The myth of obstinate Israel

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 July 2025

"If a terrorist organization embraces you, you're in the wrong place."
                                                                  - Israel's Minister of Defense
 

        Can 28 foreign ministers be wrong?  That was the number who put their names to a joint statement published on July 21 largely condemning Israel for the continued conflict in Gaza and its attendant miseries. 

What were they jointly agreed on?  

First that the war in Gaza must end immediately.  Next they state as a fact that the Israeli government is denying essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population, and that they regard this as unacceptable.  

            They condemn the continued detention of hostages by Hamas, call for their immediate release and state, with no ifs or buts, that “a negotiated ceasefire offers the best hope of bringing them home.”

They call on the Israeli government, taking for granted that what they assert is the case, to “immediately lift restrictions on the flow of aid and to urgently enable the UN and humanitarian NGOs to do their life-saving work safely and effectively.”

They condemn as completely unacceptable “proposals to remove the Palestinian population into a “humanitarian city” and strongly oppose “any steps towards territorial or demographic change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” leaving the impression that this has been declared official Israeli government policy, which is not the case.  It is a plan promoted by defense minister, Israel Katz, and has been met with considerable skepticism.

They then turn to the E1 settlement plan announced by Israel’s Civil Administration.  If implemented, they say, it would “divide a Palestinian state in two, marking a flagrant breach of international law and critically undermine the two-state solution.”

They call for a halt to settlement building across the West Bank and “settler violence against Palestinians”, which they say has soared.

Finally they urge “the parties and the international community to unite in a common effort to bring this terrible conflict to an end, through an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire. Further bloodshed serves no purpose,” they say, and end by threatening to take further action to support an immediate ceasefire and a political pathway to security and peace.

The name Hamas appears in the statement only once, in a call for release of its hostages.  No responsibility for the deteriorating situation in Gaza is assigned to the terrorist organization.

Israel’s response, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), was apt and relevant, but perhaps too brief. It rejected the joint statement, not just for its content but also for “sending the wrong message to Hamas” which, in fact, was quick to praise it.  As Israel's foreign minister, Gideon Saar, wryly observed, if a terrorist organization embraces you, “you are in the wrong place”.

What Hamas wants above all is a continued presence in Gaza once the war has ended.  So the message that Hamas takes from the statement is that international pressure on Israel could yield the result it wants more effectively than agreeing to release hostages. By attributing all the problems in Gaza to Israeli recalcitrance, it gives Hamas a green light to hold out against the latest ceasefire deal - which Israel has in fact accepted - and so prolongs the conflict. 

Finally the MFA claims that the statement by the 28 foreign ministers  “fails to focus the pressure on Hamas and fails to recognize Hamas’s role and responsibility for the situation.  While refuting some of the charges in the foreign ministers’ statement, the MFA response lacks something by way of robust counter-arguments to the unqualified assertions that abound in it.

            Throughout the Gaza war, Hamas-originated propaganda has been absorbed unquestioningly by swaths of Western opinion.  There are, for example, the highly questionable figures about civilian deaths and casualties.  Many Hamas fighters do not wear uniform, so how many, legitimately killed in the course of battle, have been counted as civilians?  The death or injury of any child is truly tragic.  If only war had not been forced on Israel by Hamas’s bloodthirsty pogrom of October 7, 2023.  But the highly emotive figures issued by Hamas of children killed must take into account that “child” is defined as individuals “up to the age of 18”, and that Hamas trains youngsters aged 15 or younger to participate in fighting the IDF.  How many of the claimed children killed were in fact armed militants actively engaged in the conflict?

            The claims in the joint statement about the construction plan known as E1 are not strictly accurate.  The E1 proposals envisage connecting Ma’ale Adumim with Jerusalem, and they would certainly have strategic, political, and emotional impact.  However, as a glance at the map can verify, the assertion that this would entirely sever the West Bank’s north from its south, is untrue.  Palestinian territorial contiguity would be affected, but the entire Jericho corridor would remain open, and north-south access in a variety of ways could remain.  Maale Adumim would still be the easternmost Israeli settlement in the Jerusalem area.

The line running from Jerusalem past Maale Adumi is Route 1, currently the main east-west artery for both Israelis and Palestinians. New by-pass roads for Palestinian West Bank traffic are proposed under E1 development plans.

The joint statement claims that E1 would undermine the two-state solution, but ignores the obvious ever-present question:  Why wasn’t a Palestinian state created in 1947 based on the UN partition plan;  in 1993 and 1995 from the Oslo Accords; from the Ehud Barack offer in 2000;   at the 2007 Annapolis conference; from the 2008 Ehud Olmert peace offer; or from US Secretary of State John Kerry’s initiative in 2013-2014?

The Palestinian leadership has in the past rejected every possible opportunity of achieving a two-state solution, yet the 28 foreign ministers continue to promote it.  Nothing in their joint statement takes account of Palestinian preferences, or even treats the Palestinians as active participants in the conflict, whose past decisions have shaped events. 

   In their calls for “negotiations” as the only means for liberating hostages, the foreign ministers ignore the fact that negotiations have been in progress for some time.  As the MFA response to the joint statement notes: “there is a concrete proposal for a ceasefire deal, and Israel has repeatedly said yes to this proposal, while Hamas stubbornly refuses to accept it.”

Following Hamas’s bloodthirsty pogrom on 7 October 2025, Israel had no alternative but to retaliate.  Benjamin Netanyahu announced two war aims:  to bring back the hostages seized by Hamas, and to ensure its total defeat, so that it could never pursue its aim of repeating 7 October “again and again” as its spokesmen said it intended.

Neither aim has yet been fully achieved, but neither has been abandoned.  The foreign ministers discount the fact that a complete end to hostilities at this stage would leave Hamas with a continuing foothold in Gaza, and the certainty of an enemy remaining on Israel’s doorstep, intent on pursuing its declared aim of eliminating Israel and killing as many Jews as possible.


Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 28 July 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-862329

Published in Eurasia Review titled "How about Hamas?", 1 August 2025
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01082025-how-about-hamas-oped/#google_vignette

 

 

 

Sharaa – friend or foe?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 July 2025

           Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al‑Sharaa (previously known as militia leader al-Jolani), is potentially a major threat to Israel’s security.  At the same time he is potentially a welcome addition to those Muslim leaders prepared to normalize relations with Israel.

Sweida, where violent confrontations have been occurring recently between Druze and Bedouin, is one of Syria’s 14 provinces. It is located in the southernmost part of the country and borders Israel’s Golan Heights. Druze comprise most of its population.  Any destabilization within the province threatens to spill across the border, particularly if Islamist groups still active inside Syria exploit the chaos.  Any security vacuum in Sweida could allow Iranian-backed militias or jihadist factions to establish a foothold near Israel’s northeastern frontier.

            On Sunday, July 13 members of a Bedouin tribe attacked and robbed a Druze man on the province’s main highway.  Sweida, a tinder-box ready to be ignited, erupted. The memory was still raw of the deadly confrontations between Druze residents and Sunni Bedouin armed groups that occurred between April 28 and May 2 – all due to a fake audio clip – and the heavy-handed intervention by Syrian government forces which carried out so-called extrajudicial “field executions” of 19 Druze civilians.  More than 100 Druze were killed in the subsequent fighting.

            At the time, Israel publicly pledged to defend the Druze and warned Syria that further violence against them would prompt a military response.  During the outbreak of sectarian violence in Suweida on July 13 more than two hundred people were killed.  Over the next few days militias affiliated with the new regime in Damascus attacked members of the Druze community.  In Israel members of the Druze minority organized demonstrations, demanding that the government act immediately to protect their co-religionists across the border.

Israel lived up to its promise.  It mounted air strikes, targeting Syrian tanks moving south from Damascus, as well as other Syrian Army vehicles and an airfield in southwestern Syria. On July 15, during the attacks, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Israel Katz issued a joint statement:  “Israel is committed to preventing harm being inflicted on the Druze in Syria, owing to the deep covenant of blood with our Druze citizens in Israel and their historical and familial link to the Druze in Syria. We are acting to prevent the Syrian regime from harming them, and to ensure the demilitarization of the region adjacent to our border with Syria.”

The same day, Syria’s defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, secured an agreement between the combatants – the Syrian army, Druze armed factions and Bedouin tribes – and a ceasefire was declared. 

Unfortunately it soon broke down, and Israel continued its campaign by targeting key Syrian government structures in Damascus, including the Defense Ministry headquarters and areas in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire in Sweida continued and, backed by US mediation, an agreement was reached between the Syrian army and Druze factions.  Under the deal government forces began withdrawing, leaving security in the hands of Druze elders and local factions, as part of a “total and immediate halt to military operations”.

Seeking to cement the ceasefire, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and envoy Tom Barrack engaged in urgent talks with both Israel and Syria.  According to Reuters, they agreed “specific steps that will bring this troubling situation to an end tonight,” suggesting a US-brokered de-escalation pact that may include an Israel promise to halt further airstrikes.

Meanwhile, on the evening of July 16, Sharaa gave a televised address to the nation.  What he said was entirely in line with what he has been asserting as his intentions from the moment he was appointed Syria’s interim president on January 29, 2025.

His first major decision had been to suspend the Assad-era constitution.  In his six months as interim president he has made no less than eight official visits abroad, signed agreements to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces into the state, and overseen the drafting of an interim constitution for a five-year transition period.  This document of intent commits the nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, explicitly pledges to maintain freedom of opinion and expression, and establishes a People’s Committee to function as an interim parliament.   

He seems to have made every effort to distance himself from his al-Qaeda roots, and to present a moderate and pragmatic image.  In public statements he has emphasized his intention to protect minorities and transform Syria into a pluralist state. 

In speaking to the Syrian people on July 16, Sharaa asserted the nation’s sovereignty, but nevertheless praised mediation from foreign sources.  In line with his declared aim of national unity and the protection of minorities, he said: “We are keen on holding accountable those who transgressed and abused our Druze people, as they are under the protection and responsibility of the state.”  He said that responsibility for security in Sweida, “will be handed to religious elders and some local factions based on the supreme national interest.”

In a statement virtually seeking conciliation with Israel, he said that the nation did not fear war, “but we have put the interests of the Syrians before chaos and destruction.”

Before the recent upsurge of violence, several pointers had suggested possible Israel-Syria reconciliation.   

For example, on April 18 US Congressman Cory Mills held a 90‑minute meeting with Sharaa in Damascus during which, Mills reported, Sharaa expressed openness to normalizing relations with Israel, stating Syria could consider joining the Abraham Accords under the right conditions.

Then, during Sharaa’s visit to French President Emmanuel Macron on May 7, both leaders confirmed that Syria has held indirect talks with Israel through mediators.

These positive indications were confirmed on July 19 when, following several days of negotiations, a ceasefire agreement was reached, brokered largely by the US, in which both Syria and Israel pledged to halt offensive operations.  The agreement included terms allowing limited redeployment of Syrian security forces to Sweida, with the understanding that Druze factions would retain some internal security roles. After the truce, Israel permitted Syrian government troops to re-enter Sweida with a limited mandate, aiming to stabilize the situation and safeguard state institutions.

There is no doubt that the tenor of remarks by Sharaa from the start of his governance seem to favor conciliation toward Israel. They suggest a potential openness to the principles of regional normalization and cooperation embodied in the Abraham Accords.  The current Israeli-Syrian truce is another hopeful sign.  If Sharaa eventually delivers the inclusive, unified, well-governed state that he promises, he will have disproved those who currently regard him with suspicion and believe that he can never rid himself of his Al-Qaeda past.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Syria's President Sharaa - friend or foe?", 21 July 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-861604

Published in Eurasia Review titled: "Al-Sharaa - true or false?", 24 July 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19072025-al-sharaa-true-or-false-oped/ 

War-torn Sudan seeks closer ties to Israel

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 July 2024 

            Sudan has been tearing itself apart in a brutal civil war for two long years.  A clash between two powerful military leaders has devastated the population and led to a humanitarian crisis.  The nation’s basic infrastructure – water, electricity, transport, health care – has more or less collapsed.  

            During June and into July nearly half the Sudanese people have been enduring acute food insecurity.  In areas like North Darfur famine-level conditions have been confirmed. One report by Associated Press describes people sucking on coal to relieve their hunger.  Food prices have soared, and people are being forced to eat weeds and wild plants which they boil with salt to make them palatable. 

The bombing of power plants and water systems has led to vast outages, forcing millions to rely on contaminated sources.  As a result, with the healthcare system barely functioning, a major cholera outbreak is sweeping the country with over 78,000 suspected cases and nearly 2,000 deaths in the past year. 

Over 11 million people are internally displaced, and roughly 4 million have fled to neighboring countries where refugee camps also face severe food and water shortages.  Outbreaks of malaria, respiratory illnesses and diarrheal diseases, linked to very poor sanitation and hygiene, are reported rampant in displaced-population areas.

How has this desperate situation come about?

It all began with Sudan’s democratic revolution in April 2019 and the collapse of the 30-year-long regime of Omar al-Bashir.  In the transitional democratic government that followed, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) became head of the ruling Sovereignty Council.  Burhan’s role, representing the military arm in the country's civilian-military collaborative administration, was specified in the power-sharing agreement of August 2019 between the military and the civilian elements within Sudan.  Under that agreement those concerned pledged themselves to move the country in an orderly fashion toward democracy, and to parliamentary elections in 2023. 

However, popular feeling grew increasingly impatient with the obvious lack of progress toward any form of democracy, and also with the administration’s failure to deal with the country’s severe economic problems.  On October 22, 2021 national frustration erupted in a mass protest in the capital, Khartoum, in support of civilian rule.

 Together Burhan and his deputy in the military command, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, orchestrated a military coup and took over control of the country.  It was not long before Burhan was challenged by Dagalo, who had spent some 20 years in the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and now headed the powerful militia. Such a strong force outside the army was seen generally as a source of instability.  Burhan’s plan to merge the RSF with the nation’s formal armed services was the main bone of contention between the two former colleagues.

   What do the two protagonists say they want?  In a series of social media posts Dagalo maintains that he and the RSF are "fighting for the people of Sudan to ensure the democratic progress for which they have so long yearned".  The RSF has a brutal track record, and many find this hard to believe.  Burhan has said he supports the idea of returning to civilian rule, but that he will hand over power only to an elected government. 

In early 2025 the SAF pushed the RSF out of Khartoum and most of Omdurman, giving  Burhan control of the greater part of Sudan, including the capital region.  In February, Burhan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council announced the formation of a new transitional government.  In May, Kamil Idris, a civilian, was appointed prime minister. This administration is accepted by the UN, the African Union, Egypt and a number of other states as the legitimate government of Sudan.

Meanwhile Dagalo and the RSF still control significant parts of western and southwestern Sudan, especially in Darfur and parts of Kordofan. In April 2025, the RSF established a rival “Government of Peace and Unity” to administer the territories under their control, but this entity lacks international recognition and is not considered the legitimate government of Sudan.

In a powerful article in the Jerusalem Post on July 1, Niger Innis, the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), argued that “Burhan is not a “moderate,” not a “pragmatist,” and certainly not a force for stability. Innis describes him as “an enabler of radical Islam, an ally of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and most dangerously, a willing tool of Iran’s expanding influence across Africa and the Middle East.” 

Innis maintained that Iranian weapons are flowing through Sudan, and that drone technology is being shipped and assembled there.  He urges Israel to mount “a coordinated campaign to remove al-Burhan and replace his regime with one that is anti-terror, anti-Iran, and aligned with the Abraham Accords vision of regional cooperation, economic development, and peace through strength.”

That reference to the Abraham Accords is significant. Sudan is, of course, one of the four Arab states that signed up to them.  In fact, it was Burhan himself who met Israel’s then-prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in February 2020 in Uganda, where they agreed to normalize relations.  On January 6, 2021 in a quiet ceremony in Khartoum, Burhan signed Sudan up to the Abraham Accords.

The battle between the SAF and the RSF swung back and forth until March 26, 2025.  On that day Burhan’s SAF regained control of the presidential palace in Khartoum.  What Innis fails to mention is that just one week later, Burhan sent his envoy, Al-Sadiq Ismail, to Israel. A report by Sudanese outlet Al-Rakoba said the visit remained secret until after Ismail had returned.

It then emerged that Ismail had been tasked with delivering several messages to Netanyahu.  First he conveyed Burhan’s desire to consolidate the normalization process.  In exchange for Israeli support in Sudan’s internal conflict against the RSF, he was prepared to re-sign the Abraham Accords in a formal public ceremony.   Another purpose for the visit was to ask Israel to assist in promoting Burhan to the US administration and easing tensions with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 

None of that translates into Burhan leading Sudan into becoming Iran’s newest proxy.  He made overtures to Iran in about 2023 because Israel, wary of becoming entangled in Sudan’s civil conflict, had refused to provide him with military support at a time when his struggle against the RSF was going badly.  On the face of it, Burhan now appears ready to strengthen Sudan’s ties with Israel.  In return Israel might very well help bring humanitarian relief to the Sudanese population, and restore the nation to stability.

Published in the Jerusalem Post titled: "Sudan seeks closer ties" and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Sudan seeks closer ties with Israel", 14 July 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-860841

Who will fund Gaza’s reconstruction?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 July 2025

          On March 4 Egypt presented to a meeting of the Arab League a detailed and costed plan for the reconstruction, development and administration of post-war Gaza. It was approved unanimously and is now Arab League policy. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who was present at the meeting, "strongly endorsed" the Egyptian plan, and pledged the UN’s full cooperation in implementing it.

            The president of the African Union, Joao Lourenco, also attended the Cairo summit and gave the plan his explicit support together with a commitment to help realize it.

            Since then it has been endorsed by the EU.  Statements from the EU High Representative, Kaja Kallas,  and the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa, confirm that the EU sees the plan as a serious basis for discussions on Gaza's future​.  They have offered "concrete support" from all 27 member countries.

            In addition France, Germany, Italy and the UK have all separately backed it.

            The Egyptian initiative addresses both immediate humanitarian needs and the long-term governance and reconstruction of Gaza.  It envisages a three-phase process: first, immediate humanitarian action;  then a multi-year reconstruction effort; and finally establishing a new governance structure for Gaza.

The first phase is planned to be completed in about six months; the rebuilding and governance reforms are estimated to last about a further four to five years.

            The plan explicitly excludes Hamas from any involvement in the future governance of Gaza.  It also bars the Palestinian Authority (PA) from direct administrative control, but it does envisage an umbrella-type council composed of Palestinian technocrats, operating under the auspices of the PA but supported by an international Governance Assistance Mission.  In addition, to maintain security during the transition, it proposes the establishment of an International Stabilization Force to be led by Arab states.

            It is obvious that the cost of rebuilding Gaza’s towns and cities and their infrastructure will be astronomic.  Egypt’s three-phase plan puts it at $53 billion, to be expended over the 5 years.  For the first six months of humanitarian relief, the reconstruction program is costed at $3 billion.  Phase two, which would involve rebuilding infrastructure such as roads and utilities, and constructing 200,000 permanent housing units, would cost some £20 billion.  The final phase, lasting two-and-a-half years and costing $30 billion, aims to complete infrastructure, build another 200,000 housing units, and develop industrial zones, ports, and an airport.

           To finance this $53 billion plan, Egypt proposes establishing an internationally supervised trust fund to receive, channel and manage financial support from a wide range of international donors. It specifically calls for the ​involvement of the World Bank:  "a World Bank-overseen trust fund will be established to receive pledges to implement the early recovery and reconstruction plan."

The plan proposes that Egypt will host an international conference, in cooperation with the UN, to coordinate donor contributions, with the World Bank providing oversight to ensure transparency and effective fund management.  The World Bank has a long-standing presence in Gaza and the West Bank, where it ​has been managing similar trust funds and coordinating with international donors for development and reconstruction projects.

           The task of reconstructing Gaza is enormous, and $53 billion is a very great deal of money to have to find. The donors likely to finance Egypt's plan include a mix of international and regional actors. ​Oil-rich nations such as Saudi Arabia and​ Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ​have deep pockets and a history of regional spending, including in Gaza. ​With an interest in curbing Iranian influence and stabilizing the region​, they are expected to be key contributors, potentially ​expected to provide at least $20 billion initially. ​A number have indicated that their one proviso is that Hamas, with its links to ​the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran, is to have no role in Gaza’s redevelopment and future governance.

           The Egyptian plan envisions mobilizing diverse sources of international aid and investment, so organizations like the UN and global financial institutions, including the World Bank and the EU, are expected to offer financial support. Development agencies, investment funds, and development banks from various countries ​will also ​be targeted.

           Egypt is a strategic ally of the US, already supported to the tune of over $1 billion annually, so it is not impossible to envisage the US assisting in the reconstruction program. Washington is interested in regional stability, counterterrorism, and preventing refugee spillover into other regions. Support could be either by way of specialist construction and infrastructure suppliers contracted by the administration, or by direct financial donation provided under the guise of humanitarian aid – a sort of post-conflict Marshall Plan-style initiative.

Another possible major donor is China.  China and Egypt are already tied closely since Chinese firms are involved in building Egypt’s new administrative capital and in developing a major industrial zone in the Suez Canal region.  China may well respond favorably to a request from Egypt to help realize its Gaza reconstruction plan, perhaps regarding it as an opportunity to strengthen its strategic position in the Middle East.

China is already investing heavily in the region through its Belt and Road initiative, as well as with strategic investments, trade partnerships, infrastructure development, and diplomatic engagement.  Enjoying a relatively neutral position in the Israel-Palestine conflict, China is in a formal strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and has close ties with the UAE, which is a key re-export hub for Chinese goods to the region and Africa. Chinese firms are involved in post-war infrastructure rebuilding in Iraq, and China is heavily invested in infrastructure and renewable energy projects in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.

Meanwhile Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is actively preparing a major donor conference aimed at securing the required financial commitments. Egypt’s plan explicitly calls for broad-based international ​attendance, including Arab states, the EU, China, the US, and other global actors. 

Eyebrows may be raised at the idea of the US and China sitting down together to discuss ​the f​inancing of Gaza reconstruction, but in fact they have both taken part in similar multilateral donor processes in the past, even when their broader relations were tense. Examples are the 2019 Global Fund’s conference, and the International Donors’ conference “Together for the People in Turkey and Syria” in 2023. The urgency of Gaza’s humanitarian crisis and the need for broad international legitimacy make their participation likely.

Both would expect to benefit from contracts worth millions of dollars to construct or reconstruct elements of a restored Gaza, but even so the program’s directors may need to look further afield to find specialist firms to undertake elements of the extensive building and infrastructure operations required.  When the tenders go out for these lucrative contracts, competition will be fierce.

As for the donor conference, it has waited for an end to hostilities in the region.  Given the current political climate, it might soon be convened.  

Published in the Jerusalem Post and Jerusalem Post online titled:  "Paying for 'the day after':  Who will fund Gaza's reconstruction?" 7 July 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-860132

Published in Eurasia Review, 12 July 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/12072025-who-will-fund-gazas-reconstruction-oped/