Monday, 20 October 2025

Gang war in Gaza

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 20 October 2025

The past few weeks have seen the emergence within Gaza of armed factions challenging Hamas.  Simmering for some time, this intra-Palestinian conflict came to the boil after the ceasefire on 10 October.  Hamas is now facing open ​defiance from ​not just one or two, but multiple armed groups emboldened by the power vacuum and security chaos within Gaza​.  

Hamas propaganda ​seeks to downplay talk of the growing Palestinian opposition, and prefers to report operations directed against individuals accused of collaborating with Israel. 

On October 12 the Palestinian Home Front, a Telegram news distribution channel affiliated with Hamas, announced: “The security services and the resistance are conducting a wide-scale field campaign across all areas of the Gaza Strip, from north to south, to locate and arrest collaborators and informants.”  A number were apprehended in Gaza city, it said: “after they were proved to be involved in spying for the enemy [and] participating in the assassination of several resistance members.”

The statement made no mention of what happened to them.  ​However, multiple independent accounts confirm that ​shortly afterward​, in full view of the public​, they were blindfolded, made to kneel on the sidewalk, and shot dead.​  More video footage circulated in October shows Hamas's armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, executing individuals by shooting them in the head in the streets of Gaza City.  These individuals undergo no judicial procedure or legal process.  They are simply accused and then assassinated in public with the aim of instilling the greatest possible fear in any who might be tempted to oppose Hamas​'s rule.

These field executions of ​Palestinians accused of treason and collaboration ​with Israel​ are part of a wider campaign by Hamas’s so-called “security forces”​.   ​Not only are they ​making a determined effort to ​restore ​their authority by regaining control of that part of Gaza from which Israeli forces have withdrawn​.  They are sending a message to the powerful ​Palestinian gangs and clans that are openly challenging ​Hamas​.  If it is to retain any presence in Gaza, Hamas must try to counter the upsurge of attacks aimed at undermining its rule. ​​​

Early in October Hamas conducted a large raid in Khan Yunis on the al-Mujaida clan which had previously been involved in assassinating Hamas operatives, and was accused by Hamas of collaboration with Israel. Dozens of Hamas gunmen stormed a clan stronghold, resulting in deaths on both sides.

On October 12, violent confrontations erupted between Hamas security forces and the Doghmush clan, a powerful local family with members connected to different political factions. Some 300 Hamas fighters were reported to have stormed a residential area where the clan gunmen had taken refuge. The clashes killed at least 27 people, including eight Hamas members and 19 clan members.

The Doghmush and al-Mujaida clans are major players in Gaza's internal power struggles. Their distinct leadership structures and political-militant affiliations have shaped recent armed conflict.

Leadership of the Doghmush clan is centered around Mumtaz Doghmush, who has led the Army of Islam, a militia linked to Al-Qaeda.  Doghmush family members have in the past been active in Fatah, Hamas, and other militant circles.  Despite past collaboration with Hamas on high-profile operations – notably the kidnapping and subsequent prisoner exchange for Israeli sold​ier Gilad Shalit – relations have soured due to competition over smuggling networks, local authority, and postwar power.

Other Doghmush elders and warlords operate semi-independently, each commanding armed gangs or criminal cells, making the clan a loose confederation. The ​Doghmush clan is reportedly involved in arms smuggling and extortion networks throughout Gaza's black market ecosystem.

The al-Mujaida clan is led by several prominent family elders in Khan Yunis, holding sway through extensive family networks.  Affiliated primarily with the Fatah movement, the al-Mujaida clan occasionally supports other Palestinian groups opposed to Hamas, especially in southern Gaza. They have resisted Hamas-imposed security measures and are accused by Hamas of collaborating with Israeli and Egyptian officials, particularly when it concerns smuggling or resource distribution.

These two clans continue to be the main flashpoints of intra-Palestinian factional rivalry, blending local leadership traditions and criminal syndicate models with political-militant operations.  But they are far from the only centers of clan-based anti-Hamas activity.  Numerous smaller armed groups and coalition factions have also appeared, usually linked to local clans or neighborhoods in Gaza. As of the end of September 2025, over a dozen new anti-Hamas armed groups had emerged, reflecting a widespread societal breakdown and the virtual collapse of Hamas's monopoly on territorial control and security.

To name but a few, there is the Rafah-based Bedouin clan Abu Shabab.  Its head, Yasser Abu Shabab, currently recognized as a leading anti-Hamas clan leader, commands a personal militia of about 400 fighters. Hamas accuses Abu Shabab of collaborating with Israel – a charge he denies.

Then there is the Hellis clan, led by Rami Hellis.  Operating in the Shejaia neighborhood of Gaza City, it has formed a coalition with other local families specifically aimed at resisting Hamas's attempts to reassert control. 

The Fatah-affiliated Khalas clan, based in eastern Gaza City and led by Ahmed Khalas, has received Israeli protection and military aid.  It is notable for having openly resisted Hamas from the moment it took control of Gaza in 2007.  Khalas serves on the Fatah Central Committee, and through him anti-Hamas clan activity as a whole is plugged into the Palestinian Authority and its structures.  In fact Khalas serves as the representative of PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Gaza.

Centered in Khan Yunis, the Khanidak clan, led by Yasser Khanidak, has also benefited from Israeli support and weaponry.  Although not as large as the Doghmush, Khanidak clan fighters have actively opposed Hamas forces during recent battles in southern Gaza.

Other militant clans who have opposed, or are currently opposing Hamas, include the Barbakh clan based in Khan Yunis and Rafah, the Abu Ziyad clan located in Zawaida near Deir al-Balah, and the Abu Werda clan based near the Port of Gaza, which frequently leads smaller, neighborhood-based defense groups that join larger clan battles as needed.

It is clear that the Hamas regime now faces widespread opposition from Palestinian leaders at the grass roots.  The organization is understandably being held accountable not only for ​the decision to mount ​its barbarous assault on Israel on October 7 2023, but crucially for underestimating the force, extent and persistence of the Israeli reprisal that followed, and the consequential devastating result for Gaza and its people.

         This ​upsurge in armed opposition, which has undoubtedly weakened Hamas’s former iron grip on the governance of Gaza​, must have influenced its decision to pay lip-service to the Trump plan. Gang warfare may yet play a crucial part in determining Hamas’s future role, if any, in Gaza.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled "Gang War in Gaza:  Determining the Future of Hamas's rule", 20 October 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-870943

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 October 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/24102025-gang-war-in-gaza-oped/





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