion reconstruction plan. In addition, Middle East SWFs (Sovereign Wealth Funds) are accelerating investments in projects like green energy, possibly integral to Gaza’s plan.  US firms with expertise in post-conflict security systems are likely to secure contracts.  

In short, Gaza’s forthcoming regeneration program offers significant investment, industrial and commercial opportunities for a wide range of potential players both regional and international.  The game is afoot.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "The game is afoot: the race to rebuild Gaza and win its major investment opportunities", 17 November 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-874017

Published in Eurasia Review, 21 November 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/21112025-rebuilding-gaza-oped/

BBC bias – new turmoil

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 10 November 2025

November 9 saw the resignations of both Tim Davie, BBC Director-General and Deborah Turness, its head of news.

It was only two months ago, on September 9, that the Culture, Media and Sport Committee of the House of Commons summoned Davie and BBC Chairman, Dr Samir Shah, to answer in person allegations of bias, editorial failures, and recent scandals, including how the BBC had come to transmit a TV program about the Gaza war that turned out to have been narrated by the son of a Hamas official. 

Shortly afterward, the broadcasting regulator Ofcom found that the film was "materially misleading", and ordered the BBC to tell its audience as much.  It was removed from the streaming service.

 Now a new furor is brewing.  On November 4 the UK’s Daily Telegraph revealed the contents of a 19-page whistle-blowing document, already circulated to the 14 members of the BBC Board of Governors, listing numerous examples of blatant bias in BBC news coverage. References to the Gaza war abound, and it also cites one egregious instance of deliberately faked news.

         Michael Prescott is a respected journalist who served as adviser to the BBC’s Editorial Guidelines and Standards Committee (EGSC) for three years.  He resigned in June 2025 because, as he explained, his repeated warnings about systemic bias and misleading coverage had been dismissed or ignored.  Direct appeals to BBC’s top executives, including the chairman, he said, had resulted in no meaningful response.  It was the consequent frustration, leading eventually to despair, that prompted his resignation.

Out of office, Prescott wrote his 19-page memo, which includes a prime example of unethical editorial action already reported by him to senior management with no result.  Its publication by the Telegraph has plunged the BBC into crisis.

Just ahead of the US 2024 presidential election the BBC broadcast an edition of its flagship current affairs program “Panorama”.  It contained a version of Donald Trump’s January 6, 2021 speech, made just after he had lost that election to Joe Biden. The speech was deliberately “doctored” to make it appear that Trump had incited the riots in the Capitol that followed.

What Trump said was: "We're going to walk down to the Capitol, and we're going to cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women."

However, in Panorama's edit, he was shown saying: "We're going to walk down to the Capitol... and I'll be there with you. And we fight. We fight like hell."

The two sections of the speech that were edited together were more than 50 minutes apart.  The "fight like hell" comment was taken from a section where President Trump discussed how "corrupt" US elections were.

Following the doctored speech, the program cut to scenes of flag-waving individuals and the Proud Boys group marching toward the Capitol, the clear implication being that Trump’s words had led to the march.  In fact the marching sequence had been filmed before Trump began to speak.

When the issue was raised with managers, said Prescott, they "refused to accept there had been a breach of standards".

Another issue that particularly concerned Prescott relates to BBC Arabic, the TV and digital news service. He reveals that throughout the Gaza war it gave a platform to contributors known to have made extreme antisemitic comments.

One journalist who had said online that Jews should be burned “as Hitler did”, appeared as a guest on BBC Arabic 244 times in 18 months.  Another, who described Israelis as less than human and Jews as “devils”, appeared on BBC Arabic 522 times between November 2023 and April 2025.

Prescott describes the “critically different treatment” between the main BBC news website and BBC Arabic of a rocket attack on a football game in the village of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights in July 2024 that claimed the lives of nine children.  BBC Arabic gave greater prominence to Hezbollah’s denials, did not mention the deaths of children, and the next day followed up with a report about claims that Israel faked the attack.

“It is hard to conclude anything other than that BBC Arabic’s story treatment was designed to minimize Israeli suffering and paint Israel as the aggressor,” wrote Prescott.

He refers to a report delivered to the EGCS in January 2025 by its senior editorial adviser.  In a period under review the main BBC website had 19 separate stories about the Israeli hostages, while BBC Arabic had none. There were four articles critical of Hamas on the main website and none on BBC Arabic, but every article critical of Israel that appeared on the main website was replicated by BBC Arabic.

 That, said Prescott, "should have prompted urgent action by the Executive but it did not.” Nor did a number of other examples.   

For instance, an internal review of the BBC’s reporting on the death toll in Gaza concluded that the BBC had given “unjustifiable weight” to highly disputed figures emanating from Hamas.  Moreover the BBC repeatedly stated on radio and TV, by Jeremy Bowen, the BBC’s International Editor, among others, that the International Court of Justice had ruled in January 2024 that there was a “plausible case of genocide” in Gaza.  But the former ICJ president, Judge Joan Donoghue, told the BBC’s HardTalk program that the media had widely misinterpreted its findings, and it was not correct to say the ICJ had found a plausible case of genocide.  It took months for the BBC to issue a clarification.

The parliamentary committee will be questioning Prescott this coming Wednesday. It has also written to BBC chairman Samir Shah, demanding answers about the broadcaster’s impartiality. 

Culture Minister Lisa Nandy has told the BBC it must “thoroughly investigate” the issues that Prescott has brought to light.

Trump's press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, described the speech doctored by the BBC as "purposefully, dishonestly, selectively edited,"  and condemned the broadcaster for disseminating "fake news".    

Several organizations, including CAMERA (Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis), have claimed the memo vindicates their longstanding complaints about BBC coverage of Israel and antisemitism.  Political figures, including Opposition leader Kemi Badenoch and former prime minister Boris Johnson, have demanded explanations and consequences for those responsible for editorial misconduct at the BBC.

The resignations of Davie and Turness will bring no end to this ruckus.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Whistleblower journalist exposes BBC bias", 10 November 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-873221

Ireland’s anti-Israel president

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 November 2025

On October 26 the people of Ireland voted overwhelmingly for Catherine Connolly as their new president.  Receiving 63% of first-preference votes, she broke a record in Irish presidential election history and won a landslide victory.

Connolly, a left-wing politician with a history of pro-Palestinian advocacy and anti-Israel invective, is one of Europe’s most outspoken critics of Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza.  She has labelled Israel “a terrorist state”, asserted that “Israel has committed genocide in Gaza”, and has pledged to “stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people as long as I have breath in my body”.

In speeches before her election she condemned Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel as a war crime, but criticized the Irish government and EU institutions for “standing idly by” and failing to enforce the Genocide Convention against Israel. She called for sanctions.​

Approving the recent recognition of Palestinian statehood by a clutch of governments, she disagreed with those who insisted that Hamas should be excluded from the future governance of Gaza.  She said it is “not for” foreign leaders like UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer to dictate who governs Palestinians, maintaining that “Hamas is part of the fabric of the Palestinian people”, having been “democratically elected”.

Her stance on Gaza, Hamas and Israel featured prominently during her presidential campaign.  It led, inevitably, to strong opposition from Jewish and pro-Israel voices. Even some political allies distanced themselves from her comments.

Those opposing her views clearly had only a minimal effect on the result of the election.  What Connolly’s overwhelming victory clearly demonstrates is the overwhelmingly strong pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel current in Irish public opinion. 

The Irish people and their leaders have for decades seemed fixated on the idea that the situation in what was once Mandate Palestine is a sort of reiteration of their own struggle for independence.

Most Irish politicians and commentators on the subject seem blind to the historic and inextricable connection of the Jewish people to the Holy Land, and the fact that on July 24, 1922 the Council of the League of Nations voted unanimously in favor of establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.  Nor that on November 29, 1947 the UN General Assembly voted to divide Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab.

Majority Irish opinion regards the Palestinian Arabs as a Middle East version of themselves, struggling against ruthless colonialist settlers – the English in their case, Israel as regards the Palestinians. Their own unhappy history bolsters their myopic and misguided view of the situation, devoid as it is of any sort of empathy with the centuries of persecution suffered by the Jewish people, the consequent rise of Zionism, and the UN-endorsed establishment of Israel after two thousand years of the Jewish people’s stateless exile.

Ireland recognized the State of Israel shortly after its creation in 1948, but was cautious in establishing formal diplomatic relations. It was 1993 before it allowed Israel to open an embassy in Dublin – the last EU member to do so.​

On the other hand Ireland was the first EU country to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially.  It did so in 1980, ignoring the indisputable fact that by then the PLO and its affiliates were deeply mired in sometimes horrific acts of terror across the world including airline hijackings, hostage killings and the Munich Olympics massacre. 1980 itself witnessed cross-border attacks, bombings, and assaults on civilian targets in Israel and the occupied territories.

This aspect of the situation may have registered less of an impact in Ireland than it would have done elsewhere because by 1980 terrorism had been a norm on the Irish political scene for some twenty years.

Back in 1920, longstanding religious, political, and cultural differences in Ireland between the Catholic majority and the Protestant minority ​living mostly in its six north-eastern counties had led to the Government of Ireland Act, which partitioned the island into what was later to become an independent Republic, and Northern Ireland which remained part of the UK. 

Civil rights movements in Northern Ireland in the 1960s sought equal rights for Catholics. They were met with a violent backlash from Protestant groups loyal to Britain, and harsh policing by the Protestant-dominated government.  The old Irish Republican Army (IRA) split apart, producing the Provisional IRA, which adopted armed struggle as a means to defend Catholic communities and force British withdrawal from Northern Ireland.

There is documented connection between the IRA together with its Provisional offshoot and Palestinian terrorist organizations, particularly the PLO.  The IRA and PLO established contact in the late 1960s, with IRA members reportedly receiving training alongside Palestinian militants in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.​  The PLO provided the Irish militants with expertise in guerrilla tactics, explosives, and urban terrorism strategies, later put to use when the Provisional IRA spread its terrorist activities to mainland Britain.

The Provisional IRA’s campaign of bombings, assassinations, and guerrilla warfare peaked during the 1970s and early 1980s. This was the height of “The Troubles,” as violence spread between republicans, loyalists, and British forces, leading to hundreds of deaths.

Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA, active in both parts of Ireland, has for decades expressed support for the Palestinian cause, and Irish-Palestinian solidarity is regularly invoked in public discourse across Ireland.​ Nevertheless, as the conflict gradually subsided in the 1990s due to exhaustion on all sides, the Sinn Fein party dedicated itself to pursuing Irish unity through negotiation.  Effective British counterterrorism and declining public support for violence culminated, after many months of painstaking negotiation, in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which established power-sharing in Northern Ireland and effectively ended the armed campaign.

UK opinion formers often suggest that this Republican-Loyalist détente should act as a template for resolving the perennial Israel-Palestine dispute. The factor that differentiates them is that neither side in Northern Ireland ever aimed to destroy the other’s people and occupy its territory, as both Fatah and Hamas have historically sought with regard to Israel.

If the Trump peace plan, which all sides have nominally accepted, manages to bypass that obstacle, a pathway to a permanent resolution of the dispute may yet emerge. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Ireland's anti-Israel president: Connolly's victory shows where the public leans", 3 November 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-872442

Published in Eurasia Review, 7 November 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/07112025-irelands-anti-israel-president-oped/

What’s the future for Hamas?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 27 October 2025

​            The US and most of the Middle East now want to get on with disempowering Hamas, installing effective governance in Gaza, and starting to rebuild the Strip. There is no evading the fact, though, that many of the Arab nations that supported US President Donald Trump’s peace initiative did so relying on point 20 of his 20-point plan:

“…as Gaza redevelopment advances and Palestinian Authority reforms are carried out, the conditions may be established for a credible pathway toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”

The Iranian regime has no interest in any version of the two-state solution; nor do its pawns – Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, to name its main protagonists. Their raison d’être remains what it always has been: the destruction of the State of Israel.

In Iran’s case, that undisguised intention extends to the annihilation of democracy itself, as exemplified by the US, to be followed by the dissemination of its version of Shi’ite Islam across the whole world. Trump’s offer of an olive branch to the Iranian regime, made during his speech to the Knesset on October 13, was rejected out of hand.

Following the Gaza ceasefire and the completion of the hostage-prisoner exchange, Hamas faces a narrow set of strategic choices, with its options greatly reduced because of its weakened position and the upsurge of armed clan opposition.

First, despite the peace plan, Hamas is likely to attempt to rehabilitate its military capacity. Boosted by the return of around 2,000 prisoners and detainees, it will surely seek every opportunity to re-entrench itself within Gaza.

Regarding disarmament, the relevant point in the Trump plan reads: “All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure (including tunnels and weapons manufacturing) will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization under independent monitors…”

Yet demilitarization has yet to be defined. Hamas may reluctantly agree to hand over its heavy weaponry, but it is most unlikely to denude its personnel of their sidearms.

Hamas will surely aim to preserve its resistance credentials and its continued military presence in Gaza. Confidential Hamas strategy documents, some captured on the computer of deceased Hamas leader Yayha Sinwar, and some from elsewhere, suggest its leadership has always been focused on survival, reconstitution, and the maintenance of leverage over Israel and the Palestinian public. The loss of the hostages as its major bargaining chip largely reduces its leverage, but not entirely.

There is, for example, Hamas’s formidable propaganda machine, highly structured and technologically well-equipped, with at least 1,000 specialists operating out of Gaza and beyond. It exploits every available media channel, from TV and radio to encrypted social network platforms, blending true, exaggerated, and manipulated content in a coordinated campaign to promote its strategic goals. The widespread dissemination of anti-Israel propaganda has been Hamas’s major success in the post-October 7 period.

The network was developed over several years and was, until recently, overseen by Abu Obeida (Samir Abdallah al-Kahlout), the masked spokesman for Hamas’s military wing, who was killed in August 2025.

Propaganda operatives were embedded within combat units throughout Gaza, and their roles included filming, editing, distributing content, and monitoring Israeli media.

Hamas will undoubtedly attempt to retain control over its propaganda operation and the personnel running it, hoping to continue influencing global opinion by way of traditional as well as its social media.

Its principal broadcast outlets are Al-Aqsa TV and Al-Aqsa Radio, through which it targets both local and broader Arab audiences. In addition, the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera network, particularly its Arabic service, consistently promotes a pro-Hamas line.

As for social media, Hamas posts on platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and, in some operations, Instagram, in order to spread messages internationally and interact with constituencies in the West Bank, diaspora communities, and even Israeli society through psychological operations.

In addition, Hamas disseminates its propaganda via several websites in Arabic, English, French, and Hebrew, and has attempted cyber operations using social engineering apps to target Israeli soldiers.

The Trump peace plan makes no mention of this major asset operated by Hamas. The organization will certainly make every attempt to retain control of it. If it succeeds, this sophisticated propaganda operation will continue to provide Hamas with a highly effective soft-power base that could ensure its continued influence within Gaza, despite its loss of support among Gaza’s population.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), a respected polling organization, carries our regular surveys of Palestinian opinion.  Its Poll No. 95, undertaken in May 2025, records a sharp decline in public confidence in Hamas. The poll it carried out a year earlier, in May 2024, showed 71% of the Gazan population approving Hamas’s onslaught on Israel on October 7, 2023.  By May 2025 that support had shrunk to 38%. In fact, overall support for armed struggle itself fell, and the survey revealed increased openness to negotiation.

Given Hamas’s priorities, its battered and depleted infrastructure, and its declining but still resilient base, Hamas will most likely attempt to undertake a period of calm under the ceasefire terms.

Without openly accepting disarmament or exclusion from Gaza’s future governance, it will probably use the time to probe for any ambiguity in the ceasefire’s terms, attempt to rebuild its organization covertly, and seek to rehabilitate itself. It will most likely resist efforts to install Arab or Palestinian Authority governance in Gaza unless it is involved in some way.

In this period, Hamas probably sees itself walking a fine line – attempting to maintain its militant identity intact without provoking Israel into renewed conflict. Unlikely to accept voluntary exile, the Hamas leadership will hope to survive the transitional period and remain relevant within Gaza.

As for the future, several Palestinian spokesmen, while declaring an undying commitment to the anti-Israel struggle, have suggested the organization might agree to a cessation of hostilities for up to 10 years – an unattractive prospect that would enable the total refurbishment of its military capacity in preparation for its next onslaught on Israel.

Trump’s plan specifically excludes Hamas from any role in the future governance of Gaza. That is not likely to deter the organization from seeking involvement in its administration, either directly or covertly by way of influence, subterfuge, or corruption. Indeed, rumors are circulating about the idea of Hamas launching a political party, under some new innocuous name, ahead of the elections envisaged in the Trump plan.

According to the UK’s Daily Telegraph, Hamas insiders have confirmed that discussions are ongoing about establishing a “civil movement” as a vehicle for participation in future Palestinian elections.

The dragon is wounded, not slain.


Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "A narrow set of choices for Gaza: What's the future for Hamas?", 27 October 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-871664

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 November 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/31102025-whats-the-future-for-hamas-oped/

Gang war in Gaza

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 20 October 2025

The past few weeks have seen the emergence within Gaza of armed factions challenging Hamas.  Simmering for some time, this intra-Palestinian conflict came to the boil after the ceasefire on 10 October.  Hamas is now facing open ​defiance from ​not just one or two, but multiple armed groups emboldened by the power vacuum and security chaos within Gaza​.  

Hamas propaganda ​seeks to downplay talk of the growing Palestinian opposition, and prefers to report operations directed against individuals accused of collaborating with Israel. 

On October 12 the Palestinian Home Front, a Telegram news distribution channel affiliated with Hamas, announced: “The security services and the resistance are conducting a wide-scale field campaign across all areas of the Gaza Strip, from north to south, to locate and arrest collaborators and informants.”  A number were apprehended in Gaza city, it said: “after they were proved to be involved in spying for the enemy [and] participating in the assassination of several resistance members.”

The statement made no mention of what happened to them.  ​However, multiple independent accounts confirm that ​shortly afterward​, in full view of the public​, they were blindfolded, made to kneel on the sidewalk, and shot dead.​  More video footage circulated in October shows Hamas's armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, executing individuals by shooting them in the head in the streets of Gaza City.  These individuals undergo no judicial procedure or legal process.  They are simply accused and then assassinated in public with the aim of instilling the greatest possible fear in any who might be tempted to oppose Hamas​'s rule.

These field executions of ​Palestinians accused of treason and collaboration ​with Israel​ are part of a wider campaign by Hamas’s so-called “security forces”​.   ​Not only are they ​making a determined effort to ​restore ​their authority by regaining control of that part of Gaza from which Israeli forces have withdrawn​.  They are sending a message to the powerful ​Palestinian gangs and clans that are openly challenging ​Hamas​.  If it is to retain any presence in Gaza, Hamas must try to counter the upsurge of attacks aimed at undermining its rule. ​​​

Early in October Hamas conducted a large raid in Khan Yunis on the al-Mujaida clan which had previously been involved in assassinating Hamas operatives, and was accused by Hamas of collaboration with Israel. Dozens of Hamas gunmen stormed a clan stronghold, resulting in deaths on both sides.

On October 12, violent confrontations erupted between Hamas security forces and the Doghmush clan, a powerful local family with members connected to different political factions. Some 300 Hamas fighters were reported to have stormed a residential area where the clan gunmen had taken refuge. The clashes killed at least 27 people, including eight Hamas members and 19 clan members.

The Doghmush and al-Mujaida clans are major players in Gaza's internal power struggles. Their distinct leadership structures and political-militant affiliations have shaped recent armed conflict.

Leadership of the Doghmush clan is centered around Mumtaz Doghmush, who has led the Army of Islam, a militia linked to Al-Qaeda.  Doghmush family members have in the past been active in Fatah, Hamas, and other militant circles.  Despite past collaboration with Hamas on high-profile operations – notably the kidnapping and subsequent prisoner exchange for Israeli sold​ier Gilad Shalit – relations have soured due to competition over smuggling networks, local authority, and postwar power.

Other Doghmush elders and warlords operate semi-independently, each commanding armed gangs or criminal cells, making the clan a loose confederation. The ​Doghmush clan is reportedly involved in arms smuggling and extortion networks throughout Gaza's black market ecosystem.

The al-Mujaida clan is led by several prominent family elders in Khan Yunis, holding sway through extensive family networks.  Affiliated primarily with the Fatah movement, the al-Mujaida clan occasionally supports other Palestinian groups opposed to Hamas, especially in southern Gaza. They have resisted Hamas-imposed security measures and are accused by Hamas of collaborating with Israeli and Egyptian officials, particularly when it concerns smuggling or resource distribution.

These two clans continue to be the main flashpoints of intra-Palestinian factional rivalry, blending local leadership traditions and criminal syndicate models with political-militant operations.  But they are far from the only centers of clan-based anti-Hamas activity.  Numerous smaller armed groups and coalition factions have also appeared, usually linked to local clans or neighborhoods in Gaza. As of the end of September 2025, over a dozen new anti-Hamas armed groups had emerged, reflecting a widespread societal breakdown and the virtual collapse of Hamas's monopoly on territorial control and security.

To name but a few, there is the Rafah-based Bedouin clan Abu Shabab.  Its head, Yasser Abu Shabab, currently recognized as a leading anti-Hamas clan leader, commands a personal militia of about 400 fighters. Hamas accuses Abu Shabab of collaborating with Israel – a charge he denies.

Then there is the Hellis clan, led by Rami Hellis.  Operating in the Shejaia neighborhood of Gaza City, it has formed a coalition with other local families specifically aimed at resisting Hamas's attempts to reassert control. 

The Fatah-affiliated Khalas clan, based in eastern Gaza City and led by Ahmed Khalas, has received Israeli protection and military aid.  It is notable for having openly resisted Hamas from the moment it took control of Gaza in 2007.  Khalas serves on the Fatah Central Committee, and through him anti-Hamas clan activity as a whole is plugged into the Palestinian Authority and its structures.  In fact Khalas serves as the representative of PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Gaza.

Centered in Khan Yunis, the Khanidak clan, led by Yasser Khanidak, has also benefited from Israeli support and weaponry.  Although not as large as the Doghmush, Khanidak clan fighters have actively opposed Hamas forces during recent battles in southern Gaza.

Other militant clans who have opposed, or are currently opposing Hamas, include the Barbakh clan based in Khan Yunis and Rafah, the Abu Ziyad clan located in Zawaida near Deir al-Balah, and the Abu Werda clan based near the Port of Gaza, which frequently leads smaller, neighborhood-based defense groups that join larger clan battles as needed.

It is clear that the Hamas regime now faces widespread opposition from Palestinian leaders at the grass roots.  The organization is understandably being held accountable not only for ​the decision to mount ​its barbarous assault on Israel on October 7 2023, but crucially for underestimating the force, extent and persistence of the Israeli reprisal that followed, and the consequential devastating result for Gaza and its people.

         This ​upsurge in armed opposition, which has undoubtedly weakened Hamas’s former iron grip on the governance of Gaza​, must have influenced its decision to pay lip-service to the Trump plan. Gang warfare may yet play a crucial part in determining Hamas’s future role, if any, in Gaza.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled "Gang War in Gaza:  Determining the Future of Hamas's rule", 20 October 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-870943

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 October 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/24102025-gang-war-in-gaza-oped/

Britain succumbs to the anti-Israel lobby

 Published in the Jerusalem Report, 16 October 2025

        It is the pressure of domestic politics, rather than any firm conviction, that has led Britain’s prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, into formally recognizing a State of Palestine.  It is true that a long-term intention to do so was embedded in the manifesto on which the Labour party fought the last general election, but the pledge was conditional, to be timed appropriately within a peace process.

That was a sensible qualification, and nothing has changed since it was published except the rapid rise in Britain of hard-left opinion following the election, and a torrent of Hamas-inspired propaganda on social and public media.  The relentless onslaught of disinformation from Gaza, swallowed in whole or in large part by the media, incorporated concocted death and casualty figures, orchestrated fatal incidents presented so as to make Israel appear responsible, and staged photographs depicting a vastly worse situation than the reality which, in all conscience, was bad enough.  

Britain’s general election in July 2024 resulted in a massive win for the Labour party.  Starmer came to power with a huge majority.  The results also threw up a few anomalies.

 Traditionally, general elections in Britain turn on domestic issues.  The economy and health are usually to the forefront of voters’ minds, together with the record of the incumbent government.  This time around, though, for one bloc of ethnic minority voters a foreign war taking place 3000 miles away was more important than all the usual domestic concerns.  

The activities of a brand new organization calling itself The Muslim Vote cost the Labour party five seats, slashed Labour majorities in a fair number of other constituencies, and placed a caucus of rabidly anti-Israel MPs in the House of Commons.  

The Muslim Vote was set up in December 2023 by an activist named Abubakr Nanabawa.  It was a response to the Labour Party’s initial decision to support Israel’s right of defense, following Hamas’s horrifying pogrom on October 7, 2023.  Any support for Israel, justified or not, is anathema to pro-Palestinian activists.   The Muslim Vote was an alliance of 23 such organizations.  Its purpose was to unseat those MPs deemed insufficiently hostile to Israel, particularly Labour party members.  Its candidates would stand in opposition to Labour, advocate immediate recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state and demand the banning of all arms sales to Israel.

They succeeded beyond their expectations.  In five constituencies its candidates beat their Labour opponents, and were voted into parliament.  Once there they formed themselves into a new pro-Palestinian bloc – the Independent Alliance – headed by Jeremy Corbyn, one-time leader of the Labour party.   

Suspended from the party in 2020 by its new leader, Keir Starmer, for antisemitic attitudes and remarks, he stood as an independent and trounced his Labour opponent, winning 49% of the votes compared to Labour’s 34%. 

The other four pro-Palestine MPs were elected in areas with among the highest proportion of Muslim voters in the UK.  One of Labour’s biggest shocks on election night was when the party’s shadow Treasury minister, Jonathan Ashworth, lost his Leicester South seat by around 1,000 votes to Shockat Adam.

“This is for Gaza!” declared Adam, as he made his victory speech.

Then came a surprising development – the launch on July 24 of a new left-wing party.  Founded jointly by Jeremy Corbyn and MP Zarah Sultana, who resigned from the Labour party to assume her new role, the new party started life with no name.  Even though widely labelled by the cheeky and irreverent “the fruit and nut party” (Sultana being the fruit and Corbyn the nut case), the four remaining members of the Independent Alliance immediately backed it.

The public response, too, was rapid and positive, with supporter sign-ups quickly running into the hundreds of thousands.  By mid-September they were pushing a million.

Gaza and pro-Palestine sentiments featured strongly in the party’s founding principles –both Corbyn and Sultana, as well as the independent MPs who back them, have repeatedly cited the Gaza conflict and Israeli policy as a key reason for creating the new party.  Their platform explicitly includes opposition to arms sales to Israel and support for Gaza and for Palestinian statehood.

Faced with these pressures, Starmer and the lacklustre David Lammy, UK foreign secretary until the Cabinet reshuffle of September 6, sacrificed principle for appeasement.  Because their early support for Israel’s right to defend itself was continuously challenged by strident left-wing voices, their backing soon merged into muted, then ever-stronger, anti-Israel sentiment and action.  

Lammy’s period as foreign secretary was marked by his unquestioning acceptance of Hamas propaganda, and a vociferous anti-Israel stance. An early act as foreign secretary was to maintain that he was legally obligated to implement the International Criminal Court’s misguided arrest warrant against Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  His position contrasted with France's view that Netanyahu benefited from immunity from the ICC.

When Lammy publicly asserted that Israel had breached international law by blocking humanitarian supplies into Gaza, his statement was formally disowned by Starmer’s office.  Subsequently, Lammy restricted certain arms sales to Israel, and supported France in its intention to recognize  a non-existent Palestinian state.

Just a few words uttered by Lammy encapsulates the extent to which he and Britain’s Labour government was in thrall to the extremist pro-Palestinian elements now dominating the parliamentary party.

   Speaking to the UN Security Council on July 29, he said that the Balfour Declaration, in which the British government said that it viewed with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, “came with the solemn promise that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the Palestinian people as well. And colleagues, this has not been upheld, and it is a historical injustice which continues to unfold.”

He used much the same language in a House of Commons debate on September 1.

But of course the Balfour Declaration said no such thing.  It contained no mention of “the Palestinian people”, because no such entity existed in 1917.  What it does say is: “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”  And there were a fair number of them, including Muslim and Christian Arabs, Druze, Bedouin, Circassians, Samaritans and Armenians.

Lammy’s replacement as Britain’s foreign secretary, Yvette Cooper, is cause for cautious optimism.  Based on her long ministerial experience – she was a junior minister in Tony Blair’s Labour administration in 1997 – she is likely to adopt a more nuanced approach to the complex challenges facing today’s Middle East.  During her term as Home Secretary in the current government, one of Cooper’s more notable actions was to proscribe the hard-left, anti-Israel group, Palestine Action. 

She did so after Palestine Action activists broke into a military airfield on June 20 and caused damage valued at around £7 million to two planes, by spraying red paint into their turbine engines and attacking them with crowbars. Four people were subsequently charged with conspiracy and criminal damage. 

When a Palestine Action protest was staged outside parliament in August, Cooper publicly defended the UK police authorities who arrested more than 500 people.  Nearly 900 were arrested in a pro-Palestine Action gathering in September.  Cooper said that many sympathizers did not “know the full nature” of those running the group.

Palestine Action was doubtless celebrating on the day that Britain recognized a state of Palestine, even though the gesture was nothing but symbolic.  Palestine has no legal existence as a state, no government, no control of its borders, and is currently split into two entities, one of them still partly controlled by a terrorist organization. 

To say that recognition was seen by Hamas as a reward for its genocidal attack on Israel on October 7 is to state the obvious  – the organization said as much.  Britain’s act of recognition, unrelated to any peace process, was truly shameful.

Published in the Jerusalem Report, and on the Jerusalem Post website titled: "Keir Starmer’s Palestinian state recognition: Sacrificing principle to domestic politics", 16 October 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-870647