A landmark event - the Magerman edition of the Koren Tanach

This review appears in the edition of the Jerusalem Report dated 13 September 2021
 

              This is a publishing event of no little significance. Koren Publishers Jerusalem have just released their new Hebrew-English Tanach – the Magerman edition. More than ten years in the development, this historic publication features a completely new English translation of the Torah – the five books of Moses – by the late, and much lamented, Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, one-time Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth. He devoted his final years to this monumental undertaking, as well as producing a translation of much of the Psalms, and lived to see his work completed. Matthew Miller, the Koren publisher, tells us in his Preface that it was as the volume went to press that Sacks passed away.

          The beauty, felicity and scholarship inherent in Sacks’s rendering of the Torah into elegant modern English are apparent on every one of its 498 pages, which form something like a quarter of the whole. Since Sacks’s polished English takes full account of Masoretic authenticity, it is no paradox to categorize it, as the publishers do, as “a fully Jewish translation.” Many other eminent scholars and translators were involved in producing the rest of the Tanach. Each translated text was edited and reviewed several times by leading biblical scholars. Outstanding in this regard was Rabbi Dr Tzvi Hersh Weinreb, who himself contributed translations of Jeremiah and Proverbs.

          This Tanach bears all the outstanding features that have distinguished Koren publications for so long. Unlike what had become the standard presentation for Hebrew-English prayer books, Koren places the Hebrew on the left-hand page and the English translation facing it on the right. This layout, unique to Koren, means that the eye can absorb the Hebrew and its English equivalent much more easily, since each language starts from the centre of the two pages.

          The Hebrew font used by Koren for this Tanach was created by the publisher’s founder, Eliyahu Koren, back in 1962. Koren Tanach Font was devised specifically for the first Tanach published by the firm. Koren studied Hebrew manuscripts and early printing types intensively, consulted with ophthalmologists, took a sensitive approach to modernization, and brought into being a distinctive typeface that is both eminently legible and a delight to the eye.

          This edition of the Tanach is unique in a number of other ways. Standard bibles divide the text into chapters according to Christian tradition. As the publishers point out in a Foreword, “for much of modern history the only books available to the Jewish student of Torah were those printed by gentiles intent on converting them.” This Tanach is the first, while retaining the standard biblical layout, to present at the same time the text in the traditional Jewish system of sedarim, including the divisions for aliyot and weekly parashot.

          In the preliminary pages of the Tanach the reader will find where the Torah readings for special Shabbatot and for Festivals can be located. Details of every Haftorah, together with the variations for Ashkenazim, Sepharadim and Yemenite practice, are also provided. Even the occasional Minhag Anglia variation is included.

          The selection of maps, charts, timelines, genealogies and illustrations that form the final 60 pages of the volume are an invaluable aid to studying and understanding the context within which the 36 books of the Tanach were produced. They also add meaning to many aspects of the biblical story. For example, we are provided with a table explaining the weights and measures referred to in the Bible, and also illustrations of the first and second Temples as well as the tabernacles in the desert and at Shilo. Maps illustrate the tribal division of the land of Israel, and trace the effect of their various wars and battles on the territory they held. Genealogical tables trace the names and generations of biblical figures from Adam onwards, while an invaluable timeline illustrates precisely the periods covered by each of the books in the Tanach, starting with creation and Genesis (Bereshit).

          The biblical creation story has, of course, generated storms of controversy over the centuries, especially so since Charles Darwin outraged the Christian world of his time with his theory of evolution. It is generally acknowledged that the first English translation of the opening sentence of Genesis by William Tyndale in 1530, subsequently cemented into the King James’s Bible, does not accord with the original Hebrew. It runs:

          “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light; and there was light.”

          Many have been the attempts to render the real meaning into English. The abstruse problems and difficulties involved are, perhaps, best illustrated by the Tikkunei Zohar, a three-volume work devoted entirely to explaining the first word of the Torah – Bereshit.

          The Hebrew-English Tanach published by the Jewish Publication Society begins: 

          “When God began to create heaven and earth – the earth being unformed and void, with darkness over the surface of the deep and a wind from God sweeping over the water – God said, “Let there be light"; and there was light.”

          Rabbi Sacks regarded this verse as of such importance that he provided a personal Foreword on the subject for inclusion in the Koren Tanach. He calls Bereshit “the most revolutionary, as well as the most influential, account of creation in the history of the human spirit.” He dwells on the fact that creation occurs not by way of science, but through words: “let there be…and there was.” Sacks maintains that the distinguishing feature of Judaism is that it is a religion of words, and this is why at the very beginning of creation God reveals himself to humanity through sacred words: “Let there be…”

         So how does Sacks render these seminal Hebrew words into English?

          “When God began creating heaven and earth, the earth was void and desolate, there was darkness on the face of the deep, and the spirit of God moved over the waters. God said: “Let there be light.” And there was light.”

         The infinite care that Sacks took over comprehending and translating these very first words of the Tanach are at one with the approach adopted by Koren to the entire enterprise. The results are evident in this magnificent new edition of the Tanach – a work that sets a new standard of excellence. To echo the words of Rabbi Sacks, “the Koren Tanach invites the contemporary reader to experience afresh the timeless stories and wisdom contained in the Hebrew scriptures.”

Qatar: A force to be reckoned with

 This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post on 30 August 2021

           The tiny state of Qatar has spent most of the past thirty years fighting for a prominent position on the world stage.  It has won through.  Qatar’s latest role – acting as a mediator between the Taliban’s political leaders and former Afghan officials – has confirmed its place at the world’s diplomatic top table.

Its position has a solid track record behind it.  Over the past year Qatar has hosted talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and before that, initiated by the Trump administration, between the Taliban and the United States.  Doha, Qatar’s capital, was the setting for that series of face-to-face negotiations. They resulted in the formal agreement of February 29, 2020 that envisaged an orderly withdrawal of US and other foreign forces, backed by an undertaking by the Taliban to engage in peace talks with the Afghan government.  President Biden, failing to follow through on the Trump deal and then announcing that the US would leave by the end of August 2021 regardless, effectively gave the Taliban carte blanche to topple the government and take over the country.  The Taliban’s founder and political head, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who had exiled himself to Qatar, returned to Afghanistan a few days ago.

Mediation between the Taliban and what is left of the previous Afghan administration now rests on Qatar.  Washington acknowledges Qatar’s key role in the crisis.  On August 20 Biden spoke on the phone with Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim al-Thani, thanking him for Qatar's efforts in the peace process. 

Even before the Afghanistan debacle, Qatar had become recognized as a regional power broker because of its major role in the delicate Israel-Hamas-Palestinian situation in Gaza.   On August 19 Qatar achieved a breakthrough when it signed a deal with the United Nations to resume supplying cash to Gazan families. The deal, which involves providing more than 100,000 families with $100 per month, may not have been sufficient to prevent further border skirmishes, but some commentators believe it has averted a resumption of full-scale hostilities between Hamas and Israel, allowing the Egyptian-led peace negotiations to continue.

             How has this Gulf state – a small peninsula projecting into the Persian Gulf – won for itself such an influential position? 

   Its bid for global status can, perhaps, be traced back to 1995 when Sheik Hamad al-Thani ousted his father, who was on an extended summer vacation in Europe, and pronounced himself Emir. Surviving a countercoup backed by Saudi Arabia, Sheik Hamad, together with his wife and prime minister, set out to convert Qatar into a high-powered modern state.

His first big achievement was to launch the Al Jazeera television news network.  Al Jazeera claimed from the start that its journalists and editors provided an objective service independent of state control – a claim often contested over the years.  Today the media giant that it has become still proclaims “Al Jazeera is an independent news organization funded in part by the Qatari government.”

In pursuit of its aspiration to become a major player in the region and beyond, Qatar’s tactics have sometimes puzzled, sometimes infuriated, its neighbours. But then, as one of the world’s wealthiest nations – and certainly number one on a per capita basis – Qatar has reckoned for a long time that it could afford the luxury of proceeding along its own preferred path, without too much concern for what others thought. 

For example, Qatar’s strategy of backing Islamists − from Hamas in Gaza, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to hard-line Syrian opposition fighters − while at the same time offering itself as a key US ally, was rooted in pragmatism: Qatar wanted to extend its influence in the region by being friends with everybody. “We don’t do enemies,” Qatar’s one-time foreign minister is reported to have said, “we talk to everyone.” 

This worthy objective is apparently inconsistent, in Qatari eyes, with signing up to the Abraham Accords.  When Qatar was mooted as one of the Arab states likely to embrace normalization with Israel, it was quick to issue a denial.

Qatar’s wayward policies, especially with regard to Islamist groups, had long infuriated its neighboring Arab states, and on 5 June 2017 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar for a second time, and virtually imposed a trade blockade.

For three-and-a-half years Qatar withstood the worst that the Saudi-led alliance could inflict, and in January 2021 diplomatic relations were restored without any concessions on Qatar’s part.  In the interim Qatar had transformed itself into a major diplomatic player and a generous donor of foreign aid.  Its ultra-modern capital Doha was full of skyscrapers, the country had become a commercial hub, and it was well on its way to becoming a cultural, sports and tourist center for the Gulf as a whole – a position likely to be consolidated when Qatar hosts the FIFA World Cup in the winter of 2022. 

The tournament kicks off on Monday, November 21 and the final will be played at the Lusail Stadium in Doha a week before Christmas on Sunday December 18. Although Israel does not have diplomatic relations with Qatar, the head of the Qatari organizing committee, Hassan al-Thawadi, confirmed back in 2019 that Israelis will be able to enter the country as tourists to attend World Cup matches.  "Everyone is welcome,” he said. ”We do not mix sport and politics, but we would hope that Palestinians are able to make it too."

The US and Qatar have often failed to see eye to eye, but the connections are strong.  At al-Udeid, about 20 miles from Doha, the US Air Force has a base servicing its Central Command which covered US forces in Afghanistan. But while welcoming the US Air Force, Qatar allowed the Taliban to establish a political office in Doha.

Qatar's declared aim has been to create a space in the Gulf region where differing parties, even rivals and enemies, could do deals.  In this it has succeeded. The effort has been long and sustained.  Khalid al-Attiyah, the then Qatari foreign minister, spoke about it eight years ago at Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.

"Our country considers that political solutions require the representation and participation of all parties to the conflict, no matter how difficult and controversial," he said. "It is our belief that only such preconditions can allow for viable, legitimate and ultimately long-term resolution to conflicts."

A quarter of a century ago Qatar set its sights on playing in the big league.  Few would deny that it has won its place there.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 30 August 2021:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with-opinion-678058

Published in the Eurasia Review:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/27082021-qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal
https://mpc-journal.org/qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with/

Published in the Jewish Business News:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/08/27/qatar-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with/

Afghanistan - whose responsibility?

This letter appeared in the Jerusalem Post on 18 August.

          Some media commentators are trying to lay the blame for the Afghanistan debacle on Donald Trump and Joe Biden equally, claiming Biden mistakenly pursued a flawed Trump policy. It is certainly true that from the moment Trump took office in 2017, he pledged to put an end to the conflict and bring the American forces back home. It took two years of secret back-channel negotiations before US-Taliban peace talks began on February 25, 2019. Abdul Ghani Barada, the co-founder of the Taliban, was at the table.

          They appeared successful. Agreement was quickly reached on a draft peace deal involving the withdrawal of US and international troops from Afghanistan, matched by an undertaking by the Taliban to prohibit other jihadist groups operating within the country. This extraordinary arrangement between the world’s leading power and a hardline extremist Islamist movement was headed: “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban, and the United States of America.”

          This Doha deal (it was concluded in Qatar) was greeted with optimism by Trump. “I really believe the Taliban wants to do something to show we’re not all wasting time,” he said.

          Further negotiations followed, and with less than a week remaining of the Trump presidency, the US military met its goal of reducing the number of soldiers in Afghanistan to about 2,500. The deal that Trump reached with the Taliban included, as the quid pro quo for the US final withdrawal, an agreement by the Taliban to enter serious peace negotiations with the Afghan government.

          If Biden had indeed followed through, US troops would have left Afghanistan by the end of May, the Afghan government would still be in power, and the Taliban would either have negotiated some form of joint stable administration, or be in the process of doing so.

          I am afraid that responsibility for the current situation rests fairly and squarely on the Biden administration.

Iraq in turmoil

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Post of 17 August 2021

         Iraq’s next parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 10, 2021.  The Iraqi people will vote into office the 328 members of the Council of Representatives who, in turn, will elect Iraq’s president and prime minister.  The present PM, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, was confirmed in post in May 2020, aware that elections would be called reasonably soon.  He has struggled hard to keep control of a turbulent situation, no doubt hoping that in the forthcoming elections he would be confirmed in office. So far, balanced on the high wire of Iraqi politics, he has survived..

On July 28 Kadhimi met US President Joe Biden in the White House.  They agreed that direct US military involvement in Iraq will end on or before December 31.  Taken together with Biden’s withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan, this means the two Middle East invasions that then-President George W Bush initiated will have been wound up.

   “Our role in Iraq,” Biden told reporters, “will be… to train, to assist, to help and to deal with ISIS as it arises, but we’re not going to be, by the end of the year, in a combat mission.”

Some cynical observers maintain that, since US troops will be remaining in Iraq, this announcement will actually change little and is merely a smoke screen allowing Kadhimi to claim that he has met the demands of his extremists and removed US combat forces from the scene.  The Arab Weekly claims that the deal actually has Iran’s blessing, since apparently Iraq’s current anarchic situation, presided over by Kadhimi, suits its book.  Back in 2020 the Iranian leadership approved Kadhimi’s nomination as prime minister, and this deal could be enough to placate Iraq’s hardliners until the October elections, which could bring him back to power.  The Biden-Kadhimi announcement is probably seen by the Iranian leadership as an opportunity to entrench itself still further within the Iraqi state.

In retrospect it becomes apparent that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, no friend of Iran, removed the most effective obstacle to Iranian expansion in the region.  Since then pro-Iranian politicians have become a powerful presence in the Iraqi parliament, and Iran has successfully inserted its Shia militias deep into the Iraqi armed forces by way of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). 

The PMF is an umbrella organization composed of a variety of Iraqi paramilitary factions, originally formed to fight ISIS.  A 2016 law, followed by a decree in 2018, incorporated the body – consisting of some 40 militias, the most powerful backed by Iran – into the Iraqi armed forces. The purpose was to provide a powerful and united armed opposition to ISIS in its efforts to regain control of parts of Iraq.

            The threat remains.  In its quarterly report to Congress published on August 3, the US Defense Department said: “ISIS continued operating as a low level and well entrenched insurgency in rural areas of Iraq and Syria.”  In a June briefing, the State Department said: “ISIS remains a determined enemy.  There is still much work to do in Iraq and Syria, where ISIS continues to conduct attacks and sow fear among local populations.”  This applies also to Iraqi Kurdistan, the semi-autonomous region under Kurdish control in the north of Iraq.

Merged into the Iraqi military machine, the PMF is technically part of the state defence forces, but its Iranian-backed militias often act outside the chain of command and in conformity with Iranian priorities. Their official status has given these paramilitary factions access to weaponry and public funds. In 2021 the government’s budget allocation for the PMF was $2.5 billion, an increase of 46% compared to 2019. 

These militias were severely weakened in January 2020 when Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s most powerful general, and the PMF’s deputy commander, Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, were both killed by a US drone strike.  The militias have retrenched since then, and now present the same armed threat to the US military presence and to the integrity of the Iraqi state as they did before.  The Biden administration has twice ordered strikes on Iran-backed militias in retaliation for attacks on American forces.

Analysts note that these attacks have been increasing recently both in numbers and in scope.  They have extended beyond US military and security targets to encompass Iraqi activists, protest leaders and security officials. The Iraqi Human Rights Commission has documented 81 assassination attempts since October 2019, 34 of which were successful; the UN has published reports detailing these political actions.  This renewed activity appears to be an Iranian-inspired effort aimed at subverting the state and its governance.  Media reports speak of the militias overtly displaying their strength in the streets, including newly-formed vigilante groups.  Public confidence in the ability of the government to uphold the rule of law has been shaken.

            The equivocal position of the PMF within the structure of the state is a major cause of Kadhimi’s failure to get a firm grip on the chaotic situation.  The sad truth is that, given the strength of pro-Iranian voices within Iraq’s parliament and in the establishment generally, the PMF has become too powerful for Prime Minister Kadhimi to control fully. He must maintain his precarious balancing act between securing the militias’ cooperation and keeping them in check.  He also needs to preserve broad support in parliament if he is to secure a second term.  So he has to tread very carefully for the time being.  The big question is what Kadhimi’s real priorities are, and what path he is likely to take if he does indeed win a second term as prime minister of today’s chaotic Iraq.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 17 August 2021

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/iraq-is-in-turmoil-opinion-676889

Published in the Eurasia Review

https://www.eurasiareview.com/13082021-iraq-in-turmoil-oped-2/

Published in the MPC Journal:
https://mpc-journal.org/iraq-in-turmoil-2/

Published in the Jewish Business News:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/08/13/iraq-in-turmoil/

Lebanon in Hezbollah's clutches

        This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 10 August 2021

Lebanon has been without a government since the massive explosion of August 4, 2020 blew Port Beirut apart and, with it, Lebanon’s administrative machine.   In the aftermath of the blast President Michel Aoun promised a swift and transparent investigation.  A year later no one has been held responsible, while the inquiry itself has been subject to continuous obstruction, evasion, and delay.

Judge Fadi Sawan was appointed to conduct the investigation.  On December 10 he formally charged caretaker prime minister, Hassan Diab, and three former ministers, with negligence in connection with the blast. But Diab, who had been supported by the Hezbollah parliamentary bloc in his bid to become the designated prime minister, refused to appear for questioning.  So did two of the other former ministers.  They were supported by caretaker interior minister, Mohammed Fahmi, described by the Abu Dhabi-based The National as “staunchly pro-Hezbollah”. Fahmi declared publicly that even if the judiciary issued arrest warrants, he would not ask the security forces to detain them.

  President Aoun, a strong supporter of Hezbollah – which reciprocates the favour – made no comment at the time, but in February Judge Fadi Sawan was removed from the inquiry.

He was replaced by Judge Tarek Bitar, who is known to have no strong political affiliations.  On July 9, 2021 Judge Bitar applied to question Major General Abbas Ibrahim, head of the powerful General Security agency.  Fahmi refused the request.  

It seems clear that the caretaker government is deliberately thwarting the investigation, and the suspicion must arise that prominent figures were involved in the circumstances leading to the explosion and are being shielded.  Indeed, in a report issued on August 3, Human Rights Watch declares: “The very design of the port’s management structure was developed to share power between political elites. It maximized opacity, and allowed corruption and mismanagement to flourish.”

Questions waiting to be answered include who authorized the detention of the Moldovan-flagged cargo ship, the Rhosus, in November 2013; under whose authority was its load of 2,754 tonnes of ammonium nitrate – which no party has subsequently claimed – off-loaded and stored in unsafe conditions on October 23 and 24; and what has happened to some 2,200 tonnes of that shipment, since – according to a report by the FBI – the blast, massive as it was, involved only around 550 tonnes. 

Amnesty International criticized Lebanon’s judicial process from the start.  “Every step, measure or statement taken thus far,” it declared in September 2020, “particularly by the highest-ranking officials in the country, have made it clear that the authorities have no intention whatsoever of fulfilling their responsibilities of conducting an effective, transparent and impartial investigation…  An international fact-finding mechanism is the only way to guarantee the rights of victims to truth, justice and remedy.” 

Human Rights Watch concurred.  Taking into account the undue influence exercised by Hezbollah, the “state within a state”, as well as the widespread graft and venality within ruling circles, HRW believes that Lebanon‘s domestic investigation is incapable of credibly delivering justice, and has called for an international, independent probe. It believes that the blast — which killed more than 200 people, wounded thousands and inflicted billions of dollars in damage — was the starkest example yet of the chronic corruption and mismanagement that have left the Lebanese with a dysfunctional state and a collapsing economy. 

In October 2020 Saad Hariri was named by the Lebanese parliament as prime minister designate, and charged with forming a new government.

          For nine long months he was at loggerheads with President Aoun, who wanted to pack any new government with Hezbollah supporting ministers. Hariri flatly refused to give way. He wanted to assemble a technocrat cabinet dedicated to enacting the reforms long demanded by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and donor countries such as the US and France. Finally, on July 15, Hariri resigned.

          Shortly afterwards a compromise candidate as prime minister designate emerged in the shape of one of the richest men in Lebanon, Najib Mikati.

          Mikati, who has served twice before as prime minister, found himself endorsed by most of Lebanon's political parties, including Hezbollah and the other major Shi’ite party, Amal, and also by former Sunni prime ministers, including Hariri.  Nevertheless, critics have called Mikati “a Hezbollah puppet,” while objecting to once again having a prime minister drawn from what they term the “corrupt political elite.”  International media have cited corruption charges brought against Mikati by a judge in 2019, in a case involving accusations of illicit gains related to subsidized housing loans — charges that he terms politically motivated.  The case has not yet come to trial.                                                                                                                                                                       

          On July 28 Mikati announced that he had submitted to the president his list of candidates for government posts. “President Aoun approved most of them,” he announced, “and he made some remarks which are acceptable.  God willing ... we will be able to form a government soon."  In light of the Hariri-Aoun standoff, few guesses are needed as to the general shape of the future Mikati Cabinet.

Doubts must persist as to whether it will have the ability, let alone the will, to undertake the root and branch reforms essential to restoring Lebanon‘s economic health. The World Bank pulls no punches in its criticism of Lebanon’s political elite in which Hezbollah features so strongly.  It accuses them of deliberately failing to tackle the country’s many problems, which include the economic and financial crisis, the Covid pandemic and the Beirut Port explosion.  In a recent report it identifies the inaction as due to a continuing political consensus that defends “a bankrupt economic system, which benefited a few for so long”.

Given the likely composition of the new administration, there seems no chance of Lebanon freeing itself any time soon from the dominance that Hezbollah has managed to acquire in the nation’s political life, and the consequent malign influence on Lebanese affairs that Iran is able to exercise through its puppet. For example, Hezbollah directly claimed responsibility for a barrage of rockets fired on August 6 toward Israel – an action coinciding with Iranian aggression off the Gulf of Hormuz and the accession of Iran’s new hardline president, Ebrahim Raisi. It is no wonder that some commentators, like the UK’s policy institute Chatham House, are coming to regard Lebanon as a state controlled by Hezbollah.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 10 August 2021
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/lebanon-in-hezbollahs-clutches-opinion-676270

Published in the Eurasia Review:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/06082021-lebanon-remains-in-hezbollahs-clutches-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal:
https://mpc-journal.org/lebanon-remains-in-hezbollahs-clutches/

Published in the Jewish Business News:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/08/06/lebanon-remains-in-hezbollahs-clutches/

 

 

 

 

"Drone Wars" by Seth J Frantzman

 I review Seth Frantzman's new book in the Jerusalem Post Magazine, 6 August 2021

          Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles, often referred to simply as UAVs. In the last twenty years they have become an essential element within the military capabilities of nations and other organizations engaged in conflict. In “Drone Wars” Seth Frantzman, senior Middle East correspondent and Middle East affairs analyst at the Jerusalem Post, has delved deep into the origins, the development and the current deployment of drones. In the course of a fascinating account he also offers pointers and predictions about their possible future.

 “Everyone who has worked with drones sees them as revolutionary,” he writes, and the story he tells, and the pioneers, politicians and military leaders he has spoken to, substantiate this. 

The drone saga started in the 1970s with Remote Pilotless Vehicles, designed by the US to evade detection by radar in their surveillance operations.  Frantzman leads us through their subsequent history, as their role expanded from mere intelligence-gathering to weapons capable of striking their targets with pinpoint accuracy.  He charts the further rapid expansion of drone capability to the present stage, where drone units consisting of fleets of sophisticated UAVs equipped with AI (artificial intelligence) have become an integral component of the fighting capabilities of a large and growing number of nations, and of combative organizations like ISIS, al-Qaeda and Hezbollah.

Israel has been involved in drone development from the very beginning.  Back in 1974, when the country was still recovering from the trauma of the Yom Kippur war, a young Israeli engineer, Yair Dubester, was employed by IAI – Israel Aerospace Industries – where the first UAV was being built.  Established in 1953 as a government institute for aviation, IAI has grown over the years to become a world leader in developing, producing and delivering state-of-the-art technologies and systems. 

Dubester worked on an early UAV called the Scout, designed to fly slowly and bring back video.  Although not highly regarded by the military at first, the system proved to be a trail-blazer.  In 1982 northern Israel came under rocket bombardment.  The onslaught from within Lebanon was coordinated between the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation), Hezbollah, elements of the Lebanese military, and Syrian armed forces which were ensconced within Lebanon.

When Israel launched its Peace for Galilee operation to stop the rocket attacks, the video sent back by UAVs of the exact location of Syrian surface-to-air missiles and their radar deployments proved to be a moment of truth for Israel’s military establishment.  The real-time surveillance provided by the drones enabled the Israeli air force to strike a devastating blow against the enemy’s air defense system.

Side by side with the drone story, Frantzman catalogues the development of anti-drone capabilities such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow-3, among others – systems devised under pressure in order to counter continuous rocket attacks from Gaza and the threat of further onslaughts from Lebanon.  Although not originally designed to be used against drones, tests towards the end of 2020 showed them to be very effective for that purpose and for taking out cruise missiles.

From the state of drone evolution by 2021, Frantzman can see the direction future development is headed, and maintains that “somewhere in a hangar” super-secret experimental and classified drones are already in existence, and may be operational.  In addition he asserts that US and Israeli defense companies are racing to develop the lasers, microwave weapons, and technology necessary for confronting the next drone threat, which he sees emanating from some, not all, of those entities intent on developing their drone capacities – China, Iran. Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, among others, together with the jihadist organizations like ISIS that are intent on waging their Islamist war against the civilized world.

“Drone Wars” is more than an absorbing chronicle of a key development in modern warfare. During the course of his journalistic career Franztman has had a number of encounters with drones, and his account is enriched with personal experience.

            For example, in 2017 he found himself in Mosul in northern Iraq.  He had entered the city embedded in the US forces intent on expelling ISIS, which was hell-bent on retaining control of the city it had captured in 2014, and was fighting a rearguard action street by street.  Beginning as the hunter, Frantzman quickly found himself the hunted.

            Evading the booby-traps left by the retreating fighters was bad enough, “but,” he writes, “it’s the buzzing of an ISIS drone that I still can hear, years later.”  Since 2017, he tells us, “ISIS had increasingly been using drones to attack the Iraqi army…there was no way to fight the drone threat…it was always there.”

            “Drone Wars”, he tells us, is based on years of working in the field under the threat of ISIS drones.  It is also the result of months of interviews with, as he puts it, “the most knowledgeable individuals across the spectrum, from critics of armed drones to prophets of how they will change the world as we know it.” 

            Frantzman is a conscientious journalist who commits nothing unsubstantiated to paper.  The source for every fact he provides and every opinion he quotes is provided in the rear of the book.  A 67-page section titled “Endnotes” contains no less than 646 footnotes.  The conscientious reader is given every opportunity to check any questionable fact or controversial statement.

            “Drone Wars” is an absorbing account of cutting-edge military technology.  What drones are already capable of doing is as nothing compared to what they might yet bring to the art of war.  Some futurologists, says Frantzman, believe that war itself will become unmanned and turn into a battle between artificial intelligences;  others hold that there must always be human control of the machine. These, together with other possible futures for drones and drone warfare, open up fascinating possibilities and stretch the mind.

            “Drone Wars” is an eminently readable survey of the past, present and future of what has become an integral element of modern life. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 6 August 2021
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/war-by-remote-control-drone-wars-book-review-675927

Iran's water crisis threatens the regime

 

          Despite more than forty years of living under a rigid and repressive theocratic regime, Iranians are not people to take government failure or flagrant abuse of power lying down.  Time and again they have demonstrated a willingness to stand up and be counted, defying the determined efforts of the state’s security forces to suppress any show of dissent.

At the moment Iran is suffering the effects of a drought described as the worst in 50 years.  According to the Iranian Department of Water and Sewerage, at least 110 Iranian cities have been struggling with cuts in water supplies during the summer of 2021.  The crisis has devastated agriculture and livestock farming, and led to electricity blackouts.  The root cause of the water and power failures, according to protesters, is long-standing government inefficiency and corruption rather than the drought.

They point to the worst-affected area – the oil-rich province of Khuzestan in the south-west of the country. Here the drought has only exacerbated problems faced by Khuzestan for decades. The province is home to a large Arab minority who have repeatedly complained of being left behind by the Iranian regime.  Khuzestan residents maintain on social media that the province has never truly had drinkable tap water, and that they have had to buy their water or take it from the rivers, many of which have now dried up.  Lawyers have said that Khuzestan’s problem stems from the illegal theft of water from river forks in the region.  Power outages have exacerbated the crisis, since many people use electricity-powered pumps to get water inside their homes.

Khuzestan is where most of the public outbursts of anger have occurred, but protests at the government’s apparent inability to deal with the situation have broken out across the nation including the capital, Tehran.  The heavy-handed action of the security forces has often converted these demonstrations into riots resulting in at least eight deaths, according to Amnesty International..

“Video footage verified by Amnesty,” the organization reports, “… and consistent accounts from the ground, indicate security forces used deadly automatic weapons, shotguns with inherently indiscriminate ammunition, and tear gas to disperse protesters.”

Despite state-imposed internet restrictions, numerous videos have come out of Khuzestan in which gunshots can be heard and tear gas seen in use. In some videos protesters are shouting at baton-wielding security forces clad in black, riding motorcycles. 

          There are many occasions in the recent past when public protest in Iran has moved past the immediate cause of complaint into a general attack on the government.  In 2009 the patently manipulated re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iranian president gave rise to an upsurge of popular anger.  Iranians took to the streets in their millions in what came to be known as the "Green Movement" condemning the government for election fraud, and demanding the removal of Ahmadinejad and the holding of new elections.

          Iran was in turmoil again in January 2018.  At first the nationwide rallies centered on the ever-rising food and commodity prices. This soon morphed into opposition to the regime in general and the Supreme Leader in particular.  Especial dissent was voiced against the vast sums expended in the Syrian civil conflict, and Iran’s military and logistical support for Hezbollah in Syria, for the Houthis in Yemen and for Hamas in Gaza.  The cost of these foreign adventures was seen as being at the direct expense of the Iranian population. 

In 2019, nationwide anti-government demonstrations followed an abrupt tripling of petrol prices. Amnesty International said at least 208 people were killed during those protests

The effect of then-President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal in May 2020, and further US sanctions, was a further blow to the economy. The effect on normal household budgets was catastrophic. On June 25 Tehran’s grand bazaar was shut down as merchants joined street protests, and thousands defied the riot police trying to quell the rebellion. Other big cities joined Tehran.  Protesters carried all manner of slogans. Some called for the Supreme Leader to resign, some chanted "Death to the liars" and some called for the IRGC, the all-powerful Guard Corps, to leave the country.  The worst, from the Supreme Leader’s point of view, were the prominently displayed signs: “Death to the dictator.”

Opposition to the government has hardened during the current water crisis.  Nostalgic chants of support for the previous Shah, on the lines of “Reza Shah, bless his soul” have been reported from a variety of public protests.  Camera-caught videos, by their nature unverifiable, have been making their appearance on social media.  One is said to show demonstrators in the town of Aligudarz chanting slogans against Khamenei.  A short video posted on Twitter by New York Times journalist Farnaz Fassihi showed people at a Tehran metro station chanting "Death to the Islamic Republic"; another showed women chanting "Down with the Islamic Republic". 

This evidence of a popular groundswell of anti-regime sentiment seems to have shaken the leadership.  They must have decided to try to placate the populace. On July 22, outgoing President Hassan Rouhani went on television not to condemn the protests, but to assert that Iranians have “the right to speak, express themselves, protest and even take to the streets, within the framework of the regulations”.

The next day Supreme Leader Khamenei reiterated that message.

“The people showed their displeasure,” said Khamenei to state media, “but we cannot really blame the people, and their issues must be taken care of.” He assured the nation that: “Now, thank God, all the various agencies, governmental and non-governmental, are working [to resolve the water crisis]”.

Both messages must have been delivered through gritted teeth.

The Iranian regime has been severely shaken by a combination of adverse circumstances including economic breakdown resulting from the US sanctions, mounting popular dissatisfaction with the government’s foreign and domestic policies, the Covid pandemic, and now water shortages exacerbated by severe drought.  Popular sentiment in favour of an end to the regime and even a restoration of the monarchy is growing.  Where will it all end?

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 5 August 2021:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/irans-water-crisis-threatens-the-regime-opinion-675852

Published in Eurasia Review:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/30072021-irans-water-crisis-threatens-the-regime-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal:

https://mpc-journal.org/irans-water-crisis-threatens-the-regime/

Published in the Jewish Business News:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2021/07/30/irans-water-crisis-threatens-the-regime/