Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 December 2025
On December 8 the London Daily
Telegraph reported that, as part of the emerging Gaza peace
framework, the US is considering a two‑year, IRA‑style “decommissioning” scheme
for the disarmament of Hamas.
Other media sources had already
reported that the idea of disarming Hamas gradually was being proposed by
Turkey and Qatar (neither of them noted friends of Israel), and that Bassem
Naim, a Hamas political bureau member, had said that the group would be open to
discussing “freezing or storing” its arsenal.
Israeli officials were reported to
believe that this slow disarmament idea is simply a ploy to keep Hamas
weaponized as long as possible, and maybe to by-pass the decommissioning of its
arsenal altogether. Moreover, weapons “stored”
(which does not feature in IRA decommissioning) are weapons re-accessible.
On
the face of it the history of the IRA’s disarmament seems to offer a blueprint for
how a violent, insurgent movement can be disempowered and made the instrument
of a durable peace. But in fact the
differences in context with Hamas are so deep that the IRA experience can offer
only indicators not a template.
The struggle for Irish
independence from Britain has a long history.
The historic conflict was intensified by the presence of a large
Protestant minority, mainly resident in the north-east of the island, loyal to
the British monarchy and opposed to rule from Dublin. Intensive political activity finally resulted
in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which created Northern Ireland as a
separate six-county devolved entity within the United Kingdom. The rest of the island passed through several
phases of increasing sovereignty before becoming the Republic of Ireland in 1948–49.
The partition compromise did not
suit those whose dream was a united Ireland. Starting in 1968, the IRA (Irish
Republican Army) and then the Provisional IRA used armed violence to try to force
an end to British rule in Northern Ireland. The strategy escalated from attacks
on security forces in the six northern counties to indiscriminate bombings and
shootings in mainland Britain. Their campaign ended when a mix of military
containment, diplomatic engagement, political inclusion and changing public
attitudes convinced the republican movement that it could pursue its goals more
effectively through negotiation than armed struggle.
The IRA’s disarmament was a protracted and politically choreographed process that ran from discussions in the mid‑1990s to the verified destruction of its arsenal in September 2005, under international supervision. To manage this, the British and Irish governments set up the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) in 1997, while the Good Friday Agreement, signed in 1998, ended the armed struggle and envisaged the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons within two years.
The first key step was symbolic
rather than destructive. In June 2000
the IICD was allowed to inspect IRA arms dumps, confirming that weapons were
being secured under agreed arrangements but not yet destroyed. The IRA then
announced in October 2001 that it had begun actual decommissioning, and the
IICD reported that an initial quantity of IRA arms had been put beyond use – though,
to protect republican sensitivities, without publishing an inventory.
It was a slow process. Crises over alleged IRA activity, and other
political problems, repeatedly interrupted momentum and limited the confidence‑building
impact of these partial moves. Finally,
on July 28, 2005, the IRA leadership publicly ordered an end to the armed
campaign, instructed all units to dump arms, and authorized its representative
to work with the IICD to finish putting weapons beyond use, with two witnesses
invited to increase public confidence.
Between late July and September
2005 the IRA carried out what the IICD described as several decommissioning
acts, culminating on September 24–26, 2005 in the final verified destruction of
all arms under its control.
To identify the IRA and its
history with Hamas in any but the most superficial terms is totally unrealistic.
The fundamental and decisive difference is that all parties in what became known as The Troubles in Northern Ireland were nominally Christian. The IRA’s purpose was to dislodge Britain from the six counties, not to eliminate its Protestant minority. When the armed struggle became more trouble than it was worth, the IRA was prepared to hammer out a deal with people with whom, in the final analysis, they shared deep cultural ties. Only a few years later Queen Elizabeth was able to shake hands with ex-IRA leaders.
By the late 1990s the IRA’s political vehicle, Sinn Féin, was fully inside an internationally underwritten peace process, with a seat at multi‑party talks, prisoner releases, institutional reforms, and a clear route into power‑sharing government in Belfast and influence in Dublin. The Good Friday Agreement created a consensual framework in which republican disarmament was explicitly linked to new institutions, cross‑border bodies, and gradual demilitarization of the British presence, giving the IRA leadership something concrete to trade weapons for.
Hamas, by contrast, currently clings
on to a portion of a devastated Gaza, is still designated a terrorist organization
by key external actors, and has no place in final status negotiations. On the contrary, it is specifically excluded
by all the main players from any participation in the final governance of Gaza.
The IRA entered the ceasefire and
decommissioning period as an undefeated insurgent force. It presented its disarmament as a voluntary,
phased choice rather than capitulation.
Hamas, after two years of intense
war, has suffered severe military attrition.
Although it remains operational and still dominates security and
administrative structures in part of the Strip, its damaged and weakened
situation mean its negotiating position is fragile.
Phase two of the ceasefire deal
requires the disarmament of Hamas as a pre-requisite for establishing
appropriate security and governance mechanisms in Gaza. Allowing Hamas to spread the decommissioning process
over two years allows it the chance to retain some sort of involvement in
Gaza’s future. The idea should be
vigorously resisted.
Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Could Hamas be disarmed by an IRA decommissioning scheme?", 16 December 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-880373
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