How Israel’s critics disregard its history

 This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph, 26 August 2025

Sir

Mary Shields (Letters, August 25) says “more and more land has been taken from the Palestinian people” compared with the size of Israel when it was created in 1948.  As Israel was created it was attacked by Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.  When the fighting ended, Israel controlled some 78 per cent of the former Mandate Palestine, compared with the 55 per cent it had been allocated originally.  This temporary situation was codified in the 1949 armistice agreements with Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria.

            Until the Six Day War of 1967, Jordan occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Egypt occupied Gaza.  They could have created a sovereign state of Palestine.  Neither made any attempt to do so.

            In 1967 Egypt, Jordan and Syria planned a joint military attack on Israel, which Israel foiled.  In doing so it ousted Egypt from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, Jordan from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Syria from the Golan Heights.  Later, the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt following the Camp David Accords. 

Under the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, the administration of the West Bank was shared between the Palestinian Authority and Israel as a temporary measure awaiting a final agreement.  That never came, as the Palestinian leadership rejected every attempt to realise a two-state solution – and there were many, some offering land swaps to compensate for obtrusive Israeli settlements. 

The obvious conclusion is that the Palestinian cause does not seek, and has never sought, a two-state solution, but the elimination of the state of Israel.

 Neville Teller

Egypt takes the lead

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2025

                                            The ceasefire negotiators

            It was, doubtless, a combination of factors that led the Hamas leadership to conclude that their best interests lay in accepting the latest version of the ceasefire proposals first suggested by US special envoy Steve Witkoff.  It came after months of arms-length and deadlocked discussions between Israel and Hamas, whose refusal to conclude a deal was reinforced when a flurry of nations proclaimed their intention to recognize a Palestinian state – France, followed by the UK, Malta, Canada, and  Australia.  These declarations effectively removed any incentive for Hamas to give away their main bargaining chip – the hostages – or even consider disarming, and for a time they ceased negotiating. 

            The dire effect of this rush to recognition was revealed by Hamas’s messages of congratulation to the governments concerned, and by Ghazi Hamad, a senior Hamas official based in Qatar.  During an interview on August 2 he is reported as saying: “The initiative by several countries to recognize a Palestinian state is one of the fruits of October 7.”

            Egypt, along with Qatar and the US, has been central to recent mediation efforts.  Egypt is also the progenitor of the only viable plan for the reconstruction, development and administration of post-war Gaza.  So there was a certain logic in Egypt’s recent assumption of the lead role in the ceasefire–hostage release negotiations, with the focus shifting from Qatar’s capital, Doha, to Cairo.   

             Taking the lead in mid-August, Egypt significantly intensified pressure on Hamas to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza.  On August 13 in Cairo Major General Hassan Rashad, head of Egyptian intelligence, met with Hamas leaders – including politburo chief Khalil al-Hayyeh – to push Hamas toward flexibility.

Egyptian officials warned Hamas that there was a limited window of opportunity to reach an agreement.  Israel was preparing its attack on Gaza city.  The deal on offer included suspending Hamas’s armed activities for a transitional period, oversight by Arab and international mediators, discussions about the temporary administration of Gaza during the interim, its demilitarization, and the release of all remaining Israeli hostages in two phases, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.

 Media reports of the discussions that led to Hamas’s acceptance of the terms include a mention of Egypt inviting other Palestinian factions and the PLO to discuss a "comprehensive deal," suggesting Egyptian willingness to sideline Hamas if it remained intransigent.

Linking its honest broker role with its plans for the reconstruction of Gaza, Egypt reportedly told Hamas that, contingent on a ceasefire agreement, it was ready to impose a temporary administration for Gaza and take practical steps toward rehabilitation. 

After a while reports from Cairo indicated that Hamas officials were starting to ease some of their previous red-line demands, particularly those that had led to the collapse of earlier talks.

At the heart of the emerging deal was a 60-day ceasefire, serving as a window for hostilities to halt, aid to resume, and negotiations to progress. 

The hostage release terms, however, are proving a new bone of contention.  The proposal accepted by Hamas specifies a two-phased sequence for their release:  10 living hostages and the bodies of others in the first phase; the remainder in a second.  But Israel’s position on the release of the remaining captives has recently hardened. A statement from the prime minister’s office on August 16 said: “Israel will agree to a deal on condition that all the hostages are released in one go”.  

Whether Israel will backtrack on this is possible but not likely.  Meanwhile it has proceeded to implement its plans to chase Hamas out of Gaza city. 

Egypt’s reconstruction plan for Gaza was always intended to run alongside ceasefire negotiations.  It was presented to a meeting of the Arab League on March 4, where it was approved unanimously. 

 UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who was present at the meeting, "strongly endorsed" the Egyptian plan, and pledged the UN’s full cooperation in implementing it. The president of the African Union, Joao Lourenco, also attended the Cairo summit and gave the plan his explicit support together with a commitment to help realize it.  Since then it has been endorsed by the EU.

Egypt’s plan envisages a six-month immediate phase which would concentrate on removing rubble, the provision of temporary shelters, initial repairs to partially damaged homes, and restoration of core infrastructure.

The first reconstruction phase which follows is envisaged as lasting up to two years, and would include the construction of around 200,000 new residential units and establishing vital supply networks.

The second reconstruction phase would last two and a half years, and would involve the creation of an economic infrastructure, including industrial zones, a commercial port, and an airport.

As regards governance, Egypt's blueprint calls for a technocratic committee to manage initial reconstruction, leading to the Palestinian Authority eventually taking over.

There has been some real progress in implementing the initial stages of the Egypt reconstruction plan – progress that has largely failed to reach the world’s headlines.

In February 2025, during the ceasefire which lasted from mid-January to mid-March, construction vehicles from Egyptian companies—particularly from the politically connected Organi Group—began operating in Gaza. Their main activities were focused on clearing rubble, especially along Salah al-Din Street, the key north-south artery in Gaza, and preliminary site preparation for the construction of up to 200,000 temporary housing units for displaced residents.

Leading Egyptian construction firms and engineering syndicates are keen to participate in implementing the plan. The Talaat Mustafa Group, for example, proposed a $27 billion, three-year initiative, involving 50 top contractors.  Meanwhile the Egyptian Syndicate of Engineers has teamed up with its Palestinian counterpart, and Egypt and Jordan have initiated training programs for Palestinian police to prepare them for security duties in Gaza.  In addition, Egypt is currently preparing for a large international donor conference to secure funding and pledges for its $53.2 billion reconstruction plan.

In short, Egypt has begun taking concrete steps to implement the early stages of its plan, but the major phases are dependent on a stable ceasefire, donor commitments that translate into real funding, and the establishment of an effective governing mechanism for Gaza.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has sent negotiators to Cairo and Doha to continue ceasefire discussions.  Two ​interesting ​possibilities ​are in the balance​:​  Israel could accept the deal that Hamas has accepted or, if Hamas ​is desperate enough for its 60-day respite, it could agree to release all the hostages in one go.  ​

Then there is the report last October in the Wall Street Journal that during meetings with Egyptian officials, Israel’s chief negotiator, David Barnea, head of Mossad, offered safe passage to Hamas members in exchange for laying down arms and releasing hostages.

         More likely, perhaps​ is stalemate on the ceasefire, and Israel proceeding with its plan to invade Gaza and defeat Hamas.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 25 August 2025
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-865146

Published in Eurasia Review, 3 September 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/03092025-egypt-takes-the-lead-oped/

One way to Palestinian autonomy

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 August 2025

           Over July 28-30 a ministerial conference at the UN representing 17 countries and the Arab League, but boycotted by the US and Israel, produced the “New York Declaration”.  This document set out a phased roadmap​ leading to a demilitarized sovereign Palestinian state, the disarmament of Hamas, ​the release of the hostages, PA reforms, and post-conflict planning. 

            A follow-up summit on Palestinian statehood is scheduled for September 22.  To be held on the sidelines of the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, this​ ministerial conference will, it is reported, establish a 19-member committee, co-led by France and Saudi Arabia, charged with creating a coordinated, timebound international framework for advancing the two-state solution.

            International players rarely acknowledge the existential danger Israel would face if this snake oil panacea for all the ills of the Middle East did not incorporate cast iron security guarantees for Israel.  Foremost among the dangers are the geographic and strategic realities.  ​

A Palestinian state would control territory only a few kilometers from Israel’s industrial and population heartland​.  For example, at some points the eastern suburbs of Tel Aviv are only some 12 km, or less than 8 miles, from the West Bank border. ​ An Islamist takeover of a new Palestine, either by force or – given the popularity of Hamas and its like – by election, is a real possibility.  If that happened Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport, and Haifa could be under daily missile threat.​  From the West Bank’s high ground, rockets or even mortars could reach major cities in under a minute.

            ​Do the two-state advocates take into account that without complete demilitarization and effective border security, a new Palestinian state would simply represent a convenient launch-pad for future attacks on Israel?  Should extremist groups seize power, an armed enemy state would exist permanently on Israel’s doorstep ​.

The bottom line is that a naïve two-state arrangement ​without guaranteed arrangements that address demilitarization, counterterrorism cooperation and secure borders would create a Gaza–like scenario in the West Bank.  If such a Palestinian state ​were to be established, Israel would face genuine existential dangers.  

​            There is another factor in play.  Supporters of the two-state solution must also take into account that Jordan​ would not regard ​with unmitigated pleasure​ the establishment of a Palestinian state ​on its doorstep unless it was hedged about with ​effective safeguards preventing its takeover by jihadists.

         Jordan already hosts over two million registered Palestinian refugees, while people of Palestinian descent comprise up to a half of Jordan’s population.​

Jordanian leaders from King Abdullah downwards are on record expressing fears of a further mass displacement into Jordan, which they describe as an existential threat that could upset the demographic balance of the state and impose unsustainable financial strains.  They also fear cross-border violence, arms smuggling, and terrorist threats.

So although official Jordanian policy supports the two-state solution, its leaders are wary that unresolved issues around refugees, Jerusalem, borders and security – as yet unaddressed by peace negotiations – could endanger its vital interests. Moreover both in official government statements and through repeated public declarations by its leadership, Jordan has rejected in advance any two-state arrangement that does not incorporate Jordan’s direct input.

Does any sort of mechanism exist which could ensure an independent Palestine but also provide Israel and Jordan with cast-iron guarantees of security and protection from all existential danger?

On May 14, 2015 noted Israeli politician, Yossi Beilin – friend and close associate of Shimon Peres and trusted colleague of Yitzhak Rabin – wrote an article for the New York Times that has become seminal.  Under the title “Confederation is the Key to Mideast Peace,” he wrote: “This idea isn’t new.  For a brief time in the 1990s, it animated some of my earliest discussions about peace with a spokesman whom Palestinians revered, Faisal al-Husseini. But that was before the Oslo Accords of 1993…In hindsight, it is clear that we should have been looking all along at confederation – cohabitation, not divorce.”

            What is a confederation?  It is a form of government in which constituent sovereign states maintain their independence while merging certain aspects of administration, such as security, defense, economic or administrative matters.  A good example is the confederation formed by the seceding states during the American Civil War.  In a federation on the other hand, such as the modern United States, the constituent parts may be fiercely independent, but they are not sovereign, and the emphasis is on the supremacy of the central government. 

            The vision of achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians through the mechanism of a confederation has its supporters​, even, surprisingly, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas. 

In 2018, when the Trump peace proposals were being drawn up, ​Abbas was asked his views on the idea. He is on record as favoring a three-way confederation of Jordan, Israel and a sovereign Palestine.  

​            Given Jordan’s collaboration, a post-war conference could be dedicated to establishing a ​new legal entity – a confederation incorporating Jordan, Israel and a Palestinian state including the Gaza Strip​ which​ could be brought into existence at the same moment as the confederation itself.  This three-state confederation could, on a small scale, copy the European Union, in which nation states, while retaining full sovereignty, agree to collaborate in certain spheres such as security, defense, economic development or infrastructure.

​            The confederation ​might have among its founding principles the establishment of a collaborative system dedicated to providing hi-tech security and economic growth for all its component states. Such an umbrella entity might also​ undertake to establish a pragmatic status for Jerusalem​, and especially its Old City, satisfactory to all parties. The Israel Defense Forces ​would act in collaboration with the forces of the other parties to guarantee the security of Israel and that of the confederation as a whole.

         With genuine acceptance of Israel as a permanent presence in the Middle East, a three-state confederation covering the whole of what was originally Mandate Palestine might open a hitherto unexplored path leading towards a peaceful and thriving future.   It could set as its objective the transformation of the region within, say, ten years, into a thriving financial, commercial and industrial hub to the benefit of all its citizens – Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian alike. 

         While support for an overriding confederation allying Jordan, Israel, and a sovereign Palestinian state appears occasionally in policy discussions, think-tank papers, and media debates, it is not an official position of any government. Yet it has the potential to overcome many of the problems associated with simply establishing a stand alone state of Palestine.  For that very reason it perhaps merits serious consideration – not least by those ministers attending the projected summit on September 22.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 18 August 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-864426

Published in Eurasia Review, 2 September 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/02092025-one-way-to-palestinian-autonomy-oped/

 

 

As Hezbollah weakens, Lebanon recovers

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2025

High drama in Lebanon:  On August 5, in response to mounting US pressure to commit to a disarmament timetable for Hezbollah, the Lebanese government convened a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace in Baabda, just outside Beirut.  The meeting started at 3 pm.  It was still in progress when, at 5 pm, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem appeared on al-Manar TV, Hezbollah’s official television channel, to reject all calls for Hezbollah to disarm, and to issue stark threats to Israel.

If Israel launched a new, large-scale aggression against Lebanon, declared Qassem, Hezbollah, alongside the Lebanese army and the Lebanese people, would defend themselves.

“This defense will lead to missiles falling inside the Israeli entity,” he threatened, “and all the security they have built over eight months will collapse within an hour.”

Bold words, but largely bravado and bluster. Qassem was implying that Hezbollah still enjoys the closest of partnerships with the Lebanese government.  In truth Hezbollah’s former iron grip over the nation has been greatly eroded, and the newly elected government is beginning to assert its authority in areas where for decades Hezbollah’s word has been law.  The “state within a state” is waning, and a truly sovereign state of Lebanon may be re-emerging.

After hours of impassioned debate, the cabinet reached a majority decision.  The Lebanese army would be instructed to develop a comprehensive plan by the end of August for establishing a state monopoly on arms, to be in place by the end of 2025. The declared objective is to bring all weapons in the country under the control of six designated state security forces, thereby ending the autonomy of non-state actors, most notably Hezbollah. Shi’ite ministers representing Hezbollah reportedly walked out of the cabinet meeting in protest before the vote.

At around 7.30 pm prime minister Nawaf Salam held a press conference and announced the decision.  Hezbollah rejected it completely.  The next morning, in a written statement, it declared:  “We will treat this decision as if it does not exist."

For two years Hezbollah and its political allies held Lebanon in a political deadlock, refusing to allow a presidential election.  It was only after the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire that Hezbollah allowed Joseph Aoun to be elected President and the new government to be installed.  

Since then Lebanon’s leadership has been conducting negotiations with US Special Envoy Tom Barrack on a phased plan to disarm Hezbollah and re-establish the Lebanese state’s monopoly on weapons.​  The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have reportedly dismantled over 90% of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, although north of the Litani River Hezbollah retains substantive arms and capabilities.

Hezbollah is no longer what it was, politically or financially.  No longer able to dictate government policy, it does retain a significant bloc in parliament known as Loyalty to the Resistance. As regards its finances, the Al-Qardh Al-Hasan Association (AQAH) operated as Hezbollah’s de facto bank.  In July Lebanon’s central bank banned licensed banks from dealing with AQAH.

Hezbollah’s popularity with the Shia population has historically been rooted in its extensive network of social services. It operated hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies, often providing medical care more cheaply than private institutions, and often at no cost for party members. Funded largely by Iran, it also ran schools, educational facilities, and youth programs. 

Media reports indicate a significant reduction in Iranian financial support and, as of mid-2025, Hezbollah’s health, social service and educational network has been significantly diminished.  Many of its hospitals and clinics have been damaged or destroyed.  Access to health care is limited.  Mobile clinics and international aid groups are filling some gaps, but routine treatments for chronic diseases have been interrupted.

A large number of schools, particularly in the south, have been damaged or repurposed as emergency shelters, and many children are not receiving education.  Hezbollah’s ability to lead reconstruction and social support has clearly been weakened.  Reports indicate a consequent loss of confidence among its traditional support base, particularly among Shi’ite civilians.

The new Lebanese administration is focused on strengthening state institutions. Recent diplomatic efforts have explicitly linked Lebanese demands for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon with a commitment to extend state authority and restrict Hezbollah’s independent operations and social authority. 

Historically, Hezbollah’s social programs addressed the neglect by central government of the Shia community.  By providing jobs, welfare, and direct aid, Hezbollah created a “shadow citizenry” closely tied to its institutions, reinforcing its political and social influence.  According to a 2024 poll, about 85% of Lebanese Shia polled expressed trust in the group.

However, overall national support was much lower.  Only about 30% of Lebanese said they trusted Hezbollah, while 55% reported no trust at all. Support among Sunnis, Druze, and Christians was minimal (below 16% in each group).

Municipal elections in 2025 showed that Hezbollah and its ally Amal still dominate in southern Lebanon, but reformist and opposition candidates made gains, even in some traditional Hezbollah strongholds. This suggests that Hezbollah’s legitimacy, even within its core constituency, has been damaged by its loss of charismatic leadership and its degraded military position.  It has been further weakened by its inability to protect or rebuild Shia communities devastated by war, and by its perceived role in causing Lebanon’s economic crisis of the past few years.

            In 2023 inflation rose to a staggering 221.3%.  It was reduced to 45.2% in 2024, but by May 2025 government action had brought it down to 14.4% – still too high for stability, but at least under control. 

            Lebanon’s economy, too, has shown signs of fragile recovery since the ceasefire. After a severe contraction of 7.1% in 2024, the economy is projected to grow by 4.7% in 2025, marking its first growth since 2017. This rebound is driven by improved political stability, a recovery in tourism, stronger consumer spending, and modest capital inflows.

            Renewed optimism and a more stable environment have been fostered by the election of a new president heading a reform-oriented government, a new Central Bank governor, key reforms and international support.

But although growth has returned for the first time in years, and inflation is down significantly from its peak, Lebanon’s economy remains fragile.  Sustained recovery will depend on political stability and more by way of reform.  And that depends above all on preventing Hezbollah from regaining anything like the power it has enjoyed in Lebanon for the past quarter-century. 

        Will the newly elected president and government be consistent in their determination to wrest the nation’s sovereignty from Hezbollah’s grasp?  If their reforms stall, or if Hezbollah stages the comeback Qassem seeks, the Lebanese government could once again find itself the junior partner of a dominant power with its own agenda. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 11 August 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-863772

What does recognition mean?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 4 August 2025

“True to its historic commitment to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,” posted France’s President Emmanuel Macron on his X account on July 24, “I have decided that France will recognize the state of Palestine.  I will make this solemn announcement at the United Nations General Assembly next September.”

         With that statement France became the first major Western and G7 country to go beyond merely proposing the two-state solution as the only way of resolving the perennial Israel-Palestine dispute.  Macron’s move is intended to signal support for some kind of renewed peace process leading to that result.  It was also aimed at encouraging other nations to follow suit.

Three decided to do so, two of them G7 nations – the UK and Canada.  Malta, the third, declared its intention unequivocally, but the UK announcement was framed in the form of a disingenuous ultimatum to Israel.  Treating recognition as a sort of punishment for non-compliance, Starmer announced that it would take place unless Israel fulfilled a range of demands framed so that they could not possibly be met in the course of a few weeks. 

What were the demands?  That “the Israeli government take substantive steps to end the appalling situation in Gaza, agree to a ceasefire and commit to a long‑term, sustainable peace, reviving the prospect of a two‑state solution. And this includes allowing the UN to restart the supply of aid, and making clear there will be no annexations in the West Bank.”

Starmer imposed no conditions on Hamas.  He merely demanded, with no means of enforcing his demands, that “they must immediately release all the hostages, sign up to a ceasefire, disarm and accept that they will play no part in the government of Gaza.”

Of course exactly the opposite occurred. ​ Starmer’s announcement was taken by Hamas as a sign that ceasefire negotiations were no longer necessary​.  It broke them off at once​, ensuring that at least one of Starmer's demands on the Israeli government could not possibly be met.

Canada’s announcement was hedged with conditions imposed on the PA.  Prime Minister Mark Carney declared  that recognition would be conditional on the PA undertaking democratic reforms, agreeing to elections in 2026 excluding Hamas, and demilitarization.  Whether this meant that Canadian recognition would not go ahead if these demands were not accepted by the PA was left unclear.

The UK’s announcement has not gone unchallenged. On July 31 no less than 40 peers in the House of Lords, many of them senior legal figures, wrote to the UK’s Attorney General, Lord Hermer. 

        They point out that the Montevideo Convention of 1933 specifies that a recognized state must have a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.  Palestine, say the peers, does not satisfy these requirements.  Its borders are disputed, there is no single functioning government, and since the main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, are in dispute with each other, it cannot possibly enter into relations with other states.

The letter, referring to Lord Hermer’s own statements on the importance of upholding international law, continues: “You have said that a selective, ‘pick and mix’ approach to international law will lead to its disintegration, and that the criteria set out in international law should not be manipulated for reasons of political expedience.  Accordingly, we expect you to demonstrate this commitment by explaining to the public and to the government that recognition of Palestine would be contrary to the principles governing recognition of states in international law.”

Lord Hermer is unlikely to disclose the rationale behind his advice to the prime minister.  If he did, it is likely to run along these lines:  Legal recognition of a state de jure would mean accepting that it meets the Montevideo Convention conditions of statehood, while political recognition de facto, which could be described as symbolic, reflects support for a cause or a political resolution rather than a legal fact. Most recognitions of Palestine – and some 140 nations have done so – are not legal affirmations of full statehood under international law, but political support for Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution.  Palestine is perceived by many, perhaps most, as a state in waiting for a future partner to resolve the dispute once and for all.

         An elephant dominates this room.  All those many nations insistent that the only practicable way forward is the two-state solution – many even postulating that this has long been the supreme aim of many Palestinians, denied them by an intransigent Israel – are deliberately blind to the fact that the Palestinian Fatah leadership has rejected specific two-state offers on multiple occasions, while Hamas, its followers, and a majority of Palestinian opinion according to the latest poll, explicitly oppose the concept altogether.

        Among the opportunities missed were the UN Partition Plan of 1947, accepted by the Jewish leadership, rejected by the Arab High Command. Some Arab opinion, including PA President Mahmoud Abbas himself, regards that rejection as a major miscalculation. In 2011, during a TV interview, he said: “It was our mistake. It was an Arab mistake as a whole..."

The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, had they been carried through, were widely regarded as a step toward establishing an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories.  At the Camp David Summit in 2000 Israel’s then-prime minister, Ehud Barack, offered a Palestinian state covering roughly 92% of the West Bank together with all of Gaza.  Contiguity within the putative state would have been achieved by way of land swaps.  Yasser Arafat rejected the plan, and the breakdown of the talks was followed by the Second Intifada, which effectively ended the Oslo process. 

In man-to-man talks with Abbas in 2008, then-Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert offered 94% of the West Bank, land swaps, shared Jerusalem, and even an international trusteeship over holy sites.  Abbas did not accept.

US Secretary of State John Kerry led talks in 2014 on a two-state plan based on 4 June 1967 boundaries.  Abbas walked away.

As for Hamas and its followers, a two-state solution is entirely rejected.  Hamas’s 2017 revised charter, while accepting a Palestinian state within 1967 borders as a “national consensus,” still refuses to recognize Israel or renounce armed struggle.  To quote: "Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea."

Given all this, the conundrum is what France, the UK and Canada believe can be achieved from a symbolic recognition of the non-state of Palestine, and how their relentless advocacy of a two-state solution rejected by most Palestinian opinion is intended to advance matters.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Palestinian statehood: what does recognition mean?", 4 August 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-863083