Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2026
Yet the Iran–Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which came into force on October 2, has significant implications for the Western alliance. The new treaty, developed out of years of ever-tighter Western sanctions on both parties, aims to deepen cooperation between Russia and Iran over the next 20 years across a wide range of fields including political, military‑technical, economic, energy, and financial issues.
On December 17, eleven months to the day after the treaty was signed, Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi visited his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, and together they signed a new cooperation program aimed at putting flesh on its bones.
They agreed to set up a three-year program of regular consultations between the two foreign ministries, framed explicitly as a “roadmap” for cooperation. The agenda specifies coordination on a wide range of matters – political, economic, cultural, defense and security – but also includes regional and international questions. That could imply future joint action in the Middle East or beyond. Both sides described the collaboration plan, which is aimed at implementing the treaty’s 20‑year strategic approach, as the first such formalized program between their foreign ministries.
Despite the widespread anti-government riots currently shaking Iran, and Russia's problematic situation in Ukraine, this formal consolidation of the Russo-Iranian relationship gives cause for concern, because it strengthens the rapidly expanding structures that have emerged in the past few years aimed at countering Western power and influence.
This Russo-Iranian entente is no flash in the pan. It grew out of a long-term relationship between them. Back in 2001 Russia and Iran had signed a treaty aimed at strengthening mutual relations and cooperation, and it was still in effect. Negotiations to revise their "marriage of convenience" started in 2020, but progress was slow. By supplying Russia with drones and ballistic missiles for its conflict in Ukraine, Iran acquired significant leverage in Moscow. That was one of the factors leading to the signing of the new understanding.
Another was the collapse in late 2024 of the Assad regime in Syria. Both nations had supported Assad, and now, shorn of their main regional foothold, they felt the need to strengthen their ties in order to prevent further erosion of their influence in the Middle East.
One example is the developing Tehran–Moscow–Beijing “triangle” linking Iran, Russia, and China through overlapping energy, arms, and sanctions‑evasion networks. Although not a formal alliance, the triangle poses a significant and growing challenge to Western interests.
Another example is the emerging economic system known as BRICS (the acronym is formed from the initial letters of the original five members - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). There are now 11 members, among whom Iran features.
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BRICS – a loose grouping of major emerging economies cooperating on economic, political, and financial issues – is specifically designed to act as a counterweight to Western‑led institutions. It has growing significance, because its enlarged membership now represents a large share of global population and output.
The implications for Israel of this newly bolstered Russo-Iranian relationship are not precisely in line with those of the West generally. Israel has a special interest in its relations with Russia, tied to the need to avoid provoking Russian retaliation when the Israe;li Air Force takes military action in Syria aimed at disrupting Iran’s supply of armaments to Hezbollah. As a result, Israel has avoided joining Western sanctions on Russia, and has severely limited military aid to Ukraine.
During the Assad era, Syria was used by Iran not only as a military arsenal, but as a key corridor for transporting military hardware to Lebanon. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Iran’s ability to use Syria has been sharply reduced, but it is not eliminated. Smuggling continues in more limited, covert, and higher‑risk forms. Iran and Hezbollah still exploit pockets of Syrian territory, especially where state control is weak, using covert overland smuggling from areas such as Homs and rural Damascus into Lebanon and also drawing on weapons stockpiles left in Syria.
Consequently Israel has conducted repeated airstrikes on Syria-Lebanon border crossings, roads, and other infrastructure – for example Arida and other crossings in the al‑Qusayr area – that are used to move weapons to Hezbollah.
When Russia intervened militarily in the Syrian civil war in 2015, it became the key external power controlling Syrian airspace and propping up Assad. At the same time Israel was intensifying its strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah assets on Syrian territory. To avoid accidental clashes, the two sides created a formal deconfliction mechanism, allowing Israel to continue its anti-Iran campaign as long as it coordinated with Russia and avoided striking its assets.
Continuous hotline and other procedures between the IDF and Russian forces in Syria enable Israel to notify Russia of forthcoming air operations, so preserving its strike capacity against Iran‑linked targets.
As long as Russia maintains a concentrated but still significant military presence in Syria (principally at Khmeimim air base, with associated access to its naval facilities at Tartus), Israel will continue to operate a separate, interest-based channel with Moscow that often diverges from Western preferences.
Since the new Russo-Iranian treaty notably lacks a mutual defense clause, neither side is obligated to come to the other’s aid militarily if attacked. Russia’s main obligation under the treaty is effectively not to side with Israel, something that was unlikely anyway. Accordingly space remains for Israel to keep its compartmentalized cooperation with Russia.
As a result, Israel maintains its back channel with Moscow while, together with the Western world as whole, prepares for the less favorable environment emerging from the ever-strengthening forces ranged against it, exemplified by this renewed Russo-Iranian accord.
Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2026, and the Jerusalem Post online, 5 January 2026, titled "Moscow and Tehran's new partnership is bad news for the West":
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-882233
