Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 January 2026
The people of Yemen are living through one of the world’s worst humanitarian and economic crises. Yemen, long a tangle of competing interests, has become a battlefield. Not only are three major entities, each wielding armed force, competing for power, but two Gulf states have been close to war with each other over Yemen-related issues.
The three main
combatants are the internationally recognized government, mainly
operating out of Riyadh in Saudi Arabia; the Southern Transitional
Council (STC) until recently based in Aden, but now
dispersed; and the Houthis, entrenched in the capital
Sanaa. Poverty, food insecurity and collapsed public services are
affecting the populations of all three.
In 2025 over 19 million people –
roughly half the population – were assessed as needing humanitarian assistance,
while more than 80% of Yemenis were found to be living in poverty, many unable
to meet basic food needs.
The Southern Transitional Council (STC) was formed in May 2017. It is an attempt, backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to restore the independent South Yemen that had existed before the unification of north and south in 1990. The movement is headed by Aidarus al‑Zoubaidi, once governor of Aden, who serves as its president. Paradoxically al-Zoubadi, who is in armed conflict with the government, simultaneously serves as a vice-president in the PLC.
The STC’s political leadership was based in Aden, which it dubbed the capital of a future South Yemen, but its fortunes have recently undergone a dramatic reversal.
On December 2 al-Zoubaidi launched a major offensive across southern and eastern Yemen. Within a week STC forces controlled most of the former South Yemen’s territory, including almost all of the southern coastline.
Al-Zoubaidi fled to the UAE
capital Abu Dhabi. Even so, the UAE, without formally renouncing its support
for the STC, has announced its “counter-terrorism mission” is at an end, and
declared it intended to pull its remaining forces from Yemen.
The present unhappy position
stems back to 2011, when popular forces within Yemen, imbued with the intoxicating zeal of the Arab Spring, forced
President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power. He abdicated in favor of his
deputy, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
Hoping for a return to power,
Saleh allied himself with the Houthis, who swept down from the north in a bid
to overthrow the government. Funded and supplied by Iran, and with
Saleh’s help, during 2014-2015 the Houthis seized over 30% of the country
including the capital, Sanaa.
In March 2015 Saudi Arabia,
alarmed at the prospect of Iran gaining a foothold on the Arabian peninsular,
formed an international coalition to support the government, and attacked the
Houthis. Since then the Houthis have entrenched themselves into their
substantial tract of west Yemen from where, supported by Iran, they have
been striking not only Israel, but international shipping which often had
little or no direct connection to Israel.
Until December 30 Saudi Arabia and
the UAE had never attacked each other directly. On that day Saudi
aircraft bombed the southern port of Mukalla, claiming they were targeting a
UAE weapons shipment destined for the STC’s anti-government campaign. The
Mukalla strike, an unprecedented escalation, was followed by the PLC’s
successful counterattack on the STC.
The international community
continues to fail Yemen. Despite President Donald Trump’s peace-making
aspirations and close relations with the leaders of both the UAE and Saudi
Arabia, the US has not pressured either to de-escalate the political tensions.
The US has not intervened in Yemen’s internal civil war, nor sought regime change in Sanaa. What the US concentrated on was degrading the Houthis’ ability to attack shipping. US naval forces have taken the lead in coalition interception operations, shooting down Houthi missiles, drones and unmanned surface vessels aimed at merchant shipping and warships in and around the Red Sea. The US directly linked these defensive actions at sea to targeted on‑shore strikes, since many of the radars and launchers destroyed were enabling the attacks on international shipping lanes.
On May 6, 2025 a US-Houthi ceasefire arrangement brokered by Oman took effect, ending the US air campaign in exchange for a halt to attacks on US vessels. The Houthis explicitly stated that this did not apply to Israel, and that they would continue to attack vessels in the Red Sea. The ceasefire has held.
As for the UN, it has long had the
Yemen situation under review, although its efforts have not succeeded in
resolving its conflicts, either political or military.
It was on September 5, 2021 that Hans Grundberg took up the post of UN Special Envoy for Yemen. He currently works under a Security Council mandate to mediate an end to the conflict in Yemen. His remit is to facilitate a Yemeni‑owned political process leading to an inclusive political settlement.
This is not entirely a “pie in the
sky” aspiration, since in April 2022 Grundberg actually secured a nationwide
two-month truce between the Houthis and the government. He secured two
renewals of the truce (to early August and then to October 2, 2022), providing
roughly six months of relative calm. Even though the truce later lapsed,
Grundberg was able to use it to open some limited political and economic
space for a time.
The UN is now reduced to issuing
ineffective, if well-intentioned, aspirations for Yemen’s future. On
December 22 the Security Council published a statement reaffirming its support
for the efforts of the UN Special Envoy, and its…”strong commitment to the
unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and to the
Presidential Leadership Council and the Government of Yemen.”
Small comfort to the struggling,
poverty-stricken and battle-weary Yemenis.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-883829
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