What’s the future for Hamas?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 27 October 2025

​            The US and most of the Middle East now want to get on with disempowering Hamas, installing effective governance in Gaza, and starting to rebuild the Strip. There is no evading the fact, though, that many of the Arab nations that supported US President Donald Trump’s peace initiative did so relying on point 20 of his 20-point plan:

“…as Gaza redevelopment advances and Palestinian Authority reforms are carried out, the conditions may be established for a credible pathway toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”

The Iranian regime has no interest in any version of the two-state solution; nor do its pawns – Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, to name its main protagonists. Their raison d’être remains what it always has been: the destruction of the State of Israel.

In Iran’s case, that undisguised intention extends to the annihilation of democracy itself, as exemplified by the US, to be followed by the dissemination of its version of Shi’ite Islam across the whole world. Trump’s offer of an olive branch to the Iranian regime, made during his speech to the Knesset on October 13, was rejected out of hand.

Following the Gaza ceasefire and the completion of the hostage-prisoner exchange, Hamas faces a narrow set of strategic choices, with its options greatly reduced because of its weakened position and the upsurge of armed clan opposition.

First, despite the peace plan, Hamas is likely to attempt to rehabilitate its military capacity. Boosted by the return of around 2,000 prisoners and detainees, it will surely seek every opportunity to re-entrench itself within Gaza.

Regarding disarmament, the relevant point in the Trump plan reads: “All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure (including tunnels and weapons manufacturing) will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization under independent monitors…”

Yet demilitarization has yet to be defined. Hamas may reluctantly agree to hand over its heavy weaponry, but it is most unlikely to denude its personnel of their sidearms.

Hamas will surely aim to preserve its resistance credentials and its continued military presence in Gaza. Confidential Hamas strategy documents, some captured on the computer of deceased Hamas leader Yayha Sinwar, and some from elsewhere, suggest its leadership has always been focused on survival, reconstitution, and the maintenance of leverage over Israel and the Palestinian public. The loss of the hostages as its major bargaining chip largely reduces its leverage, but not entirely.

There is, for example, Hamas’s formidable propaganda machine, highly structured and technologically well-equipped, with at least 1,000 specialists operating out of Gaza and beyond. It exploits every available media channel, from TV and radio to encrypted social network platforms, blending true, exaggerated, and manipulated content in a coordinated campaign to promote its strategic goals. The widespread dissemination of anti-Israel propaganda has been Hamas’s major success in the post-October 7 period.

The network was developed over several years and was, until recently, overseen by Abu Obeida (Samir Abdallah al-Kahlout), the masked spokesman for Hamas’s military wing, who was killed in August 2025.

Propaganda operatives were embedded within combat units throughout Gaza, and their roles included filming, editing, distributing content, and monitoring Israeli media.

Hamas will undoubtedly attempt to retain control over its propaganda operation and the personnel running it, hoping to continue influencing global opinion by way of traditional as well as its social media.

Its principal broadcast outlets are Al-Aqsa TV and Al-Aqsa Radio, through which it targets both local and broader Arab audiences. In addition, the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera network, particularly its Arabic service, consistently promotes a pro-Hamas line.

As for social media, Hamas posts on platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and, in some operations, Instagram, in order to spread messages internationally and interact with constituencies in the West Bank, diaspora communities, and even Israeli society through psychological operations.

In addition, Hamas disseminates its propaganda via several websites in Arabic, English, French, and Hebrew, and has attempted cyber operations using social engineering apps to target Israeli soldiers.

The Trump peace plan makes no mention of this major asset operated by Hamas. The organization will certainly make every attempt to retain control of it. If it succeeds, this sophisticated propaganda operation will continue to provide Hamas with a highly effective soft-power base that could ensure its continued influence within Gaza, despite its loss of support among Gaza’s population.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), a respected polling organization, carries our regular surveys of Palestinian opinion.  Its Poll No. 95, undertaken in May 2025, records a sharp decline in public confidence in Hamas. The poll it carried out a year earlier, in May 2024, showed 71% of the Gazan population approving Hamas’s onslaught on Israel on October 7, 2023.  By May 2025 that support had shrunk to 38%. In fact, overall support for armed struggle itself fell, and the survey revealed increased openness to negotiation.

Given Hamas’s priorities, its battered and depleted infrastructure, and its declining but still resilient base, Hamas will most likely attempt to undertake a period of calm under the ceasefire terms.

Without openly accepting disarmament or exclusion from Gaza’s future governance, it will probably use the time to probe for any ambiguity in the ceasefire’s terms, attempt to rebuild its organization covertly, and seek to rehabilitate itself. It will most likely resist efforts to install Arab or Palestinian Authority governance in Gaza unless it is involved in some way.

In this period, Hamas probably sees itself walking a fine line – attempting to maintain its militant identity intact without provoking Israel into renewed conflict. Unlikely to accept voluntary exile, the Hamas leadership will hope to survive the transitional period and remain relevant within Gaza.

As for the future, several Palestinian spokesmen, while declaring an undying commitment to the anti-Israel struggle, have suggested the organization might agree to a cessation of hostilities for up to 10 years – an unattractive prospect that would enable the total refurbishment of its military capacity in preparation for its next onslaught on Israel.

Trump’s plan specifically excludes Hamas from any role in the future governance of Gaza. That is not likely to deter the organization from seeking involvement in its administration, either directly or covertly by way of influence, subterfuge, or corruption. Indeed, rumors are circulating about the idea of Hamas launching a political party, under some new innocuous name, ahead of the elections envisaged in the Trump plan.

According to the UK’s Daily Telegraph, Hamas insiders have confirmed that discussions are ongoing about establishing a “civil movement” as a vehicle for participation in future Palestinian elections.

The dragon is wounded, not slain.


Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "A narrow set of choices for Gaza: What's the future for Hamas?", 27 October 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-871664

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 November 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/31102025-whats-the-future-for-hamas-oped/