Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 July 2026
US President Donald Trump’s 20‑point plan for Gaza,
announced on September 29, 2025, linked a one‑off hostage/prisoner exchange to
a transition period in which Gaza would be demilitarized and placed under
tightly managed international oversight.
The new governance features a
technocratic National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) – a
Palestinian body running services and reconstruction. It would operate under the strategic control
of a Trump‑chaired “Board of Peace” and an international security presence.
Hamas is to be removed from
governing authority and stripped of its military capacity. In its
place vetted local forces and international
troops would enforce a terror‑free, demilitarized Gaza.
Meanwhile massive, externally directed reconstruction and investment
programs would get under way.
In due course the Palestinian
Authority would inherit Gaza from this interim committee, but only if the PA completes
a prescribed reform program on security, corruption, and governance. At that point a unified Palestinian
administration over Gaza and the West Bank, backed by elections, is envisaged.
Beyond that, the plan holds out
the prospect of US‑backed negotiations toward a Palestinian state, but only
once the demilitarization process is in progress, and the reformed PA proves it
can govern Gaza within this heavily circumscribed framework.
The plan was formally adopted by the UN Security Council on November 17, 2025
in Resolution 2803. Eight Arab and
Islamic states had already issued a joint statement welcoming Trump’s effort
and confirming that they were ready to work with the US on implementing it: Egypt,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE. Even Hamas had agreed to some parts of the
proposal, including hostage release and transferring authority, while maintaining
that other elements – such as its own disarmament – required further negotiation.
The first phase of the plan – ceasefire plus hostage and prisoner exchange
– was achieved and ended large‑scale Israeli–Hamas hostilities. For phase two the UN resolution authorized a
temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to help demilitarize Gaza and
train Palestinian police, with US coordination and contributions from Arab and
other states.
As of mid‑2026, Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania had
pledged troops, while Egypt and Jordan have agreed to train Palestinian police. However no ISF units have actually deployed
inside Gaza, while the $100 million earmarked by the UAE for police training remains
frozen.
Meanwhile the military geography
on the ground has been changing. Since
the ceasefire the IDF has steadily reduced the area controlled by Hamas from
47% of the Strip to 40% or even less. In May 2026 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he
intended to expand Israel’s control to 70% of Gazan territory. However territory
and population are not in balance. No
more than 15% of Gaza’s population remains in Israeli-controlled areas; at
least 85%, and perhaps more, are living in wretched conditions in the coastal
zones and urban enclaves held by Hamas.
Reports speak of overcrowding, problems with sanitation and access to
services, and a severe lack of water.
Gaza’s traditional water sources
have been badly degraded by the war, leaving much of the population reliant on
minimal supplies, some trucked in daily. Trump’s 20‑point plan and its Board of
Peace envisage substantial investment in repairing Gaza’s water infrastructure,
but in reality these water‑sector reconstruction measures remain largely at the
planning and pledge stage.
More generally, despite Trump's announcement that billions has been
pledged through the Board of Peace, the Financial Times reported on May
27 that no donor money has actually reached the World Bank, and that informed
sources said “not one US dollar” had yet been spent on Gaza reconstruction
through the Board's funding mechanisms.
Turkish and Egyptian construction giants, US and European firms, and Gulf‑based
companies are preparing bids to benefit from the envisaged multi‑billion‑dollar
rebuild. Most projects are at planning
or competition stage, except for one large‑scale build actually under way.
A Gaza‑based contractor, Masoud & Ali Contracting Co (MAC), is
constructing an Emirati‑funded housing compound for tens of thousands of
displaced Palestinians in an Israeli‑controlled part of southern Gaza. In addition a few businesses and contractors have
started some limited reconstruction.
In mid-2026 Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan can best be described as wilting.
While still formally in play, phase two seems to have stalled. The ceasefire is repeatedly violated, Hamas demilitarization
and therefore Israeli withdrawal have not occurred, and reconstruction in
accordance with the plan remains minimal.
This is not precisely the picture
presented on March 24 by Nickolay Mladenov, the UN High Representative for Gaza
and director‑general of the US‑backed Board of Peace, in his first appearance
before the UN Security Council. He was
present to brief members on progress in implementing the Gaza peace plan
endorsed the previous year in Security Council Resolution 2803.
Mladenov informed the council that
a plan, developed with and guaranteed by the US, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, “is
now in place for the decommissioning and reintegration of armed groups in Gaza.”
He described the principle at the heart
of the framework as: “one authority, one law, one weapon.”
This formula, he stressed, applied
without exception to all armed active militias in the Strip, explicitly
including Hamas. The objective was the complete decommissioning of weapons in
Gaza and their transfer to the control of the technocratic Palestinian
authority.
Mladenov said that the first
priority, after consolidating a total ceasefire and emergency humanitarian
measures, would be to identify and remove heavy weapons systems and military‑grade
infrastructure, including tunnels. Subsequent stages would expand disarmament
in parallel with staged Israeli withdrawals. The process would be supervised by
Palestinian security forces answerable to the National Committee.
Crucially, Mladenov linked
compliance with disarmament to the start of large‑scale reconstruction, arguing
that collecting the most dangerous weapons was a precondition for economic
recovery.
bringing together Board officials, the NCAG, and allied advisers to review stalled plans for post‑war governance, reconstruction, and a transition away from Hamas rule. Participants later called the talks “highly productive”.
So the Gaza peace plan is not dead; it is languishing. It could surely be nursed back to health.
