Trump, Erdogan and the F-35 enigma

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 July 2026

Designed as a multirole combat aircraft, the F-35 combines low-observable (stealth) shaping with advanced sensors, data fusion, and networked communications, enabling it to conduct air-to-air combat, precision strike missions, intelligence gathering, and electronic warfare in contested environments.       

       On July 7, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump met the media together with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

       Trump used the occasion to announce that the US would ​be lift​ing the sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey in December 2020 under the CAATS (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions)​ Act.

       Turkey had been sanctioned because Erdogan​​, in defiance of Washington’s express warnings, ​had gone ahead and purchased the Russian S‑400​, a long-range surface‑to‑air missile system​ specifically designed as a defense against aircraft such as the F-35​, the advanced multirole stealth fighter that has become the cornerstone of America’s tactical air power.

       Trump was then asked whether Turkey would be allowed to buy the F-35.
       "Turkey has been in many ways much more loyal than other countries that we thought would be loyal,” he replied “…so it is something we definitely would consider."

       That was an astonishing response, given that Turkey is still deploying the S-400 system, specifically designed as a defense system against aircraft such as the F-35.

       It was Erdogan’s decision to acquire the S-400 that got him ejected from the F-35 program back in 2017. As soon as he announced his intention to do so, Washington made it clear that any attempt to fly US F-35s and simultaneously operate the Russian S-400 defense system was an absolute non-starter. It would effectively turn the S‑400 into a live intelligence‑collection platform on the F‑35’s stealth and mission‑system profile.

The S-400 mobile air defense system is designed to detect, track, and engage aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and certain other aerial targets using a combination of phased-array radars, command vehicles, and multiple types of interceptor missiles operating at different ranges and altitudes.

       What was obvious then remains obvious today. If F-35s routinely flew within range of an operational S-400, the Russian-designed radars could collect enormous quantities of data about the aircraft's radar signature, flight profiles, electronic emissions and tactics. Highly classified information about the F-35's stealth characteristics could be exposed.

       That concern explains why Congress enacted legislation barring the transfer of F-35s to Turkey while it retains the Russian S-400 air defense system.

       It has not prevented continued low-level negotiations between Turkey and the US about the possibility of Turkey rejoining the F-35 program. On December 10, 2025, US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack wrote on social media that the US was in ongoing discussions with Turkey “regarding their desire to rejoin the F-35 program and their possession of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. As laid out in US law, Türkiye must no longer operate nor possess the S-400 system to return to the F-35 program."

       By April 2026 Barrack’s stance had hardened. Speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum he expressed confidence that the long-running dispute over Turkey's Russian-made S-400 air-defense system was nearing resolution. "I think you're going to see the S-400 [problem] solved soon," he said, adding: "From my boss's point of view, acceptance into an F-35 program is fine."

       There may be political and practical reasons for Trump’s change of heart.

       Deteriorating relations with Iran has made Turkey's strategic value to Washington considerably greater. Turkey controls NATO's southeastern flank and borders Iran, Iraq and Syria. Trump may judge that rebuilding the alliance with Ankara is now a priority.

       Moreover a confidential understanding may have been reached over the S-400. Although nothing has been announced publicly, media reports suggest that there have been discussions about deactivating the system. Reuters notes that transferring the system to a third country is another proposal under discussion.

      Congress has not changed the statutory restrictions of the sale of the F-35, meaning that any proposal to do so could face a significant legal and political battle. Trump may be prepared to challenge Congress. But all he may be signaling is intent rather than a settled policy. All he said was that he will lift sanctions and "consider" F-35 sales.

       If Erdogan is ultimately to win the F-35 struggle, then either Turkey has to remove, export or permanently deactivate the S-400; or Congress has to agree to relax or amend the legal restrictions despite the continued presence of the S-400.

       Currently there is no evidence that the first has occurred, while there is substantial evidence of bipartisan resistance in Congress to the second. That is why, despite Trump's dramatic shift in tone, the path to restoring Turkey's F-35 status remains uncertain.

       Speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 17, Barrack threw in a casual remark that raised a few eyebrows at the time, but has not been followed up.

       "Greece has S-300s and F-35s," he said.

       Greece, like Turkey, is a member of NATO. Could it possibly be deploying the advanced US fighter and the Russian anti-missile defense system at the same time – the very situation that Washington totally vetoed in the case of Turkey?

       An examination of the facts reveals a complicated but innocuous situation that has little in common with Turkey’s.

       Barrack was entirely accurate when he spoke of ​the S-300​, ​an older​ version with significantly more limited capabilities than the ​S-400. ​Moreover the S-300 system​ operated by Greece was not a Greek purchase.

       In 1997 Glafcos Clerides's government in Cyprus ordered two S-300 PMU-1 batteries from Russia. Turkey threatened military action if the missiles were deployed in Cyprus. After a major diplomatic crisis involving the US, Britain and NATO, Cyprus agreed not to install them. In 1998-99 the missiles were transferred to Greece.

       So Greece inherited the S-300, designed during the late Soviet period and delivered more than 25 years ago.

       US officials have consistently argued that Turkey's case is fundamentally different. Despite repeated US warnings, Turkey deliberately negotiated a major strategic defense contract with Russia in 2017, and it bought the far newer S-400 Triumf, one of Russia's most advanced strategic air-defense systems..

       As for the F-35s, in January 2024 the US State Department approved the sale of 40 Lightning II aircraft to Greece.

       On July 8, following the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, Greece’s prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, told Greek journalists: "Greek pilots will begin training on the Greek F-35s in 2027.”

       Greece’s situation may indeed be different from Turkey’s, but a convincing case could be made for a precedent having been set. 

       Could this be the chink that leads to opening the door for Turkey’s acquisition of the F-35?