Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 October 2025
On September 17 Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim president, who was
briefing reporters in Damascus ahead of his trip to the UN General
Assembly, said that the ongoing negotiations with Israel to reach a
security pact could lead to results “in the coming days.” According to
Saudi-owned newspaper Independent Arabia, citing “senior Syrian sources”,
Israel and Syria were expected to sign a security agreement under US auspices
on September 25.
It never happened. Multiple
news outlets, citing senior US officials and both Israeli and Syrian sources,
indicated that the two sides were very close to concluding a security
arrangement intended to reduce hostilities along the border and protect the
Druze minority. However, issues such as Israel's access to
Sweida, precise demilitarization mechanisms, territorial buffer zones, and
domestic political considerations in Syria delayed finalization.
Officials from both Israel and
Syria, as well as US mediators, remain optimistic that this is merely a
postponement. Senior US figures have suggested that
an agreement will be reached and signed soon.
What might come as news to some is that negotiations have been “ongoing” between Israel and Syria - in fact, for months. The key Syrian participant, in addition to Sharaa himself, has been Syria’s foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani.
Describing a security pact with
Israel as a “necessity” for Syria, Sharaa has said that
an agreement would need to respect Syria’s airspace and territorial
unity, and he seems to believe it should be monitored by the UN.
This potential deal is explicitly not being framed as normalization.
Syria’s position is that with the Golan Heights issue unresolved, and certain
Israeli-held positions such as Mount Hermon still outstanding, normalization
with Israel is not on the table at this point.
However on September 17, during a media briefing to
reporters in Damascus, Sharaa said that Syria is seeking “something like”
the 1974 Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement concluded after the Yom Kippur
War. It established a formal ceasefire, and separated opposing forces by
creating a demilitarized zone and a UN-patrolled buffer zone on the Golan
Heights.
Sharaa also mentioned that in July
a Syria-Israel deal had been “four to five days” away, but the outbreak of
violence in Sweida derailed it.
On July 12, following mutual
kidnappings and attacks between Druze and Bedouin armed groups, the
Druze-majority region of Sweida in southern Syria was engulfed in severe armed
sectarian clashes. The violence involved shoot-outs, extrajudicial executions,
massacres, burning of villages, and looting. Over 1,500 people were
killed, hundreds of whom were Druze civilians, with at least 192,000 people
displaced from the region.
Israel intervened to protect the
Druze by mounting airstrikes targeting Syrian government and Bedouin
positions. Ceasefires were declared on July 15 and 19, but tension and
periodic violence continued. Sweida remains a potent factor in efforts to
end conflict in southern Syria.
The US, which is playing a mediating role in the Syria-Israel security discussions, is also deeply involved in the agreement known as the Sweida roadmap, publicly announced on September 16 in Damascus. The negotiations leading to it were one reason for delaying the broader Israel-Syria security pact. The official signatories are Syria’s Shaibani, US envoy Barrack, and Jordanian foreign minister Ayman Safadi.
Two earlier rounds of talks held
in Amman in July and August 2025 had set the stage for this final
agreement. At a joint press conference attended by all three, the
seven-point roadmap to address the crisis in Sweida province was unveiled.
Describing it as “a collective
vision,” Barack said the plan ensures displaced people can return to
Sweida. Jordan’s Safadi said: “Security in southern Syria is an extension
of Jordan’s security and essential for our stability. We want Syria to
stabilize, recover and rebuild after years of destruction and suffering, and to
start practical steps toward a brighter future for all Syrians”.
And indeed the roadmap emphasizes
regional security considerations, linking the security of southern Syria to
that of Jordan, which also hosts Druze and Bedouin communities.
The agreement aims to restore
normal life in Sweida, including opening key roads, restoring services,
allowing aid, launching an internal reconciliation process, and prosecuting
inciters of the violence. Heavy weapons have reportedly been withdrawn from southern
Syria under the plan, addressing Israeli security concerns as well. A
joint Syrian-Jordanian-American mechanism is expected to oversee
implementation, including ceasefires and security sector reform.
The Syrian government will allow
local Druze security forces to operate in Sweida to protect roads and ensure
movement of people and commerce. The violence had led to large
displacements, with over 160,000 people affected, including Druze and Bedouin
internally displaced. The roadmap intends to plan for their return.
Whereas the Sweida roadmap
stresses equal citizenship and an incremental trust-building approach, in
north-eastern Syria the situation is nearly the opposite. Despite
Sharaa’s best efforts – including a formally signed agreement in March – the
Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are resisting full reintegration in
the new Syria. They reject assimilation and are demanding genuine
decentralization in any new constitution.
Efforts at incorporating Kurdish
civil and military bodies into the Syrian national forces have stalled and, as
transitional authorities in Damascus have been prioritizing unitary control,
thousands have been demonstrating for greater autonomy.
This runs counter to Turkey’s
interests. Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is broadly pro-Sharaa
as long as he continues to prioritize Syria’s territorial unity and does not
allow the SDF or other Kurdish groups to gain autonomy outside Damascus’s
authority. Turkey retains a readiness to use force should Kurdish
federalization or stalling on integration become apparent.
Sweida and the Kurdish region are
not the only problems facing Sharaa as he tries to steer Syria toward unity and
inclusivity. There are entrenched regional administrations, each with
independent military, civil, and judicial structures such as Rankous in the
Qalamoun Region and Al-Tal, on the outskirts of Damascus.
Many observers believe that failure to reach an inclusive and mutually respectful arrangement with all Syrian constituencies could threaten both the transitional process and national unity, risking a return to internal conflict.
So while the Sweida stabilization
includes reconciliation and reintegration, Sharaa’s broader strategy is
constrained by Kurdish demands for a degree of autonomy at odds with his
concept of a unified nation, Turkey’s rooted opposition to any such development,
and the challenge of coordinating the fragmented power centers that abound in
Syria. If Sharaa and his government can achieve genuine pluralism and
decentralization in a post-Assad Syria, not only a security pact,
but a normalization deal with Israel could well follow.
"Sweida’s crisis and the quiet path to a Syria-Israel security deal":
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