On December 16, US Central Command convened a multi-nation conference in Doha, the capital of Qatar. Its purpose was to set up the International Stabilization Force (ISF) that is an essential element in Phase Two of President Donald Trump’s Gaza ceasefire/peace plan. The enterprise was a failure. As painfully emerged after the conference, not a single unequivocal commitment was forthcoming from the multitude of nations attending. Media reports indicate that offers of troops, police or finance remained at the level of “interest” or conditional willingness, pending domestic legal reviews and a clearer mandate, or a UN or treaty framework.
For some reason no complete list
of the nations participating in the conference has yet been provided in
official media releases. Published reports of the number of states
present vary wildly from “approximately 25” as reported by The Media
Line, to 45 according to Ynet Global. Among
the states that did attend though, there were two notable absentees:
Israel and Turkey. Neither had been invited.
As for Israel, most political
analysts agree that since Washington was trying to convince Arab, Muslim and
other states to send forces or support to Gaza, Israel's
presence would have made their participation
more difficult. In the absence of Israel,
moreover, it would be easier to keep the focus on the prospective
multinational force rather than on Israel’s security demands.
Turkey, it is generally agreed,
was not invited because Israel specifically requested its exclusion. Israel has
consistently objected to any Turkish security role in post‑war Gaza. One
commentator likens the idea of allowing Turkish troops into Gaza to welcoming
in a Trojan horse. The people of Troy, an ancient city in modern-day Turkey,
were tricked into bringing a giant wooden horse inside their walls. Once inside,
Greek soldiers emerged to sack the city.
The purpose of the ISF is to help
disarm Hamas, thus preventing Gaza from again becoming a launchpad for attacks
on Israel. But Turkey under its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has for
years supported Hamas. Senior Hamas leaders have been allowed
to take up residence in Istanbul and Ankara, and maintain
offices and networks, including political and operational hubs.
Some, like Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, have been
granted Turkish citizenship.
Since he came to power Erdogan,
with his Muslim Brotherhood origins, has time and again demonstrated a deep
hostility toward Israel. Two weeks after Hamas’s barbaric assault on
Israel on October 7, 2023, he described Hamas as a “liberation” movement,
adding: “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a group of mujahideen
defending their lands and citizens.”
In March 2024 he said: “No one can
make us qualify Hamas as a terrorist organization…Turkey is a country that
speaks openly with Hamas leaders and firmly backs them.”
Erdogan has said he is willing to
contribute forces immediately to the projected ISF, but it is pretty obvious
that to allow Turkish forces to participate would be to undermine the whole
purpose of the enterprise from the start.
Just prior to the Doha conference,
on December 15, President Trump – anticipating a successful outcome – said
in the White House that the ISF was “already running…More and more countries
are coming into it. They’re already in but they’ll send any number of troops
that I ask them to send.”
Clearly Doha failed to deliver the
result that Washington had envisaged.
As regards the major Arab states –
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Jordan – reports prior to the
Doha conference indicated all as potential troop contributors. Moreover
Saudi Arabia and the UAE were reported to be “working with the US to secure
funding for the deployment of troops to Gaza.”
In the event none of these states
committed soldiers or resources. They and the other Arab
governments remained cautious, fearful of risking clashes with
Hamas, to say nothing of domestic opposition at policing or
disarming Palestinians. Even Qatar as host, while backing
the ISF concept, did not pledge troops or funding.
As
for the non-Arab Muslim
states and the European nations that have expressed support for
the ISF – among others Indonesia, Italy, France and the UK –
although some accounts say Indonesia has “signaled readiness” to send
troops, and that Italy “may be the only European country to contribute
forces,” expressions of intent have not been converted into formal
commitments.
UN and diplomatic reports reveal
that, though the UK and France expressed strong support
for the rapid deployment of an ISF in principle, neither government used
the Doha conference to earmark budgets or announce specific troop numbers. Other
invited states (including Pakistan, Azerbaijan and various Western and Asian
allies) appear in lists of those expressing willingness to assist in some
way, but none converted willingness to actual commitment.
The failure to generate firm troop
or funding pledges suggests that setting up the ISF will be a more protracted
undertaking than initially envisaged. US officials
have now acknowledged that, even under optimistic assumptions,
building the force could take most of 2026. They have spoken about a
target of around 10,000 troops.
Phase Two of the Trump peace plan
rests on four interlocking elements: disarming Hamas; further withdrawal of the
IDF; transfer of security to the ISF operating alongside vetted
Palestinian police; and the establishment of an interim technocratic
Palestinian governing committee under a Board of Peace, with an eventual
handover to a reformed Palestinian Authority and a pathway to Palestinian self‑determination.
All four depend on the ISF
actually deploying in meaningful strength, with a clear mandate, rules of
engagement and reliable financing. Following Doha, however, it
seems likely that the ISF will emerge later, smaller and in a more cautious
manner than envisaged in the Trump peace plan and UN Resolution 2803,which
gave the plan international legitimacy.
Some commentators are now warning
that in the absence of clear national commitments, Phase Two itself risks
remaining “largely a blueprint on paper rather than an actionable plan,” with a
danger of drifting into a “permanent Phase One” in which the IDF would, of
necessity, have to remain in Gaza to maintain security.
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